Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning and F-22 'Raptor' : News & Discussion
- Thread starter Nick
- Start date
The calculations are obviously correct, for the volume of the entire missile. But the length is much more important since that's where you fit in the electronics and warhead, not the diameter. It's about how much space you have in the end for the motor and fuel, and the Derby competes with the AMRAAM, not the ASRAAM. You need to compensate the figures for the volume taken up by the non-propulsion systems, which is different for all three missiles, and is not very impressive for the AMRAAM.
The Derby ER is even better than the Meteor's. So most of the length is just the propulsion. Plus dual thrust.
So a little less than half for AMRAAM and 1/3rd for Derby ER. Even if D is much better, it's still not better than the Derby ER. Plus dual thrust.
Lol. This guy has been BSing on this topic since last year that even Milspec and Ashwin called out his BS and to this day Milspec is waiting for a source from Rafael where they claim Derby-ER's range is greater than the Aim-120D which has 50%+ greater range than the Aim-120C7.
www.strategicfront.org
Rafale DH/EH of Indian Air Force : News and Discussions
:) I think we just ordered 1000 missiles from russia last year. That pretty much sums up all of the garbage you have written above...
F-35 : le rêve aéronautique connaît toujours des déboires
F-35: the aeronautical dream still faces setbacks
7 September 2021
In November 2014, we published a review article on the F-35 and its setbacks (1). Nearly five years later, the programme has made progress, found new buyers, with others indicating that the aircraft had reached its initial operational capability (IOC). But since then, new problems have arisen and raise the question of its real operationality, as its operational evaluation phase is due to end before the end of the year. Here is an update.
The operational evaluation process leading to the long-awaited declaration of the US F-35's IOC should make it possible to validate a number of parameters - an essential point before series production - but doubts about the value of the future announcement quickly arose, before being highlighted by a report from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO). The latter worked in particular on the basis of information transmitted by the Pentagon's Department of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). In addition to the variously known problems, which clearly took longer to resolve than expected, there were also problems whose scope had been underestimated.
ALIS in the land of maintenance
This is the case for the integrated logistics management system ALIS (Automated Logistics Information System), which must not only allow maintenance - predictive or curative - while establishing schedules, but also the management of spare parts, and this in an automated manner. The approach is that of 'all-in-one' maintenance, whether it is daily or longer term. The development of the system has, logically enough given the scale of the task, been lengthy, but has also suffered from criticisms of its very nature.
On the one hand, access, which is essential for giving the green light to use the aircraft, is provided by a subscription - for a fee - to Lockheed, which retains ownership. On the other hand, the system operates in a network, which requires daily information feedback, also automated, to the manufacturer. This entails the risk of hacking or eavesdropping by a third party, who would then be aware, in real time, of the status of a given fleet. This approach, which was widely criticised, has been partially revised: devices can now be used without being connected to ALIS for 30 days (initially it was 48 hours).
Moreover, the very operation of ALIS is open to criticism, although its use was intended to reduce the burden - particularly the human burden - of maintenance for the client air forces. The process, which is more fluid, should also ensure greater fleet availability. However, in practice, the opposite has been observed. The US Air Force has seen an increase in workload, mainly due to false maintenance alerts, slow network connections, and non-automation, which forces maintainers to manually enter the work done, or even to use parallel databases, which the USAF itself modestly describes as a 'high level of manual effort'. The situation was such that Lockheed itself did not use the system on its lines until 2018 and the US Air Force Secretary could declare on 28 February 2019: "I can guarantee that no Air Force maintainer will ever call his daughter Alice."
Patches have obviously been put in place. In fact, ALIS is said to have gone through 27 versions. But if they can solve some problems, the complexity of the system is such that others are created. Others have sometimes persisted since 2012, without ever having been resolved. This is particularly the case with the sub-programmes. For example, the Squadron Health Management application can declare a device non-operational, while the Customer Maintenance Management System, another application, indicates that it is operational. The future of ALIS and its 65 applications - including some related to planning and debriefing or training (2) - is bleak, so much so that the Air Force has ordered a replacement programme, Mad Hatter, from Lockheed. The idea would be to install the functional parts of ALIS in a cloud. But this will probably not solve everything. For example, the management of spare parts for the various sub-systems of the aircraft, which has never been standardised, even though they come from 1,500 sub-contractors, is causing not only a work overload but also a slowdown in supplies.
A disarmed weapons system?
The F-35 continues to experience several problems with its weapons and sensors. The most serious concerns the EOTS (Electro-Optical Targeting System), which is positioned under the nose and serves as both a laser designator and IRST (Infra-Red Search and Track):
The issue of the F-35A's internal gun misalignment has not yet been resolved, especially since it has been found that this problem affects all aircraft in different ways. POGO also states that the tests carried out with the three types of ammunition to be used are fairly unrepresentative and have only involved a few shells of each type in the various employment configurations studied. This criticism is added to that of the calibre and number of shells being smaller than those of the A-10, raising questions about the relevance of using the F-35 as a replacement for the Thunderbolt II, a function that the US Air Force continues to insist on. It also raises questions from the US Army, which is the primary user of the A-10's firepower. Without an EOTS allowing optimal vision shared with ground troops - in particular through ROVER video software - and with a gun that is not very precise and less adapted than that of the Thunderbolt, a real deficit in terms of air support is likely to appear.
There is also the question of the ability to recognise ground-to-air and air-to-air threats. The F-35 must enable its pilots to evolve in an optimal manner according to its dynamic and stealth characteristics, by identifying the threats encountered. To do this, it is necessary to compare the information gathered by the sensors with threat databases called Mission Data Loads (MDLs), without which it is impossible to identify adversary signals - or to discriminate between friendly and allied signals. While these databases need to be updated frequently as the theatre progresses, it took Eglin specialists 12 to 15 months to provide the MDLs used in the F-35's operational assessments, and they have not yet been deemed accurate and relevant. In this case, the software and systems were inadequate and cumbersome. The problem is not just American: Eglin also has to produce MDLs for six F-35 configurations, four Block 4 iterations and 12 geographic regions, amounting to 120 MDLs that will then have to be updated - a task that seems simple at first glance, but could take several months, a timeframe that is incompatible with the deployability requirements of the forces equipped with the aircraft.
The issue of cyber vulnerabilities also remains unresolved, given that the very concept of the F-35 is based on connectivity in several respects. On the one hand, according to POGO, the methodology: the team responsible for testing cyber vulnerabilities is not governmental, but depends on Lockheed, which poses an obvious problem of objectivity. On the other hand, the strength of the F-35 - its connectivity - is also its weakness:
The platform and the system remain problematic
Even before the start of the operational test phase, the Pentagon acknowledged that the aircraft still had 941 design flaws, 102 of which were "Category 1", i.e. mission-critical and could cause the death of the pilot or serious injury.
Several observers had already pointed out that several Category 1 problems had been redesigned and subsequently considered less serious. The Systems Design and Development (SDD) phase itself was abruptly terminated in April 2018. The tests of the current phase are partly compromised by these problems since the 23 aircraft concerned require an availability of 80%, which seems to be far from being achieved. They are further compromised by the fact that the simulation systems to test a multi-aircraft engagement in a dense air-to-air and ground-to-air threat environment are not yet operational. The simulators themselves do not yet have the flight profiles and relevant information about the F-35 necessary for their operation. This work would presumably be completed by the end of 2019, but these evaluations would then be conducted at the very end of the process.
In addition, structural problems are still observed, again calling into question the test methodology. In this case, the assessment of the aircraft's fire survivability was also entrusted to Lockheed, which determined that it met the contractual specifications in three of the four scenarios considered... whereas the Pentagon's DOT&E estimated the opposite in 2017 (3). More seriously, it was determined that the F-35B and C participating in the tests had structural cracks, so that they would not be able to reach their potential of 8,000 flight hours and might have to leave service in 2026. No information has been provided by the US authorities on the F-35A. Moreover, the marine versions also suffer from very low operational availability: 23% for the F-35B in October 2017, 12.9% in June 2018. In December 2017, the availability of the F-35C was 0%. POGO is similarly critical of the transparency around the communication of the programme, stating that much of the information presented by the Pentagon in previous reports was missing this year. The quality of the evaluation of the aircraft, obviously essential for its operational career to officially begin, could therefore be called into question.
At the same time, however, US timetables are being maintained by the Pentagon's Joint Program Office (JPO), which is simultaneously pushing for the earliest possible withdrawal from service of a large number of F-16s and A-10s. The US Navy's F/A-18C/Ds were retired in February 2019 and the Marines are also being asked to part with theirs. The challenge at this stage is to be able to meet the planned delivery rates - at a time when the US Air Force has been forced to buy the F-15EX, a real wake-up call for Lockheed - but also to meet the promises made in terms of unit cost. The stakes are also commercial: mass production will make it possible to deliver to customers who have been able to set delivery dates in their contracts. However, the problems will not be solved, far from it. For lack of a sound prototyping policy, Lockheed launched pre-production too quickly, adopting a trial-and-error logic that led to the logistical nightmare of successive adaptations "to the right standard" of the first aircraft produced.
However, the stakes are not low: the question of the development of the Block 4/Continuous Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2) standard is already looming. This standard will make it possible to use all the weapons envisaged for the F-35, and in particular the B61-12 gravity nuclear bomb, but its cost remains unknown. Thus, the retrofit of aircraft already delivered is not a given: in April 2019, the JPO estimated it at $10.5 billion for R&D over eight years and $2.5 billion for the retrofit of the 441 American aircraft. For the RAF, the cost will be $486 million, so it is assessing the desirability of the upgrade. In this case, it would qualify its F-35Bs for some weapons (air-to-air missiles, SPEAR 3 missiles). They would also serve as scouts for Typhoon aircraft acting as "ammunition trailers" once they are networked with Lightning IIs. Belgium would receive them directly at Block 4, at a fixed price as stipulated in the contract. In addition to the logistical issues - and all those already mentioned - there are also the more discreet questions about the reliability of the engine.
What is the unit cost?
The budgetary issue remains topical. Although we are now far from the "$50 million fighter" touted in the early 2000s, the price increase was dizzying before starting to decrease in 2018. Belgium's 34 F-35 Block 4s are guaranteed to cost €117.97 million/piece (including two simulators and various services), but the cost for other countries seems higher. Above all, in addition to the uncertainties surrounding the Block 4/C2D2, the stabilisation of costs should also be put into perspective in two respects:
Conversely, there are still uncertainties regarding new orders (Canada, Netherlands). The increase in costs linked to the Turkish issue does not depend solely on the volume of F-35s finally produced, but also on industrial processes. The United States estimates that 6-7% of the F-35s come from Turkish firms... which will have to be replaced, even if the parts they manufacture from single sources are rare. The fact remains that production costs will no doubt be renegotiated upwards elsewhere, with such discussions leading to additional delays.
In the end, if the F-35 offers the prospect of a digitised aircraft, it must also be noted that this logic is above all that of a managerial dream. Many air forces are expecting a reduction in their maintenance workloads, with unprecedented efficiency gains resulting from information sharing. The prospect of a 'Google view' pointing out the positions of opposing threats and enabling pilots to optimise their flight and stealth is also attractive. But these visions tend to obscure the enemy's side of the equation: both Russia and China are active on the cyber and electronic warfare fronts, while developing sensors to thwart radar stealth, better isolate infrared signatures and locate emissions on which the entire F-35 concept is based.
More broadly speaking, as regards the genetic strategy of the system, the reduction in the number of aircraft, linked to the cost of their systems, is also a vulnerability to endogenous (accidents, maintenance delays) and exogenous (enemy actions, including costly attacks on air bases) attrition. While the problems linked to ALIS, EOTS, data fusion, armament and engine reliability can be settled with dollars, the problem of reducing fleets too much is paid for with less strategic freedom of manoeuvre...
F-35: the aeronautical dream still faces setbacks
7 September 2021
In November 2014, we published a review article on the F-35 and its setbacks (1). Nearly five years later, the programme has made progress, found new buyers, with others indicating that the aircraft had reached its initial operational capability (IOC). But since then, new problems have arisen and raise the question of its real operationality, as its operational evaluation phase is due to end before the end of the year. Here is an update.
The operational evaluation process leading to the long-awaited declaration of the US F-35's IOC should make it possible to validate a number of parameters - an essential point before series production - but doubts about the value of the future announcement quickly arose, before being highlighted by a report from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO). The latter worked in particular on the basis of information transmitted by the Pentagon's Department of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). In addition to the variously known problems, which clearly took longer to resolve than expected, there were also problems whose scope had been underestimated.
ALIS in the land of maintenance
This is the case for the integrated logistics management system ALIS (Automated Logistics Information System), which must not only allow maintenance - predictive or curative - while establishing schedules, but also the management of spare parts, and this in an automated manner. The approach is that of 'all-in-one' maintenance, whether it is daily or longer term. The development of the system has, logically enough given the scale of the task, been lengthy, but has also suffered from criticisms of its very nature.
On the one hand, access, which is essential for giving the green light to use the aircraft, is provided by a subscription - for a fee - to Lockheed, which retains ownership. On the other hand, the system operates in a network, which requires daily information feedback, also automated, to the manufacturer. This entails the risk of hacking or eavesdropping by a third party, who would then be aware, in real time, of the status of a given fleet. This approach, which was widely criticised, has been partially revised: devices can now be used without being connected to ALIS for 30 days (initially it was 48 hours).
Moreover, the very operation of ALIS is open to criticism, although its use was intended to reduce the burden - particularly the human burden - of maintenance for the client air forces. The process, which is more fluid, should also ensure greater fleet availability. However, in practice, the opposite has been observed. The US Air Force has seen an increase in workload, mainly due to false maintenance alerts, slow network connections, and non-automation, which forces maintainers to manually enter the work done, or even to use parallel databases, which the USAF itself modestly describes as a 'high level of manual effort'. The situation was such that Lockheed itself did not use the system on its lines until 2018 and the US Air Force Secretary could declare on 28 February 2019: "I can guarantee that no Air Force maintainer will ever call his daughter Alice."
Patches have obviously been put in place. In fact, ALIS is said to have gone through 27 versions. But if they can solve some problems, the complexity of the system is such that others are created. Others have sometimes persisted since 2012, without ever having been resolved. This is particularly the case with the sub-programmes. For example, the Squadron Health Management application can declare a device non-operational, while the Customer Maintenance Management System, another application, indicates that it is operational. The future of ALIS and its 65 applications - including some related to planning and debriefing or training (2) - is bleak, so much so that the Air Force has ordered a replacement programme, Mad Hatter, from Lockheed. The idea would be to install the functional parts of ALIS in a cloud. But this will probably not solve everything. For example, the management of spare parts for the various sub-systems of the aircraft, which has never been standardised, even though they come from 1,500 sub-contractors, is causing not only a work overload but also a slowdown in supplies.
A disarmed weapons system?
The F-35 continues to experience several problems with its weapons and sensors. The most serious concerns the EOTS (Electro-Optical Targeting System), which is positioned under the nose and serves as both a laser designator and IRST (Infra-Red Search and Track):
- the first is a maintenance classic: the sensor is permanently installed, thus prohibiting the conduct of air-to-ground missions if it fails, whereas it is sufficient to change pods on more conventional aircraft. In theory, ALIS should allow predictive maintenance to avoid this situation. In practice, however, its poor performance will also affect availability for air-to-ground missions - especially since the purchase of the F-35 came at the cost of reducing the number of aircraft for many air forces;
- The second is even more emblematic: currently, the EOTS does not allow a laser-guided weapon to designate a moving target. The F-35 is therefore not suitable for CAS (Close Air Support) missions. The US Air Force's alternative is to fire GPS/laser-guided ammunition: firing at coordinates must follow a designation either by another aircraft or by a ground team. Tactical flexibility is lost, while the air force may have to acquire the appropriate weapons. Mission scenarios are also made more complex, for example in counter-A2/AD, forcing the deployment of either special forces... or non-stealth aircraft.
The issue of the F-35A's internal gun misalignment has not yet been resolved, especially since it has been found that this problem affects all aircraft in different ways. POGO also states that the tests carried out with the three types of ammunition to be used are fairly unrepresentative and have only involved a few shells of each type in the various employment configurations studied. This criticism is added to that of the calibre and number of shells being smaller than those of the A-10, raising questions about the relevance of using the F-35 as a replacement for the Thunderbolt II, a function that the US Air Force continues to insist on. It also raises questions from the US Army, which is the primary user of the A-10's firepower. Without an EOTS allowing optimal vision shared with ground troops - in particular through ROVER video software - and with a gun that is not very precise and less adapted than that of the Thunderbolt, a real deficit in terms of air support is likely to appear.
There is also the question of the ability to recognise ground-to-air and air-to-air threats. The F-35 must enable its pilots to evolve in an optimal manner according to its dynamic and stealth characteristics, by identifying the threats encountered. To do this, it is necessary to compare the information gathered by the sensors with threat databases called Mission Data Loads (MDLs), without which it is impossible to identify adversary signals - or to discriminate between friendly and allied signals. While these databases need to be updated frequently as the theatre progresses, it took Eglin specialists 12 to 15 months to provide the MDLs used in the F-35's operational assessments, and they have not yet been deemed accurate and relevant. In this case, the software and systems were inadequate and cumbersome. The problem is not just American: Eglin also has to produce MDLs for six F-35 configurations, four Block 4 iterations and 12 geographic regions, amounting to 120 MDLs that will then have to be updated - a task that seems simple at first glance, but could take several months, a timeframe that is incompatible with the deployability requirements of the forces equipped with the aircraft.
The issue of cyber vulnerabilities also remains unresolved, given that the very concept of the F-35 is based on connectivity in several respects. On the one hand, according to POGO, the methodology: the team responsible for testing cyber vulnerabilities is not governmental, but depends on Lockheed, which poses an obvious problem of objectivity. On the other hand, the strength of the F-35 - its connectivity - is also its weakness:
- Within the aircraft itself, the fusion of data from the various sensors (radar, Distributed Aperture System) should provide the pilot with better situational awareness. However, the corruption of one of these systems would contaminate the others, as well as the central computer system;
- The devices communicate with each other;
- the devices are themselves linked to the ALIS system, which is centralised in the United States but connected to the terminals of the user countries. Each potential contaminant entry point is therefore likely to affect the entire fleet;
- It should be added that the F-35s also feed the MDLs automatically, including by transmitting flight profiles and what the sensors "see and hear". Norway became aware of these transfers - which could have been intercepted by neighbouring Russia - which in turn prompted the development of a specific firewall, Sovereign Data Management, at a cost of $26 million.
The platform and the system remain problematic
Even before the start of the operational test phase, the Pentagon acknowledged that the aircraft still had 941 design flaws, 102 of which were "Category 1", i.e. mission-critical and could cause the death of the pilot or serious injury.
Several observers had already pointed out that several Category 1 problems had been redesigned and subsequently considered less serious. The Systems Design and Development (SDD) phase itself was abruptly terminated in April 2018. The tests of the current phase are partly compromised by these problems since the 23 aircraft concerned require an availability of 80%, which seems to be far from being achieved. They are further compromised by the fact that the simulation systems to test a multi-aircraft engagement in a dense air-to-air and ground-to-air threat environment are not yet operational. The simulators themselves do not yet have the flight profiles and relevant information about the F-35 necessary for their operation. This work would presumably be completed by the end of 2019, but these evaluations would then be conducted at the very end of the process.
In addition, structural problems are still observed, again calling into question the test methodology. In this case, the assessment of the aircraft's fire survivability was also entrusted to Lockheed, which determined that it met the contractual specifications in three of the four scenarios considered... whereas the Pentagon's DOT&E estimated the opposite in 2017 (3). More seriously, it was determined that the F-35B and C participating in the tests had structural cracks, so that they would not be able to reach their potential of 8,000 flight hours and might have to leave service in 2026. No information has been provided by the US authorities on the F-35A. Moreover, the marine versions also suffer from very low operational availability: 23% for the F-35B in October 2017, 12.9% in June 2018. In December 2017, the availability of the F-35C was 0%. POGO is similarly critical of the transparency around the communication of the programme, stating that much of the information presented by the Pentagon in previous reports was missing this year. The quality of the evaluation of the aircraft, obviously essential for its operational career to officially begin, could therefore be called into question.
At the same time, however, US timetables are being maintained by the Pentagon's Joint Program Office (JPO), which is simultaneously pushing for the earliest possible withdrawal from service of a large number of F-16s and A-10s. The US Navy's F/A-18C/Ds were retired in February 2019 and the Marines are also being asked to part with theirs. The challenge at this stage is to be able to meet the planned delivery rates - at a time when the US Air Force has been forced to buy the F-15EX, a real wake-up call for Lockheed - but also to meet the promises made in terms of unit cost. The stakes are also commercial: mass production will make it possible to deliver to customers who have been able to set delivery dates in their contracts. However, the problems will not be solved, far from it. For lack of a sound prototyping policy, Lockheed launched pre-production too quickly, adopting a trial-and-error logic that led to the logistical nightmare of successive adaptations "to the right standard" of the first aircraft produced.
However, the stakes are not low: the question of the development of the Block 4/Continuous Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2) standard is already looming. This standard will make it possible to use all the weapons envisaged for the F-35, and in particular the B61-12 gravity nuclear bomb, but its cost remains unknown. Thus, the retrofit of aircraft already delivered is not a given: in April 2019, the JPO estimated it at $10.5 billion for R&D over eight years and $2.5 billion for the retrofit of the 441 American aircraft. For the RAF, the cost will be $486 million, so it is assessing the desirability of the upgrade. In this case, it would qualify its F-35Bs for some weapons (air-to-air missiles, SPEAR 3 missiles). They would also serve as scouts for Typhoon aircraft acting as "ammunition trailers" once they are networked with Lightning IIs. Belgium would receive them directly at Block 4, at a fixed price as stipulated in the contract. In addition to the logistical issues - and all those already mentioned - there are also the more discreet questions about the reliability of the engine.
What is the unit cost?
The budgetary issue remains topical. Although we are now far from the "$50 million fighter" touted in the early 2000s, the price increase was dizzying before starting to decrease in 2018. Belgium's 34 F-35 Block 4s are guaranteed to cost €117.97 million/piece (including two simulators and various services), but the cost for other countries seems higher. Above all, in addition to the uncertainties surrounding the Block 4/C2D2, the stabilisation of costs should also be put into perspective in two respects:
- On the one hand, the programme is not very transparent in budgetary terms. It is difficult to monitor press releases: in addition to batch orders, there are also long lead items for future batches, as well as corrections and anything else that may relate to the motorisation, ALIS or structures. The unit cost thus depends on what is or is not put into the balance: low transparency can thus make it possible to hide a cost increase. Moreover, this issue will be dynamic: for the user air forces, ALIS will thus be the subject of a subscription, so that the unit cost of an aircraft can no longer be "fly away";
- on the other hand, the price is linked to the orders actually placed. There is no shortage of unknowns in Turkey, where deliveries have been suspended, with only six F-35s ordered out of a target of 100; in Singapore, which has ordered four aircraft for testing; in Israel, where some believe the emphasis should be on the F-15IA; in Italy, because of payment difficulties; and even in Japan, after the crash of an aircraft in April, when the fleet's unreliability forced seven emergency landings. It should also be noted that while targets are relatively stable over time, actual orders are still far from being placed...
Conversely, there are still uncertainties regarding new orders (Canada, Netherlands). The increase in costs linked to the Turkish issue does not depend solely on the volume of F-35s finally produced, but also on industrial processes. The United States estimates that 6-7% of the F-35s come from Turkish firms... which will have to be replaced, even if the parts they manufacture from single sources are rare. The fact remains that production costs will no doubt be renegotiated upwards elsewhere, with such discussions leading to additional delays.
In the end, if the F-35 offers the prospect of a digitised aircraft, it must also be noted that this logic is above all that of a managerial dream. Many air forces are expecting a reduction in their maintenance workloads, with unprecedented efficiency gains resulting from information sharing. The prospect of a 'Google view' pointing out the positions of opposing threats and enabling pilots to optimise their flight and stealth is also attractive. But these visions tend to obscure the enemy's side of the equation: both Russia and China are active on the cyber and electronic warfare fronts, while developing sensors to thwart radar stealth, better isolate infrared signatures and locate emissions on which the entire F-35 concept is based.
More broadly speaking, as regards the genetic strategy of the system, the reduction in the number of aircraft, linked to the cost of their systems, is also a vulnerability to endogenous (accidents, maintenance delays) and exogenous (enemy actions, including costly attacks on air bases) attrition. While the problems linked to ALIS, EOTS, data fusion, armament and engine reliability can be settled with dollars, the problem of reducing fleets too much is paid for with less strategic freedom of manoeuvre...
Lulz. A frenchy article about old issues of the F-35? It clearly shows how butt hurt the frenchies are of the F-35... you will never see articles from US news about the french plane because it's so insignificant that nobody cares. If you were to ask the french about the F-35 they'd know what the F-35 is if you were to ask Murrcans about the french plane they'd look at you funny and ask what the hell is it.
French really got hurt when Swiss selected the F-35 but really took a punch to the gut when they found out why the Swiss selected the F-35 over the french plane. When the french heard the F-35 was FAR superior and cheaper to operate it pretty much killed their spirit. Just look how the frenchies react when the Ozzies said no thank you to french subs. Lol.
In a couple of months the hearts of the french will break again when Finland selects the F-35.
You don't know the French very well, because it makes us laugh that Americans would believe that. In France, we say that when an enemy makes a mistake, we must not intervene, and that's what we do for the Americans and the F-35.
Oh we know the french very well... their back stabbing ways are legendary that even General Patton said, 'I would rather have a German division in front of me than a French one behind me.'
Says a lot about you people.
Say a lot about PattonOh we know the french very well... their back stabbing ways are legendary that even General Patton said, 'I would rather have a German division in front of me than a French one behind me.'
Says a lot about you people.
... and you.
Speaking of RNLAF
The latest Department of Defense report is out
www.rijksoverheid.nl
While the projected operating budget for 46 aircraft in 2020 was 397 million per year for the period 2020-2025
It has increased to 464 million per year for the period 2021-2026 and is now estimated at 470 million euros per year
For a 200 flight hours that's make a 50000 euro/flight hours !!!
On the other hand, the procurement budget has been reduced
For 46 aircraft, it was estimated at 5921 million euros
The current estimates speak of 5631 million euros + 84.9 million of reserve for risk taking
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
The latest Department of Defense report is out
Project Verwerving F-35: Jaarlijkse voortgangsrapportage 2021
Deze jaarlijkse rapportage gaat in op de voortgang van het groot project Verwerving F-35 in Nederland. De internationale ontwikkelingen in het F-35 project worden meegenomen voor zover deze direct invloed hebben voor de Nederlandse situatie. Deze rapportage beslaat de periode 1 juli 2020 tot en...
www.rijksoverheid.nl
While the projected operating budget for 46 aircraft in 2020 was 397 million per year for the period 2020-2025
It has increased to 464 million per year for the period 2021-2026 and is now estimated at 470 million euros per year
For a 200 flight hours that's make a 50000 euro/flight hours !!!
On the other hand, the procurement budget has been reduced
For 46 aircraft, it was estimated at 5921 million euros
The current estimates speak of 5631 million euros + 84.9 million of reserve for risk taking
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Lol. Can't wait to read your reaction at airdefense when Finland selects the F-35... Maybe finally you and your fellow fanboys will finally get it and figure out why the F-35 soundly beats your plane.Speaking of RNLAF
The latest Department of Defense report is out
Project Verwerving F-35: Jaarlijkse voortgangsrapportage 2021
Deze jaarlijkse rapportage gaat in op de voortgang van het groot project Verwerving F-35 in Nederland. De internationale ontwikkelingen in het F-35 project worden meegenomen voor zover deze direct invloed hebben voor de Nederlandse situatie. Deze rapportage beslaat de periode 1 juli 2020 tot en...
While the projected operating budget for 46 aircraft in 2020 was 397 million per year for the period 2020-2025
It has increased to 464 million per year for the period 2021-2026 and is now estimated at 470 million euros per year
For a 200 flight hours that's make a 50000 euro/flight hours !!!
On the other hand, the procurement budget has been reduced
For 46 aircraft, it was estimated at 5921 million euros
The current estimates speak of 5631 million euros + 84.9 million of reserve for risk taking
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Oh who am I kidding you'll likely make an excuse and blame it on bribes or Biden pressure.
F-35 Production Set at 156 Per Year Until Completion | Air & Space Forces Magazine
F-35 production will peak at 156 a year in 2023 and remain at that level "for the foreseeable future," Lockheed Martin said.
www.airforcemag.com
I can't no more be desapointed since I'm sure that the deal in Finland will be for f-35, since I have undestood how FMS work.
F-35 Production Set at 156 Per Year Until Completion | Air & Space Forces Magazine
F-35 production will peak at 156 a year in 2023 and remain at that level "for the foreseeable future," Lockheed Martin said.
The Air Force has signaled that it will buy about five fewer F-35s per year over the next few years, preferring to wait for the Block 4 jets as they start coming off the production line in fiscal 2023.
Actually that's Block 3F with TR3, not Block 4.
Did DAS or AN/ASQ239 prove to be efficient against SU35 ?
Spectra did. In Egypt. This year.
With the follow on decision to purchase 30 more birds.
Lol. So it jammed a downgraded SU-35 with no EW capability.
And to answer your question the AN/ASQ239 Barracuda did something more capable than super super spectra...
"...While a lot of missions are conducted with the JOTT partners, the Dutch F-35s periodically fly with the 148th Fighter Squadron ‘Kickin’ a$$’, the RNLAF’s F-16 training unit in Tucson, Arizona, to evaluate and validate new tactics. ‘The first time we got to test all these advanced capabilities to their fullest potential was about a year ago, with and against our F-16s in Tucson,’ says Knight.
‘The initial scenario was that our two F-35s would escort a four-ship of F-16s across a notional border and protect them against another eight-ship of F-16s simulating a modern adversary. A relatively inexperienced flight leader was in charge of the F-16s on our side and Lt Col Joost ‘Niki’ Luijsterburg, the Tucson detachment commander, was responsible for the adversaries. Up to this point we had only practised these scenarios in the simulators and while we had a decent game-plan, we were all anxious to see how the F-35 would perform in real life. We figured that the F-35’s stealth would keep us out of harm’s way for most of the fight, but that we also need to protect the friendly F-16s, maximize the lethality of their missiles and get them to the target.
To make this happen, we planned to initially use electronic attack against the adversary F-16s, see if we could avoid having them detect friendly fighters and datalink the location of the hostile aircraft to our F-16s. This way we could use the F-16s on our side to shoot down the initial wave of enemy fighters and keep our own missiles available once the ‘Blue Air’ F-16s had to focus on their target attack. The plan worked flawlessly."
Can your inferior french plane do this..? No!
The INSIDER daily digest -- July 1, 2021 | InsideDefense.com
This Thursday INSIDER Daily Digest has news on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, cybersecurity funding and more.
Keeping the F-35 Ahead of the Bad Guys | Air & Space Forces Magazine
Operational testing is still underway, but the F-35 is already beginning its first major upgrade.
www.airforcemag.com
Make-or-Break Time for the F-35 | Air & Space Forces Magazine
The Air Force’s most important program faces increased scrutiny as high costs, low availability, and other problems continue.
www.airforcemag.com
A spokeswoman for the F-35 Joint Program Office said the TR3 upgrade “will deliver to Lot 15 in 2023, as required.”
So the TR3 is a pre-Block 4 upgrade and it delivers by the end of 2023. It's only after TR3 is delivered that Block 4 upgrades begin. So the delivery in 2023 is basically the 3F with TR3 upgrade.
Question asked in the Swiss parliament about F-35 costs and inflation:
The Federal Assembly — The Swiss Parliament
Air2030/F-35: Inflation-adjusted offer
The 5,068 billion offered for the 36 F-35 fighter jets are not adjusted for inflation. According to the Tages-Anzeiger of 21 September 2021, the fighter jet manufacturers also had to offer prices adjusted for inflation.
- What is the inflation-adjusted offer price for the F-35?
- Does the F-35 also underseen its competitors by a whole billion in terms of price-adjusted offers?
Answer.
"The procurement costs for the F-35A amount to 5.068 billion Swiss francs at the time of the offers as of February 11, 2021 and are therefore in the specified financial volume of the planning decision. We understand the first question to mean that the price is in demand with the offset inflation. The total costs, which consist of procurement and operating costs, amount to around 15.5 billion Swiss francs for the F-35A over 30 years and including inflation. The difference to the second cheapest candidate is in the range of 2 billion francs and not 1 billion francs, as listed in the question."
www.parlament.ch
This comment was spot on...
'That is the biggest middle finger to the person asking the question in the entire thing. Not only is the question stupid, you didn't even get the premise of the question right.'
If only they'd tell us which fighter came in FAR second... It's possible it wasn't the french plane.
The Federal Assembly — The Swiss Parliament
Air2030/F-35: Inflation-adjusted offer
The 5,068 billion offered for the 36 F-35 fighter jets are not adjusted for inflation. According to the Tages-Anzeiger of 21 September 2021, the fighter jet manufacturers also had to offer prices adjusted for inflation.
- What is the inflation-adjusted offer price for the F-35?
- Does the F-35 also underseen its competitors by a whole billion in terms of price-adjusted offers?
Answer.
"The procurement costs for the F-35A amount to 5.068 billion Swiss francs at the time of the offers as of February 11, 2021 and are therefore in the specified financial volume of the planning decision. We understand the first question to mean that the price is in demand with the offset inflation. The total costs, which consist of procurement and operating costs, amount to around 15.5 billion Swiss francs for the F-35A over 30 years and including inflation. The difference to the second cheapest candidate is in the range of 2 billion francs and not 1 billion francs, as listed in the question."
Geschäft Ansehen
www.parlament.ch
This comment was spot on...
'That is the biggest middle finger to the person asking the question in the entire thing. Not only is the question stupid, you didn't even get the premise of the question right.'
If only they'd tell us which fighter came in FAR second... It's possible it wasn't the french plane.