Ukraine - Russia Conflict

This article deserves to be taken seriously, with one caveat: Stubb is offering a political interpretation based on recent Ukrainian figures, not a definitive, independent assessment.

The strongest point is that Stubb did indeed say this at Brookings on April 13: a casualty ratio of 1:5, approximately 150 to 157 Russian soldiers killed per square kilometer, and a Ukraine that he considers “in a much better position than at any previous stage of the war.” The Brookings transcript and corroborating reports make this clear.

The second solid point is that the 95% attributed to drones did not come out of thin air. Stubb did indeed cite this figure, and it fits a documented trend: Reuters had already reported in August 2025, via Fedorov, that 80 to 90% of Russian targets struck were hit by drones, and then other sources in early 2026 cited figures of over 80%. So 95% is a higher estimate, but not inconsistent with Ukraine’s recent trajectory.

The third solid point is the figure of 33,000 enemy drones destroyed in March. It is clearly cited by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, by Fedorov, and reported by CEPA and other media outlets. It is therefore not a baseless rumor.

Where caution is needed is regarding the analytical significance of these figures. The 1:5 ratio is much more favorable to Ukraine than the CSIS’s earlier estimates, which were closer to 1:2 to 1:2.5. This could mean three things at once: Ukrainian drones have genuinely improved the attrition ratio, the period under observation is particularly favorable to Kyiv, and Stubb is also selecting the most politically advantageous figures.

So, if we take this seriously, the correct conclusion would be:

1. Attrition appears to have worsened significantly for Russia.
If the 1:5 ratio is even roughly accurate for the recent period, this means the war is costing Moscow far more in terms of manpower than before.

2. Ukrainian drone superiority has likely become a defining factor, not a marginal one.
The figures on destruction, interceptions, and drone loss rates all point in this direction.

3. This reinforces the idea that the war is becoming a war of attrition rather than one of breakthrough.
Whoever best replaces their losses—their drones, their lines of communication, and their units—retains the advantage, even without a major, spectacular offensive.

4. If Ukraine today needs less “American-style” Western support than at the start, it is because it is better at converting the aid it receives into attrition gains.

And the article’s final point should not be overlooked either: Stubb emphasizes Ukraine’s ability to strike at a range of 3,000 km. Even if this isn’t the core of the paper, it means he sees not only a Ukraine that is better at defense, but also a Ukraine that is better at projecting a threat.

So my assessment would be:

This is an important signal.
Not because every figure is gospel.
But because, taken together, these figures all tell the same story: Ukraine today seems better able than ever before to use drone technology to wear down Russian forces.

And if this holds true over several months, then:
the inexorable advance is no longer inexorable.

Western media has always reported a higher casualty rate for Russia. That bit has never changed since day 1.


But there's never been a single instance of Ukraine handing over more bodies to Russia. One would assume all those failed Russian offensives will see Russian bodies right at their doorstep. But it's the Russians clearing all the bodies and handing them over.

Closer to reality.

The Kremlin allows the public to report individual deaths. And with wartime deaths related to massive compensation, it's quite likely that families are reporting it publicly to ensure swift payments.

Russia's contract recruitments are falling too.

Although Western media is portraying it negatively, it looks more like they are approaching their final numbers for their newly raised army units. Putin did say all new units will be fully raised by 2027.
 
Western media has always reported a higher casualty rate for Russia. That bit has never changed since day 1.

Ukraine yes, they have higher figures, NATO no, their figures are correct.
But there's never been a single instance of Ukraine handing over more bodies to Russia. One would assume all those failed Russian offensives will see Russian bodies right at their doorstep. But it's the Russians clearing all the bodies and handing them over.
Russia is moving forward, so dead Russians end up on Russian side of frontline.
Closer to reality.
Nah, named dead are only a percentage.

Russia is suffering "crazy losses" in Ukraine, tallying around 65,000 soldiers over the last two months, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on Saturday at the Munich Security Conference.
The Kremlin allows the public to report individual deaths. And with wartime deaths related to massive compensation, it's quite likely that families are reporting it publicly to ensure swift payments.
If they have family.


At present it's about 1.4 million total casualties including ~400,000 dead.
 
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Western media has always reported a higher casualty rate for Russia. That bit has never changed since day 1.


But there's never been a single instance of Ukraine handing over more bodies to Russia. One would assume all those failed Russian offensives will see Russian bodies right at their doorstep. But it's the Russians clearing all the bodies and handing them over.

Closer to reality.

The Kremlin allows the public to report individual deaths. And with wartime deaths related to massive compensation, it's quite likely that families are reporting it publicly to ensure swift payments.

Russia's contract recruitments are falling too.

Although Western media is portraying it negatively, it looks more like they are approaching their final numbers for their newly raised army units. Putin did say all new units will be fully raised by 2027.
The strong point is this: body exchanges are not a clean proxy for total battlefield losses. They are shaped by where fighting happens, who controls the ground after an attack, whether remains can be recovered under fire, and each side’s administrative choices. So it is true that “Russia handed over more Ukrainian bodies” does not by itself prove Ukraine lost more men overall. Reuters and other reporting on recent exchanges show large asymmetries in specific transfers, but that only tells you about those transfers, not total war losses. For example, on 9 April Russia handed over 1,000 bodies said to be Ukrainian in exchange for 41 Russian bodies, while Red Cross-facilitated exchanges overall have reportedly been running at roughly 1,000 bodies a month each way.

Where I would push back is the implied conclusion that therefore Western reporting of higher Russian losses is mostly narrative. There is a wider body of evidence behind that view: repeated failed Russian offensives, open-source visual confirmation of equipment losses, Western intelligence estimates, and Russian recruitment pressure. Even sources sympathetic to Moscow acknowledge that Russia is relying heavily on contract recruitment and other replenishment mechanisms to sustain a very high casualty burn rate. ISW’s recent assessments say Russian recruitment has fallen below estimated casualty rates in early 2026, and Russian universities have reportedly been pressured to feed personnel into drone and military units.


On the specific point that “the Kremlin allows the public to report deaths because compensation is large,” that is plausible as a mechanism, but it cuts both ways. Public reporting can indeed help families secure payments, yet it can also mean the open record is incomplete, geographically uneven, and biased toward places where local reporting is still possible. It is useful evidence, but not a full census.

On “contract recruitment is falling because Russia is nearing final manning targets for new units by 2027,” that is possible, but it is only one interpretation. Another is the simpler one: recruitment is getting harder because the war is long, casualties are high, and the pool of willing volunteers is getting thinner. Recent open-source assessments lean more toward that second explanation than toward the comforting idea that Moscow is calmly approaching planned end-strength.
 
The strong point is this: body exchanges are not a clean proxy for total battlefield losses. They are shaped by where fighting happens, who controls the ground after an attack, whether remains can be recovered under fire, and each side’s administrative choices. So it is true that “Russia handed over more Ukrainian bodies” does not by itself prove Ukraine lost more men overall. Reuters and other reporting on recent exchanges show large asymmetries in specific transfers, but that only tells you about those transfers, not total war losses. For example, on 9 April Russia handed over 1,000 bodies said to be Ukrainian in exchange for 41 Russian bodies, while Red Cross-facilitated exchanges overall have reportedly been running at roughly 1,000 bodies a month each way.

Where I would push back is the implied conclusion that therefore Western reporting of higher Russian losses is mostly narrative. There is a wider body of evidence behind that view: repeated failed Russian offensives, open-source visual confirmation of equipment losses, Western intelligence estimates, and Russian recruitment pressure. Even sources sympathetic to Moscow acknowledge that Russia is relying heavily on contract recruitment and other replenishment mechanisms to sustain a very high casualty burn rate. ISW’s recent assessments say Russian recruitment has fallen below estimated casualty rates in early 2026, and Russian universities have reportedly been pressured to feed personnel into drone and military units.


On the specific point that “the Kremlin allows the public to report deaths because compensation is large,” that is plausible as a mechanism, but it cuts both ways. Public reporting can indeed help families secure payments, yet it can also mean the open record is incomplete, geographically uneven, and biased toward places where local reporting is still possible. It is useful evidence, but not a full census.

On “contract recruitment is falling because Russia is nearing final manning targets for new units by 2027,” that is possible, but it is only one interpretation. Another is the simpler one: recruitment is getting harder because the war is long, casualties are high, and the pool of willing volunteers is getting thinner. Recent open-source assessments lean more toward that second explanation than toward the comforting idea that Moscow is calmly approaching planned end-strength.

Western AIs focus on Western narratives.

Red Cross facilitating thousand bodies each month is the one we are referring to, and it's pretty much one-sided. You can see how words can be manipulated using incomplete information. If the Russians are the ones handing over the bodies consistently every month, that's absolutely not good news for Ukrainians. It shows greater concern for the dead by Russians than Ukrainians. It shows Ukrainians are being abandoned inside kill zones, leaving the cleanup to the Russians. That's a losing strategy. Goodbye morale for the soldiers who are actually doing the fighting and actually know the ground situation.

A US major on the frontline by the name of Stanislav Krapivnik reports extremely high desertion rates for the Ukrainians.

As much as 40,000 according to this article. A Ukrainian MP reports 400,000.

This is far higher than what's been reported for Russia. What's managed by Western media and actually verified information like bodies exchanged present two different pictures.

As for death reporting in Russia, the Russians have over 80% smartphone penetration, and it's a given that family members connected to soldiers who have been paid large signing bonuses are likely to be tech savvy. It's silly to assume they cannot report missing and dead kin. Rather, it's more likely that the reporting is inflated and there are more fake claims than real. That's probably why claims are verified via images and videos of funerals along with proper identification of the soldiers.

As for lower signings, what it means is the govt is signing lesser contracts. We don't know if it's due to a supply problem or a demand problem. Sure, since the war is still going on, we can give the West the benefit of the doubt, but this also means things aren't going well for Ukraine either. At least we know that while the Ukrainians are focusing all of their efforts on reinforcing the frontline, the Russians are focusing on raising new units and reinforcing the frontline while also training conscripts. Ukraine's struggling with numbers and the Defense Ministry has asked for 2 million new recruits. All of this ties into things being way worse for Ukraine.
 
Western AIs focus on Western narratives.

Red Cross facilitating thousand bodies each month is the one we are referring to, and it's pretty much one-sided. You can see how words can be manipulated using incomplete information. If the Russians are the ones handing over the bodies consistently every month, that's absolutely not good news for Ukrainians. It shows greater concern for the dead by Russians than Ukrainians. It shows Ukrainians are being abandoned inside kill zones, leaving the cleanup to the Russians. That's a losing strategy. Goodbye morale for the soldiers who are actually doing the fighting and actually know the ground situation.

A US major on the frontline by the name of Stanislav Krapivnik reports extremely high desertion rates for the Ukrainians.

As much as 40,000 according to this article. A Ukrainian MP reports 400,000.

This is far higher than what's been reported for Russia. What's managed by Western media and actually verified information like bodies exchanged present two different pictures.

As for death reporting in Russia, the Russians have over 80% smartphone penetration, and it's a given that family members connected to soldiers who have been paid large signing bonuses are likely to be tech savvy. It's silly to assume they cannot report missing and dead kin. Rather, it's more likely that the reporting is inflated and there are more fake claims than real. That's probably why claims are verified via images and videos of funerals along with proper identification of the soldiers.

As for lower signings, what it means is the govt is signing lesser contracts. We don't know if it's due to a supply problem or a demand problem. Sure, since the war is still going on, we can give the West the benefit of the doubt, but this also means things aren't going well for Ukraine either. At least we know that while the Ukrainians are focusing all of their efforts on reinforcing the frontline, the Russians are focusing on raising new units and reinforcing the frontline while also training conscripts. Ukraine's struggling with numbers and the Defense Ministry has asked for 2 million new recruits. All of this ties into things being way worse for Ukraine.
Damn, you're unable to grasp a very simple fact. If Russia is advancing, which they are, when a load of their troops get killed doing so, they end up inside Russian-controlled territory, as do the Ukrainian ones when Russia advances. So you expect Ukraine to go into Russian-controlled territory, collect Ru dead and then hand them back? :rolleyes:

Aside from that, any Ru dead who weren't officers or above are simply left there as compost.
 
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A video showing an attack by nine Ukrainian FPV drones on a Russian boat. The video was filmed near the Dnieper Estuary. The Ukrainian drone attack was reportedly repelled, after which the Russian boat deployed a smoke screen and completed its combat mission.