I'd like to talk to you about the ergodic hypothesis.
The ergodic hypothesis, or ergodicity hypothesis, is a fundamental assumption of statistical physics according to which, at equilibrium, the mean value of a quantity calculated statistically is equal to the mean of a very large number of measurements taken over time. The first value is the one that can be calculated using statistical physics, while the second is close to what can be measured experimentally. The ergodic hypothesis is therefore fundamental for a good match between theory and experiment.
It is used in statistical physics and this is not really surprising, because we know that time generates one of the four dimensions of Minkowski space. There are phenomena where this hypothesis is valid and others where it's less certain, but it's more a characteristic of the phenomenon, a kind of regularity than a fundamental law of physics like the principle of least action.
I think that this can be applied to phenomena other than physical phenomena, for example sociological phenomena, and I propose to use it to analyse the F-35's 'Surge' capabilities and compare them with the Rafale's capabilities.
I'm going to define two types of surge: temporal surge and spatial surge, and the ergodic hypothesis will be that they are equivalent in terms of flight hours generated per aircraft.
The temporal surge consists of preparing the aircraft as much as possible before a period of intense activity in order to be able to generate as many flight hours as possible during this period.
An example of surge is described here:
The Monster Myths of the CVL Concept
The Center for Naval Analysis monitored JTFEX 97-2 and carefully studied the scenario described above, which comes from the introduction of this CNA paper
USS Nimitz and Carrier Air Wing Nine Surge Demonstration dated April 1998. “Surge 97”, as it was called, was preceded by six days of an intense, event-driven scenario in which the entire Nimitz battle group conducted offensive and defensive operations. During these six days
USS Nimitz and CVW-9 generated about 700 fixed-wing sorties.
Following that six-day period, operations paused for 16 hours, and USS Nimitz and CVW-9 made several preparations for “The Surge” including personnel augmentation, planning augmentation, and replenishment to insure the carrier was fully prepared for the exercise. The resulting average of 192 sorties was touted by the Navy as the benchmark for carrier operations.
We can see that the average number of flight hours generated over a surge period of activity plus the preparation period is no different from the number of flight hours generated in normal mode over the period of activity.
In fact, the US initially carried out 700 sorties in 6 days, i.e. 700/6 = 115.7 sorties per day, and then 192 sorties in one day, but with 16 hours of preparation, which brings us to 24*192/(24+16) = 115.2 sorties per day for 24 hours.
We are working in advance of the phase of the operations, which means that they can be concentrated over a shorter period of time. If we take into account the preparation period + the operational period, the number of flight hours generated per unit of time is no different from the maximum that can be achieved given the characteristics of the aircraft and the characteristics of the support set up. On the other hand, if we reduce the flight hours generated to the period of operations alone, we obtain a higher figure, which characterises the 'surge' mode.
Space surge was encountered here:
Le F-35
A fleet of 39 Israeli Air Force F-35I Adair aircraft has reached more than five times the normal level of operations since the 7 October attacks by Hamas and has maintained that level with the help of international support, a US Joint Programme Office (JPO) official said on 10 April.
Israel's fleet of Lockheed Martin-built stealth fighters achieved a 75 per cent mission readiness rate and an 85 per cent mission readiness rate despite a 565 per cent increase in average monthly flying hours over a six-month period, said Major General Donald Carpenter, head of logistics and sustainment for the F-35 JPO.
About five of Israel's F-35Is, or 12% of the fleet, were deemed unfit for missions on the first day of the war, Carpenter said. But Israeli maintainers immediately returned four aircraft to operational service, and 38 jets were flying by the end of the day on October 7, Carpenter said.
"Israel was ready because its neighbours are Hamas and Iran", added Mr Carpenter.
By moving to three shifts for continuous operations, Israeli maintainers and field service representatives enabled the Israeli Air Force to continue flying F-35Is at a rate of 35 to 39 aircraft per day.
As a member of the global spare parts pool for the F-35, the high pace of Israeli operations has also been supported by spare parts deliveries from partner countries, Carpenter said.
In this case, there was no preparation, but rather an increase in support resources by increasing the number of maintenance teams to three in order to work 24 hours a day, and by prioritising the delivery of spare parts to the Israelis. This last point has led to a drop in the number of flight hours generated by the worldwide F-35 community, with the exception of the Israelis, who have increased, while the overall average has remained unchanged or almost unchanged.
What's interesting is that we see an increase of 565%, which gives an indication of the benefits that can be expected from a time surge.
I deduce that in surge mode the F-35 can generate 102 hours of flight time in a month.
Now that we've made a few calculations, we can put them to use.
To do this, we're going to start by listing the F-35s ordered by Europeans, and those already present in Europe.
Belgium 0/34; Denmark 4/27; Finland 0/64; Germany 0/35; Greece 0/40; Italy 23/90; Netherlands 31/52; Norway 21/52; Poland 0/32 +32; Switzerland 0/36; UK 28/48.
This means that there are already 107 F-35s in Europe, and eventually 510 + possibly 32, depending on the intentions of known countries.
The same exercise can be carried out for the Rafale
France 150/225; Greece 18/24; Croatia 6/12, giving a total of 174 Rafales already in Europe and 261 in the longer term.
We can now calculate the current flight-hour production for the two aircraft, which enables us to calculate how many pilots can maintain their licences, the maximum flight-hour production and the same production in 'surge' mode.
The statistics examined by
@Herciv every month show that, depending on the period, the number of flying hours per month and per aircraft varies between 14 and 18 hours and I have already argued that this number is constrained, i.e. that the USAF would like to be able to generate more flying hours but cannot. Moreover, even during the Israeli surge, production was 90,000 hours for 990 aircraft and 6 months, i.e. 15 hours per aircraft per month and 12.5 for non-Israeli aircraft, which is certainly not voluntary. So for the F-35, current flight hour production and maximum flight hour production are the same and equal to 16 hours per aircraft per month, due to the kindness of our hearts. For Surge mode, I've proposed 102 hours per month per aircraft, starting from 18 hours for the number of current flying hours (the best rate in the statistics) and increasing it by 565%.
For the Rafale, it's simpler: France recently increased its current flying hours to 300 h per year, or 25 h per month. Dassault tells us that the maximum is 1000 h per year, or 84 h per month, and specifies that in 'Surge' mode the maximum is 350 h per month.
With the 107 F-35s present in Europe, we can therefore generate 20544 flight hours, which means we can maintain 20544/180 = 114 pilots.
In the event of a crisis, assuming that we have seen it coming and have prepared the aircraft, or that we benefit from a space surge as was the case with the Israelis, we could generate 107 * 102 = 10914 flight hours for one month. After that, the number of flight hours will gradually drop to 1,712 monthly flight hours.
With the 174 Rafales in Europe, we can therefore generate 52200 flight hours, which means we can maintain 52200/180 = 290 pilots.
In the event of a crisis, assuming that we have seen it coming and have prepared the aircraft, or that we benefit from a space surge as was the case with the Israelis, we could generate 174 * 350 = 60900 flight hours for one month. After that, the number of flight hours will gradually fall to 14,616 monthly flight hours.
Eventually, the situation will become more balanced:
With the 526 F-35s in Europe, we can generate 100992 flight hours, which means we can maintain 100992/180 = 561 pilots.
In the event of a crisis, assuming that we have seen it coming and have prepared the aircraft, or that we benefit from a space surge as was the case with the Israelis, we could generate 526 * 102 = 53652 flight hours for one month. After that, the number of flight hours will gradually fall to 8,414 monthly flight hours.
With the 261 Rafales in Europe, we can therefore generate 78300 flight hours, which means we can maintain 78300/180 = 435 pilots.
In the event of a crisis, assuming that we have seen it coming and have prepared the aircraft, or that we benefit from a space surge as was the case with the Israelis, we could generate 261 * 350 = 91350 flight hours for one month. After that, the number of flight hours will gradually fall to 21924 monthly flight hours.
The Rafale fleet has a lower production than the F-35 solely in terms of current flying hours, essentially because we don't want to use up the aircraft's potential too quickly. The major drawback is that during the first month of a crisis, each Rafale pilot would have to fly 7 hours a day to make the most of the Rafale's capabilities.
Another amusing observation: Rafale production is moving towards 33 aircraft a year, whereas F-35 production would be moving towards 156 aircraft a year if it weren't for the TR3/Block4 problem combined with electrical generation/cooling capacity.
However, the 33 Rafales added each year can produce up to 33,000 flight hours in normal mode per year and, in surge mode, 1,550 flight hours in one month.
In comparison, the 156 F-35s produce 29952 flight hours in normal mode per year and, in surge mode, 15912 flight hours in one month.
While aircraft production is very different, the flight hours that can be generated are very similar.