The entire discussion over the past few pages has centred on the IAF's actions and its implication for India. Few have tried to analyse from PA+PAF's perspective on the implications of this skirmish on their overall military doctrines and even ORBAT. I'm writing from PA's perspective because PAF is expected to act in a supporting role to PA during major combat operations, and PA's ability to conduct ground operations will be heavily dependent upon PAF's performance. Also Rawalpindi GHQ rules above PAF HQ. Note that the following requirements are in addition to PAF's own duties of defending PAF bases
PA's ground operations doctrine in major combat is based on asymetric combat. To explain in simple terms, Nepoleon's stratagem: Use weak numerically inferior forces for defensive operations against stronger fighting forces while concentrating strong forces against enemy weak forces. PA intends to use small light Anti tank infantry battalions to take on own Armored brigades and light anti tank focused brigdes against armored divisons, with the intention of holding the enemy for 48-72 hours till own forces momentum is broken. The heavy forces, armor and mech forces are to be kept in concentrated reserve with the intention of striking weak own forces in any sector or counter attack on own forces in the event of IA's breakthrough.Textbook examples include FieldMarshal Walther Model's mobile battlegroups for counter attack while maintaining light forces along the front as a screen to hold and ground down Soviet offensives, if possible. PA envisons operations of similar nature against IA.
Now that doctrine requires that PAF be able to keep reasonable control of the air over PA strong forces' assembly/launch areas and key logistics lines. Without it massed PA armor forces will be slaughtered wholesale by IAF strikes. In fact without securing adequate air superiority PA will never be able to even concentrate adequate strong forces to make any effective challenge to any reasonble tier 1 IA formation. And PA knows this. PA's desperate situation in Longewala is an apt example of what happens when enemy has unchallenged air superiority over you.
Even for the defensive operations, PAF is required to contest the airspace effectively so that IA doesn't utilize IAF's CAS aircraft to render smaller challenging forces combat ineffective through relentless and uncontested CAS strikes. Example would be the utter destruction of PA defensive forces at several key points in then East Pakistan by air ops. the positions of defending PA troops were hammered hard enough that PA forces holding them simply shattered and were rendered combat ineffective before IA began a serious challenge in the area. As such on several occasions met forces that were already degraded by air strikes in the days before.
After the skrimish/engagement of PAF with IAF, PA's ability to conduct both defensive war while maintaining adequate strong forces for offensive/counteroffensive is severely suspect. The going theory within PA HQ was that PAF frontline aircrafts with BVRs can engage a numerically superior in a roughly equal battle, thereby tying down IAF from executing large scale CAS operations. The fact that PAF's premium fighter could not hold its own will no doubt have caused concern among ground war theorists in PA. Even with Mobile SAM support, which is in any case limited in number, PA formations are now under heightened state of threat given PAF will have to maintain most of its frontline fleet in contesting/defending against IAF assets while IAF can spare premium multirole Aircraft to Ground attack aircraft for terrestial force destruction. Under such circumstances asymetric combat doctrines cannot be safely applied without risking forces to utter destruction.
This is one of the reason PA was unwilling to engage in a major skirmish after India abrogated statehood of J&K on Aug 5. PA generals know in any such conflict even PAF's tier 1 aircrafts can and will be tied up defending against IAF's tier 2 assets, leaving precious little to support PA formations engaged in skirmish.