China’s “String of Pearls” and India's Two Front War Predicament : Analysis
- Thread starter Aashish
- Start date
Lowy Institute came up with their 2019 Asia Power Index. India is ranked at 4th after US, China and Japan. The gap between India and Japan is barely 1.5 points and is likely to be bridged in the future. But India remains an underachiever, and is likely to remain one for a while.
Here is their website : Asia Power Index
Here is the key findings from 2019 : https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/Lowy-Institute-Asia-Power-Index-2019-Key-Findings.pdf
Here is their website : Asia Power Index
Here is the key findings from 2019 : https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/Lowy-Institute-Asia-Power-Index-2019-Key-Findings.pdf
Did Japan and India just launch a counter to China’s Belt and Road?
Geopolitics :
By Rupakjyoti Borah
Published: 7:15am, 6 Jun, 2019
Pumps dredge sand near to Colombo’s main seaport. China, India and Japan are all helping Sri Lanka to develop the port. Photo: AFP
It is hard to overstate the significance of the recent agreement between India and Japan to help Sri Lanka develop its Colombo Port.
Under the deal to develop the East Container Terminal, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority will retain 100 per cent ownership of the terminal, while
Sri Lanka will hold a 51 per cent stake in the Terminal Operations Company with the India-Japan joint venture retaining the remaining 49 per cent.
Both the timing of the deal and its terms are conspicuous. After all, Sri Lanka is still smarting from its last experience of turning to a larger Asian neighbour for help in developing infrastructure – when, struggling to repay its debts to Beijing, it was forced to hand over control of its
Hambantota port and 15,000 acres of land to China on a 99-year lease.
That episode, which gave rise to claims China was using its Belt and Road Initiative investments as a form of debt diplomacy, wasn’t just painful for Sri Lankans, who were forced to come to terms with a loss of sovereignty. It also gave a fright to India, which saw control of a strategically located territory just a few hundred miles from its shores be ceded into the hands of one of its greatest rivals.
Controversial: Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Photo: Xinhua
So the news that India has teamed up with another of Asia’s powerhouse economies to offer Sri Lanka a deal regarding another port – a deal that(unlike Hambantota) pointedly leaves overall control in Sri Lankan hands – has inevitably given rise to speculation that India and Japan are motivated by a desire to push back against Chinese influence, and perhaps even to take on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature regional infrastructure initiative the Belt and Road Initiative.
Japan and India have both said that the project should not been seen as a counter to the Belt and Road, but some sceptics have a hard time believing this – especially given China is also funding development projects at the Colombo Port. Others suggest the project is better seen as an example of Japan and India throwing their hat into the infrastructure ring, rather than an outright challenge.
After all, the port is not the only example of India-Japan collaboration on infrastructure. The two countries are also partnering in setting up a diesel power plant in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These islands, along with some parts of Northeast India, were the only parts of India which were under the control of the Japanese during the second world war, so there is a certain symbolism involved.
COMMON INTERESTS
There are various reasons why tie-ups such as these between India and Japan make sense at this juncture.
One of them is the personal chemistry between the two leaders. In India, newly re-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi – who now has an even larger majority than before – has an association with Japan that stretches back to when he was the chief minister of Gujarat province. He has built up a great working relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and this is likely to continue.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Photo: AFP
The Japan-India partnership has blossomed under the two leaders and in a rare honour, Abe hosted Modi at his holiday home in Yamanashi prefecture during his more recent visit to Japan in October last year for the annual bilateral summit. Abe was among the first to congratulate Modi on his re-election and the pair will meet in Osaka this month for the G20 Summit and later this year in India for an annual bilateral summit.
They won’t be short of talking points when it comes to areas where India and Japan could help each other out. For instance, while the new Indian government sees job-creation as a big issue, Japanese investment could help set up new industries and create more and newer jobs. In return, Japan with its ageing population could make good use of India’s huge pool of trained manpower.
SEA CHANGE
The two countries’ common interests stretch beyond the sphere of infrastructure. Both have an interest in balancing China’s growing influence in the maritime arena, and it was to this end that their forces last month took part in a joint sail-through in the South China Sea alongside US and Philippine vessels. Beijing claims the vast majority of the sea as its sovereign territory, a claim that is disputed by various neighbours.
The sail-through was seen as particularly significant for the involvement of the Philippines, given President Rodrigo Duterte has tended to favour a softly, softly approach towards Beijing.
But the presence of both Japanese and Indian vessels should also raise eyebrows, as it suggests India’s growing closeness with the United States could help it strengthen ties with Japan, Washington’s long-term ally.
The sail-through takes on added weight in light of Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision” and India’s “Act-East Policy” – another maritime interest the two countries share.
For Japan, India is an important part of its vision for the Indo-Pacific, where Tokyo has deployed its helicopter-carrier JS Izumo and the destroyer JS Murasame. Abe has long talked up the need for strong ties in Indo-Pacific – as far back as 2007 he gave a landmark speech in the Indian Parliament titled “Confluence of the Two Seas”.
WHAT NEXT?
The leaders of the two countries both have strong political backing, giving them the leeway to make bold moves. In India, Modi’s party, the
BJP, has grown even more powerful since the election. It secured 303 seats in the lower house of the Indian Parliament (the Lok Sabha), improving on its performance in 2014, when it won 282 seats. This gives Modi huge elbow room and the ability to take hard decisions, both on the internal and external fronts. In Japan, Abe enjoys strong approval ratings and there is no credible opposition to him.
Stronger than ever: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo: EPA
They have already shown signs of strengthening defence cooperation, with the two countries working towards a logistics sharing agreement that would help foster interoperability between their defence forces. India has already signed a similar treaty with the US, known as LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement).
Such moves are significant given New Delhi’s previous eagerness to be seen as non-aligned. Under Modi, it seems, India is becoming multi-aligned.
For his part Abe, fresh from hosting the mercurial US President Donald Trump, knows that strong ties with a Modi-led India could come in handy for Japan, especially if and when Washington or Beijing tighten the screws on Tokyo, whether on the trade or the defence front. Doubtless, there will be similar calculations going on in New Delhi.
Which brings us back to the recent joint investment in Sri Lanka. It may be too early to tell conclusively whether the move is a serious attempt to counter the Belt and Road and Chinese influence or if it is simply a case of the countries throwing their hats into the infrastructure ring.
For now, we will have to wait and see if Tokyo and New Delhi try the same formula elsewhere.
Rupakjyoti Borah is with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. This is his personal analysis
This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Belt and road tide may be turning in Colombo port plan.
Did Japan and India just launch a counter to China’s Belt and Road?
Geopolitics :
By Rupakjyoti Borah
Published: 7:15am, 6 Jun, 2019
- India and Japan are to help Sri Lanka develop Colombo Port – prompting speculation of a challenge to Beijing’s signature infrastructure programme.
- Is it just a case of two countries throwing their hat into the ring – or part of a deeper challenge to Chinese influence in the region ?
Pumps dredge sand near to Colombo’s main seaport. China, India and Japan are all helping Sri Lanka to develop the port. Photo: AFP
It is hard to overstate the significance of the recent agreement between India and Japan to help Sri Lanka develop its Colombo Port.
Under the deal to develop the East Container Terminal, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority will retain 100 per cent ownership of the terminal, while
Sri Lanka will hold a 51 per cent stake in the Terminal Operations Company with the India-Japan joint venture retaining the remaining 49 per cent.
Both the timing of the deal and its terms are conspicuous. After all, Sri Lanka is still smarting from its last experience of turning to a larger Asian neighbour for help in developing infrastructure – when, struggling to repay its debts to Beijing, it was forced to hand over control of its
Hambantota port and 15,000 acres of land to China on a 99-year lease.
That episode, which gave rise to claims China was using its Belt and Road Initiative investments as a form of debt diplomacy, wasn’t just painful for Sri Lankans, who were forced to come to terms with a loss of sovereignty. It also gave a fright to India, which saw control of a strategically located territory just a few hundred miles from its shores be ceded into the hands of one of its greatest rivals.
Controversial: Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Photo: Xinhua
So the news that India has teamed up with another of Asia’s powerhouse economies to offer Sri Lanka a deal regarding another port – a deal that(unlike Hambantota) pointedly leaves overall control in Sri Lankan hands – has inevitably given rise to speculation that India and Japan are motivated by a desire to push back against Chinese influence, and perhaps even to take on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature regional infrastructure initiative the Belt and Road Initiative.
Japan and India have both said that the project should not been seen as a counter to the Belt and Road, but some sceptics have a hard time believing this – especially given China is also funding development projects at the Colombo Port. Others suggest the project is better seen as an example of Japan and India throwing their hat into the infrastructure ring, rather than an outright challenge.
After all, the port is not the only example of India-Japan collaboration on infrastructure. The two countries are also partnering in setting up a diesel power plant in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These islands, along with some parts of Northeast India, were the only parts of India which were under the control of the Japanese during the second world war, so there is a certain symbolism involved.
COMMON INTERESTS
There are various reasons why tie-ups such as these between India and Japan make sense at this juncture.
One of them is the personal chemistry between the two leaders. In India, newly re-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi – who now has an even larger majority than before – has an association with Japan that stretches back to when he was the chief minister of Gujarat province. He has built up a great working relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and this is likely to continue.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Photo: AFP
The Japan-India partnership has blossomed under the two leaders and in a rare honour, Abe hosted Modi at his holiday home in Yamanashi prefecture during his more recent visit to Japan in October last year for the annual bilateral summit. Abe was among the first to congratulate Modi on his re-election and the pair will meet in Osaka this month for the G20 Summit and later this year in India for an annual bilateral summit.
They won’t be short of talking points when it comes to areas where India and Japan could help each other out. For instance, while the new Indian government sees job-creation as a big issue, Japanese investment could help set up new industries and create more and newer jobs. In return, Japan with its ageing population could make good use of India’s huge pool of trained manpower.
SEA CHANGE
The two countries’ common interests stretch beyond the sphere of infrastructure. Both have an interest in balancing China’s growing influence in the maritime arena, and it was to this end that their forces last month took part in a joint sail-through in the South China Sea alongside US and Philippine vessels. Beijing claims the vast majority of the sea as its sovereign territory, a claim that is disputed by various neighbours.
The sail-through was seen as particularly significant for the involvement of the Philippines, given President Rodrigo Duterte has tended to favour a softly, softly approach towards Beijing.
But the presence of both Japanese and Indian vessels should also raise eyebrows, as it suggests India’s growing closeness with the United States could help it strengthen ties with Japan, Washington’s long-term ally.
The sail-through takes on added weight in light of Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision” and India’s “Act-East Policy” – another maritime interest the two countries share.
For Japan, India is an important part of its vision for the Indo-Pacific, where Tokyo has deployed its helicopter-carrier JS Izumo and the destroyer JS Murasame. Abe has long talked up the need for strong ties in Indo-Pacific – as far back as 2007 he gave a landmark speech in the Indian Parliament titled “Confluence of the Two Seas”.
WHAT NEXT?
The leaders of the two countries both have strong political backing, giving them the leeway to make bold moves. In India, Modi’s party, the
BJP, has grown even more powerful since the election. It secured 303 seats in the lower house of the Indian Parliament (the Lok Sabha), improving on its performance in 2014, when it won 282 seats. This gives Modi huge elbow room and the ability to take hard decisions, both on the internal and external fronts. In Japan, Abe enjoys strong approval ratings and there is no credible opposition to him.
Stronger than ever: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo: EPA
They have already shown signs of strengthening defence cooperation, with the two countries working towards a logistics sharing agreement that would help foster interoperability between their defence forces. India has already signed a similar treaty with the US, known as LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement).
Such moves are significant given New Delhi’s previous eagerness to be seen as non-aligned. Under Modi, it seems, India is becoming multi-aligned.
For his part Abe, fresh from hosting the mercurial US President Donald Trump, knows that strong ties with a Modi-led India could come in handy for Japan, especially if and when Washington or Beijing tighten the screws on Tokyo, whether on the trade or the defence front. Doubtless, there will be similar calculations going on in New Delhi.
Which brings us back to the recent joint investment in Sri Lanka. It may be too early to tell conclusively whether the move is a serious attempt to counter the Belt and Road and Chinese influence or if it is simply a case of the countries throwing their hats into the infrastructure ring.
For now, we will have to wait and see if Tokyo and New Delhi try the same formula elsewhere.
Rupakjyoti Borah is with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. This is his personal analysis
This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Belt and road tide may be turning in Colombo port plan.
Did Japan and India just launch a counter to China’s Belt and Road?
PM Modi highlights 'importance of India' in trilateral meet with Trump, Abe
1 min read . Updated: 28 Jun 2019, 08:38 AM IST PTI
US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Narendra Modi laugh during a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit. Photo: AP
Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday held a "productive" trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Japanese premier Shinzo Abe, and extensively discussed issues of the Indo-Pacific region, connectivity and infrastructure development ahead of the formal opening of the G-20 Summit here.
It was the second Japan-America-India (JAI) meeting.
The discussion focused on how the three countries can together work together towards an open, stable and rule-based Indo-Pacific region.
During the Japan-America-India trilateral meeting, Modi highlighted "the importance India attaches to" the grouping.
The main topic of discussion was Indo-Pacific, how the three countries can work together in terms of connectivity, infrastructure, ensuring peace and security, and working together to build upon this new concept, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said.
"Committed to a better future. Meeting of JAI (Japan-America-India) Trilateral takes place in Osaka. PM @AbeShinzo welcomes the leaders. @POTUS congratulates Prime Ministers Modi and Abe for their electoral victories. PM Modi highlights the importance India attaches to JAI," the prime minister's office tweeted.
"Today's meeting of the JAI Trilateral was a productive one. We had extensive discussions on the Indo-Pacific region, improving connectivity and infrastructure development. Grateful to PM @AbeShinzo and President @realDonaldTrump for sharing their views as well," Modi tweeted later.
"2nd 'JAI' - Japan-America-India Trilateral Meeting between PM @narendramodi, Japanese PM @AbeShinzo & POTUS @realDonaldTrump on margins of #G20 Summit. Discussion focused on how the 3 countries can together work together towards an open, stable & rule-based Indo-Pacific region," External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said on Twitter.
Later, the prime minister met Trump separately.
On Thursday, Modi held wide-ranging talks with Abe on the global economy, issues of fugitive economic offenders and disaster management.
Prime Minister Modi will also meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Putin and other leaders during the June 28-29 summit.
This will be Modi's sixth G-20 Summit.
This story has been published from a wire agency feed without modifications to the text. Only the headline has been changed.
PM Modi highlights 'importance of India' in trilateral meet with Trump, Abe
1 min read . Updated: 28 Jun 2019, 08:38 AM IST PTI
- The discussion focused on how India, US and Japan can work together towards an open, stable Indo-Pacific region
- Today's meeting of the Japan-America-India Trilateral was a productive one, Modi tweeted
US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Narendra Modi laugh during a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit. Photo: AP
Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday held a "productive" trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Japanese premier Shinzo Abe, and extensively discussed issues of the Indo-Pacific region, connectivity and infrastructure development ahead of the formal opening of the G-20 Summit here.
It was the second Japan-America-India (JAI) meeting.
The discussion focused on how the three countries can together work together towards an open, stable and rule-based Indo-Pacific region.
During the Japan-America-India trilateral meeting, Modi highlighted "the importance India attaches to" the grouping.
The main topic of discussion was Indo-Pacific, how the three countries can work together in terms of connectivity, infrastructure, ensuring peace and security, and working together to build upon this new concept, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said.
"Committed to a better future. Meeting of JAI (Japan-America-India) Trilateral takes place in Osaka. PM @AbeShinzo welcomes the leaders. @POTUS congratulates Prime Ministers Modi and Abe for their electoral victories. PM Modi highlights the importance India attaches to JAI," the prime minister's office tweeted.
"Today's meeting of the JAI Trilateral was a productive one. We had extensive discussions on the Indo-Pacific region, improving connectivity and infrastructure development. Grateful to PM @AbeShinzo and President @realDonaldTrump for sharing their views as well," Modi tweeted later.
"2nd 'JAI' - Japan-America-India Trilateral Meeting between PM @narendramodi, Japanese PM @AbeShinzo & POTUS @realDonaldTrump on margins of #G20 Summit. Discussion focused on how the 3 countries can together work together towards an open, stable & rule-based Indo-Pacific region," External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said on Twitter.
Later, the prime minister met Trump separately.
On Thursday, Modi held wide-ranging talks with Abe on the global economy, issues of fugitive economic offenders and disaster management.
Prime Minister Modi will also meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Putin and other leaders during the June 28-29 summit.
This will be Modi's sixth G-20 Summit.
This story has been published from a wire agency feed without modifications to the text. Only the headline has been changed.
PM Modi highlights 'importance of India' in trilateral meet with Trump, Abe
No longer in a cleft stick: India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific
25 Jun 2019 | Aakriti Bachhawat
India has assumed far greater prominence in Australian strategic thinking in recent times, as a potential economic and political counterweight to China. While Australia’s Indo-Pacific outlook is still inclusive in the sense that it envisages a constructive role for China that involves its adherence to the rules-based order, there’s been a greater inclination towards India because Beijing’s actions over the past five years haven’t exactly conformed to Canberra’s vision.
Five years ago, Melissa Conley Tyler and I argued in The Strategist that Australia, in its tilt towards the Indo-Pacific concept, faced an important choice: between its own preferred inclusive approach to China (and to seeking Chinese partnership) and an endorsement of the US’s and India’s more exclusivist views (aimed at keeping China out). Given that India was very much at the centre of the Indo-Pacific reorientation, this seemed to create a potential conundrum for Australian policymakers and a sticking point which would determine the sustainability of Canberra’s Indo-Pacific vision. Five years on, it seems that Australian and Indian policy perceptions on the Indo-Pacific are in much greater alignment.
The shift in Australian attitudes has come about due to three distinct but interrelated factors: recognition of China’s increasing aggression and use of grey-zone coercion in the South China Sea; Chinese attempts at interfering in Australia’s domestic politics; and a fear of China’s using its economic heft through the Belt and Road Initiative to create debt traps and dual-use facilities like ports in the South Pacific. China’s actions have contributed to the overall worsening of US–China relations, which has had a major influence on Australian assessments. At the same time, India has become a bona fide strategic partner to Australia’s primary ally. India is a strong and resilient democracy and there’s much consonance of values between Canberra and New Delhi.
Australia has thus ramped up its engagement with and support of India politically, diplomatically, and in terms of military overtures, especially in the past two years. In 2017, the two countries established an annual ‘2+2’ meeting of defence and foreign affairs officials at the secretary level. Economically, Australian exports to India have doubled in the past five years, from $11 billion to $22 billion. The Australian government’s endorsement last year of an India economic strategy, which sets ambitious targets for bilateral economic and strategic engagement between now and 2035, is also an indication of how seriously Canberra is pursuing its relationship with New Delhi. While the realisation of a free trade agreement faces long bureaucratic hurdles, there are reasons to be optimistic that the deal will eventually be sealed.
Militarily, the number of bilateral meetings, exercises and activities between Australia and India increased from 11 in 2014 to 38 in 2018. This year’s AUSINDEX maritime exercise included anti-submarine-warfare drills—complex exercises that reflect unprecedented trust between the two nations, especially as such close partnership goes against India’s traditional defence policy norms of strategic autonomy.
Last year, India participated for the first time in Pitch Black, a multilateral air-defence exercise hosted by Australia. Australia has also proposed a logistics support agreement with India similar to the arrangement India has with the US. On the diplomatic front, India has created an Indo-Pacific wing in its external affairs ministry, signifying a tighter embrace of the geopolitical concept by New Delhi.
Australia has become a strong supporter of India at the UN too. It co-sponsored the resolution to list Pakistani terror mastermind Masood Azhar as a terrorist. Australia’s strong condemnation of the Pulwama terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir in February and tacit support to India during its crisis with Pakistan are a far cry from the summer of 1998 when Canberra’s trenchant criticism of New Delhi’s nuclear tests badly soured the relationship.
India’s perceptions of Australia have traditionally suffered from what I’d like to call a ‘shadow’ complex; during the Cold War, non-aligned New Delhi saw Canberra as a shadow of the US. After the Cold War, and particularly in the past decade, India leaned towards believing that Australia was far too close to China to be a strong partner. In other words, and especially in the context of the growing ties between India and the US since the 2008 US–India nuclear deal, Australia’s closeness to America doesn’t shape Indian perceptions of Australia as much as its economic dependence on China does.
Australia’s closeness to China was seen to be the reason for Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd’s withdrawal from the first iteration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan and the US in 2008. New Delhi, however, will have noted the Australian government’s more recent making of some tough decisions, like banning Huawei from its 5G rollout and passing foreign interference legislation. India probably sees Australia’s current policy settings as providing more room for innovative approaches to balancing the country’s economic and strategic priorities. Australia needs to understand that, as with everything else when it comes to the Indian bureaucracy, change will be slow, especially a change in mindset and perceptions.
US President Donald Trump’s pursuit of a transactional foreign policy and the testing by a revisionist China under Xi Jinping of the limits of the rules-based order have left little room for manoeuvere for middle and rising powers. Australia and India have found common interests and purpose, which helps explain their deepening friendship.
The Australia–India relationship has often been cited as the weakest link in the Quad. Despite deepening defence ties, India’s continued refusal to allow Australia to participate in the Malabar maritime exercises has been seen as the litmus test for the partnership. However, it’s important to note the leaps and bounds by which the bilateral relationship has progressed outside the framework of the Quad, especially over the past two years.
The return of incumbent governments in both India and Australia means that the prospects for a strengthened Quad have never been better. While there’s a general sense that all Quad nations want to keep their engagement low key and unremarkable, there’s no denying that healthy bilateral relationships are a starting point for any meaningful multilateral cooperation.
As the Australian high commissioner to India, Harinder Sidhu, said in a recent speech:
No longer in a cleft stick: India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist
25 Jun 2019 | Aakriti Bachhawat
India has assumed far greater prominence in Australian strategic thinking in recent times, as a potential economic and political counterweight to China. While Australia’s Indo-Pacific outlook is still inclusive in the sense that it envisages a constructive role for China that involves its adherence to the rules-based order, there’s been a greater inclination towards India because Beijing’s actions over the past five years haven’t exactly conformed to Canberra’s vision.
Five years ago, Melissa Conley Tyler and I argued in The Strategist that Australia, in its tilt towards the Indo-Pacific concept, faced an important choice: between its own preferred inclusive approach to China (and to seeking Chinese partnership) and an endorsement of the US’s and India’s more exclusivist views (aimed at keeping China out). Given that India was very much at the centre of the Indo-Pacific reorientation, this seemed to create a potential conundrum for Australian policymakers and a sticking point which would determine the sustainability of Canberra’s Indo-Pacific vision. Five years on, it seems that Australian and Indian policy perceptions on the Indo-Pacific are in much greater alignment.
The shift in Australian attitudes has come about due to three distinct but interrelated factors: recognition of China’s increasing aggression and use of grey-zone coercion in the South China Sea; Chinese attempts at interfering in Australia’s domestic politics; and a fear of China’s using its economic heft through the Belt and Road Initiative to create debt traps and dual-use facilities like ports in the South Pacific. China’s actions have contributed to the overall worsening of US–China relations, which has had a major influence on Australian assessments. At the same time, India has become a bona fide strategic partner to Australia’s primary ally. India is a strong and resilient democracy and there’s much consonance of values between Canberra and New Delhi.
Australia has thus ramped up its engagement with and support of India politically, diplomatically, and in terms of military overtures, especially in the past two years. In 2017, the two countries established an annual ‘2+2’ meeting of defence and foreign affairs officials at the secretary level. Economically, Australian exports to India have doubled in the past five years, from $11 billion to $22 billion. The Australian government’s endorsement last year of an India economic strategy, which sets ambitious targets for bilateral economic and strategic engagement between now and 2035, is also an indication of how seriously Canberra is pursuing its relationship with New Delhi. While the realisation of a free trade agreement faces long bureaucratic hurdles, there are reasons to be optimistic that the deal will eventually be sealed.
Militarily, the number of bilateral meetings, exercises and activities between Australia and India increased from 11 in 2014 to 38 in 2018. This year’s AUSINDEX maritime exercise included anti-submarine-warfare drills—complex exercises that reflect unprecedented trust between the two nations, especially as such close partnership goes against India’s traditional defence policy norms of strategic autonomy.
Last year, India participated for the first time in Pitch Black, a multilateral air-defence exercise hosted by Australia. Australia has also proposed a logistics support agreement with India similar to the arrangement India has with the US. On the diplomatic front, India has created an Indo-Pacific wing in its external affairs ministry, signifying a tighter embrace of the geopolitical concept by New Delhi.
Australia has become a strong supporter of India at the UN too. It co-sponsored the resolution to list Pakistani terror mastermind Masood Azhar as a terrorist. Australia’s strong condemnation of the Pulwama terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir in February and tacit support to India during its crisis with Pakistan are a far cry from the summer of 1998 when Canberra’s trenchant criticism of New Delhi’s nuclear tests badly soured the relationship.
India’s perceptions of Australia have traditionally suffered from what I’d like to call a ‘shadow’ complex; during the Cold War, non-aligned New Delhi saw Canberra as a shadow of the US. After the Cold War, and particularly in the past decade, India leaned towards believing that Australia was far too close to China to be a strong partner. In other words, and especially in the context of the growing ties between India and the US since the 2008 US–India nuclear deal, Australia’s closeness to America doesn’t shape Indian perceptions of Australia as much as its economic dependence on China does.
Australia’s closeness to China was seen to be the reason for Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd’s withdrawal from the first iteration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan and the US in 2008. New Delhi, however, will have noted the Australian government’s more recent making of some tough decisions, like banning Huawei from its 5G rollout and passing foreign interference legislation. India probably sees Australia’s current policy settings as providing more room for innovative approaches to balancing the country’s economic and strategic priorities. Australia needs to understand that, as with everything else when it comes to the Indian bureaucracy, change will be slow, especially a change in mindset and perceptions.
US President Donald Trump’s pursuit of a transactional foreign policy and the testing by a revisionist China under Xi Jinping of the limits of the rules-based order have left little room for manoeuvere for middle and rising powers. Australia and India have found common interests and purpose, which helps explain their deepening friendship.
The Australia–India relationship has often been cited as the weakest link in the Quad. Despite deepening defence ties, India’s continued refusal to allow Australia to participate in the Malabar maritime exercises has been seen as the litmus test for the partnership. However, it’s important to note the leaps and bounds by which the bilateral relationship has progressed outside the framework of the Quad, especially over the past two years.
The return of incumbent governments in both India and Australia means that the prospects for a strengthened Quad have never been better. While there’s a general sense that all Quad nations want to keep their engagement low key and unremarkable, there’s no denying that healthy bilateral relationships are a starting point for any meaningful multilateral cooperation.
As the Australian high commissioner to India, Harinder Sidhu, said in a recent speech:
We are in a stronger place of trust and understanding of each other than we were even a decade ago. There is more comfort in working together. Slowly we are shaking off our own ‘hesitations of history’ and we are looking to the future, instead of looking back.
No longer in a cleft stick: India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist
Vigilant R&AW Cripples China-Pakistan Nexus in Arabian Sea
A secret report of RA&W reveals that Indian agency successfully thwarted ISI designs in the strategic island of Maldives.
Updated: June 29, 2019 9:21 PM IST, by IANS
New Delhi: In a bid to check the growing influence of China-Pakistan nexus in the Indian Ocean, India’s external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) is bolstering up its maritime intelligence network, laying more emphasis on the Arabian Sea region. Eight months ago, in the tenure of the then President of Maldives, Abdullah Yameen, capital city Male had become the overseas hub of Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
A secret report of RA&W reveals that Indian agency successfully thwarted ISI designs in the strategic island of Maldives. The ISI, backed by Ministry of State Security, MSS (Chinese spy agency) and involving a few close aides of former Maldives President Abdullah Yameen, was encouraging anti-India activities being operated from Pakistan’s embassy located in Male, report says. Yameen was allegedly close to a senior Pakistan diplomat and was later trapped by the Chinese agency.
The report says that during the tenure of Abdullah Yameen, President of Mauritius (2013-2018), the Chinese gained military, economic and political influence in the strategic island. Yameen’s activities did not find favours with India.
A highly placed source in the government told IANS that the Chinese invested more than 2 billion dollars in large-scale infrastructure projects, but the money pumped in by Beijing was more in the form of a loan. Yameen entertained several Chinese companies and even leased small islands to them.
According to a source, the situation changed once Ibrahim Mohammed Solih took over as Maldives’ new President. “Finally Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Maldives (June 8 and 9) was a morale booster for India’s security and intelligence agencies. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was the key person in planning this first foreign visit of Modi in his second term, a source said.
Sources said that former President Yameen was also close to Pakistan and had allegedly facilitated ISI to increase its presence in the island country. During Yameen’s tenure, Pakistan Embassy at Lily Magu area in Male had become an overseas hub of ISI, engaged in hatching conspiracies against India. In fact, Pakistan’s Ambassador played a key role in bringing Beijing closer to Yameen.
Turning the tide against Yameen, pro-India leader Ibrahim Mohammed Solih took an anti-China stance in last year’s election and succeeded in his mission. Sources said once Solih took over the reins in Male, ISI’s growing influence in the Maldives was gradually neutralised. Besides the Maldives, R&AW is also stepping up its vigil of Chinese vessels around Seychelles and Mauritius.
New R&AW Chief Samant Goel, an expert on Sino-Pak affairs with more than 18 years of experience in the agency now plays an important role in stepping up India’s vigil in the Arabian Sea region. Goel, a 1984 batch IPS officer, is said to be close to Ajit Doval and has been a key figure in chalking out the planning of Balakot air strike early this year.
“With Doval at the helm, his close aide Samant, a meritorious officer, can take the agency to a new height of professionalism. As far as checking the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean is concerned, the RA&W is quite capable of achieving its set objective,” said a former senior official of India’s external agency.
Sources said to rejuvenate the cadre and enhance human intelligence, RA&W has got rid over several officers who were not performing up to the mark. The officers whose identity was compromised or against whom there were complaints relating to integrity, were also shown the door.
The agency has also procured state-of-the-art gadgets and is well-equipped to intercept conversations of satellite phones.
In cyber-related surveillance, RA&W can be compared with any top spy agency of the world including Mossad (Israel) or China’s Ministry of State Security, MSS. Sources said apart from increasing maritime presence, MSS is also focusing on economic espionage as China becomes a major telecom player.
The MSS boasts of some of the best hackers who can break into any secret data from a server located in any part of the world. Sources said R&AW is well equipped to tackle any such cyber threat originating from any part of the globe.
Vigilant R&AW Cripples China-Pakistan Nexus in Arabian Sea
A secret report of RA&W reveals that Indian agency successfully thwarted ISI designs in the strategic island of Maldives.
Updated: June 29, 2019 9:21 PM IST, by IANS
New Delhi: In a bid to check the growing influence of China-Pakistan nexus in the Indian Ocean, India’s external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) is bolstering up its maritime intelligence network, laying more emphasis on the Arabian Sea region. Eight months ago, in the tenure of the then President of Maldives, Abdullah Yameen, capital city Male had become the overseas hub of Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
A secret report of RA&W reveals that Indian agency successfully thwarted ISI designs in the strategic island of Maldives. The ISI, backed by Ministry of State Security, MSS (Chinese spy agency) and involving a few close aides of former Maldives President Abdullah Yameen, was encouraging anti-India activities being operated from Pakistan’s embassy located in Male, report says. Yameen was allegedly close to a senior Pakistan diplomat and was later trapped by the Chinese agency.
The report says that during the tenure of Abdullah Yameen, President of Mauritius (2013-2018), the Chinese gained military, economic and political influence in the strategic island. Yameen’s activities did not find favours with India.
A highly placed source in the government told IANS that the Chinese invested more than 2 billion dollars in large-scale infrastructure projects, but the money pumped in by Beijing was more in the form of a loan. Yameen entertained several Chinese companies and even leased small islands to them.
According to a source, the situation changed once Ibrahim Mohammed Solih took over as Maldives’ new President. “Finally Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Maldives (June 8 and 9) was a morale booster for India’s security and intelligence agencies. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was the key person in planning this first foreign visit of Modi in his second term, a source said.
Sources said that former President Yameen was also close to Pakistan and had allegedly facilitated ISI to increase its presence in the island country. During Yameen’s tenure, Pakistan Embassy at Lily Magu area in Male had become an overseas hub of ISI, engaged in hatching conspiracies against India. In fact, Pakistan’s Ambassador played a key role in bringing Beijing closer to Yameen.
Turning the tide against Yameen, pro-India leader Ibrahim Mohammed Solih took an anti-China stance in last year’s election and succeeded in his mission. Sources said once Solih took over the reins in Male, ISI’s growing influence in the Maldives was gradually neutralised. Besides the Maldives, R&AW is also stepping up its vigil of Chinese vessels around Seychelles and Mauritius.
New R&AW Chief Samant Goel, an expert on Sino-Pak affairs with more than 18 years of experience in the agency now plays an important role in stepping up India’s vigil in the Arabian Sea region. Goel, a 1984 batch IPS officer, is said to be close to Ajit Doval and has been a key figure in chalking out the planning of Balakot air strike early this year.
“With Doval at the helm, his close aide Samant, a meritorious officer, can take the agency to a new height of professionalism. As far as checking the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean is concerned, the RA&W is quite capable of achieving its set objective,” said a former senior official of India’s external agency.
Sources said to rejuvenate the cadre and enhance human intelligence, RA&W has got rid over several officers who were not performing up to the mark. The officers whose identity was compromised or against whom there were complaints relating to integrity, were also shown the door.
The agency has also procured state-of-the-art gadgets and is well-equipped to intercept conversations of satellite phones.
In cyber-related surveillance, RA&W can be compared with any top spy agency of the world including Mossad (Israel) or China’s Ministry of State Security, MSS. Sources said apart from increasing maritime presence, MSS is also focusing on economic espionage as China becomes a major telecom player.
The MSS boasts of some of the best hackers who can break into any secret data from a server located in any part of the world. Sources said R&AW is well equipped to tackle any such cyber threat originating from any part of the globe.
Vigilant R&AW Cripples China-Pakistan Nexus in Arabian Sea
Raja Mandala: Modi’s Taiwan opportunity
If there is one piece of real estate that holds the key to the geopolitics of East Asia, it is Taiwan.
Written by C. Raja Mohan | Updated: May 28, 2019 5:01:22 am
Most major nations have significant cooperation with Taiwan without extending it diplomatic recognition. India, however, has too many self-imposed constraints on its Taiwan policy. (Express Photo)
Suggesting that the new government in Delhi should put Taiwan on its diplomatic priority list might look a rather small-bore recommendation for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has come back with a huge domestic mandate that vastly enhances his international standing. Some in Delhi, however, would say that Modi’s focus on Taiwan is too big and risky an idea. They worry it might offend Chinese political sensitivities. But productive engagement with Taiwan is not about abandoning India’s “One-China” policy or playing some kind of a “card”. India has been rather scrupulous in respecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
When the NDA government assumed office in 2014, the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj vented the frustration that Beijing does not reciprocate with a “One-India policy”. Given the stakes in a sensible relationship with China, the NDA government rightly chose to stay the course on the “One-China policy”. But it is by no means sensible for Delhi to deny itself the benefits of engaging Taiwan within the framework of its One-China policy.
Most major nations have significant cooperation with Taiwan without extending it diplomatic recognition. India, however, has too many self-imposed constraints on its Taiwan policy. It is now time to lift many of them. Even more important, is the need to end Delhi’s traditional political neglect of the Taiwan relationship. Lack of interest at the high political level means there is no bureaucratic ownership in South Block.
To be sure, since the establishment of formal channels of contact in the mid-1990s, there has been steady progress in the relationship. Annual bilateral trade has reached $7 billion last year and the hope is to raise it to $20 billion in the next few years. There has been a rise in Taiwan’s investments in India and a steady growth in exchanges between the two societies.
During the last five years, the NDA government has taken steps to enhance the relationship. These include the upgradation of the bilateral investment agreement, promotion of major Taiwanese investments, expanding parliamentary exchanges and facilitating track-two dialogues on regional issues.
There are at least three reasons why Delhi should take a fresh look at Taiwan and replace its current incrementalism with a more ambitious policy.
The first is geopolitical. The delicate three-way political compromise between US, China and Taiwan crafted in the 1970s appears to be breaking down, thanks to rising China’s regional assertiveness, the renewed threat of forceful reunification of Taiwan and Beijing’s relentless pressure tactics against Taipei.
Meanwhile in Washington, as part of the belated push-back against China under the Trump Administration, the “deep state” is determined to strengthen ties with Taiwan. In reinforcing its security commitment to Taiwan, the Trump Administration has begun to send its naval ships through the Taiwan Straits more frequently than before. Meanwhile, divisions within Taiwan on the future ties with Beijing have deepened.
The relative quiet in the triangular relations between the US, China and Taiwan over the last four decades tends to mask the strategic significance of Taiwan that straddles the sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific and is a stone’s throw from China’s mainland.
If there is one piece of real estate that holds the key to the geopolitics of East Asia, it is Taiwan. The unfolding dynamic around Taiwan will have significant consequences for India’s Act East Policy and its emerging role in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Second is geo-economic. The unfolding trade war between the US and China is compelling Taiwan to accelerate its plans to move its large manufacturing bases away from China to Southeast Asia and India. Well before the US-China trade conflict intensified, Taiwan announced the “New Southbound Policy” in 2016. The objective is to strengthen ties with the 10 countries of the ASEAN as well as Australia, New Zealand and India.
As the structure of industrial production in East Asia undergoes a profound transformation, amidst the prospect of an economic decoupling between the US and China, India has once-in-a-generation opportunity to boost its own manufacturing sector. For Modi’s agenda of promoting industrial production and creating jobs in India, the Taiwan connection with its impressive small and medium enterprises is more than opportune.
The third is talent and technology. Few issues have animated Modi than the promotion of global access to India’s professional talent. As it turns out, Taiwan has embarked on a big mission to attract skilled workers. With a declining birth rate and growing emigration, Taiwan’s industry, education, and technology development could do with Indian engineers and scientists. At present, there are barely 2,000 Indians working in Taiwan.
There is no shortage of ideas for the transformation of India’s relations with Taiwan. An agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation is one of those. The synergy in human resources provides the basis for massive collaborations between the universities, research institutions and technology enclaves in the two countries.
What the bilateral relationship now needs is high-level political attention in Delhi to make things happen and quickly. Expanding the engagement with Taiwan can’t be a tactical game; it should be an important part of Delhi’s effort to come to terms with all corners of Greater China that looms so large over India’s future.
Those who think Taiwan is small beer in the wider scheme of Indian grand strategy should ponder over two facts. Taiwan’s GDP is about $600 billion and twice the size of Pakistan’s economy. And few entities in the international system are today as eager and capable of boosting Modi’s domestic economic agenda.
Raja Mandala: Modi’s Taiwan opportunity
If there is one piece of real estate that holds the key to the geopolitics of East Asia, it is Taiwan.
Written by C. Raja Mohan | Updated: May 28, 2019 5:01:22 am
Most major nations have significant cooperation with Taiwan without extending it diplomatic recognition. India, however, has too many self-imposed constraints on its Taiwan policy. (Express Photo)
Suggesting that the new government in Delhi should put Taiwan on its diplomatic priority list might look a rather small-bore recommendation for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has come back with a huge domestic mandate that vastly enhances his international standing. Some in Delhi, however, would say that Modi’s focus on Taiwan is too big and risky an idea. They worry it might offend Chinese political sensitivities. But productive engagement with Taiwan is not about abandoning India’s “One-China” policy or playing some kind of a “card”. India has been rather scrupulous in respecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
When the NDA government assumed office in 2014, the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj vented the frustration that Beijing does not reciprocate with a “One-India policy”. Given the stakes in a sensible relationship with China, the NDA government rightly chose to stay the course on the “One-China policy”. But it is by no means sensible for Delhi to deny itself the benefits of engaging Taiwan within the framework of its One-China policy.
Most major nations have significant cooperation with Taiwan without extending it diplomatic recognition. India, however, has too many self-imposed constraints on its Taiwan policy. It is now time to lift many of them. Even more important, is the need to end Delhi’s traditional political neglect of the Taiwan relationship. Lack of interest at the high political level means there is no bureaucratic ownership in South Block.
To be sure, since the establishment of formal channels of contact in the mid-1990s, there has been steady progress in the relationship. Annual bilateral trade has reached $7 billion last year and the hope is to raise it to $20 billion in the next few years. There has been a rise in Taiwan’s investments in India and a steady growth in exchanges between the two societies.
During the last five years, the NDA government has taken steps to enhance the relationship. These include the upgradation of the bilateral investment agreement, promotion of major Taiwanese investments, expanding parliamentary exchanges and facilitating track-two dialogues on regional issues.
There are at least three reasons why Delhi should take a fresh look at Taiwan and replace its current incrementalism with a more ambitious policy.
The first is geopolitical. The delicate three-way political compromise between US, China and Taiwan crafted in the 1970s appears to be breaking down, thanks to rising China’s regional assertiveness, the renewed threat of forceful reunification of Taiwan and Beijing’s relentless pressure tactics against Taipei.
Meanwhile in Washington, as part of the belated push-back against China under the Trump Administration, the “deep state” is determined to strengthen ties with Taiwan. In reinforcing its security commitment to Taiwan, the Trump Administration has begun to send its naval ships through the Taiwan Straits more frequently than before. Meanwhile, divisions within Taiwan on the future ties with Beijing have deepened.
The relative quiet in the triangular relations between the US, China and Taiwan over the last four decades tends to mask the strategic significance of Taiwan that straddles the sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific and is a stone’s throw from China’s mainland.
If there is one piece of real estate that holds the key to the geopolitics of East Asia, it is Taiwan. The unfolding dynamic around Taiwan will have significant consequences for India’s Act East Policy and its emerging role in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Second is geo-economic. The unfolding trade war between the US and China is compelling Taiwan to accelerate its plans to move its large manufacturing bases away from China to Southeast Asia and India. Well before the US-China trade conflict intensified, Taiwan announced the “New Southbound Policy” in 2016. The objective is to strengthen ties with the 10 countries of the ASEAN as well as Australia, New Zealand and India.
As the structure of industrial production in East Asia undergoes a profound transformation, amidst the prospect of an economic decoupling between the US and China, India has once-in-a-generation opportunity to boost its own manufacturing sector. For Modi’s agenda of promoting industrial production and creating jobs in India, the Taiwan connection with its impressive small and medium enterprises is more than opportune.
The third is talent and technology. Few issues have animated Modi than the promotion of global access to India’s professional talent. As it turns out, Taiwan has embarked on a big mission to attract skilled workers. With a declining birth rate and growing emigration, Taiwan’s industry, education, and technology development could do with Indian engineers and scientists. At present, there are barely 2,000 Indians working in Taiwan.
There is no shortage of ideas for the transformation of India’s relations with Taiwan. An agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation is one of those. The synergy in human resources provides the basis for massive collaborations between the universities, research institutions and technology enclaves in the two countries.
What the bilateral relationship now needs is high-level political attention in Delhi to make things happen and quickly. Expanding the engagement with Taiwan can’t be a tactical game; it should be an important part of Delhi’s effort to come to terms with all corners of Greater China that looms so large over India’s future.
Those who think Taiwan is small beer in the wider scheme of Indian grand strategy should ponder over two facts. Taiwan’s GDP is about $600 billion and twice the size of Pakistan’s economy. And few entities in the international system are today as eager and capable of boosting Modi’s domestic economic agenda.
Raja Mandala: Modi’s Taiwan opportunity
Taiwan-China rivalry hits Indian shores
Chung Kwang Tien, Representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India, gestures as he answers a question at an event in New Delhi on May 8, 2019. Reuters file photo
Sandeep Dikshit
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, May 10
Increasing tensions between China on one hand and Taiwan and the US on the other have started lapping Indian shores.
Three days after the US House of Representatives passed a law which supports increased defence spending by Taiwan, Taipei’s local mission here appealed for Indian help to get it back on a global health body from which it was excluded after a Independence-minded President took office three years ago.
China has been pressuring countries to severe all diplomatic ties with Taiwan ever since the US cut diplomatic ties in 1979 and recognised only Beijing under the “One China” policy. As a result, Taiwan has formal embassies in 17 countries only while the rest are called Taipei Economic and Cultural Centres.
Head of the Indian Centre, Chung-kwang Tien made the case for Taiwan’s inclusion in a World Health Organisation conference on grounds that no country should be excluded from such a critical sector where his country had much to contribute.
India has a substantial relationship with Taiwan despite having no formal ties and Tien made no effort to hide it while taking pot-shots at China. “Our Indo-Taiwan trade is balanced unlike another country where India is in the red by $ 55 billion,” he said in a reference to Sino-Indian trade. Taiwan, he said, is considered a soft power unlike other “sharp powers”, he said in another broadside at Beijing.
At the same time, Tien acknowledged that China had considerably more heft and said, “we will not ask for too much” while appreciating the presence of Ronald Sapa Tlare, MP, as a signal of political support to the Taiwanese cause.
Dr Anamika, a Taiwan expert, offered a solution: the WHO DG could extend an invite to Taiwan if its participation as an “observer non-member state” is problematic because of lack of agreement on whether it is a state or not.
But this faux fight over Taiwan’s attendance at a WHO meet obscures the passage of the US Taiwan Assurance Act which has raised China’s hackles. Unlike the previous two Taiwanese Presidents, Tsai Ing-wen desires a departure from the Kuomintang's approach which has contributed to tensions and a stark warning from Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Tien termed the US law as a “strong shot in the arm at the right time” and urged other countries to follow suit. “China has gone too far by sticking its nose into everyone’s business,” he observed.
Tien also defended Taiwan’s support to the China—containment policy for the Indo-Pacific by pointing out that it was a missing link.
“We are strategically placed. If Taiwan is not included there will be a missing link,” he said while declaiming any intention of indulging in a power game.
Taiwan-China rivalry hits Indian shores
Chung Kwang Tien, Representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India, gestures as he answers a question at an event in New Delhi on May 8, 2019. Reuters file photo
Sandeep Dikshit
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, May 10
Increasing tensions between China on one hand and Taiwan and the US on the other have started lapping Indian shores.
Three days after the US House of Representatives passed a law which supports increased defence spending by Taiwan, Taipei’s local mission here appealed for Indian help to get it back on a global health body from which it was excluded after a Independence-minded President took office three years ago.
China has been pressuring countries to severe all diplomatic ties with Taiwan ever since the US cut diplomatic ties in 1979 and recognised only Beijing under the “One China” policy. As a result, Taiwan has formal embassies in 17 countries only while the rest are called Taipei Economic and Cultural Centres.
Head of the Indian Centre, Chung-kwang Tien made the case for Taiwan’s inclusion in a World Health Organisation conference on grounds that no country should be excluded from such a critical sector where his country had much to contribute.
India has a substantial relationship with Taiwan despite having no formal ties and Tien made no effort to hide it while taking pot-shots at China. “Our Indo-Taiwan trade is balanced unlike another country where India is in the red by $ 55 billion,” he said in a reference to Sino-Indian trade. Taiwan, he said, is considered a soft power unlike other “sharp powers”, he said in another broadside at Beijing.
At the same time, Tien acknowledged that China had considerably more heft and said, “we will not ask for too much” while appreciating the presence of Ronald Sapa Tlare, MP, as a signal of political support to the Taiwanese cause.
Dr Anamika, a Taiwan expert, offered a solution: the WHO DG could extend an invite to Taiwan if its participation as an “observer non-member state” is problematic because of lack of agreement on whether it is a state or not.
But this faux fight over Taiwan’s attendance at a WHO meet obscures the passage of the US Taiwan Assurance Act which has raised China’s hackles. Unlike the previous two Taiwanese Presidents, Tsai Ing-wen desires a departure from the Kuomintang's approach which has contributed to tensions and a stark warning from Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Tien termed the US law as a “strong shot in the arm at the right time” and urged other countries to follow suit. “China has gone too far by sticking its nose into everyone’s business,” he observed.
Tien also defended Taiwan’s support to the China—containment policy for the Indo-Pacific by pointing out that it was a missing link.
“We are strategically placed. If Taiwan is not included there will be a missing link,” he said while declaiming any intention of indulging in a power game.
Taiwan-China rivalry hits Indian shores
The baby steps to India's counter to the BRI. For all the rueing about lack of scale, at at least we will deliver what we promise and it won't land you under a mountain of debt.
Extending $28 billion in loans, India reaches out to 63 countries
TNN | Updated: Jul 1, 2019, 22:17 IST
Highlights :
While lacking the scale, or even the ambition, of China’s BRI, India’s development cooperation partnership based on concessional Lines of Credit (LOC) has been carrying out economic projects in 63 countries around the world.
There are currently 279 LOCs, worth $28 billion, extended to these countries located in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and Oceania, the government informed Parliament last week in response to a question on what India was doing to counter BRI’s economic and foreign policy issue.
“Of this, 254 projects aggregating nearly $4.70 billion have been completed, while 194 projects worth nearly $19 billion are under implementation. These include 94 connectivity projects in five countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood being taken up with LOC worth nearly $6.6 billion,” junior minister V Muraleedharan said in response to a question.
India, he said, had a robust development cooperation agenda that constituted a significant dimension of its close and multi-faceted ties with many partner countries, including in India’s neighbourhood.
“Extension of Government of India Lines of Credit on concessional terms is a key component of this development partnership in diverse areas of socio-economic development such as power, transport, connectivity, agriculture and irrigation, manufacturing industries, water and sanitation etc,” he said.
As per government, while expansion and strengthening of connectivity is an integral part of India’s economic and diplomatic initiatives, it is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms. They must follow principles of openness, transparency and financial responsibility.
Extending $28 billion in loans, India reaches out to 63 countries | India News - Times of India
Extending $28 billion in loans, India reaches out to 63 countries
TNN | Updated: Jul 1, 2019, 22:17 IST
Highlights :
- There are currently 279 Lines of Credit (LOCs), worth $28 billons, extended to these countries located in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and Oceania.
- Of this, 254 projects aggregating nearly $4.70 billion have been completed, while194 projects worth nearly $19 billion are under implementation: Junior minister V Muraleedharan
While lacking the scale, or even the ambition, of China’s BRI, India’s development cooperation partnership based on concessional Lines of Credit (LOC) has been carrying out economic projects in 63 countries around the world.
There are currently 279 LOCs, worth $28 billion, extended to these countries located in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and Oceania, the government informed Parliament last week in response to a question on what India was doing to counter BRI’s economic and foreign policy issue.
“Of this, 254 projects aggregating nearly $4.70 billion have been completed, while 194 projects worth nearly $19 billion are under implementation. These include 94 connectivity projects in five countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood being taken up with LOC worth nearly $6.6 billion,” junior minister V Muraleedharan said in response to a question.
India, he said, had a robust development cooperation agenda that constituted a significant dimension of its close and multi-faceted ties with many partner countries, including in India’s neighbourhood.
“Extension of Government of India Lines of Credit on concessional terms is a key component of this development partnership in diverse areas of socio-economic development such as power, transport, connectivity, agriculture and irrigation, manufacturing industries, water and sanitation etc,” he said.
As per government, while expansion and strengthening of connectivity is an integral part of India’s economic and diplomatic initiatives, it is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms. They must follow principles of openness, transparency and financial responsibility.
Extending $28 billion in loans, India reaches out to 63 countries | India News - Times of India
Ocean’s eleven
India and ASEAN agree on their outlook to the Indo-Pacific. They must act in concert.
Written by Gautam Bambawale | Published: July 3, 2019 1:58:37 am
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (Source: Twitter/@MEAIndia)
At the 34th ASEAN summit in Bangkok, the leaders of the 10-nation grouping finally came out with their positions on the Indo-Pacific region in a document titled ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’. While ASEAN has not spelt out what it considers to geographically constitute the region, there appear to be several similarities between the Indian and ASEAN approaches to this critical subject.
Acknowledging that this is a very important part of the globe from both a geo-political as well as geo-economic perspective, the group clearly wants developments here to be ASEAN-centric and even ASEAN-led. The Outlook “envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms… as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation”. This approach of ASEAN heaves closely to the Indian position, which was best articulated by PM Narendra Modi in his Shangrila dialogue address on June 1, 2018, where, in reference to the Indo-Pacific region he had stated, “Southeast Asia is at its centre. And, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future. That is the vision that will always guide India…”. This similarity of approach works well for both sides, since we already have sizeable areas of cooperation within the “ASEAN Plus India” and the East Asia Summit frameworks, and we already work together in many of the ASEAN-led platforms and vehicles of cooperation.
A second objective of the ASEAN group, as far as the Indo-Pacific is concerned, is to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity by upholding a “rules-based regional architecture”. India, too, seeks such an order which must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons. The new ASEAN Outlook specifically refers to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while talking of peaceful resolution of disputes, which can be interpreted as being squarely aimed at China and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. India too believes that when “nations make international commitments, they must uphold them” including in freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and settlement of disputes. Once again, there is a close harmony of views between India and ASEAN.
The ASEAN Outlook clearly has an inclusive approach to the region as it visualises “avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game”. India has also stated that the Indo-Pacific region is not an exclusive club aimed at any country but must be inclusive, aiming at security and prosperity for all in the region. This is none other than PM Modi’s idea of SAGAR, which he has elaborated extensively in his many visits within the region, including recently at the Majlis of the Maldives. Once again, we see the similarities between India and ASEAN which are starkly different from the idea of a waning power taking on an emerging one in its backyard.
Finally, the Outlook makes it amply clear that the objective of security and stability is the continued growth and development of all countries in the region through greater connectivity, more trade and higher investment. Here too, free, fair and balanced trade by sticking to the rules of the game will be very important, so that extreme imbalances can be cut out and prosperity shared by all — not confined to the few. Whether ASEAN and others in the region can ensure such fair behaviour is something which we will have to work towards. ASEAN pressure on India to ensure completion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by the end of 2019 is a case in point. Obviously, India will sign on only when it believes it has got as much in return for what it gives.
Strikingly, no countries have been named in the ASEAN Outlook. It is not being positioned as a new strategy of ASEAN, but a continuation of what have been ASEAN goals and objectives for decades. It is clearly mentioned that no new structures will be created, but that existing ones will be optimally utilised for achieving some of the goals stated in the Outlook. The East Asia Summit (EAS) will be one such platform where not only are China and Japan present, but also Russia and the United States. The ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting) Plus framework will also come in handy on defence and security matters.
There is great similarity and parallel in both thought and approach between the Indian and ASEAN positions on the Indo-Pacific Region. As middle or balancing powers that do not want to be in a position to have to choose sides between the big players, there is common ground between the two. This, in turn, dictates our positions on this very topical issue. As we all know and realise, it is becoming increasingly difficult to navigate on a trapeze string without falling off. Individual countries or groups of nations are now being called upon to back one side against the other. This is difficult for both ASEAN as well as India.
A concert between the balancing powers is, therefore, the requirement of the day. India should quickly seize the moment of the announcement of the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Region’, and institute a new dialogue with the 10-member grouping so that we can both further calibrate our approaches in this very important matter. Together, we shall have more say on this subject than we have individually, and that will stand us in good stead. A Track-1 India-ASEAN Indo-Pacific dialogue should be instituted at the earliest.
The writer is a former Indian Ambassador to China. Currently he is distinguished fellow, Pune International Centre and distinguished professor, Symbiosis International University
Ocean’s eleven
India and ASEAN agree on their outlook to the Indo-Pacific. They must act in concert.
Written by Gautam Bambawale | Published: July 3, 2019 1:58:37 am
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (Source: Twitter/@MEAIndia)
At the 34th ASEAN summit in Bangkok, the leaders of the 10-nation grouping finally came out with their positions on the Indo-Pacific region in a document titled ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’. While ASEAN has not spelt out what it considers to geographically constitute the region, there appear to be several similarities between the Indian and ASEAN approaches to this critical subject.
Acknowledging that this is a very important part of the globe from both a geo-political as well as geo-economic perspective, the group clearly wants developments here to be ASEAN-centric and even ASEAN-led. The Outlook “envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms… as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation”. This approach of ASEAN heaves closely to the Indian position, which was best articulated by PM Narendra Modi in his Shangrila dialogue address on June 1, 2018, where, in reference to the Indo-Pacific region he had stated, “Southeast Asia is at its centre. And, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future. That is the vision that will always guide India…”. This similarity of approach works well for both sides, since we already have sizeable areas of cooperation within the “ASEAN Plus India” and the East Asia Summit frameworks, and we already work together in many of the ASEAN-led platforms and vehicles of cooperation.
A second objective of the ASEAN group, as far as the Indo-Pacific is concerned, is to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity by upholding a “rules-based regional architecture”. India, too, seeks such an order which must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons. The new ASEAN Outlook specifically refers to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while talking of peaceful resolution of disputes, which can be interpreted as being squarely aimed at China and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. India too believes that when “nations make international commitments, they must uphold them” including in freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and settlement of disputes. Once again, there is a close harmony of views between India and ASEAN.
The ASEAN Outlook clearly has an inclusive approach to the region as it visualises “avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game”. India has also stated that the Indo-Pacific region is not an exclusive club aimed at any country but must be inclusive, aiming at security and prosperity for all in the region. This is none other than PM Modi’s idea of SAGAR, which he has elaborated extensively in his many visits within the region, including recently at the Majlis of the Maldives. Once again, we see the similarities between India and ASEAN which are starkly different from the idea of a waning power taking on an emerging one in its backyard.
Finally, the Outlook makes it amply clear that the objective of security and stability is the continued growth and development of all countries in the region through greater connectivity, more trade and higher investment. Here too, free, fair and balanced trade by sticking to the rules of the game will be very important, so that extreme imbalances can be cut out and prosperity shared by all — not confined to the few. Whether ASEAN and others in the region can ensure such fair behaviour is something which we will have to work towards. ASEAN pressure on India to ensure completion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by the end of 2019 is a case in point. Obviously, India will sign on only when it believes it has got as much in return for what it gives.
Strikingly, no countries have been named in the ASEAN Outlook. It is not being positioned as a new strategy of ASEAN, but a continuation of what have been ASEAN goals and objectives for decades. It is clearly mentioned that no new structures will be created, but that existing ones will be optimally utilised for achieving some of the goals stated in the Outlook. The East Asia Summit (EAS) will be one such platform where not only are China and Japan present, but also Russia and the United States. The ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting) Plus framework will also come in handy on defence and security matters.
There is great similarity and parallel in both thought and approach between the Indian and ASEAN positions on the Indo-Pacific Region. As middle or balancing powers that do not want to be in a position to have to choose sides between the big players, there is common ground between the two. This, in turn, dictates our positions on this very topical issue. As we all know and realise, it is becoming increasingly difficult to navigate on a trapeze string without falling off. Individual countries or groups of nations are now being called upon to back one side against the other. This is difficult for both ASEAN as well as India.
A concert between the balancing powers is, therefore, the requirement of the day. India should quickly seize the moment of the announcement of the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Region’, and institute a new dialogue with the 10-member grouping so that we can both further calibrate our approaches in this very important matter. Together, we shall have more say on this subject than we have individually, and that will stand us in good stead. A Track-1 India-ASEAN Indo-Pacific dialogue should be instituted at the earliest.
The writer is a former Indian Ambassador to China. Currently he is distinguished fellow, Pune International Centre and distinguished professor, Symbiosis International University
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