Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Again, for russia, mass murder is the solution to all problems. Here they announce they will completely destroy every town and city taken by Ukraine in Kursk. Because death and destruction is the only thing they can do.
On the Durov/Telegram issue:
On the Durov/Telegram issue:
I wonder how easily people take a stance on what's happening with Pavel Durov. Whatever it is, it cannot be a simple story.
1) Durov founded VKontakte, the billion-dollar worth social media network. In Russia, it had an edge over Facebook and others because it was very slow to respect intellectual property rights. Put simply, for years it was a major channel for free downloads of movies, games, and other products.
2) VKontakte was taken from Durov by a classic pincer movement in Putin's Russia. A couple of Putin oligarchs offered to buy VKontakte and used the security services to threaten Durov with arrest, thus lowering the acquisition price. He sold his share and left Russia.
3) An eccentric billionaire and outside of Russia, Durov launched Telegram, a messaging service. It had an edge over competing services because, again, it has been slow to protect intellectual property rights and enforce regulations. (This is what Durov is currently accused of.)
4) In Russia, Telegram has become popular as
- a messaging service for those who do not want the government to read its correspondence. Because of draconian censorship, it has become the only way to publish Op-Eds, columns, etc. for many. That's why so many opposition figures and opinion leaders are buffled with the Durov's arrest.
- a platform for Putin's propagandists. Over the years, the regime has been spending an enormous amount of money boosting all kind of propaganda channels. You can see the frustration of the recipients these day.
- military who used Telegram channels to communicate during the war against Ukraine. As the Russian government failed to create other communication networks for military, this has been the main one. You can see how unhappy they are today.
5) No question that Putin’s secret services and intelligence wanted Durov to give them control over Telegram the same way they got it over VKontakte. Less clear how much he actually yielded. During protests in Bashkorstan a few years, it seemed that FSB was able to use the data. During the Russia-Ukraine war, a popular Ukrainian channel helping Russian soldiers to desert was censored, etc. Given how actively Russian officials work to get to Durov these days, there might be a lot at stake.
What amazes me is how easily commentators take sides in the unfolding story. Every episode described above involved many complicated trade-offs to be resolved.
Pavel Durov got arrested 
Here's what this means for the US 
, EU 
, Ukraine 
, and Russia 
, from the perspective of a Ukrainian-US tech entrepreneur who's been covering Telegram's Kremlin connections and security holes for the last 15 months. Thread: 1/X
, EU , Ukraine , and Russia , from the perspective of a Ukrainian-US tech entrepreneur who's been covering Telegram's Kremlin connections and security holes for the last 15 months. Thread: 1/X
Aug 25, 2024 · 2:33 AM UTC
"The detention and search warrant was issued because Durov did not cooperate with French security forces and did not properly moderate Telegram, which makes him an accomplice in crimes such as drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, child abuse, etc" - 
TF1 2/X
TF1 2/X
I was following Durov's story for the last ~17 years more or less, since the early days of VK. First as a VK user in Ukraine in 2007, then as a tech entrepreneur in the US and Ukraine 2012-2022, finally as a volunteer investigator since in 2023 3/X
What we're seeing now is a sharply negative reaction from the "rightwing X users", starting with @elonmusk and @TuckerCarlson, who are joined by @KimDotcom, @Cobratate, and others, demanding to free Pavel and stop censoring "The Free Speech" 4/X
However, they all fail to mention that allegations against Pavel are serious, he never complied with the content moderation rules, allowing arms trafficking, illegal drugs, human trafficking, and worse to flourish on the platform, using UAE jurisdiction as a safe heaven 5/X
as TF1 reports "French authorities are checking Durov's possible connections with the Kremlin"
TF1 reports "French authorities are checking Durov's possible connections with the Kremlin"also this: "Pavel Durov is a French citizen and is not subject to exchange or extradition"
6/X
And on this topic, we have a collection of selected investigative pieces on kremlingram.org/, a non-profit studying Telegram’s security and its potential ties to the Kremlin. And there's more behind the hood. Follow @Kremlingram and @tokar_ua for more 7/X
While there's no smoking gun proving Durov does what Putin says – there are plenty (50+?) of indirect pieces of evidence pointing towards numerous connections, despite Telegram's and Durov's public denial of such. 8/X
This tweet is unavailable
We have also shown that Telegram has people in Russia doing work for them (whether they call them employees or not), most of TG's revenues come from Russia, they have Russian bondholders, among which - money of Russia's top oligarchs and Putin's pals 10/X
Media often cite a story of Durov's own telling that he was "exiled from russia" for allegedly "refusing to provide data on Ukrainian users to the Russian government in 2013". We have reasons to believe this might be no more than a cover-up story 11/X
The same goes for the alleged blocking attempt of Telegram in Russia in 2018 which supposedly failed, whereas governments less tech-savvy than Russia were able to block it. 2018 might've been the best marketing campaign for a messenger ever 12/X
So I'd ask reporters to use "allegedly" or similar wording whenever they tell those stories, 13/X
If you are only going to read one piece about Telegram+Kremlin - let it be this piece by @tokar_ua for @Textyorgua_Eng, a highly reputable Ukrainian media doing a lot of investigative work and data journalism texty.org.ua/articles/112347… 14/X
Again, for more reporting on Telegram's connections to the Kremlin– check out kremlingram.org/ and follow @Kremlingram - more good stuff there 18/X
Now back to the latest news.
Here's one of russia's top pro-war telegram channels followed by some 800k people unironically posts this: "De-facto, they detained the head of communications for the Russian Army (VS RF)" t.me/voenacher/70638
19/X
This should not come as a surprise. Telegram, indeed, is the main comms channel for the Russian army - not just a news source, but a key messenger, used to coordinate action on different levels, store videos and large files, etc. 20/X
While a lot of Ukrainian civilian population relies on Telegram for the news, military doesn't use it, preferring WhatsApp and Signal instead. It is formally forbidden to use TG in comms in Ukrainian military. 21/X
Meanwhile, in Russia, they blocked Signal, widely considered as one of the most secure messaging apps with two-way encryption. As well as Facebook and Instagram (not Whatsapp yet, which is a top messenger in russia), but are for some reason not concerned about Telegram 22/X
Oh, and by the way, Durov was returning from Azerbaijan as he got detained in France. Do you think he comes there often? Not really. It has just so coincided, Pavel was at 
a few days ago at the same moment when Putin made a visit there. 23/X
a few days ago at the same moment when Putin made a visit there. 23/X
There was a public rumor that Pavel wanted to meet Putin to prevent Telegram from being blocked in russia, but Putin didn't want to see him. However, I would not take it at a face value and would not be so sure the meeting didn't take place or what the real topic were 24/X
In other news, Yekaterina Mizulina, a nutritious russian public figure, has a fresh take: "Durov's arrest is targeting TON cryptocurrency, which is used as a wallet by many large russian businesspeople". Thanks for letting us know how they hide the bloody money, Yekaterina! 25/X
What is obvious now, is that Russia (both the Kremlin and most of the so-called opposition groups) will be yelling about double standards and free speech violation. This is a regime with zero free press, where journalists and politicians are being killed. Just ignore this 26/X
(both the Kremlin and most of the so-called opposition groups) will be yelling about double standards and free speech violation. This is a regime with zero free press, where journalists and politicians are being killed. Just ignore this 26/X
The Republican part of the media sphere in US may go in the same direction. If this is you, please think about how Telegram's community aligns with your values, the values of Christianity and human dignity. 27/X
may go in the same direction. If this is you, please think about how Telegram's community aligns with your values, the values of Christianity and human dignity. 27/X
How do we handle an app with 1 billion users which is completely outside of the US legal framework yet has millions of users in the US and can influence events, like Jan 6th, when Telegram was the key app? 28/X
legal framework yet has millions of users in the US and can influence events, like Jan 6th, when Telegram was the key app? 28/X
For some reason, I feel more confident about the EU . This will be more of a "wait and see" approach, and let the French legal system do its work. 29/X
. This will be more of a "wait and see" approach, and let the French legal system do its work. 29/X
Finally, in Ukraine I hope this will be yet another signal for people to decrease their reliance on a platform, which is likely compromised and used by our mortal enemy. My current replacement choice is Signal/Whatsapp for messages and X for the news. 30/X
I hope this will be yet another signal for people to decrease their reliance on a platform, which is likely compromised and used by our mortal enemy. My current replacement choice is Signal/Whatsapp for messages and X for the news. 30/X
That's it for now.
Let me know what you think and how the whole situation is perceived from your point of view.
I will keep adding updates and selected replies to this thread over the next few days as the story unveils.
Russia has been arresting people for BS reasons from the off - basically hostage taking.
Anyway, here are the reasons:
Pavel Durov detained in France: All you need to know about the Telegram founder
Pavel Durov, founder of Telegram, was detained in Paris over allegations that the messaging app's poor moderation helped illegal activities like money laundering and child exploitation. Having previously fled Russia for refusing government demands, 39-year-old Durov faces further scrutiny from...economictimes.indiatimes.com
In case you're wondering Paddy , that's the handle of the President of El Salvador . His bio in X reads Philosopher King .
whats cooking ?
kyivindependent.com
Belarus gathering significant number of troops, weaponry along Ukraine's border 'under guise of exercises,' Ukraine says
Belarus' Armed Forces are "concentrating a significant number of personnel" as well as weaponry along Ukraine's northern border with Belarus "under the guise of exercises," Ukraine's Foreign Ministry warned on Aug. 25, citing information gathered by the country's intelligence sources.
Nothing burgers.whats cooking ?
Belarus gathering significant number of troops, weaponry along Ukraine's border 'under guise of exercises,' Ukraine says
Belarus' Armed Forces are "concentrating a significant number of personnel" as well as weaponry along Ukraine's northern border with Belarus "under the guise of exercises," Ukraine's Foreign Ministry warned on Aug. 25, citing information gathered by the country's intelligence sources.
Belarus military are inferiorly equipped and have no combat experience the Ukraine Brigades that protect Kyiv Oblast and borders west of Kyiv is more than enough to slaughter Belarus military incursion. Ukraine brigades deployed to defend non combat regions their soldiers get rotated for combat duty all the time replaced by troops in brigades seeing combat as a rest deployment.
Ukraine FPV drones alone would wreck havoc at Belarusian armored columns.... also you might get a Polish intervention where they go inside Ukraine.
Des coups et des douleurs
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
Blows and pain
At 2pm on 6 October 1973, the Egyptian army launched Operation Badr. In just a few hours, five Egyptian infantry divisions preceded by commando battalions crossed the Suez Canal, overtaking the Bar Lev line forts and establishing a bridgehead. The Israeli side was taken completely by surprise and the ground and air counter-attacks came up against the anti-tank defences beyond the canal and the anti-aircraft defences below.
Surprisingly, this small bridgehead was Egypt's only strategic objective. Despite the tactical setbacks that followed and the Israeli counter-attack on African soil, the initial victory and the fact that this territorial guarantee was maintained until the end were enough for Egypt to save its honour and agree to enter into negotiations. Four years later, Anwar al-Sadat was in Israel to talk peace.
Opening the cat's box
We now know a little more about the Ukrainians' intentions in their offensive in the Russian province of Kursk. Such an operation could consist of a major raid, aimed at destroying and undermining Russian forces and power as far as possible before returning to Ukraine, or an operation to conquer territory. The scale of the resources deployed, the time taken and the plan to seal off the Glushkovo district by destroying the bridges, which would very probably precede a new Ukrainian attack from that side, seem to indicate that the second option was chosen.
To be more precise, we are visibly moving towards a limited conquest operation aimed at taking an area that is sufficiently significant strategically (thousands of km2) and defensible operationally, i.e. relying on natural defences, such as the river Seym, and entrenchments, while being, like the Egyptians in October 1973, in the bubble of protection and support from air defence and long-range artillery with, moreover, relatively short and protected logistical lines. The pocket currently held, plus the future pocket in the Glushkovo district between the border and the Seym, already meets these criteria. It can still be extended, but probably not much more, as the fluid phase of manoeuvre combat begins to give way to the creation of a front line with the commitment of Russian reinforcements.
It is therefore highly unlikely, and probably not desirable, that the Ukrainians will go very far beyond the current zone in the direction of Kursk, for example, or even the province's nuclear power station. In strategy, as in many other things, you have to know where enough is enough. To advance as far as Kursk, for example, some fifty kilometres beyond the current line of contact, would require a further increase in the number of brigades involved in order to maintain a minimum force density. We would need more than just an arrow pointing towards the provincial capital, but a pocket large enough to ward off the threat of a flank attack or simply strikes on a single logistical axis. Twice as many brigades as are currently deployed would be needed to hold this area, which seems hard when you're already fighting just-in-time, only to arrive in front of a city of over 400,000 inhabitants, which would no doubt require even more forces and time to seize. All this would also require the entire artillery and ground-air defence support echelon to be moved to Russia, with all the constraints that this implies. A lot of uncertain effort - to continue with the example of the 1973 war, let's remember the great Egyptian mistake of committing the two reserve armoured divisions in front of the held zone - for strategic gains that would not be proportionate. Most of these strategic gains have already been made, and controlling 4,000 or 6,000 km2 instead of the 2,000 which might be hoped for in the short term would not multiply them by two or three.
These gains are already considerable and primarily political. We already mentioned them in the last post, and they haven't changed. Like Schrödinger's big cat, considered to be both alive and dead before we discovered its true state by opening its box, Putin could be considered both extremist and timid when faced with the prospect of declaring war. After a few days of stupefaction, as is always the case when he is surprised, Vladimir Putin finally showed that he was more afraid of internal reactions to a war mobilisation than of the Ukrainians.
There are only two possible uses of legitimate force: war and the police. Putin chose to describe the Ukrainian operation as a ‘terrorist attack’ and to entrust its management to siloviki - the men of the intelligence and police services - rather than to real generals. However, it is the regiments and brigades that were deployed to Kursk as a matter of urgency that are really closing the gap and endeavouring to crystallise a new front line by defending all the localities.
This Ukrainian ground attack also tested the Russian population, in particular the vast majority of those ‘spared’ from the war. On this side, we are logically witnessing a patriotic reflex of support for the defenders of the homeland, but it is a passive support. As the sociologist Anna Colin-Lebedev pointed out, the contrast with the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the Russian attacks in Crimea and the Donbass in 2014-2015 is striking. For example, there has been no spontaneous formation of self-defence battalions on the border with Ukraine, due to a long period of political sterilisation and a complete and accepted transfer of the use of force to the state services. There was no revolt to be expected on this side of the border either, which nobody was expecting, except perhaps in the event of a general mobilisation, which Putin did not want, and which is perhaps the main lesson to be learned from this operation.
Nor was it a surprise for the Ukrainians that the Western allies were faced with the fait accompli of using their weapons and equipment on Russian soil. As was to be expected, this use did not provoke Russian thunderbolts on the territory of the supplier countries, which are obliged to follow suit. It would be unthinkable to make a fool of ourselves by demanding the immediate return of German Marder or American Stryker vehicles, or even French VABs, to Ukrainian soil, or to prohibit the use of HIMARS rocket launchers or AASM bombs after they have demonstrated their effectiveness against enemy forces on Russian soil. This is another significant development which, in conjunction with the US decision to also supply long-range air-to-ground missiles, could boost the Ukrainian strike campaign.
In view of Russia's matamore-like impotence, we can only regret the weakness of our attitude towards Russia over the years and particularly just before the war in 2022. In our possible documents, we spoke only of ‘dialogue’ as a possible attitude towards Russia, sometimes with the addition of ‘firm’, but only timidly because we had eliminated all the means by which this could be achieved. We thought Russia was strong, but we knew we were weak, so we were cowardly, even long after the war had begun. To paraphrase Péguy, we explained that we wanted to keep our hands pure to hide the fact that we no longer had any hands.
The other strategic novelty of this summer is indeed the increase in Ukrainian deep strikes. Strikes from the air can be categorised into three missions: immediate support in front of manoeuvre troops (those preferred by soldiers on the ground); interdiction behind the front line and, finally, destruction of military or civilian targets of military interest in great depth, such as Russian refineries or, conversely, the Ukrainian electricity network. The most productive strikes, particularly in terms of thwarting the Russian strategy of pressure and suffocation, are interdiction strikes on bases, depots, command posts - in short, the entire rear network that enables the manoeuvre forces to operate.
Loosening the stranglehold
The primary instrument of the Ukrainian strike campaign is the increasingly sophisticated and numerous fleet of long-range drones that they have been able to build up independently. We would be well advised to learn from them, given that we base our deep strike capability solely on our powerful but rare fighter-bombers. The main disadvantage of drones is that they cannot carry a very high explosive charge, which limits their use to targets with little protection. Fortunately for the Ukrainians, and this is a new source of surprise, the Russians have still not concreted their air bases and many other sensitive targets in their rear. They have contented themselves for the most part with moving these targets as far as possible from the front line, thereby slowing down operations, and protecting them with a little more air defence, which absorbs precious resources to the detriment of the contact line. For some time now, therefore, we have been witnessing a number of very successful strikes, such as on the Murmansk and Marinovka bases, the Proletarsk fuel depots and the Congo trader ferry, again specialising in the transport of fuel.
Everything seems to point to a Ukrainian desire to avoid attacking on the hard front of the Donbass as much as possible in favour of raids or sometimes land conquests and strikes everywhere else, what I call ‘privateer warfare’. It was a bit like the Athenian strategy against Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, or the Roman strategy during the Second Punic War, after a vain attempt to defeat Hannibal on the battlefield. It should be remembered, however, that this peripheral strategy is very rarely decisive in itself, and is sometimes even disastrous. While enthusiasts may compare Operation White Triangle at Kursk to the Inchon landing in September 1950 during the Korean War, sceptics may point to the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415BC or the establishment of a fortified camp at Diên Biên Phu at the end of 1953 after a number of highly successful French airborne or amphibious operations (the expression ‘privateer war’ comes from this).
There was always the risk that the enemy would counter this strategy defensively or adopt the same one. It wasn't really the failure of the Sicilian expedition that led to Athens‘ defeat eleven years later, but the creation of a Spartan fleet and Athens’ naval defeat at Aigos Potamos. Deprived of its fleet, Athens found itself powerless to withstand the Spartan siege. Logically, Russia should now - and in fact should long ago - have lignemaginotised its border, setting up a specific military command with a tier of active or rapidly mobilisable forces and theatre reserves. It should pour concrete around all possible targets, or bury them, or both, and bristle them with multi-layered anti-aircraft defences, at low and medium altitude for the time being, a bit like when they protected the Nile in 1970 against the Israeli air campaign or contributed to the defence of Tonkin at around the same time against the Americans. The fact that this was not done when the war had been going on for more than two years never ceases to amaze us, and still testifies to the profound dysfunctions of this corrupt, hyper-centralised and paranoid regime. The Soviet Politburo was much more efficient and responsive.
In the meantime, the Ukrainian-style privateer war has a bright future ahead of it, multiplying the blows in order to wear down the adversary and boost everyone's morale with victory announcements. However, to really win a war you have to fight battles and plant flags over cities, and the Ukrainians are expected to do this, especially in the Donbass. There is perhaps hope in this respect, even if the latest news from the Toretsk and Pokrovsk regions is not good.
It's worth remembering the prevailing sentiment in the summer of 2022 when the cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk had just been taken by the Russians after months of fierce fighting. All the pro-Russians in France and Navarre were (re)singing victory or calling for the Ukrainians to surrender ‘to shorten their suffering (and our expenses)’. Things seemed inevitable in the face of the multiple and inexorable Russian nibbling attacks. And then, the Russians suddenly stopped, victims of exhaustion, while on the other side the Ukrainian forces were rapidly gaining strength thanks to a special mobilisation effort and the contribution of Western artillery. The strategic curves dear to the heart of General Svetchin, the idol of the sacrosanct Soviet operational art, had crossed. This lasted until the spectacular victories in the provinces of Kharkiv and Kherson at the end of November, until a new equilibrium was reached as a result of Russian adaptations in the emergency.
I have the feeling, but perhaps this is simply an optimistic bias, that the Russians are beginning to reach their climax in the face of the reorganisation of the Ukrainian forces, once again powerfully assisted by the West, primarily the Americans. The capture of Pokrovsk by the Russians would indeed be a catastrophe, but it is probably not about to happen. However, one day the Ukrainians will have to win offensive battles again in the region if they want to win the war, and that doesn't seem likely either. To conclude in much the same way as we've been saying for months, we'll probably have to wait until 2025 and maybe 2026 to see something resembling a victory for one of the two sides and then, let's put things in order, peace negotiations. Maybe we will.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
Blows and pain
At 2pm on 6 October 1973, the Egyptian army launched Operation Badr. In just a few hours, five Egyptian infantry divisions preceded by commando battalions crossed the Suez Canal, overtaking the Bar Lev line forts and establishing a bridgehead. The Israeli side was taken completely by surprise and the ground and air counter-attacks came up against the anti-tank defences beyond the canal and the anti-aircraft defences below.
Surprisingly, this small bridgehead was Egypt's only strategic objective. Despite the tactical setbacks that followed and the Israeli counter-attack on African soil, the initial victory and the fact that this territorial guarantee was maintained until the end were enough for Egypt to save its honour and agree to enter into negotiations. Four years later, Anwar al-Sadat was in Israel to talk peace.
Opening the cat's box
We now know a little more about the Ukrainians' intentions in their offensive in the Russian province of Kursk. Such an operation could consist of a major raid, aimed at destroying and undermining Russian forces and power as far as possible before returning to Ukraine, or an operation to conquer territory. The scale of the resources deployed, the time taken and the plan to seal off the Glushkovo district by destroying the bridges, which would very probably precede a new Ukrainian attack from that side, seem to indicate that the second option was chosen.
To be more precise, we are visibly moving towards a limited conquest operation aimed at taking an area that is sufficiently significant strategically (thousands of km2) and defensible operationally, i.e. relying on natural defences, such as the river Seym, and entrenchments, while being, like the Egyptians in October 1973, in the bubble of protection and support from air defence and long-range artillery with, moreover, relatively short and protected logistical lines. The pocket currently held, plus the future pocket in the Glushkovo district between the border and the Seym, already meets these criteria. It can still be extended, but probably not much more, as the fluid phase of manoeuvre combat begins to give way to the creation of a front line with the commitment of Russian reinforcements.
It is therefore highly unlikely, and probably not desirable, that the Ukrainians will go very far beyond the current zone in the direction of Kursk, for example, or even the province's nuclear power station. In strategy, as in many other things, you have to know where enough is enough. To advance as far as Kursk, for example, some fifty kilometres beyond the current line of contact, would require a further increase in the number of brigades involved in order to maintain a minimum force density. We would need more than just an arrow pointing towards the provincial capital, but a pocket large enough to ward off the threat of a flank attack or simply strikes on a single logistical axis. Twice as many brigades as are currently deployed would be needed to hold this area, which seems hard when you're already fighting just-in-time, only to arrive in front of a city of over 400,000 inhabitants, which would no doubt require even more forces and time to seize. All this would also require the entire artillery and ground-air defence support echelon to be moved to Russia, with all the constraints that this implies. A lot of uncertain effort - to continue with the example of the 1973 war, let's remember the great Egyptian mistake of committing the two reserve armoured divisions in front of the held zone - for strategic gains that would not be proportionate. Most of these strategic gains have already been made, and controlling 4,000 or 6,000 km2 instead of the 2,000 which might be hoped for in the short term would not multiply them by two or three.
These gains are already considerable and primarily political. We already mentioned them in the last post, and they haven't changed. Like Schrödinger's big cat, considered to be both alive and dead before we discovered its true state by opening its box, Putin could be considered both extremist and timid when faced with the prospect of declaring war. After a few days of stupefaction, as is always the case when he is surprised, Vladimir Putin finally showed that he was more afraid of internal reactions to a war mobilisation than of the Ukrainians.
There are only two possible uses of legitimate force: war and the police. Putin chose to describe the Ukrainian operation as a ‘terrorist attack’ and to entrust its management to siloviki - the men of the intelligence and police services - rather than to real generals. However, it is the regiments and brigades that were deployed to Kursk as a matter of urgency that are really closing the gap and endeavouring to crystallise a new front line by defending all the localities.
This Ukrainian ground attack also tested the Russian population, in particular the vast majority of those ‘spared’ from the war. On this side, we are logically witnessing a patriotic reflex of support for the defenders of the homeland, but it is a passive support. As the sociologist Anna Colin-Lebedev pointed out, the contrast with the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the Russian attacks in Crimea and the Donbass in 2014-2015 is striking. For example, there has been no spontaneous formation of self-defence battalions on the border with Ukraine, due to a long period of political sterilisation and a complete and accepted transfer of the use of force to the state services. There was no revolt to be expected on this side of the border either, which nobody was expecting, except perhaps in the event of a general mobilisation, which Putin did not want, and which is perhaps the main lesson to be learned from this operation.
Nor was it a surprise for the Ukrainians that the Western allies were faced with the fait accompli of using their weapons and equipment on Russian soil. As was to be expected, this use did not provoke Russian thunderbolts on the territory of the supplier countries, which are obliged to follow suit. It would be unthinkable to make a fool of ourselves by demanding the immediate return of German Marder or American Stryker vehicles, or even French VABs, to Ukrainian soil, or to prohibit the use of HIMARS rocket launchers or AASM bombs after they have demonstrated their effectiveness against enemy forces on Russian soil. This is another significant development which, in conjunction with the US decision to also supply long-range air-to-ground missiles, could boost the Ukrainian strike campaign.
In view of Russia's matamore-like impotence, we can only regret the weakness of our attitude towards Russia over the years and particularly just before the war in 2022. In our possible documents, we spoke only of ‘dialogue’ as a possible attitude towards Russia, sometimes with the addition of ‘firm’, but only timidly because we had eliminated all the means by which this could be achieved. We thought Russia was strong, but we knew we were weak, so we were cowardly, even long after the war had begun. To paraphrase Péguy, we explained that we wanted to keep our hands pure to hide the fact that we no longer had any hands.
The other strategic novelty of this summer is indeed the increase in Ukrainian deep strikes. Strikes from the air can be categorised into three missions: immediate support in front of manoeuvre troops (those preferred by soldiers on the ground); interdiction behind the front line and, finally, destruction of military or civilian targets of military interest in great depth, such as Russian refineries or, conversely, the Ukrainian electricity network. The most productive strikes, particularly in terms of thwarting the Russian strategy of pressure and suffocation, are interdiction strikes on bases, depots, command posts - in short, the entire rear network that enables the manoeuvre forces to operate.
Loosening the stranglehold
The primary instrument of the Ukrainian strike campaign is the increasingly sophisticated and numerous fleet of long-range drones that they have been able to build up independently. We would be well advised to learn from them, given that we base our deep strike capability solely on our powerful but rare fighter-bombers. The main disadvantage of drones is that they cannot carry a very high explosive charge, which limits their use to targets with little protection. Fortunately for the Ukrainians, and this is a new source of surprise, the Russians have still not concreted their air bases and many other sensitive targets in their rear. They have contented themselves for the most part with moving these targets as far as possible from the front line, thereby slowing down operations, and protecting them with a little more air defence, which absorbs precious resources to the detriment of the contact line. For some time now, therefore, we have been witnessing a number of very successful strikes, such as on the Murmansk and Marinovka bases, the Proletarsk fuel depots and the Congo trader ferry, again specialising in the transport of fuel.
Everything seems to point to a Ukrainian desire to avoid attacking on the hard front of the Donbass as much as possible in favour of raids or sometimes land conquests and strikes everywhere else, what I call ‘privateer warfare’. It was a bit like the Athenian strategy against Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, or the Roman strategy during the Second Punic War, after a vain attempt to defeat Hannibal on the battlefield. It should be remembered, however, that this peripheral strategy is very rarely decisive in itself, and is sometimes even disastrous. While enthusiasts may compare Operation White Triangle at Kursk to the Inchon landing in September 1950 during the Korean War, sceptics may point to the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415BC or the establishment of a fortified camp at Diên Biên Phu at the end of 1953 after a number of highly successful French airborne or amphibious operations (the expression ‘privateer war’ comes from this).
There was always the risk that the enemy would counter this strategy defensively or adopt the same one. It wasn't really the failure of the Sicilian expedition that led to Athens‘ defeat eleven years later, but the creation of a Spartan fleet and Athens’ naval defeat at Aigos Potamos. Deprived of its fleet, Athens found itself powerless to withstand the Spartan siege. Logically, Russia should now - and in fact should long ago - have lignemaginotised its border, setting up a specific military command with a tier of active or rapidly mobilisable forces and theatre reserves. It should pour concrete around all possible targets, or bury them, or both, and bristle them with multi-layered anti-aircraft defences, at low and medium altitude for the time being, a bit like when they protected the Nile in 1970 against the Israeli air campaign or contributed to the defence of Tonkin at around the same time against the Americans. The fact that this was not done when the war had been going on for more than two years never ceases to amaze us, and still testifies to the profound dysfunctions of this corrupt, hyper-centralised and paranoid regime. The Soviet Politburo was much more efficient and responsive.
In the meantime, the Ukrainian-style privateer war has a bright future ahead of it, multiplying the blows in order to wear down the adversary and boost everyone's morale with victory announcements. However, to really win a war you have to fight battles and plant flags over cities, and the Ukrainians are expected to do this, especially in the Donbass. There is perhaps hope in this respect, even if the latest news from the Toretsk and Pokrovsk regions is not good.
It's worth remembering the prevailing sentiment in the summer of 2022 when the cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk had just been taken by the Russians after months of fierce fighting. All the pro-Russians in France and Navarre were (re)singing victory or calling for the Ukrainians to surrender ‘to shorten their suffering (and our expenses)’. Things seemed inevitable in the face of the multiple and inexorable Russian nibbling attacks. And then, the Russians suddenly stopped, victims of exhaustion, while on the other side the Ukrainian forces were rapidly gaining strength thanks to a special mobilisation effort and the contribution of Western artillery. The strategic curves dear to the heart of General Svetchin, the idol of the sacrosanct Soviet operational art, had crossed. This lasted until the spectacular victories in the provinces of Kharkiv and Kherson at the end of November, until a new equilibrium was reached as a result of Russian adaptations in the emergency.
I have the feeling, but perhaps this is simply an optimistic bias, that the Russians are beginning to reach their climax in the face of the reorganisation of the Ukrainian forces, once again powerfully assisted by the West, primarily the Americans. The capture of Pokrovsk by the Russians would indeed be a catastrophe, but it is probably not about to happen. However, one day the Ukrainians will have to win offensive battles again in the region if they want to win the war, and that doesn't seem likely either. To conclude in much the same way as we've been saying for months, we'll probably have to wait until 2025 and maybe 2026 to see something resembling a victory for one of the two sides and then, let's put things in order, peace negotiations. Maybe we will.
Footage of the Russian kamikaze drone "Lancet-51" striking a Ukrainian T-64BV tank. The video was filmed on August 11 in the village of Cherkasskoye Porechny, Kursk region of Russia. The video is unique in that the drone strike was filmed by the Ukrainian and Russian armies simultaneously. At first glance, the Ukrainian T-64BV tank withstood the drone strike, apparently due to the tank's net protection, but after moving forward, it stopped and a fire started inside. It is unknown whether the crew managed to leave the tank, but as a result of the fire and detonation of ammunition, the tank was completely destroyed.
Wagner boys are there in belarus. Just troop movement from belarus is good enuf to strain Ukraines combat resources. It will make the troops in kursk highly insecure.
Poland might intervene chances are pretty thin, but remember lviv was historically part of poland. In topsy turvy world of geopolitics Ukraine might end up losing lviv to poles.
This is an idea that comes up often in russian conversations; because thieves think everyone is a thief, and corrupt fascist warmongers think everyone is a corrupt fascist warmonger. It helps the russians cope with the fact their country is the worst in the world, if they can believe the rest of the world also sucks. I mean, they're at the point where they're looking at North Korea as a holiday destination. It's not possible to be more pathetic than that.
In fact that's why the tin of poo in the Kremlin felt he needed to invade Ukraine in the first place; if the russians were to see Ukraine stop being a shithole country because they managed to get rid of pootin's corrupt puppets, then that could give ideas to the russians.
More russian infighting. Again, for russians, the solution to all their problems is to kill more of their own. Everyone's a traitor and a thief, after all.
Also russian economy is still getting worse every day. Inflation keeps climbing, and the government keeps stealing more money from everyone in order to fund pooty-poot's dream of going back to the nineteenth century.
It makes sense as poland is in Nato , they can claim protection. All they have to do is hold a phony referendum and declare ppl in these territories voted to join poland. US can make any thing happen !
It would ensure that US has still some foothold near russia and can keep the pot boiling.
NATO doesn't need to get closer to russia, NATO already has Finland and the Baltics.
Also Romania and Bulgaria and Turkey.
And Poland doesn't want more territory. Countries in the EU, with the possible exception of Hungary, are not stuck in the 19th century like russia is. Seeing your population suddenly increased by several million people with a different culture and language is not actually something that European countries actively desire. It can be something that russia desires because to the russian government, people are just cattle and their culture and language are therefore irrelevant; but that's a russian thing. It's important to remember that russia is not a real country, but merely a dumpster fire pretending to be a world power.
russians are just dumb scum, devoid of any virtue. They lie constantly:
And they constantly boast about the war crimes they're extremely proud to be committing:
russia sucks; always has, always will.