French Military aviation update and discussion
- Thread starter Picdelamirand-oil
- Start date
"I have to admit that we did not feel this harassment. On the contrary, when we looked up at the sky, we saw the Greek fighters who had already been expelled from the area by the Turkish fighters, here in Farmakonisi "
Video of the Turkish F-16 intercepting in the eastern Aegean on May 3, 2020. The Air Force's Mirage 2000-5 Mk2 A / F pilot has managed to capture the enemy A / F in firing parameters. (FIRST TOPIC, 05-05-2020)
Video of the Turkish F-16 intercepting in the eastern Aegean on May 3, 2020. The Air Force's Mirage 2000-5 Mk2 A / F pilot has managed to capture the enemy A / F in firing parameters. (FIRST TOPIC, 05-05-2020)
@Picdelamirand-oil thank you for your reply in another thread, but i need to know how rafale will perform active cancellation against AESA radars? For active cancellation you need to know the frequency amplitude & phase of the incoming radiation, but in aesa the frequency will be changed instantaneously.
Radar detects something by receiving the echo of a previously sent signal. This echo is therefore an image of this signal, attenuated by the reflection on the target, but also by the distance. Therefore, the target "sees" a raw signal only attenuated by the distance from the transmitter, whereas the transmitter must be able to pick up a signal attenuated by twice this distance (forward and backward) and the "bounce" on its target, i.e. a distorted and much weaker signal. In the same way, car headlights can be seen from far, far away. However, they do not make it possible to distinguish anything at 500m.
However, the ability of the target to detect a radar signal depends on the capabilities of its sensors. They are by construction of small size, thus less powerful than a radar antenna. The question is therefore whether these sensors can detect the emitted wave before the transmitter can itself pick up the reflected wave, which brings into the equation the emitted power, the performance of the transmitter and the sensor, and the SER of the target. However, the important point in the story is that the radar wave is much more powerful at the target than its echo is when it returns to the transmitter, giving de facto advantages to countermeasure systems.
The LPD capability is designed to prevent detection of the radar signal. The LPI capability goes further in that it seeks to secure the information obtained. When applied to radio, the SPL ensures that it will not be trivial for a third party to listen to what is being said, while the IPL will make it difficult to interpret the discussion and reduce the opportunity to interfere with it. But in both cases these are methods that lower the likelihood that a third party will be able to take advantage of the signals being transmitted, not take advantage of the certainty, and that lowering of the likelihood depends, of course, on the listening skills of that third party. In other words, the "LPI" label is absolutely no guarantee of immunity. It is only a means of more or less hindering adverse countermeasures. To intercept a message is to be able to modify it to distort the information it contains. For example, it is to make ghost targets appear, to position them somewhere else, or even to erase the information (active cancellation). A radar's LPI capabilities are designed to prevent these devious actions, i.e., to maximize the confidence that can be placed in the sensor.
There are two main technologies to detect the opposing radars: a Super Heterodyne (SH) technology which consists in scanning a frequency band and which has a high sensitivity. The only way to detect is to listen to the right frequency (among all the frequencies of the band) at the moment when the opponent's emission arrives. The LPI in this case would be to have the shortest possible transmission (and therefore of great power) to reduce the probability that the listening and the transmission are compatible.
There is another technology, called broadband, which can detect 100% of the emissions in a whole band but is less sensitive. To counteract this type of detection we can spread the pulse over time and thus decrease the power of the radar so that the relatively poor sensitivity prevents detection.
We see that the first strategy is countered by the second detector and the second strategy is countered by the first detector.
We can then spread out in frequencies instead of spreading out in time. We must also consider that the Radar knows very well what signal it has sent, how it has spread over time and frequencies, and that it will be able to reconstruct it on reception. Knowing the signal that you sent makes it possible to find it even below the ambient noise level. The downside is that you don't have to modify the whole signal so that the radar can't recognize it, and that's one of the factors that explains the success of SPECTRA.
But this is where it becomes sophisticated and everyone is trying to be at the cutting edge of the most effective treatments, it's who will be the smartest, and if we know where we are, we don't really know where the others are. We hope to be the smartest, and we are constantly improving our treatments; the others have the same hopes and are making the same developments.
The areas where Thales is working are related to detection and interference (including Gallium nitride amplifiers):
At a minimum, broadband detection is required. This is called LBI, as Wide Band Instantaneous, but by analogy, it can be called "wide-angle" because the need to listen over the whole band limits the sensitivity ("the distance of view").
On SPECTRA, a narrowband detection ("zoom") has been added, which only works from a more limited frequency range ("one pointing") but provides better sensitivity (superheterodyne or SH technique). Its intrinsic qualities allow an interferometric localization which is regularly discussed in the forums.
The need being to improve the reaction time, we see the interest to detect earlier than what allows the current LBI and always over the whole band. It is in fact necessary to detect at a consistent distance from SH detection and localization.
Moreover, like any "wide angle", it is necessary to do it with potentially "an image loaded with signals of interest".
It can be said that with its PEAs, the DGA is making Thales work on this 3rd level of performance, while the competitors are probably still preparing the 2nd level.
There are Spectra modes that we don't even activate on our territory, as they are so secret, for fear of indiscreet ears. So there are functions that we use in practice, while keeping the best for the worst, because the comparison between the radar signal and its jammed return makes it possible to know the type of jamming used, and especially what knowledge the jammer has of the radar and its anti-interference, and therefore its vulnerability.
It is likely that the authorization to jam must go back to a very high level in the Forces.
It is said that, during a Rafale evaluation, the US had blocked the use of UAE F16s when they realised that SPECTRA had integrated the behaviour of the radar picked up the day before into its library.
The USAF, which is the first to put all its counters on stealth, is also the first to be surprised by the jamming capabilities of its allies.
Quite often they come to make fun of our mirages 2000 which "shine" on the radar like a diamond in the light. Often enough we show them that with our CMEs we can get past their stealth fighter and their big E-3 without them noticing.
I still remember a pilot telling me that when landing after an exercise with Americans, the Americans came to give him a dressing-down "so scared of us that you didn't even dare to show up" and that they were soon disheartened during the debriefing when they realised that the French had attacked all the targets they were supposed to defend...
For F4 Thales is working on an autonomous digital jammer.
This is undoubtedly an extension of the use of DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory): current and future threats are becoming more and more sophisticated, the aircraft has less time to defend itself. The DRFM jammer captures and digitizes the incoming radio frequency pulses transmitted by the threat. It stores them and retransmits a modified signal that indicates a false target with different coordinates and signature.
But the DRFM enhancements alone do not adequately cover the range cited in the term "autonomous digital jammer". Indeed, if we start from the classical architecture of SPECTRA, we see that the detection and location functions are physically separated from the interference functions.
Logically, the increase of the jammer's autonomy concerns the integration of detection functions in the jammer to improve the response time.
The physical integration of the detection functions into the interferer involves :
Compacting the detectors, logically by digitization, which should also provide the necessary sensitivity over the widest possible band (so as not to have to switch from instantaneous wideband detection to more sensitive narrow-band detection in super heterodyne),
Compaction of the emitters also a priori with GaN technology.
It could be Mirage 2000 from UAE Coming from Egypt, Mirage 2000 or Rafale from Egypt or Rafale from France. People said it's a french operation due to the incident in the Mediterranean with the ship "Courbet" which was illuminated by the radar of 3 Turkish frigates during a control of a suspicious cargo ship.
Turkey has been getting some high quality weed from its biradar mulk across our border it seems. First in Syria now in Libya.
Dreams of establishing back the caliphate
Egyptians are on a shopping spree themselves. With no F35 for Turkey and Typhoons coming for Egypt soon, it will be a problem for Turks if they extend the conflict in Libya.
Dreams of establishing back the caliphate
Egyptians are on a shopping spree themselves. With no F35 for Turkey and Typhoons coming for Egypt soon, it will be a problem for Turks if they extend the conflict in Libya.
Turkey Or rather Erdogan & his AK party also supports the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which has always been an existential threat to the armed forces there & vice versa since Gemaal Abdel Nasser's crackdown on them & sentencing their top leadership to lengthy terms in prison or to death like Syed Qutb the ideological godfather of all these violent Salafi movements especially of Bin Laden & AQ to ISIS.Turkey has been getting some high quality weed from its biradar mulk across our border it seems. First in Syria now in Libya.
Dreams of establishing back the caliphate
Egyptians are on a shopping spree themselves. With no F35 for Turkey and Typhoons coming for Egypt soon, it will be a problem for Turks if they extend the conflict in Libya.
If Turkey manages to secure a base in Libya, you can bet your last rupee they'd start destabilizing the El Sisi government in Egypt. Sisi won't be sitting on his backside waiting for Turkey to succeed in setting up a base. Hence, the stage is set for a clash.
Saudis will literally bankroll the equipment and Egyptians already have the manpower themselves. I am just waiting for that to happen.
The Russians are the monkey here in Libya between the two cats in Libya meanwhile.
The Russians would keep a low profile. That's Egypt's backyard. There are serious limitations to what Russia can accomplish there. Turkey is running on empty there as they'd soon discover. It's one thing to invade a moth eaten moribund state on your border & slap them around & quite another to enter into a dysfunctional state far from your base or supply lines antagonizing the regional heavyweight there.
In the video you can even see the LERX vortices which means the distance has to be around 1.5km max.
The last news are : a new order of 12 to 24 Rafale (and a follow on order for some more Gowind light frigates made in Egypt)
Why ? Because Italy is politically too near of Turkey, and in the contrary France is in a clear opposition to Ankara.
The 2 Italian FREMM frigates will probably be sold to Egypt (and between you and me, they are better equipped than the french ones. But keep quiet please), but nothing more.
