China’s “String of Pearls” and India's Two Front War Predicament : Analysis

[Aashish]

China's great push forward: PLA's foreign military outposts a threat to India?

On the economic front, China is powering ahead with its One Belt, One Road infrastructure plan. But, the announcement made by the PLA on December 18, now hints at how Beijing's military footprint in the region is also set to grow.

Beijing, December 21, 2017 | UPDATED 10:22 IST

Photo: Reuters


On the day that the Donald Trump administration unveiled its first national security strategy that identified India as "a leading global power and stronger strategic and defence partner" and described China as a "rival", Beijing had a quiet announcement of its own.

On December 18, People's Liberation Army (PLA) officials for the first time confirmed that China was "planning to explore the possibility of more foreign military outposts in Africa, West Asia and other areas", to add to the PLA's first overseas base in Djibouti opened in July.

The aim, PLA advisors told the South China Morning Post, was "to protect [China's] expanding overseas interests in the Indian Ocean Region".

The announcement came as the Trump administration, for its part, outlined a vision to mount a robust opposition to China's fast-expanding influence and presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Asia-Pacific. Trump's strategy explicitly identified China and Russia as "rival powers" that seek to "erode American security and prosperity". The Trump administration said it would "seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India" and "help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region".

The strategy left unsaid how Washington plans to do so, especially as many countries have, in Trump's first year in office, gravitated deeper into China's economic orbit even as the US President has spoken of "America First" and withdrawn the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, the region's biggest counter till date to Chinese economic influence.

On the economic front, China is powering ahead with its One Belt, One Road infrastructure plan. The December 18 announcement by the PLA now hints at how Beijing's military footprint in the region is also set to grow.

Six months after opening the first overseas base in Djibouti, signs are that China has ambitious plans to beef up its first outpost. In September, the PLA conducted its first live-fire drills in its new base in the Djibouti desert, a drill that carried its own significance as the first PLA live-firing deployment overseas (outside of UN peacekeeping missions) since the 1979 Vietnam war.

Mathieu Duchatel, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and co-author of China's Strong Arm, Protecting Chinese Nationals and Assets Abroad, notes that behind this changed calculus for China and the spurt in recent activity in spreading its overseas footprint was a key turning point in 2015, when the PLA was pressed into service for the mass evacuations of tens of thousands of Chinese nationals from unrest in Libya and Yemen.

Following Djibouti, two additional IOR bases are already being considered, according to Chinese planners and media reports. China has reportedly had preliminary discussions with the Seychelles, while many Chinese observers believe that Gwadar in Pakistan would be a natural location, given that it's also being developed as the hub of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. China is also building or managing ports in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

These developments, Duchatel says, suggest China's foreign policy is undergoing a transformative shift away from its traditional 'non-interference' to a gradual 'militarisation' of foreign policy. CPEC, he says, is further moving this shift into uncharted territory, with tens of thousands of Chinese nationals expected to move into one of the world's most unsafe countries.

The prospect of a Chinese 'string of pearls', littoral military bases in the IOR, set up with the aim of encircling India, has preoccupied strategists for many years. Today, it's not only India that is driving China's calculus but its growing global footprint. The pearls are growing in number, and the string ever longer.

Chinas great push forward: PLAs foreign military outposts a threat to India?

 

[Aashish]

Indian interests in Nepal are being elbowed out by China

KP OliCPNUML leader KP Oli
WRITTEN BY
Harsh V Pant
Monday 25 December 2017 2:15 IST

If the winner in Nepali elections, the Left alliance, wanted to send out a message that it would follow a “balanced” foreign policy, then surely its leader K P Oli, has a strange way to demonstrate it. In a surprise move, Oli visited the border with China in Rasuwagadhi and declared that the Rasuwagadhi-Kerung border point, the only trade, and transit point between Nepal and China, would be upgraded to international standards. This came days before he blamed sections of the Indian media for creating a rift between the Left coalition and New Delhi.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs, for its part, had welcomed the outcome of Nepali elections. In its official statement, it said: “We congratulate the government and the people of Nepal. India has age-old unique, time-tested ties of friendship with the country. We look forward to working with the next democratically elected government in Nepal to advance our close and multifaceted partnership across all sectors and to support Nepal in its pursuit of peace, stability, economic prosperity and all round development,”

But clearly, a new phase has begun in India-Nepal relations with the decisive victory of the coalition of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) led by Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) led by KP Sharma Oli. The Nepali Congress has been routed. It claims that election for the Upper House needs to be completed before a new government can be formed. The scale of victory for the Left coalition can be expected to bring some stability to a country which has been facing continuous turmoil for the past two decades. After the Maoist insurgency ended, several Prime Ministers have come and gone, unable to manage the political transition in the Himalayan Kingdom effectively. The constitution-making process has been equally tortuous leading to the mobilisation by the Madhesi groups in the Terai region against what they perceived to be a discriminatory document.

The blockade in Nepal-India border in September 2015 by Madhesi groups was blamed on India and it was then that Oli emerged as a vocal critic of New Delhi’s policy towards Nepal even as he made his intention of taking his country closer to China clear. Oli secured China’s support during the six-month-long blockade and after he was forced to resign, he had accused India of affecting a government change by forcing Maoists to withdraw support from his government through “remote control.” Oli made it an electoral issue by raising the India bogey during his campaign, scapegoating New Delhi for the blockade and for breaking the coalition.

The blockade along the India-Nepal border due to the Madhesi crisis indeed had angered a large part of the Nepalese population, allowing China to step in as an alternative to India by providing not only internet access but also alternative trade routes. Nepal’s economy has been ailing since the earthquake of 2015 as its reliance on aid and remittances remains at an all-time high. China’s attraction under such circumstances is quite natural. Beijing has pledged $8.3 billion to build roads and hydropower plants in Nepal even as Indian commitments remain in the realm of $317 million. As part of its ambitious “One Belt, One Road” initiative, Beijing is looking into the possibility of connecting Kathmandu to Lhasa in Tibet via railways at an estimated cost of $8 billion. China’s activities have been steadily expanding in Nepal after Kathmandu’s support for OBOR materialised. This happened despite India’s stiff resistance to OBOR.

The Modi government’s proactive outreach to Nepal in its early days suffered a setback due to the Madhesi crisis. The Deuba government had decided to cancel a major $2.5 billion hydroelectric project awarded to Chinese state company China Gezhouba Group in November 2017 much to the annoyance of Beijing. The new government is Nepal will reverse the decision. Oli had warned against revoking the plan. “The issue here is about foreign investment and such decisions cannot be taken on a whim,” he had said. Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Nepal in March 2018. He was supposed to visit last year but it had to be cancelled it due to change of government in Nepal. China’s major security interests in Nepal is the border with the Tibet autonomous region, a potential hotbed of domestic instability over questions of sovereignty.

While New Delhi will be viewing the developments in Nepal with some concern, for Kathmandu there is a greater room for manoeuvrability now between China and India. India cannot and should not prevent Nepal from developing closer links with China so long as Kathmandu remains cognizant of vital Indian interests. Nepali leaders also recognise that the links with India, which traverse history, culture, and geography, cannot be severed so easily. And while Oli may look like a difficult proposition for India, New Delhi should also be aware that all governments in Nepal have tried to play the China card vis-à-vis India. Oli will not be unique in that respect not will be the last.

The author is Professor of International Relations, King’s College London, and a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation

http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/co...-nepal-are-being-elbowed-out-by-china-2570307

 

[Aashish]

India appears threatened by Chinese projects in Sri Lanka: experts
By Dong Feng and Wang Cong Source:Global Times Published: 2017/12/24 22:13:39

South Asia giant feeling threatened, adopts zero-sum mindset: experts

A view of the port facility at Hambantota port File photo: VCG



India has launched fierce attacks against Chinese commercial activities in Sri Lanka in recent weeks, and moved to secure more projects in Sri Lanka with Japan, in what appears to be desperate moves to maintain its declining influence in Sri Lanka.

Chinese experts pointed out on Sunday that India, which has considered Sri Lanka its backyard rather than a sovereign nation, has adopted a very dangerous zero-sum mindset on China's cooperation with other countries, which is not conducive to regional economic cooperation.

On December 9, Sri Lanka formally handed over commercial activities at the Hambantota port to China Merchants Port Holdings Co as part of a $1.2-billion deal that would grant the Chinese company a 99-year lease on the port. The port, which was financed and built by Chinese companies, went into operation in 2010 but has failed to make a profit.

The handover of the port to the Chinese company has drawn widespread attention among global media outlets, especially those in India.

In an editorial posted on December 14, the Hindustan Times called the Hambantota port deal a "white elephant in gilded chains" while declaring Chinese investments in infrastructure "little more than a modern neo-colonial enterprise."

"It is pointless for India to try and outbid and buy out every maritime facility that China builds and manages in the Indian Ocean. What India is trying to do is to showcase how the Chinese way of infrastructure building is little more than a modern neo-colonial enterprise," the editorial reads.

India is also looking to secure a deal to run an airport near Hambantota, which has been dubbed the "world's emptiest airport," in order to monitor China's growing presence in Sri Lanka, according to a report from CNBC on December 13.

Commercial, not political

China Merchants Port Holdings Co declined the Global Times' request for comments over the weekend, but official documents showed that the company considered the deal purely commercial and not political.

The company regards the Hambantota project as a 100 percent commercial project with no political motives, and the project development fully complies with Sri Lankan laws and regulations and international practice, according to a document obtained by the Global Times.

The document further stressed that the project is in the best interest of both Sri Lanka and the company. It pointed out that the overwhelming majority of employees at Hambantota are Sri Lankans, with Chinese employees accounting for only a small share.

At the Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd (CICT), another investment by the company in Sri Lanka, there are only 25 Chinese employees out of a total of more than 1,300 employed at the project.

The document stated that the management of Hambantota port will learn from CICT in the future.

Experts said the deal represents win-win cooperation between Sri Lanka and the Chinese company.

"The lease agreement has entitled China to operate the port and to generate revenue. This is beneficial to both the local economy and job creation, a truly win-win deal," Zhou Fangyin, a professor with the Guangdong Research Institute for International Strategies, told the Global Times on Sunday.

Zhou pointed out that the investments China has committed to are large in scale, high in risk and take years to complete, yet they are expected to generate revenue, and the agreements aid development without causing too much debt for the host country.

Zhou Yongsheng, a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University's Institute of International Relations, pointed out that China-Sri Lanka cooperation has been conducted under the principle of equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation.

India's zero-sum mindset

The two experts said that India's reaction to China's cooperation with Sri Lanka reflected the zero-sum mindset of some Indian officials and media outlets and their lack of knowledge of international law.

"India has always had strong influence over the decision-making of many South Asian countries on foreign policy, including Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, treating them like its backyard," Zhou Fangyin said. "However, such an overbearing mindset will not work anymore."

Zhou Yongsheng said any negative comments from India are sour grapes. "India's negative comments reflect its lack of common sense in international law, as they narrow-mindedly assume the Indian Ocean belongs to India." he said.

Zhou Yongsheng further pointed out that India is using double standards toward China in sharp contrast to its view of the US and Japan.

"The lease agreement is a reasonable commercial arrangement, but even if China some day would leverage the port for any military activities, it is totally understandable," he said. He added the US has established many military bases over the world, and the Japan Self-Defense Force Base Djibouti is a military base operated by the Japan Self-Defense Forces located near Ambouli, Djibouti.

"If that is not tagged as a neo-colonial model, there is no point to label China's commercial lease agreement as such," Zhou Yongsheng stressed.

Chu Daye contributed to this story.

India appears threatened by Chinese projects in Sri Lanka: experts - Global Times

 

[Shashank]

First of all we should declare the policy of military installation of enemies in 3rd countries in case of a war. Any enemy warship or armed forces bases should be open for attack in case of war. It should be incorporated in our military doctrine. small nations in our vicinity should understand the consequences of siding with china in case of War.

 

[Shashank]

Playing Taiwan card dangerous for New Delhi : Chinese Media

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After the signing of the India-Taiwan memorandum of understanding to promote mutual industrial cooperation, Indian scholars recently suggested that it was "imperative to strengthen political and strategic engagement" between the two sides, which "cannot be dictated" by the mainland.

Although the Taiwan question is not an issue at the governmental level, some Indians have been relentlessly advising the Modi government to play the Taiwan card, using endorsement of the one-China policy as leverage with China. These calculations are beyond the economic sphere and extremely dangerous to Sino-Indian relations. Touting the Taiwan card, Indians seem to have forgotten that India itself has sensitive issues, such as complicated ethnic issues. It's necessary to remind New Delhi that the one-China policy is the bottom line of China that India cannot afford to touch.

New Delhi is eager to attract investments from Taiwan, but the country must be wary of Tsai Ing-wen's political purposes behind the collaboration. The Taiwan administration has been promoting investment in India's telecommunications, steel and information technology. This is driven more by political than economic considerations.

Since assuming office, Tsai hasn't yet acknowledged the 1992 Consensus and has been constantly touting her dangerous political agenda of "Taiwan independence." The Taiwan administration under Tsai continues to seek external assistance to confront the mainland.

In 2016 Tsai put forward the New Southbound Policy, aiming to intensify Taiwan's exchanges with Southeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania. The policy is an attempt to expand room for Taiwan's pro-independence forces. The Taiwan administration is seeking to use Beijing-New Delhi border spats and India's strategic vigilance toward China to unite with India and win pro-independence forces more opportunities to thrive.

New Delhi would be wrong if it believed the Taiwan card can be used to pressurize Beijing or even retaliate against it over the Doklam standoff. Challenging China's bottom line and the one-China policy will bring serious consequences and ruin the achievements of the Sino-Indian relationship.

Some Indians regard China as a strategic rival and misinterpret China's rise as a challenge to India's regional status. Only by cooperation, instead of confrontation, can the two countries strengthen mutual trust, which conforms to the interests of both.

New Delhi should abandon geopolitical mentality and view ties with Beijing from a cooperative perspective. China and India highlighted the significance of border security on Friday. This is the right direction for Beijing-New Delhi interactions, and we hope both governments can seize this as an opportunity to improve their relations.

 

[Shashank]

Cross post from CPEC and OBOR thread

CPEC and the Silk Road Rail Network

Reliable freight routes will help Pakistan and neighbouring countries cut transportation costs, save time and ease mobility

Yasir Habib Khan

DECEMBER 23, 2017

If CPEC is handled carefully and Pakistan is able to use it to its advantage, there is a fortune to be made in trade and the industrial market through one of its lesser known projects. This is the Silk Road Rail Network (SSRN), also known as the Eurasian Rail Project or Eurasian trans-continental rail transport network. It is meant to link Pakistan to Eurasian countries; including Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Turkey and Germany as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This massive overland railroad which will stretch from Myanmar to Germany only exists on paper today, but it is highly likely that it will see the light of day soon as the practical and theoretical issues associated with it have been smoothed out.

Robust and reliable freight routes will help cut transportation cost, save time and ease mobility. China and the Eurasian countries, which include Pakistan, will be able to exploit the SRRN and rejuvenate their economies and change the fate of the entire Eurasian landmass. 80 percent of global trade is currently executed through sea due to a lack of rail networks across the world. Once the SRRN is completed, global trade will be revolutionised. China Railways has already published its master plan for the SRRN, outlining all emerging rail routes. The railway will start at Kunming, the capital of China’s western Yunnan province and connect Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey before ending in the heart of Europe at Hamburg.

However, this project does not include the 1800 kilometre long rail line between Pakistan and China, which is specifically a part of CPEC. The SRRN is part of the Silk Road Train. There is already optimism regarding this plan, because freight trains have already journeyed from China to Europe in the recent past. 7500 mile long rail links are already operating within Suzhou, a major city in the South Eastern Jiangsu province, which leads to Warsaw.

80 percent of global trade is currently executed through sea due to a lack of rail networks across the world. Once the SRRN is complete, global trade will be revolutionised. China Railways has already published its master plan for the SRRN, outlining all emerging rail routes. The railway will start at Kunming, the capital of China’s western Yunnan province and connect Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey before ending in the heart of Europe at Hamburg

There are also railways which go from Lianygang to Rotterdam, Chengdu to Lodz, Chongqing to Duisburg, Yiwu to Madrid and Zhengzhou to Hamburg. Currently, these trains move along one of two main routes: either they go north from China to link with Russias Trans-Siberian network or they travel west across Kazakhstan and feed into the Trans-Siberian at Yekaterinburg which divides Europe and Asia.

After the China-Madrid rail connection, the China-London route has been gaining traction. This is the second longest rail route conceived in history. It journeyed from China to the UK, reaching Barking’s Eurohub freight terminal in London in January 2017. The train is famous by the name of ‘East Wind’, getting its inspiration from Chairman Mao who once claimed that “The East Wind shall prevail over the West.” This train made London the fifteenth European city with direct rail links to China. Last month, the first freight train set off from Standord-le-Hope, Essec for Yiwu in Zhejiang province, China. As Brexit looms, British Prime Minister Theresa May is likely hoping trade ties between the UK and China continue to improve.

The train starts its journey from Zhengzhou, which is located on the southern banks of the Yellow River. Once it was known as one of the eight ancient capitals of China, home to the famous Shaolin Monastery. Being a leading national railway hub, it has easy access to Beijing and some other regions by high speed train.



Passing through Baoji, Tianshui, Lanzhou and Zhanye, renowned cities for China huge industrial belt, it reaches at Xinjiang, old route of Silk Road trade that linked to Middle East. This ancient route’ footprints may be found easily by moving into its traditional open-air bazaars of the oasis cities of Hotan and Kashgar. Making headways, train has a route of the old Kazakh capital Almaty, and Astana, Kazakhstan’s modern capital. After penetrating into Russia, train accesses to Yekaterinburg, Russia’s fourth-largest city. It is place of Ural mountain range considered as the boundary between Europe and Asia.

Before The Silk Road Rail Network made the world sit up and take notice, some initiatives had taken shape in form of “The Trans-Siberian”. After this, various rail routes came into play between East and West. As a major part of the Silk Road Economic Belt, the overland segment of China’s BRI, direct cargo trains are frequently moving between China and Europe.

The writer is a senior journalist working for China Today, CRIOnline and, China Plus. He also writes for local and international print media. He is a fellow of ICFJ and a recipient of China friendly Netizen 2017 award. He can be reached at [email protected] and tweets at @yasirkhann

 

[Aashish]

Images of Pakistan’s Gwadar port do not match all the hype around it
COL. VINAYAK BHAT (RETD)
5 hours ago

Pakistan's Gwadar port | Vinayak Bhat/ThePrint

No signature of a Djibouti style base but signs of expansion plans; road, access still limited.

New Delhi: Limited work has started at Pakistan’s much-hyped Gwadar port that has been leased on a long-term basis to a Chinese company, latest satellite images reveal.

The project seems to be more suited to be a military base in the future, rather than a successful commercial port.

The satellite images do not yet show the signature of a major Chinese base akin to Djibouti but at least two locations seem to be earmarked for future expansions to accommodate military infrastructure at the strategically located port.

Gwadar has strategic importance given its geographic location at the mouth of Persian Gulf that makes it a central point between Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Most of the world’s sea lines of communications (SLOCs) — where most of global trade flows — can also be monitored from Gwadar.

China is looking at exploiting this huge potential of Gwadar in the name of improving Pakistan’s, especially Balochistan’s, economic condition and has apparently leased the port for 45 years, right up to 2059.

Although the port was inaugurated many times by Presidents, PMs and even chief martial law administrators, there has not been much progress on the construction or operations front from 2006 until November 2016.

China’s push for Gwadar as the main hub of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — has led to some construction, although at a snail’s pace.

Satellite images show that the port still lacks proper roads or storage facilities, especially for oil storage, besides bulk cargo/containers handling equipment. However, the prospects of the Gwadar port turning into a Chinese base seem to be brighter now than any time before.

Construction work at the port started in November 2016 and satellite images from Google Earth dated 20 May 2017 and later suggest that limited progress has been made in this period.

Vinayak Bhat/ThePrintRoad access
The road access to the port is still very narrow at a width of just 5 m width. The last stretch of 5 km is not yet complete, possibly due to local citizens’ objections. The Chinese government has allocated $250 million as compensation after which probably the work is progressing very slowly.

Vinayak Bhat/ThePrintWater channel
Work on deepening of the waterway is yet to start. The port would also require at least two turning basins, large enough to allow cargo ships to change directions with ease. However, dredgers have not been observed near the port for a long time now.

Possible Chinese base
A large area meant for future expansion of the port is being prepared for different types of buildings, not akin to a terminal. Perhaps, this area is being developed as a Chinese base.

Two large multi-storey buildings and a very huge shed are being constructed as well. The western revetment has been broken to make a pathway, possibly for sea access to this base area. The area east of the present cargo terminal and the newly constructed Chinese staff barrack are being developed too.

Pier remains same
There is no change in the size and shape of the pier. Even now only three ships can be parked at Gwadar at any given time. There are five new heavy-duty cranes observed there, suggesting improvement in loading and unloading timings. No other facilities have been added.

New barracks
About 30 large barracks have been constructed recently for Chinese staff. The barracks have been provided with triple layered security perimeter but seem to be guarded only at the entrance. A large football field is observed in the area.

Storage area
A large fenced area near the barracks has been allocated for storage of construction materials and for parking of vehicles. Some construction material and vehicles have been kept under camouflage near the area.

Vinayak Bhat/ThePrint
Obfuscations

There are a few major irritants in the progress of Gwadar port.

The Chinese government has promised to build a large harbour for fishermen’s ease on the western side of Gwadar but nothing has been done in this regard. The pier constructed is neither a pier nor long enough as planned. Recent images show a breakwater type of structure rather than a pier.

Local fishermen have not yet vacated their pier on the eastern side, which would pose a hindrance to movement of large cargo ships.

Colonel Vinayak Bhat (retd) is a Military Intelligence veteran of the Indian Army with vast experience of satellite imagery analysis. He has worked as a Chinese interpreter and is a specialist on PLA and Pakistan’s armed forces. He tweets @rajfortyseven


Images of Pakistan’s Gwadar port do not match all the hype around it – ThePrint

 

[Himanshu]

China to Build Second Foreign Naval Base, This Time in Pakistan

China is planning to build its second foreign naval base in Pakistan following the ribbon cutting ceremony for its first overseas base in Djibouti last July.
Sources close to the People's Liberation Army have confirmed to the South China Morning Post that a Chinese naval port is being built at a strategic location on Pakistan's southern coast.

"China needs to set up another base in Gwadar for its warships because Gwadar is now a civilian port," Zhou Chenming, a Chinese military analyst, told the South China Morning Post on Friday. "Gwadar port can't provide specific services for warships," Zhou said; hence the need for a new base.

Gwadar is less than 50 miles east of the Pakistan-Iran border and sits in Balochistan Province, where fiercely independent Baloch nationalists have waged guerrilla wars against both the Pakistani and Iranian governments. "Public order there is a mess," Zhou said.

"China and Pakistan have found common ground in terms of maritime interest in the region," Pakistani analyst Sheikh Fahad says. "Gwadar port can be used for joint naval patrols in the Indian Ocean, further increasing the naval outreach of China and Pakistan in the region. Gwadar port will increase the countries' naval movements and further expand defense cooperation, especially in the naval field," Fahad noted.

In mid-December, Lawrence Sellin, a retired US Army Reserve colonel, reported for the Daily Caller that high-ranking Chinese and Pakistani officials had met in Beijing to discuss future projects.

Last June, a Pakistani diplomat said China's help was needed as an "equalizer," pointing to the naval base as all-but-inevitable. "Previously it was the US and Saudi Arabia… Now it's China," the diplomat told NBC. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman later dismissed the report as "pure guesswork," but now it seems the port will, in fact, be built.

xperts have noted that India is keeping a close eye on the development of China-Pakistan relations. "China finds it very useful to use Pakistan against India and ignore India's concerns, particularly on terrorism issues. That has created a lot of stress in the relationship between Beijing and Delhi," Rajeev Ranan Chaturvedy, a researcher at the National University of Singapore, told SCMP.

But "Indian naval capabilities and experience in the Indian Ocean region are fairly good — much better than Pakistan and China," Chaturvedy said.

 

[Paro]

@Hellfire @randomradio @Aashish in a war with Pakistan would Chinese infrastructure be tourched or we going to bypass them?

 

[Himanshu]

China building military base in Pakistan

China is constructing its second overseas military base in Pakistan as part of a push for greater power projection capabilities along strategic sea routes.
The facility will be built at Jiwani, a port close to the Iranian border on the Gulf of Oman, according to two people familiar with deal.
Plans call for the Jiwani base to be a joint naval and air facility for Chinese forces, located a short distance up the coast from the Chinese-built commercial port facility at Gwadar, Pakistan. Both Gwadar and Jiwani are part of Pakistan’s western Baluchistan province.
Plans for the base were advanced during a visit to Jiwani on Dec. 18 by a group of 16 Chinese People’s Liberation Army officers who met with about 10 Pakistani military officers. Jiwani is located on a peninsula about 15 miles long on a stretch of land with one small airfield.
According to sources, the large naval and air base will require the Pakistani government to relocate scores of residents living in the area. Plans call for their relocation to other areas of Jiwani or further inland in Baluchistan province.
The Chinese also asked the Pakistanis to undertake a major upgrade of Jiwani airport so the facility will be able to handle large Chinese military aircraft. Work on the airport improvements is expected to begin in July.
The naval base and airfield will occupy nearly the entire strategic peninsula.
Jiwani will be China’s second major overseas military base. In August, the PLA opened its first foreign base in Djibouti, a small African nation on the Horn of Africa.
The Pentagon has dubbed China’s foreign military basing ambitions the “string of pearls” strategy. The Chinese are planning to set up bases along a line of states stretching from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.
The military bases are part of a bid by Beijing to protect strategic sea lanes used to transport oil and other resources for China’s large energy-consuming modernization.
Chinese Communist Party and military leaders fear the country could be crippled by foreign powers through a blockade or other military interdiction operations to disrupt oil shipments to China along the sea route during a crisis or conflict.
China’s government has sought to downplay the Djibouti base as merely a logistics facility for anti-piracy sea patrols in the region and not a power-projection tool. Similar propaganda will be used to limit international reaction to the Jiwani base.
Some Pentagon officials, however, regard the Djibouti base and the future second base at Jiwani as part of efforts to control oil shipping in and out of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Both Chinese bases are located near strategic chokepoints — Djibouti near the Bab el Mandeb on the Red Sea and Jiwani close to the Strait of Hormuz on the Persian Gulf.
Pakistan’s military also has been moving additional troops and security forces into nearby Gwadar, where China has invested heavily in building a commercial port and other infrastructure projects.
President Trump on Monday issued a harsh rebuke of Pakistan, tweeting that the United States “foolishly” supplied Pakistan with $33 billion in aid over 15 years and stating that “they have given us nothing but lies & deceit.”
“They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” Mr. Trump tweeted.
Reuters reported that China’s investment has included $500 million in grants and $230 million for an international airport.
China is also promoting what Beijing calls the Belt and Road Initiative, a development program of land and sea routes over 60 nations in Asia, Europe and Africa.
As part of that initiative, China plans to turn Gwadar into a megaport for transshipping goods worldwide, along with energy pipelines, roads and rail links connecting to western China. Chinese naval and air forces at nearby Jiwani would then provide protection for that base.
China also has leased a port on the Indian Ocean island of Sri Lanka that recently opened at Hambantota. The facility has raised concerns in India that views China as a growing regional and global threat.


I guess that explains Trump tweets.

 

[randomradio]

@Hellfire @randomradio @Aashish in a war with Pakistan would Chinese infrastructure be tourched or we going to bypass them?

Infrastructure really means roads and bridges. We will have to fight for them.

 

[Himanshu]

This week developments:

China to Fully Fund Afghan Military Base
US Approves Multimillion Sale of Software Upgrades for F-16 Jets to Oman
Pentagon to bulk up in Afghanistan with drones, troops under Trump’s new strategy
Trump to meet with Kazakhstan's president at White House, discuss Afghanistan strategy
Kenneth Juster, US ambassador to India, calls for strengthening of ties

 

[RATHORE]

Trailing China, a new defence deal with France gives India a foothold in Indian Ocean
PRANAB DHAL SAMANTA 31 January, 2018

Illustration by Peali Dezine

Indian ships and naval assets can now move across from the Pacific to Singapore, Andamans, Diego Garcia, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Djibouti, onwards to Oman.

India is all set to firm up a defence logistics agreement with France, just like the LEMOA with the United States. The move will allow India access to French military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa, and round off another critical part of enhancing its military presence in these waters to counter China.

The agreement, which is expected to be signed during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to India in early March, was firmed up around the time New Delhi worked out the fine-print with Seychelles to build and operate a military base there.

What’s important to understand, however, is the bigger picture which is evidently falling in place, and why it’s important not to stop just here.

The approach
There are essentially two major frames to this strategy – bases which India will build, and bases or ports that its forces can access.

On the first count, India moved on Assumption Island in Seychelles and Agalega islands in Mauritius, both on the outer stretches of Africa, with an intent to monitor big shipping traffic moving across the Indian Ocean and also towards the Horn of Africa and to the Persian Gulf.

In both these places, India will build infrastructure and operate bases with adequate safeguards to the sovereignty of the country concerned.

The other big proposal in this folder, which is under consideration at the highest levels, is a possible base in Oman. That would expand Indian presence to the mouth of the Persian Gulf. However, the entire project would entail a massive expenditure that the government is now going through with a toothcomb.

The next category is access India will get by way of agreements with other countries.

The LEMOA with the US provides India access to Diego Garcia, the biggest American base in the Indian Ocean, besides Guam, on the edge of the Pacific Ocean.

In the same way, the logistics agreement with France will allow India access to the strategically important French base in the Reunion Islands near Madagascar. This is typically the French area of colonial influence, where another opening will be the French facilities in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) already operates a military base here, its first such base overseas.

Another agreement India signed as part of this maritime strategy was with Singapore two months ago at the Defence Ministers’ Dialogue. Through this understanding, India can dock its naval platforms in Singapore for longer periods, use its facilities, and even conduct maritime surveillance missions in the South China Sea.

Put together, all of this completes a bigger jigsaw, much of which is now falling into place. As a result, Indian ships and naval assets can move across from the edge of the Pacific, Singapore down to the Andamans, Diego Garcia, then on to Mauritius, Seychelles, and Djibouti, onwards to Oman.

This forms the entire arc from the Pacific to the mouth of the Persian Gulf, essentially forming the expanse now termed as the ‘Indo-Pacific’. Australia, too, is said to be interested in pursuing a logistics agreement of the kind the US has and now France will have with India.

So, what emerges is a group of interoperable navies collaborating to use one another’s bases in order to build a more effective security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

India will obviously service and station troops in bases that it will build and operate. The idea should be to increase the number of foreign bases in this category. And here is where, the government will have to find the finances and political muscle to see it through.

China’s lead
There should be no doubt that India has to make up for lost time and opportunity on this front. While this strategy may look impressive, the fact is China has moved far ahead, threatening to negate Indian influence in its traditional areas of dominance.

Maldives is a good example of how China has moved literally into India’s backyard to build a whole port city with a possible base. This, along with its port in Gwadar, Pakistan, provides a perfect entry into the Arabian Sea and down to the Indian Ocean.

The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka is, for all practical purposes, now leased to China. This has forced India to go deeper south in the Indian Ocean towards Mauritius.

But India must not stop there or become dependent on the US or France. It must explore possibilities in Madagascar, which is like a junction point in the Indian Ocean where routes diverge.

Also of big value are the large under-sea data cables in the area, which are constantly being probed by Chinese submarines. China is now able to mount more under-sea missions in the Indian Ocean due to better port access, another cause of big concern.

While Seychelles and Mauritius are good starts, what India must ensure is more such agreements and better delivery on the ground. The much delayed Chabahar project in Iran, which was meant to be India’s answer to Gwadar, should serve as a constant reminder on how poor execution can neutralise any strategic advantage or play.

Link: Trailing China, a new defence deal with France gives India a foothold in Indian Ocean

 

[Shashank]

India Could Soon Set Up A Military Base In Oman, Says Report​

Just days after signing an agreement with Seychelles to develop ‘military infrastructure’ on one of its strategically located islands in the western Indian Ocean, India could have a similar arrangement with Oman, ThePrint has reported.

According to the daily’s report, the proposal for a military base in the strategically located nation in the Persian Gulf - one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world - is under consideration at the highest levels of the government. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in Oman next week as part of his west Asia tour.

The report also says that India could soon sign a defence logistics agreement with France, just like the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States. The agreement, the report says, will enable Indian naval ships to accesses strategically important French base in the Reunion Islands near Madagascar and in Djibouti, where China has set up its first foreign military base.

India is also set to develop military infrastructure on Mauritius’ Agalega island. The development of bases in the Indian Ocean and agreements such as LEMOA will give India a string of facilities that it can use to project power in the entire Indian Ocean. This is important in view of China’s increasing presence in the region.

In recent years, China has significantly increased deployment of naval assets in the region. It could be planning to set up a base in Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which it has acquired for a period of 40 years. It has also acquired Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port for 99 years in a ‘debt-equity’ swap and has also expanded presence in the Maldives. Apart from surface vessels, India has also spotted conventional and nuclear submarines of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the Indian Ocean.

India Could Soon Set Up A Military Base In Oman, Says Report

 

[Himanshu]

The Indo-Japanese Pivot to Africa

In pursuit of a robust strategic partnership, India and Japan are broadcasting their desire to work together far beyond South Asia, with an emphasis on Africa. Their vision for an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) lacks detail, but still offers an opportunity to raise both countries’ profile in a strategic continent. To compete with China’s presence there, however, India and Japan will have to show that they are committed to the continent and that they can deliver not just on quality but also on speed.

The four India-Japan joint statements released since Prime Minister Modi took office show a clear growth in the ambition for activities beyond India. The 2014 statement primarily emphasized Japanese investment in India; when it ventured abroad, it did so in the context of building connectivity between India’s Northeast and Southeast Asia. Africa does not feature until the 2016 statement, which promises “India-Japan dialogue” to explore partnership in “the areas of training and capacity building, health, infrastructure and connectivity.” The 2017 statement takes this a step further, describing a shared commitment “to explore the development of industrial corridors and industrial network [sic] for the growth of Asia and Africa.”

The AAGC concept first appeared between the 2016 and 2017 statements, in a vision document authored by three government-sponsored think tanks. Despite the name, it’s far from clear that the AAGC will take the shape of an actual semi-linear route along the lines of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. Instead, much like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the AAGC is envisioned as an investment and outreach package. It has four main pillars: “development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, capacity and skill enhancement, and people-to-people partnerships.”

The original Indo-Japanese goal of better connectivity between India and Southeast Asia is far from achieved. South Asian connectivity as a whole remains remarkably poor; Japan’s interest in participating in an India-led initiative to develop Iran’s Chabahar Port illustrates the opportunities for infrastructure cooperation in India’s “near abroad.” So why Africa? What has spurred the two nations to look so far afield for opportunities?

There are two important reasons India and Japan settled on Africa as a field for cooperation. The first is the most obvious: economic potential. Despite India’s close historical and diasporic ties to the African continent, as well as its geographic proximity, Indian and Japanese exports to Africa lag far behind those of China.

China’s economy, of course, is far larger than that of India and Japan combined, and thus a dollar-for-dollar comparison is not entirely fair. The situation is rather different when we look at exports to Africa as a percent of total exports: it’s clear that Africa is an important market for India, especially for refined petroleum. By contrast, less than one percent of Japan’s total exports went to Africa in 2016.

From India’s perspective, furthermore, increasing trade with Africa fits well with its developing trade strategy of focusing on markets where its high-value goods are competitive. India’s 2016 Capital Goods Policy, for instance, suggests reorienting trade promotion efforts towards African countries and other developing nations, as opposed to focusing on trade agreements with developed countries. And India is well-positioned to take advantage of African growth: eastern Africa, one of the most economically vibrant areas of the continent, has a large Indian diaspora and is relatively close to ports on India’s west coast. The AAGC builds on existing Indian efforts to build ties with Africa, including the 2015 India-Africa Forum Summit.

The map of African growth, however, shows some of the drawbacks of this strategy. While the continent’s economic picture is highly diverse, with a few strong performers, 13 African nations are growing at less than 2 percent a year, according to the World Bank . It will be difficult, although certainly not impossible, for Japan and India to grow their exports in the context of slow or zero growth.

But the AAGC does not have a purely economic rationale. The second reason for a joint Indo-Japanese project focusing on Africa is explicitly political and strategic: it is an opportunity for the two countries to show what they can do outside of the South Asian region. The AAGC offers a riposte to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (which focuses mainly on Central and Southeast Asia) and also to China’s ongoing investment and trading activity in Africa.

It’s no secret that over the past 15 years China has made major investments in Africa; its greenfield FDI in the continent surpassed that of the United States in 2015 and 2016 and is on track to do so in 2017 as well. China has such strong ties with African nations such as Zimbabwe and Ethiopia that the general who led the recent coup in Zimbabwe sought Chinese approval before moving against long-term leader Robert Mugabe.

But despite the hype surrounding Chinese power in Africa, much of it driven by China’s penchant for announcing blockbuster investment totals, there’s room for competition. For one thing, the actual value of Chinese investment is less than fears of Chinese influence over the subcontinent would suggest. The Johns Hopkins China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) estimates that China lent Africa roughly $94 billion between 2000 and 2015, with $11.8 billion of that total coming in 2015. To put this in context, in 2015 the OECD nations lent $36.4 billion to the continent. Furthermore, Chinese funds are far from evenly distributed. Angola and Ethiopia together have received $32.3 billion, more than a third of the total. In 2015, 36 African nations did not receive any loans from China. If Japan and India target their investment wisely, they can quickly become major players.

CARI data on FDI also shows that Chinese dominance is far from assured. In 2015, the stock of Chinese FDI in Africa stood at $34.7 billion, with net inflows of $3 billion. American FDI in the continent, in contrast, stood at $64 billion. As with loans, many nations received minimal Chinese FDI—28 states received investment of less than $25 million.

China’s relatively modest, if high-profile, investments have won it widespread popularity in Africa. A survey of citizens of 36 African countries found that 24 percent of those surveyed preferred following China’s model of economic development, compared to 30 percent who picked that of the United States and 2 percent who favored the Indian model. More than 60 percent of Africans have a positive view of Chinese activities.

India and Japan are unlikely to match Chinese investments in the near term. The AAGC is unlikely to compete with money alone, however. As mentioned in the vision document, the AAGC hopes to spur “people centric sustainable growth” by engaging a wide range of stakeholders and providing infrastructure that’s built to last. It’s undoubtedly true that many Chinese-funded projects don’t adhere to the high environmental and social standards crafted by multilateral lending agencies. China also tends to build and finance projects that multilateral lenders find too risky. India and Japan are calculating that the African people are hungry for a more equitable and transparent alternative, even if it means more expensive projects or longer timelines. But they may also need to match China’s willingness to take on projects that would not receive funding from more traditional sources.

Indo-Japanese cooperation to develop Africa offers clear-cut strategic benefits. The Chinese example suggests that gaining influence and building trade in Africa is as much about consistency, visibility, and engagement as it is about the actual dollar value of investments. And given the continent’s needs, there is certainly more than enough room for all three countries to be big players in Africa. But India and Japan will have to work hard to execute projects with speed and efficiency if they are going to reduce China’s lead in the region. Quality, quickly, is the key.

 

[kimkaw]

And chinese officially enter Afghanistan by funding a military base with Afghans.
Indians kept on analysing and chanting america america america america.

Now if their base is close to Kashmir then God save us.

 

[_Anonymous_]

And chinese officially enter Afghanistan by funding a military base with Afghans.
Indians kept on analysing and chanting america america america america.

Now if their base is close to Kashmir then God save us.

If the CPEC is to end up succeeding in creating an all weather highway between Pakistan & Xinjiang , it'd have to be through the Wakhan not through the Khunjerab Pass as was previously speculated . They're merely securing that passage by building a military base there .

The ball is now in India's court . Will we continue to be passive reactionists or will we be ballsy enough to cut the access between Pakistan and China by seizing PoK - though arguably it's a bit Late in the day for such drastic maneuvres . Extremely Difficult not impossible.

 

[kimkaw]

by seizing PoK

How do you propose on seizing Pok? I have read on threads people having very argumentative discussion when some one mentioned that it's time to seize Pok. Where as majority is nearly not interested in Pok.

This also means future deadlock for India if GB is ever inside Indian administration, how do you propose building a road not passing near road (QTTA) to Xinjiang ?

 

[Himanshu]

India gets access to strategic Oman port Duqm for military use

In a strategic move to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean region, India has secured access to the key Port of Duqm in Oman for military use and logistical support, top sources have told The Indian Express. This is part of India’s maritime strategy to counter Chinese influence and activities in the region.

This was one of the key takeaways of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Oman over the last two days. He met Sultan of Oman Sayyid Qaboos bin Said Al Said and an annexure to the Memorandum of Understanding on Military Cooperation was signed between the two countries. Sources said following this pact, the services of Duqm port and dry dock will be available for maintenance of Indian military vessels.

The Port of Duqm is situated on the southeastern seaboard of Oman, overlooking the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is strategically located, in close proximity to the Chabahar port in Iran. With the Assumption Island being developed in Seychelles and Agalega in Mauritius, Duqm fits into India’s proactive maritime security roadmap.

Recently, Duqm has seen a rise in Indian activities. In September last year, India deployed an attack submarine to this port in the western Arabian Sea. A Shishumar-class submarine entered Duqm along with naval ship INS Mumbai and two P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft. India gets access to strategic Oman port for military use, reconnaissance aircraft. The naval units were on a month-long deployment with the aim of enhancing surveillance and cooperation.

Following Modi’s visit to Oman, the joint statement said the two sides noted that the MoU on Military Cooperation, signed in 2005 and renewed in 2016, has provided the general framework to strengthen bilateral defence ties. India and Oman noted that the MoUs on cooperation in maritime security and between Coast Guards of the two countries, signed in May 2016, have provided a firm foundation for deepening institutional interactions. “Both sides expressed satisfaction at the signing of an annexure to the existing MoU on Military Cooperation between the defence ministries,” it said.

In August 2017, Oman signed an MoU with the United Kingdom that allowed the Royal Navy to use the Port of Duqm. The agreement allows UK access to facilities at Duqm, and among the vessels that will be allowed to dock at the port is the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, the largest ship in the British Navy.

The joint statement said the Indian side thanked Oman for facilitating operational visits by Indian Naval ships and aircraft as well as Indian Air Force aircraft to various ports and airports. “Recognising their common responsibility towards promoting regional peace and security, the two sides underlined the importance of further cementing bilateral strategic engagement, especially in the areas of security and defence,” it said.

It also said that the two sides expressed satisfaction at the ongoing bilateral security collaboration in the fields of counter-terrorism, information-sharing and capacity-building, and the Prime Minister appreciated the support extended by Omani security agencies on “specific issues of security concern to India”.

They agreed to provide further impetus to the robust defence relations, including through regular joint exercises by the three defence forces, training of Navy, Air and Army officials, as also cooperation in the area of coastal defence and through participation in defence exhibitions, the statement said.

The Port of Duqm also has a special economic zone, where about $1.8 billion investments are being made by some Indian companies. The Adani group had signed an MoU with Duqm port authorities last year, but no investments have been made so far. “The Prime Minister expressed his admiration at the ongoing efforts and plans the Sultanate of Oman is making to diversify its economy and welcomed the invitation to Indian companies to invest in various sectors in the special economic zones of Oman, including SEZs in Duqm, Sohar and Salalah. He offered India’s partnership and cooperation in areas of priority, such as minerals and mining, manufacturing, logistics, infrastructure, tourism, agriculture and fisheries, IT and IT enabled-services, skills development, innovation,” said the joint statement.

In the context of strategic oil reserves near Duqm, it said the Prime Minister reiterated India’s invitation to Oman to participate in building strategic oil reserves in India. “Sultan briefed the Indian Prime Minister on Oman’s own initiative to create its strategic oil reserves in Ras Markaz near Duqm. The two sides agreed that there is broad scope for mutual cooperation in building their strategic oil reserves,” the statement said.

Besides Sultan Qaboos, the Prime Minister met Deputy Prime Minister Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmoud al-Said, and Deputy Prime Minister for International Relations and Cooperation Affairs Sayyid Asa’ad bin Tariq Al Said.

He also visited a Shiva temple and the Grand Mosque, besides addressing the business community, before leaving for Delhi. During his meeting with Modi, Sultan Qaboos shared his views on turmoil in the region, especially in Yemen. The Prime Minister thanked him for his efforts in securing the release of captured priest, Father Tom, from Yemen last year.

“The two sides acknowledged the common threat posed by terrorism to peace and security and agreed to continue working together bilaterally, regionally and globally to counter this menace. They reiterated their strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever committed and by whomever, and declared that there could be no justification for any act of terrorism anywhere,” said the joint statement.

The two sides also emphasised the need to “isolate the sponsors and supporters of terrorism” and agreed that the international community should take urgent action against all entities which support terrorism and use it as an instrument of policy.

 

[Arbit]

The time for action is now. Once the CPEC gains wind for better or worse, it will provide us with a fait accompli. Not to say it cannot be managed by a competent leadership but will we have competent leader ship 15-20 years down the line. That is the question we need to give a good thought.

Secondly If I were to take a decision, putting it crudely and succinctly : I would get all countries on my Side, annex POK, call a bluff and immediately give a holler to Chinese accepting CPEC through Indian territory.
Its business, they will understand once their business is secured and trade route access isn't cut off, which, of course we will promise to secure. On our terms.

This is of course need to proceed with much finesse than I have written, but something tells me we are moving towards the same general direction.

Mark these words. We might test a big fat agni in coming months.

How do you propose on seizing Pok? I have read on threads people having very argumentative discussion when some one mentioned that it's time to seize Pok. Where as majority is nearly not interested in Pok.

This also means future deadlock for India if GB is ever inside Indian administration, how do you propose building a road not passing near road (QTTA) to Xinjiang ?

Once support of key countries is acquired, Seizing Pok shouldn't be much of a problem. As for the majority not interested in Pok, they are only thinking about the population. Whereas its territory which is important. We have managed Kashmir, what a few district size populations centres will do to the equation. Nothing.

Edit: Added quote