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asialyst (fr.) jan.21)
Pakistan in political and security chaos: towards a return to military power?
Far from breaking with a second half of 2022 marked by crises of all kinds, coupled with a humanitarian disaster due to the summer floods and multiform terrorism, Pakistan is approaching 2023 on a similar domestic, fragile and uncertain framework. The dominant feature is great political instability in an exsanguinated economic-financial context and a sinister security framework. A very worrying matrix which, in the opinion of some observers, could open the way to a possible return to business - in the long term - of the generals. Such a prospect is not without concern for the defenders of democracy in a country where historically, for at least three generations, the voice and the fist of the generals have prevailed over the civil authority, including the elected government and Parliament. The hypothesis of an umpteenth military putsch is also stirring the concert of nations. Starting with neighbouring India, the "world's largest democracy", a historical rival and traditional outlet for a Pakistani regime, whether civilian or martial, that is regularly on the verge of collapse.
Last week, in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI or Pakistan Movement for Justice) - the political formation of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was forced to resign last spring - and its allies announced that they were ending their participation in the government of these two provinces, which are sensitive in many ways. This withdrawal, long planned by the former captain of the national cricket team, automatically paves the way, according to the letter of a Constitution that will celebrate its sixtieth anniversary this year, for the organisation of a legislative election in these two provinces in the north and east of the country by the end of April. This decision by the former head of government, which was mooted a few weeks ago, is not taking anyone by surprise in Pakistan and is part of Imran Khan's strategy to push his successor Shebhaz Sharif (PML-N) to call an early general election, which the PTI and its leader believe they are in a good position to win again.*[*As the PTI did in the last general election held in the summer of 2018, winning more seats in the National Assembly (156) on its own than the two major political parties, the Sharif family's PML-N (83 seats) and the Bhutto political dynasty's PPP (55)].
Moreover, since the hasty resignation* [*Following a successful no-confidence motion tabled by the opposition] of the Khan government last April, the elected representatives of the PTI and its allies have been boycotting the National Assembly benches. Last weekend, the 22nd head of the Pakistani government had hinted that the elected members of his party could in the short term return to the benches of the parliament, which would test the proper functioning of the legislative power and the nerves - already very blunt - of the febrile Sharif government. Moreover, earlier this week, the Speaker of the National Assembly 'accepted' the resignation of the 35 PTI MPs submitted nine months earlier, last April. This validation implies that by-elections for these now officially vacant parliamentary seats will have to be held at the same time as the polls in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
This febrile political and institutional context is painfully superimposed on an eminently stricken economic and accounting framework and a security environment that continues to be severely degraded by terrorist inflation. A fortnight ago, the authorities revealed that the country's foreign exchange reserves had reached their lowest level in history at the beginning of January, with the State Bank of Pakistan having barely more than 4 billion dollars on its books. This is just enough to finance the equivalent of three weeks of imports. Recently, the World Bank estimated that "Pakistan's economic growth is not only declining, but is also lowering the regional growth rate", attributing some of the turmoil to the severe impact of the historic floods in almost a third of the country. "Recovery and reconstruction needs are expected to be 1.6 times the national development budget for the fiscal year 2022-23," the multilateral institution fears, against a backdrop of continuing crippling inflation (25% by December 2022, according to a former Pakistani finance minister).
As for the long negotiations that have been going on for months between government representatives and the management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with a view to obtaining emergency financial aid of several billion dollars, the least that can be said is that they are slow to translate into a concrete accounting result for Pakistan's exsanguinated finances. "The IMF has certainly committed itself to a $7 billion loan, but this has only been half paid out to Islamabad, as the Pakistani government has been reluctant to respect the institution's conditions to reduce subsidies to the energy sector and increase tax revenues," the French press has usefully pointed out in recent days.
Anti-terrorist military offensive in sight?
Without any real surprise, in this general panorama that is worrying in almost all respects, the breath of air will unfortunately hardly come at the beginning of 2023 from the security field, which is also repeatedly affected. During the first two weeks of January, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP) claimed nothing less than 23 terrorist attacks at the national level.
In recent days, in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the omnipotent Pakistan Army and the intelligence services (ISI), faced with this worrying volume of attacks* [*In 2022, for the whole year, there were precisely 365 terrorist incidents perpetrated on the national territory (971 victims), the highest total in the last five years (source: South Asia Terrorism Portal)], there has been increasing talk of the possible launch in the short term by the army of a vast anti-terrorist offensive targeting both the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the separatist rebels active in another of the country's volatile provinces, Baluchistan. A region under high surveillance - as it is closely associated with various Sino-Pakistani economic and industrial development projects, such as in the strategic port of Gwadar. A project linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the very controversial 'New Silk Roads' (Belt & Road Initiative, BRI) dear to President Xi Jinping. However, the latter is being targeted in various ways (material destruction, targeted assassinations, bombings and attacks against security forces) and at close range by a resilient and determined local Baluch insurgency. The latter hardly hesitates to attack directly the Chinese nationals working on these many sites, or even in Karachi itself, as on 28 September. To the point of seriously annoying the Beijing authorities.
Buoyed by unquestionable popular support, an ego and self-confidence that defy belief, and the certainty of a return to power through the ballot box in a national election at the earliest possible date, former Prime Minister Imran Khan is quite capable of taking the defiance even further. Not without danger, because his relationship with the very influential caste of generals, now very reserved towards him, is less close.
In Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore or Peshawar but also outside the country (Washington, Paris, London or Berlin), some observers fear the current political instability, further aggravated by the dissolution of the two provincial assemblies and the mass resignations of the elected representatives of the opposition in the National Assembly. Will it lead to yet another intervention by the generals in power in the short term, in one form or another? Are we to believe the public statements of the army chief at the end of 2022 that the martial institution was once and for all finished with interference in the management of national political affairs? /deepl