Point de situation des opérations en Ukraine 28 avril 2022
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update on operations in Ukraine 28 April 2022
Strategic level
The US counter-offensive in Ukraine is in the position of the Soviet Union, which took advantage of the massive, absurd and clumsy American involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s to arm its enemies. The United States is thus clearly taking the lead in a new coalition, in which, as always, it is providing at least 70% of the means, no longer of war as during the New World Order, but of confrontation. The enemy this time is Russia and the means are unlimited except for that of open warfare, which does not exclude small battles as long as they do not lead to escalation.
We will analyse this posture in more detail later, but let us simply note at this stage the relative weakness of Russia in the face of this offensive, a Russia that can be countered in all possible fields of action except perhaps with the weapon of gas, a double-edged weapon that only really affects European countries. In this respect, the call for the regular, more or less veiled threat of the use of nuclear weapons, contradicted each time a few days later by the reminder that this type of weapon could only be used in the event of an existential threat, is rather an admission of impotence.
Let us note that the United States is capable of doing this, and of providing, for example, 30 times more military aid in value than France, because it has given itself the means to do so for several decades instead of constantly reducing them. They have stocks and their defence industry is industry, not luxury craftsmanship. By comparison, the total planned order for the very expensive Medium Range Missile (MRM) to equip the French forces corresponds to about one week of combat in Ukraine.
Note the extension of the theory of victory, which is no longer only to make Vladimir Putin give up in front of the staggering cost of this war for Russia (a strategy that has never worked on its own) or internal pressure (from the people or from its administrative-mafia oligarchy, a very risky option) but also now to defeat, or even destroy, the Russian army on the ground. Historically, and particularly in Russia, it is the military situation on the ground that determines what happens next. The Tsarist regime collapsed first of all because of the defeat and demoralisation of its army, and the Soviet regime also collapsed after the unfortunate experiences in Africa and especially in Afghanistan, in parallel with the disintegration of society.
Operational level
The Russian effort was always directed from the Yzioum-Lyman-Rubizhne axis, a 100 km wide front, towards Severodonetsk in the east and towards Sloviansk-Kramatorsk in the west, from Yzium and Lyman. This attack is supported by secondary attacks, from Yzium towards Velyka, to cover the main action facing west, and from Kadiivka (Luhansk People's Republic, LPR) to envelop Severodonetsk from the south, particularly at Novotoshkivske (captured) and Popasna, before presumably moving towards Bakhmut and Kramatorsk.
Winning the battle of the Donbass is equivalent to taking a rectangle of 100 km of frontage and 70 km of depth, the size of a French department, in which the three major cities are located. This area is currently defended by the Ukrainians with five manoeuvre brigades, two territorial brigades and several National Guard and militia battalions, roughly the equivalent of 20 Russian battle groups. The estimated concentration of Russian forces in the area is 30-40 BGs. The Russian forces rely on their artillery and 600,000 shells/day capacity, and the Ukrainian forces on the tactical superiority of their manoeuvre units, fortified terrain and, above all, on the large urban strongholds equivalent to Mariupol. All other things being equal, it would take Russian forces between two and three months at the current rate to capture this rectangle.
But things are not otherwise equal. Russian forces are combining this effort with attacks along the border of the two separatist republics from Horlivak and Donetsk, and then in the southern Dnieper area of Donetsk PR with little success, except partially in the centre at Huliaopole. It is difficult to imagine a wider advance in the region without reinforcements in manoeuvre units.
On the other hand, there was a great deal of Russian activity in the Kherson region north of the Dnieper, first with fire and then perhaps with new attacks in the direction of Mykolayev and or Kryvyi Rih. Perhaps this activity can be linked to the alerting of the 14th Army in Transdniestria and the destruction of the Zatova bridge at the mouth of the Dniester River, which would be aimed at securing the Ukrainian forces in Odessa, and in particular the 5th Armoured Brigade, during the attack on Mykolayev. However, it is not clear how the Russians could advance with the forces they have. Perhaps it is a matter of securing the eventual referendum to create a Kherson People's Republic (KPR) before having the equivalent in Melitopol, and thus politically fixing the Russian military gains.
In Mariupol, the last Ukrainian forces are still holding out in the Azov industrial complex, despite continued aerial bombardment and attacks. Despite this stronghold of several square kilometres inside the city, victory - which will be celebrated with a military ceremony on 9 May - and a return to "normal life" are announced in Russia.
The situation remains unchanged in the Kharkiv region, which is still being shelled as Ukrainian forces have advanced north and west of the city.
Efforts were made on both sides to hinder enemy communications to the front. Russian air forces attacked Ukrainian railway infrastructure and there were several reports of mysterious destruction of depots on Russian soil and even an attack from the air in Voronezh north-east of Moscow.
Tactical level
The oryxspioenkop.com tally of material losses shows 587 Russian armoured fighting vehicles (tanks, infantry vehicles) lost from the 5th (final end of the Battle of Kiev) to the 28th of April, out of a total of 1,622, equating to the equipping of one battle group (40 armoured fighting vehicles) every two days, compared to one BG per day previously. These are only the verified casualties, the actual losses can be estimated to be about 50% higher. The proportion of destroyed vehicles is now 2/3 and the proportion of abandoned vehicles is much reduced. The Russians lost only 72 artillery pieces in April, compared with twice as many previously, and 200 trucks compared with 600. This evolution reflects the disaster that the battle of Kiev represented for the Russians - transformed into a diversionary operation by the propaganda - and the evolution of the fighting.
The high proportion of support vehicles, including artillery and support pieces, lost indicates that the rear of the Russian armies were under attack, due to the elongation of the Russian armies, sometimes spread over narrow axes of several hundred kilometres, and due to the raiding and harassment capabilities of the Ukrainian forces. The current Russian attacks in the Donbass or the Kherson region are less deep and wider. Little progress is being made, but the density of forces at the front is greater and protection of the rear is better.
There were also 382 combat vehicles lost on the Ukrainian side, an average of 5 per day, which has been fairly constant since the beginning. Again, the ratio of destruction to capture and abandonment losses has increased. The casualty ratio - 1:4 - is still very much in favour of the Ukrainians, including casualties from destruction. A precise study of the causes of destruction would be needed, but this difference is largely explained by the Ukrainians' tactical superiority and general defensive posture, which allows them to take the initiative in the vast majority of cases and a high density of top-down anti-tank weapons - Javelin missiles, guided shells, TB2 drones, rodent drones, rockets fired from buildings - that is, capable of hitting vehicles from above.
To deal with this immediately, the Russian forces rely on firepower and the prior neutralisation of possible or actual areas of origin of fire. Artillery conquers, armoured-mechanised forces occupy. The result was a very slow and devastating battle.
It should be noted that, in addition to the resistance of the men, the continuation of the fighting was only possible because the two adversaries had major stocks of equipment, which compensated for the considerable losses, but also, to a lesser extent, of ammunition. This is perhaps the Achilles heel of both sides. The Russians need millions of shells, the Ukrainians thousands of anti-tank projectiles of all kinds.
www.navyrecognition.com
