COPY PASTED FROM BHARAT RAKSHAK
They had a Discussion with Retired Colonel S. Dinny
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We had invited Col. Dinny for a presentation. This is what he said. Very comprehensive and good analysis too.
PRC's Gain
- Gained some territory in North Bank of Pangong Tso. 8Kms between Finger 8 and Finger 4, avg. 3 Kms width. So, 24 Sq Kms. May be slightly reduced now if they have gone back to Finger 5
- Changed the status-quo along the LAC all of a sudden with induction of troops and heavy weaponry. This wasn't expected by us
- They have possibly dragged us into a prolonged employment
- Inflicted casualties on us, 20 bravehearts.
Our Gain
- The notion of India standing upto coercion by PLA is now widely acknowledged everywhere
- We are occupying certain strategic heights on the Kailash Range which gives us tactical and strategic advantage
- We have inflicted casualties on PLA
- Some attempt at rectification of trade imbalance is going on even if not much, which wouldn't have been attemptedd otherwise
- Border infrastructure is getting a sharper focus now as a result
- There is a paradigm shift, even among ordinary people, from Pak-centric to China-centric
- Some issues like Tibet or Quad which were taboo are getting more accepted
- Our relationship with the US has got closer militarily
PRC's Losses
- A permanent scar in its relationship with a big country like India. It is not going to be BAU henceforth. Our military has lost trust.
- On the world stage, this is certainly a loss of face for China
- PLA's Moldo Garrison is now being dominated by IA
- Loss of PLA lives
- Economic impact
Our Losses
- Loss of some territory at Pangong Tso
- Loss of precious lives of our soldiers
- Troop mobilization leading to economic impact
- Threat of a live LAC from now on {LoCisation of LAC}
Why did PRC do this?
- Was it for territorial gain? Only 24 Sq Kms belies that. Depsang is not occupied by PLA though they stop patrolling. We have other means of doing patrolling there.
- Was it for emphasizing their 1959 Claim Line? Not true. They are already ahead of their claim line
- Chinese vulnerability? PLA doesn't feel vulnerable at all, they have enough buffer, we do not have much means of recapturing those areas. G219 interception is impossible
- A reaction to abolition of Art 370/35A? China knows we are not its threat in Ladakh. Even Pakistan has not moved its strike corps.
- Two-front war? PLA would not do that because it would be a dent on its image as a 'superpower' especially when engaged with the US on that score.
- Is it to threaten DSDBO road? Cannot be because they are not on the ridges at Galwan to do so. They have now even gone back from there.
- Was it to stop India-US proximity? PRC would have known that a military threat like this would only bring India-US even closer. Cannot be the reason
- Was it to convert LAC into the LoC as in our western front? India can easily take this cost though it is an unnecessary burden. In Siachen we spend Rs. 5 Crores a day. Neither India nor China can occupy the entire 800 Kms of ridge line, unlike in LoC. There is no terrorist infiltration unlike in LoC. If PLA occupies some heights, then we will do the same and the game is endless.
- Is it to show to the rest of the world that 'China has arrived'? May be, we may not know.
But, there could be a different and more plausible reason for what had happened and that is the NWMA (Non-War Military Activities) doctrine of the PLA. This is to use coercive threats below the threshold of a war to achieve its very tactical objectives.
The May 5/6 clashes in the north bank of Pangong Tso were violent. Video footages showed the Indian troops capturing a PLA humvee and even a PLA soldier pinned to the ground, possibly died later on. Casualty on the PLA side possibly happened and they wanted to 'teach us a lesson'. So, they came in a big way into Pangong Tso with diversion/support tactics in Gogra & Galwan. The Galwan incident looks like it was unplanned. The non-removal of the tent there by the PLA for whatever reason and the resulting incidents ultimately changed the whole scenario. The Chinese never expected the quick Indian counter-attack in Galwan, mobilization and the international focus and reaction. They now want to give a 'strategic twist' to their 'tactical miscalculation' by referring to Article 370, UT etc. At the same time, they know it is a military matter between the two armies. {So, China both tactically & strategically stupid?}
We cannot rule out another Galwan-like incident as the armies are in close contact range. We may see newer areas of patrolling as a result of these events. The old CBMs have broken down and a new one is now needed.
As regards the Punjabi-songs, he said the IA also does psyops but in different ways. For example, the towering, well-built, mustachioed Rajput Regmt. soldiers give the Chinese a complex and they are employed deliberately to do so.
As for mining, he said that the mine that exploded and killed an SFF soldier was a 1962 vintage when retreating Indian troops threw mines and strewn them all over without planting them carefully. Wind & shifting gravel have taken them all over and these dangerous areas are marked.
