Comment expliquer les échecs de la défense aérienne russe ?
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)How can we explain the failures of Russian air defence?
On the 46th day of the war, Ukrainian aircraft are still flying around. A surprising fact for the Russian army, reputed to be excellent in this field and often presented as the second largest air force in the world.
A state of affairs largely in favour of the Russians
More than a month after the start of the war, Russia still does not seem to be in control of the Ukrainian sky. Bayraktar TB2 drones, MiG-29 fighter planes, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters are still on the Ukrainian side, as well as an air defence system that continues to intercept Russian missiles and fighter planes. However, from a strategic point of view, the neutralisation of the enemy's air defences (SEAD) is the first task to be accomplished in order to dominate the enemy. This should not have been an insurmountable task for a Russian Air Force with hundreds of advanced fighters, strategic bombers and missiles specifically designed to destroy enemy radars. At the beginning of the war, the Russians had 2,678 aircraft compared to 233 for the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian air defence had less than 200 heavy systems (Buk, S-300...), while Russia praised the merits of its equipment, modernised to deal with all types of threats and intercept even drones. On paper, the Ukrainian army seems to be a dwarf compared to the Russian giant, but it is not content to stand up to it and allows itself some real coups. How is this possible?
Russian anti-aircraft systems overrated?
Among the technological gems that Russia boasts about is the S-400 Triumph ground-to-air anti-aircraft system. Considered by many to be the most advanced anti-aircraft system in the world, it is capable of engaging its targets at a range of 400km. Yet the system was unable to stop two missiles fired by Ukraine at Russian airfields in Melirovo and Taganrog, destroying two Su-30s and an Il-76 on the ground. The same happened in Berdyansk, a captured port on the Sea of Azov, where a Russian landing ship was destroyed by a ballistic missile. In all three cases, they were Tochka-U missiles, simple ballistic missiles from the 1970s with a maximum range of 120 km...
Ukraine even allowed itself to carry out Mi-24 helicopter raids in Belgorod, which requires flying over an occupied area of Ukrainian territory, crossing the Russian border, flying at least 40 km in Russian airspace before bombing a fuel depot and then turning back (video opposite). A plan that went off without a hitch and that leaves one wondering about the effectiveness of Russian air defence systems. Ukraine has again this week shared images of its Mi-8s in action and the loss of a Mig-29 was announced (proving that they were still operating), while Russia announced it had air supremacy over Ukraine on 28 February. It claims to have destroyed more Ukrainian helicopters and fighters than the country had before the war...
TB2 drones, a thorn in Russia's side
Russia has the Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system, officially capable of jamming all communications over 300km and reputed to be one of the most aggressive electronic warfare systems on the planet. It was deployed in Armenia to counter Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and prevent their pilots from operating them, without success. The same observation can be made in Ukraine, and the capture of at least one Krasukha 4 could considerably reduce the system's effectiveness once it has been dissected by the intelligence services of Ukraine's allies.
In addition to these means of jamming, Russia had also put forward the KUB and Lancet-3 prowling munitions, said to be effective against TB2 drones. The company Zala even presents the destruction of the Turkish drone in its demonstration video... On the ground, Russia explained that it was the obsolescence of the Pantsir air defence systems in Armenia and Libya that explained their poor capacity to face the TB2, while their own modernised Pantsir would be able to cope. This is not the case, and while Bayraktars have been shot down, Turkey delivered 11 more to Ukraine in March alone... Ukraine could continue to make the Russian bear suffer with its drones, so much so that odes in honour of the Bayraktar are widely shared (video opposite), contributing to Ukrainian propaganda.
Effective Ukrainian air systems
Another reason for the difficulties of Russian air defence is the underestimation of Ukrainian equipment. Indeed, the Ukrainian army had a substantial arsenal of air defence systems, including the S-300 with a range of up to 120km, the DK12 Kub with a range of 24km, the Buk-M1 with a range of 45km, as well as many other theatre anti-aircraft systems. Russia did not commit enough force against these systems, announcing the success of its SEAD missions early on before suffering further losses and then releasing videos of fighters equipped with anti-radar missiles again. The Ukrainian army is receiving increased support from Western countries, which continue to deliver weapons. The delivery of thousands of light surface-to-air missiles began before the war and continues, with the supply of ever more sophisticated means such as the Starstreak portable system produced by Thales UK, with the documented loss of at least one Russian Mi-28 helicopter (see our dedicated article).
As of 20 March, more than 70 Russian aircraft have been shot down through images shared on social media alone, including 9 Su-25, 4 Su-30SM, 5 Su-34 and 1 Su-35... Other aircraft have been shot down and videos are available of them falling, but without formal identification they are not counted. The loss of aircraft known as "4.5+ generation" is explained by their obligation to fly at low altitude to try to fire unguided ammunition, as a high altitude drop has no chance of hitting its target. This is a dangerous descent because it puts the aircraft within range of manpads, a practice that has completely disappeared in Western countries. Although this may seem like a drop in the bucket of available Russian aircraft, the Ukrainians have proven that they can defend themselves against the so-called powerful Russian air force, reducing its ability to act on the territory.
Western intelligence support.
The Ukrainian army would certainly not be as effective without the help of the intelligence services of allied countries, first and foremost the United States. Many countries have deployed ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) assets with overflights of Ukraine's neighbours, the unstated aim being to provide intelligence to the Ukrainians. NATO operates AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command System) aircraft such as the Boeing E-3 Sentry and the E-8 JSTARS, as well as RQ-4 Global Hawk drones that can fly for up to 32 hours. There are also KC6135 Stratotanker tankers. While taking care not to cross the Ukrainian border, they scan the country's interior and obtain tactical information that they share with Ukraine, in particular the take-off of Russian fighter planes, the operating times of Russian radars, the definition of the cones under which Ukrainian aircraft can fly undetected. Similarly, the presence or not of Russian AWACS, the Ilyushin A-50s, is a determining factor for conducting raids. In terms of aerial intelligence, Russia is clearly lagging behind, with only a small volume of Ilyushin and Beriev A-50 aircraft developed during the Soviet era, some fifteen of each model. In comparison, the US has more than a hundred heavy radar aircraft and 170 dedicated airborne aircraft (mainly E-2C Hawkeye). The Russian aircraft apparently only operate for a few hours and do not ensure a permanent air presence, leaving slots available for the Ukrainians to take off the few remaining air assets.
The record is not good for the Russian Army. The failure of the SEAD and the Russian air force, although full of promise, can be explained by a combination of these elements:
- anti-aircraft systems that are experiencing serious failures,
- a Ukrainian army better equipped and resilient than estimated,
- a Russian inability to destroy all Ukrainian defensive and offensive means despite a month and a half of war,
- the reinforcement of light and efficient defence systems by donations from Western countries,
- intelligence support from Ukraine's allies.
