Ukraine - Russia Conflict

Igor Girkin returns to roast Shoygu in his latest long Telegram post

Igor Girkin who has remained relatively quiet in the past couple of weeks after his debacle and an alleged attempt to enter Ukraine through Crimea, comes back with a long-winded post on his Telegram channel, once again throwing shade at the Russian Minister of Defence who is claimed to be “pushing for mobilisation in Russia while the president is firmly against it”.

In the post, Girkin first goes over the results of the third “Effective” stage of the SMO, claiming that it has now slowly became the fourth “preserve the civilian population of Ukraine” stage:

In the last couple of weeks, a topic has emerged on the Internet that is becoming more widespread, it has a nominal name: “Shoygu is not to blame for anything, he is doing all his best to win the war (insisting on holding the necessary mobilisation measures for this), but Putin personally interferes with him.” Apparently – this topic is being heavily thrown in and pushed through. And it is especially receiving a push right now, when Ramzan Akhmadovich [Kadyrov] reiterated his readiness to “quickly take Kyiv at any moment, if there is such an opportunity” (quoting closely, not exactly).

Since my deepest sympathies for the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (sometimes reaching enthusiastic admiration) are widely known, and for half a year I have been restrained from even more hysterical reverence for the president by the firmly observed promise “not until the war is over,” I consider myself entitled to try and act as an “arbitrator” (don’t take it as impudence!) in this (to use the words of respected Vitaly “Afrika”) “dance of shadows on the ashes”, which the anonymous force behind the above “stuffing” is trying to present to us.

So, very briefly about the current military situation:

1. The third (“Effective” – R.A. Kadyrov) stage of the SMO, in just three weeks since its start smoothly became the 4th (“saving the civilian population by slowing down the pace of the operation” – by S.K. Shoigu personally);

2. In fact, all the “effectiveness” of the 3rd stage ended with insignificant (but costly) tactical advances near Donetsk, culminating in the capture of the Peski urban settlement. On the Kherson front, there was an “exchange” – ours advanced 5 km to Mykolaiv from Snigirevka, ukrs captured two villages and a bridgehead on the Inuglets River between Snigirevka and Davydov Brod. On other fronts also, in general, the frontline has not changed.

3. During the summer, the enemy sharply (by many times) increased the number of missile and unmanned strikes against the deep and close rear areas of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDPR, achieving new successes, now quite comparable (in terms of damage) with missile strikes on their own territory received from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the beginning of the SMO. Thus, in this respect, the RF Armed Forces have lost “exclusive superiority”, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine have achieved a certain parity. Sad but true.


Concluding on the result of these stages Girkin believes that Russian Federation has lost the initiative and failed to reach the stated goals of the third stage, which in fact has lead to Ukraine strengthening its position in the war despite issues with replenishment of troops. He then moves on to pronounce how the narrative of Shoygu being capable of producing any results and mobilising the country are completely false:

Based on this, it can be concluded that within the framework of the SMO, the Russian command not only failed to achieve the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but even the complete displacement of the enemy forces from the territory of the DPR using available forces fell into the category of “hopeful dreams.” It is clear that new offensive attempts will be made and may even lead to new tactical successes, but on the whole, a balance has developed on the frontline. And the “scales” on the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are now very slowly but steadily outweighing the Russian.

Both sides are experiencing problems with the replenishment of troops and their growing demotivation, however, in the context of the overall numerical superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this problem is less critical for them than for the RF Armed Forces.

Another thing is that the Russian Federation, indeed, has not yet decided to fight at full strength and has not even tried to carry out limited mobilisation measures at the front and in the rear, which (only in theory and of course far from immediately) can sharply incline the “scales” in our direction.

And now we return to our beloved minister’s allegedly acute urge to “achieve this very mobilisation” and his “attempts” to convince the “unyielding supreme leader” to announce it.

So, I think this version is a complete and absolute lie. At least even looking at what activities the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is taking right now to replenish troops without mobilisation. And right now, instead of replenishing the extremely tired and already seasoned (that is, those who have learned to fight in the current difficult conditions) front-line units (which could dramatically increase their morale and combat effectiveness in general), Mr. Shoygu’s department is feverishly forming in all regions of the Russian Federation the “volunteer named battalions”, which, once they get to the front, will inevitably be if not defeated in the very first battles (just like now our troops are beating units of the “territorial defense”), then they will inevitably suffer huge unjustified losses – simply due to the general “dampness” and inexperience of the personnel. And it is not a fact that after these “cruel lessons” and huge losses the “named volunteers” will not start to running much faster than the fighters of PMCs and line contract units are doing now.

Thus, we are talking about either the same “advanced cretinism”, or about … the sabotage I have repeatedly mentioned. (I agree to the presence and “symbiosis” of both of these motives).

But, let’s say, we are talking simply about progressive idiocy and the desire of the thoroughly ineffective army elite to “just create as many colonel and general command / staff positions as possible.” Let it be.

But after all, in the event of mobilisation, our Russian society will face a logical question: “But how is that!? We were defeating everyone for six months! And suddenly mobilisation is required? Konashenkov has been lying to us all this time?!?!” To this question – like it or not, something will need to be answered. And “organisational conclusions” must be made. And who will be the first candidate for “organisational conclusions”? What do you think? Konashenkov? Hardly!

Or, perhaps, do you think that Vladimir Vladimirovich himself will appear on TV and ask “to be treated with understanding”, taking the blame on himself? I highly doubt it.


Girkin continues his criticism of Shoygu once again bringing up the argument that any decent general would have already resigned after failing to achieve their stated goals:

Sergei Kuzhugetovich will certainly become the first and main candidate “to fly out”. “By the totality of merit”, so to speak … He will be remembered everything, all the “2000 drones”, and “unparalleled” tanks / aircraft / missiles (in numbers that can be counted on the fingers), and an amazing selection of leading military personnel, and general supply of troops, etc., etc.

Does our wonderful minister want such an ending? I doubt. Therefore, I’m practically sure that he will “pull the cat by the tail” to the end, reporting to the president that “just a little more, just a little more – and the enemy will break down and sue for peace! be patient a little!” And – since our president is most of all inclined to “do nothing and wait until something happens…” – then such assurances fall on fertile ground. Well, I think so….

And, yes, if you imagine for a moment that Sergei Kuzhugetovich really “like a lion is fighting for the national-state interests of Russia” and daily reports to the president the full truth about what is happening at the front, supplementing it with the words: “I strongly beg you to immediately mobilise, until it’s not too late!” – then why he did not resign, offering it as the most serious and obvious argument, not wanting to take responsibility for the impending disaster? (I remind you that in my eyes, the protracted war in the so-called Ukraine “was and will be a catastrophe that can lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation, which I wrote about many times for many years in a row).

But right after his resignation – Sergei Kuzhugetovich, as a seasoned experienced politician (well, he’s not a military man, really?) – could (“dressed in all white”) go to the media platform and mournfully declare: “I did everything I could, but since it was not possible to convince Vladimir Vladimirovich to mobilise and introduce martial law – I wash my hands of it!”

But Sergei Kuzhugetovich will never do this. Since the word “Honour” for him is nothing more than an abstract concept, but “Authority” is an utterly understandable and quite tangible thing. And for the sake of some kind of “honour” he would not even think of sacrificing authority, while to “playing an honest man” in any way convincingly, there’s not enough brains for that.


It appears as if Girkin’s scare has gone away and we are going to see more of his posts in the near future.
 
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Igor Girkin returns to roast Shoygu in his latest long Telegram post

Igor Girkin who has remained relatively quiet in the past couple of weeks after his debacle and an alleged attempt to enter Ukraine through Crimea, comes back with a long-winded post on his Telegram channel, once again throwing shade at the Russian Minister of Defence who is claimed to be “pushing for mobilisation in Russia while the president is firmly against it”.

In the post, Girkin first goes over the results of the third “Effective” stage of the SMO, claiming that it has now slowly became the fourth “preserve the civilian population of Ukraine” stage:

In the last couple of weeks, a topic has emerged on the Internet that is becoming more widespread, it has a nominal name: “Shoygu is not to blame for anything, he is doing all his best to win the war (insisting on holding the necessary mobilisation measures for this), but Putin personally interferes with him.” Apparently – this topic is being heavily thrown in and pushed through. And it is especially receiving a push right now, when Ramzan Akhmadovich [Kadyrov] reiterated his readiness to “quickly take Kyiv at any moment, if there is such an opportunity” (quoting closely, not exactly).

Since my deepest sympathies for the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (sometimes reaching enthusiastic admiration) are widely known, and for half a year I have been restrained from even more hysterical reverence for the president by the firmly observed promise “not until the war is over,” I consider myself entitled to try and act as an “arbitrator” (don’t take it as impudence!) in this (to use the words of respected Vitaly “Afrika”) “dance of shadows on the ashes”, which the anonymous force behind the above “stuffing” is trying to present to us.

So, very briefly about the current military situation:

1. The third (“Effective” – R.A. Kadyrov) stage of the SMO, in just three weeks since its start smoothly became the 4th (“saving the civilian population by slowing down the pace of the operation” – by S.K. Shoigu personally);

2. In fact, all the “effectiveness” of the 3rd stage ended with insignificant (but costly) tactical advances near Donetsk, culminating in the capture of the Peski urban settlement. On the Kherson front, there was an “exchange” – ours advanced 5 km to Mykolaiv from Snigirevka, ukrs captured two villages and a bridgehead on the Inuglets River between Snigirevka and Davydov Brod. On other fronts also, in general, the frontline has not changed.

3. During the summer, the enemy sharply (by many times) increased the number of missile and unmanned strikes against the deep and close rear areas of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDPR, achieving new successes, now quite comparable (in terms of damage) with missile strikes on their own territory received from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the beginning of the SMO. Thus, in this respect, the RF Armed Forces have lost “exclusive superiority”, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine have achieved a certain parity. Sad but true.


Concluding on the result of these stages Girkin believes that Russian Federation has lost the initiative and failed to reach the stated goals of the third stage, which in fact has lead to Ukraine strengthening its position in the war despite issues with replenishment of troops. He then moves on to pronounce how the narrative of Shoygu being capable of producing any results and mobilising the country are completely false:

Based on this, it can be concluded that within the framework of the SMO, the Russian command not only failed to achieve the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but even the complete displacement of the enemy forces from the territory of the DPR using available forces fell into the category of “hopeful dreams.” It is clear that new offensive attempts will be made and may even lead to new tactical successes, but on the whole, a balance has developed on the frontline. And the “scales” on the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are now very slowly but steadily outweighing the Russian.

Both sides are experiencing problems with the replenishment of troops and their growing demotivation, however, in the context of the overall numerical superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this problem is less critical for them than for the RF Armed Forces.

Another thing is that the Russian Federation, indeed, has not yet decided to fight at full strength and has not even tried to carry out limited mobilisation measures at the front and in the rear, which (only in theory and of course far from immediately) can sharply incline the “scales” in our direction.

And now we return to our beloved minister’s allegedly acute urge to “achieve this very mobilisation” and his “attempts” to convince the “unyielding supreme leader” to announce it.

So, I think this version is a complete and absolute lie. At least even looking at what activities the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is taking right now to replenish troops without mobilisation. And right now, instead of replenishing the extremely tired and already seasoned (that is, those who have learned to fight in the current difficult conditions) front-line units (which could dramatically increase their morale and combat effectiveness in general), Mr. Shoygu’s department is feverishly forming in all regions of the Russian Federation the “volunteer named battalions”, which, once they get to the front, will inevitably be if not defeated in the very first battles (just like now our troops are beating units of the “territorial defense”), then they will inevitably suffer huge unjustified losses – simply due to the general “dampness” and inexperience of the personnel. And it is not a fact that after these “cruel lessons” and huge losses the “named volunteers” will not start to running much faster than the fighters of PMCs and line contract units are doing now.

Thus, we are talking about either the same “advanced cretinism”, or about … the sabotage I have repeatedly mentioned. (I agree to the presence and “symbiosis” of both of these motives).

But, let’s say, we are talking simply about progressive idiocy and the desire of the thoroughly ineffective army elite to “just create as many colonel and general command / staff positions as possible.” Let it be.

But after all, in the event of mobilisation, our Russian society will face a logical question: “But how is that!? We were defeating everyone for six months! And suddenly mobilisation is required? Konashenkov has been lying to us all this time?!?!” To this question – like it or not, something will need to be answered. And “organisational conclusions” must be made. And who will be the first candidate for “organisational conclusions”? What do you think? Konashenkov? Hardly!

Or, perhaps, do you think that Vladimir Vladimirovich himself will appear on TV and ask “to be treated with understanding”, taking the blame on himself? I highly doubt it.


Girkin continues his criticism of Shoygu once again bringing up the argument that any decent general would have already resigned after failing to achieve their stated goals:

Sergei Kuzhugetovich will certainly become the first and main candidate “to fly out”. “By the totality of merit”, so to speak … He will be remembered everything, all the “2000 drones”, and “unparalleled” tanks / aircraft / missiles (in numbers that can be counted on the fingers), and an amazing selection of leading military personnel, and general supply of troops, etc., etc.

Does our wonderful minister want such an ending? I doubt. Therefore, I’m practically sure that he will “pull the cat by the tail” to the end, reporting to the president that “just a little more, just a little more – and the enemy will break down and sue for peace! be patient a little!” And – since our president is most of all inclined to “do nothing and wait until something happens…” – then such assurances fall on fertile ground. Well, I think so….

And, yes, if you imagine for a moment that Sergei Kuzhugetovich really “like a lion is fighting for the national-state interests of Russia” and daily reports to the president the full truth about what is happening at the front, supplementing it with the words: “I strongly beg you to immediately mobilise, until it’s not too late!” – then why he did not resign, offering it as the most serious and obvious argument, not wanting to take responsibility for the impending disaster? (I remind you that in my eyes, the protracted war in the so-called Ukraine “was and will be a catastrophe that can lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation, which I wrote about many times for many years in a row).

But right after his resignation – Sergei Kuzhugetovich, as a seasoned experienced politician (well, he’s not a military man, really?) – could (“dressed in all white”) go to the media platform and mournfully declare: “I did everything I could, but since it was not possible to convince Vladimir Vladimirovich to mobilise and introduce martial law – I wash my hands of it!”

But Sergei Kuzhugetovich will never do this. Since the word “Honour” for him is nothing more than an abstract concept, but “Authority” is an utterly understandable and quite tangible thing. And for the sake of some kind of “honour” he would not even think of sacrificing authority, while to “playing an honest man” in any way convincingly, there’s not enough brains for that.


It appears as if Girkin’s scare has gone away and we are going to see more of his posts in the near future.
What many don't realise is that full mobilisation means more people but not that much more equipment. Sending in more people without more tanks and artillery will just increase Russian deaths. Both sides are limiting the deployment of manpower for this very reason. WWI was a classic example of this, far more manpower than tanks and artillery being thrown over trench tops, result = lots of deaths.

Russia also needs to hold back military to maintain the stability of Russia itself.
 
What many don't realise is that full mobilisation means more people but not that much more equipment. Sending in more people without more tanks and artillery will just increase Russian deaths. Both sides are limiting the deployment of manpower for this very reason. WWI was a classic example of this, far more manpower than tanks and artillery being thrown over trench tops, result = lots of deaths.

Russia also needs to hold back military to maintain the stability of Russia itself.
Against earthen fortifications artillery works, you just have to be close enough to be accurate enough.

Against the bunkers of more solid surfaces and other fortified houses, the Russians use their thermobaric ATGM quite massively.

The small problem is that unlike in Syria or a siege, the Ukrainian lines are still quite elastic ... so an undermining job could be costly and come to nothing as the position could be abandoned before the sappers even get close.

During the cold war the tactic against fortified positions was to spray with bomblets to foul the ground and prevent the infantry from moving ... then artillery covering an assault to nail the residual infantry fixed.

The big problem in Russian tactics is the difficulty to concretize their domination by fire. And that's where the human means are lacking: they don't have a sufficient level of infantry which means that despite the attrition in the Ukrainian ranks, they only timidly engage assault means to take the positions, largely bombed, and prefer to wait for the enemy to retreat "of its own" under pressure, when the position becomes indefensible following the manoeuvre. Obviously this takes a long time.
 
Against earthen fortifications artillery works, you just have to be close enough to be accurate enough.

Against the bunkers of more solid surfaces and other fortified houses, the Russians use their thermobaric ATGM quite massively.

The small problem is that unlike in Syria or a siege, the Ukrainian lines are still quite elastic ... so an undermining job could be costly and come to nothing as the position could be abandoned before the sappers even get close.

During the cold war the tactic against fortified positions was to spray with bomblets to foul the ground and prevent the infantry from moving ... then artillery covering an assault to nail the residual infantry fixed.

The big problem in Russian tactics is the difficulty to concretize their domination by fire. And that's where the human means are lacking: they don't have a sufficient level of infantry which means that despite the attrition in the Ukrainian ranks, they only timidly engage assault means to take the positions, largely bombed, and prefer to wait for the enemy to retreat "of its own" under pressure, when the position becomes indefensible following the manoeuvre. Obviously this takes a long time.
I think they have enough manpower, it's just that manpower doesn't last long whilst advancing. WWI scenario basically, except worse. Advancing across opening ground against dug in positions and artillery is just suicide. In a trench that's properly dug, with zig-zags and sheltered T-junction pockets, artillery has to have metric accuracy to do the job, otherwise it just sprays dirt on the enemy. Ukrainian trench personal are also well schooled in using remote and indirect firing means without being above the trench line, e.g. drones to correct artillery and drop bombs, mortars, 105mm light guns integrated into the trench, remote Stugna-P launchers etc. They can remain lethal without being above the trench. An advancing enemy also has to run a gauntlet of mines, which can be sewn via MLRS systems without anyone going out there. Ukraine have broadly succeeded in phase II, which is drawing the enemy advance to a standstill or near standstill, phase I being defending Kyiv. Phase III now begins, which is maintaining the current situation for long enough for Russia to either see sense (unlikely), go bankrupt and/or disintegrate. Part of phase III will include an increasing amount of partisan action in Ukraine and elsewhere to weaken Russian morale, prevent Russia 'setting up shop' or establishing control, and to generally expedite the Russia going bankrupt part.

The war is already at a stage where it's clear that nobody can win military, a diplomatic end is impossible given the combination of inherent hatred and ridiculous demands, so it will become about money and funding the war. Putin is hoping that he can weaken support for Ukraine by cutting off energy supplies this winter, so when it gets to the end of March 2023 and he realises this hasn't happened, it will put him in a very difficult position politically - a man with no plan.
 
What many don't realise is that full mobilisation means more people but not that much more equipment. Sending in more people without more tanks and artillery will just increase Russian deaths. Both sides are limiting the deployment of manpower for this very reason. WWI was a classic example of this, far more manpower than tanks and artillery being thrown over trench tops, result = lots of deaths.

Russia also needs to hold back military to maintain the stability of Russia itself.
Paddy, a sincere advice to you. Do you actually read what you post? Why don't you perform the following exercise for the benefit of our mental health which is sorely but surely being damaged by your posts?!

Ask yourself whether you're merely adding to the clutter or is your post going to make a difference & if so how?

What is the quality of analysis you're undertaking?

Type down your response but don't post it , walk the dog & remember not to shit on the sidewalk & embarass the dog, return home & check out your draft, take a deep breath & I'm sure you'd delete 90% of what you want to inflict us with. I mean look at this thread. It contains thousands of posts, nearly 90% of which is made by you, nearly all of which are tweets or the occasional farticle mostly from Yahoos on Yahoo & the rare occasion you analyse this is what you come up with.

Stop spamming the site!! If we wanted tweets, there are bots which could do a better job of it than you.

Russia isn't escalating not because it can't but because it doesn't want to & it's not for the fanciful reasons you've ascribed. It's merely because they know the sanctions the West has imposed is here to stay , the high prices of oil & gas is ephemeral coz alternatives being developed is the only way forward thus nullifying this major advantage they enjoy in these commodities running their economy but that's a decade or more into the future.

Right now, the bigger the premium they get the more it'd help them in the years to come.
The US thinks it has crippled Russia courtesy those sanctions so much so that from getting nations to curtail their imports from Russia they've only now realised their mistake & are looking to cap the prices on such imports . Good luck to them .

Well this is how Russia responds, by prolonging the war, ensuring high gas prices, encashing the premium while laughing at European impotence. In other words those sanctions are working both ways, they're crippling Russia but not by much but also Europe which is definitely damaging to their economy.

If it means sacrificing a few thousand soldiers more to prolong the war , so be it. Putin enjoys the unwavering support of the masses irrespective of the propaganda you've been subject to & which you've come to believe. All those Russians who may hate Putin have sunk their differences to rally behind him. That's the way most rational countries behave & contrary to your beliefs Russia is a rational country.

You want to cripple Russia, you start pouring gas & oil into the market. Get Iran , Venezuela among other nations to bring their supplies in, prices will cool off, since the OPEC cartel won't oblige you or will pay your demand lip service. The moment you do that, Russia will begin to employ massive force & accomplish it's objectives , for prolonging the war then will mean further damage to their economy unlike the situation now.
 
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India cut its purchases of Russian crude for the first time in 5 months and switched to Saudi Arabia's cheaper oil​

India slashed its purchases of Russian crude in July for the first time since March this year in the face of cheaper Saudi oil, Reuters reported.

Oil shipments to India averaged 877,400 barrels per day from Russia last month. That's about a 7.3% decline from June.

Meanwhile, India oil imports from Saudi Arabia rose by 25.6% in July to their highest in three months, Reuters said. Imports reached 824,700 barrels per day after Riyadh reduced its official selling price to Asian customers in June and July.

India and China are the largest importers of Russian crude right now, as Western sanctions on Moscow have deterred buyers in markets like Europe and slashed the value of its oil. Exports of Russian oil to Asia have reeled in stunning revenues for the country where it is expected to generate $285 billion this year from its oil and gas sales.

But appetite for Russian crude appears to be shrinking as a pickup in prices for Russian crude fueled by strong demand wards off some of its most eager buyers. Last week, Russia crude exports to Asia fell to their lowest level since the war, with daily flows dropping below 2 million barrels per day.

At the same time, Russia is tapping into new markets to export its oil where Bloomberg cited data showing Russian tankers were headed for Sri Lanka and Egypt.

Saudi Arabia is not the only oil producer luring in more Asian buyers however. Cheaper US crude is also attracting refiners in South Korea and India in a sign that competition between the world's largest oil producers is heating up.
 
Russia moving S-300s from Syria to Ukraine. Clearly they are running low.