Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning and F-22 'Raptor' : News & Discussion

Pic, you are funny with your pre data altered ChatGPT. Sad when you make up your own troll.
It's like when you quoted a fellow air-defense.net guy who wrote his first article on a blog.. It all means nothing.
 
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There are some online rumours regarding US offering India F-35A if Trump comes to power. Sometime back I told @randomradio that MRFA may turn into a two-way fight between F-35A Block-4 and Rafale F5. My prophecy still may come true, who knows!
 
There are some online rumours regarding US offering India F-35A if Trump comes to power. Sometime back I told @randomradio that MRFA may turn into a two-way fight between F-35A Block-4 and Rafale F5. My prophecy still may come true, who knows!
There is no way F35 participating mrfa tendering process. They may offer F35 to India through g2g deal,without out offering any tot.
 
Pic, you are funny with your pre data altered ChatGPT. Sad when you make up your own troll.
It's like when you quoted a fellow air-defense.net guy who wrote his first article on a blog.. It all means nothing.
I think you're too limited to understand the power of ChatGPT. I ask it to extract the 'atoms' of information and then I place them in a classification plan in Excel which allows me to accumulate the atoms of information by theme, the advantage being that the same information is only there once even if it is present in several articles. For example, here's what I have on the F-35:
  • The F-35 does not appear to be interoperable.
  • The F-35 is only interoperable with the F-35.
  • There is a persistent question as to why the Europeans are buying the F-35.
  • The US armed forces are also asking questions about the F-35.
  • Lockheed Martin's aerospace director is optimistic that F-35 deliveries will resume after a pause of about a year.
  • F-35 deliveries to the USAF have resumed after a hiatus due to software problems.
  • Lockheed Martin plans to deliver 20 F-35s a month, seven of which are in storage and 13 newly built.
  • It will take 12 to 18 months to clear the stock of F-35s in storage.
  • Delays in F-35 deliveries are due to problems with the TR-3 software.
  • Lockheed Martin has begun flight acceptance of the TR-3 aircraft.
  • The US government has officially accepted ten TR-3 aircraft.
  • Some TR-3 aircraft have been forwarded to the final customer.
  • U.S. government certification enables aircraft certification for international customers.
  • TR-3 aircraft benefit from hardware upgrades such as new cockpit displays.
  • TR-3 aircraft have significantly more processing power.
  • TR-3 aircraft have a new memory unit.
  • TR-3 aircraft have an improved distributed opening system.
  • Deliveries are made as part of a "training delivery capability".
  • Approximately 95% of the F-35's combat capability is already integrated into the aircraft.
  • Much of the weapons software is already in the aircraft.
  • Flight tests and the corresponding weapons software certifications have not yet been carried out.
  • Lockheed Martin is targeting the end of next spring for implementation of the full combat capability software.
  • The F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER program continues to experience production problems and modernization delays.
  • Hardware and software delays and limited test capability are hampering progress on the Block 4 modernization.
  • The F-35 programme is facing TR-3 hardware and software issues, leading to delays in capability development and aircraft delivery.
  • The programme is assessing the cost, schedule and scope of Block 4, which has become a major sub-programme of the F-35.
  • The programme is taking steps to increase test capability, with new test aircraft planned for 2029.
  • Late deliveries of the TR-3 lead the programme to re-evaluate the full Block 4 schedule.
  • The TR-3 hardware was due to be delivered on aircraft from July 2023, but has been delayed until June 2024.
  • The supplier of the TR-3 integrated central processor is delivering this component late and with quality problems.
  • By February 2024, around 61% of the integrated processor assemblies had been delivered.
  • The delays are due to supply chain issues, labour shortages and quality testing difficulties.
  • Lockheed Martin is using rotating TR-3 hardware kits to alleviate embedded processor shortages.
  • All aircraft will have to be fitted with permanent TR-3 hardware kits before they can be delivered.
  • The on-board central processor experienced start-up failures during initial testing.
  • Persistent stability problems with the TR-3 software have delayed the programme.
  • The TR-3 radar and electronic warfare systems experienced frequent problems, requiring in-flight restarts.
  • Problems with data logging have made it difficult to identify the causes of software problems.
  • Lockheed Martin plans to deliver a less capable version of the TR-3 software for flight testing in April 2024.
  • The initial TR-3 software will be installed on the fleet in June 2024, but will not offer any new capabilities.
  • The TR-3 software with new capabilities will not be delivered until 2025.
  • TR-3 delays have delayed aircraft deliveries to the government and the development of Block 4 capabilities.
  • Lockheed Martin is stationing all TR-3-capable F-35s pending permanent hardware kits and new software.
  • Lockheed Martin and the Ministry of Defence plan to certify an average of 20 aircraft a month to clear the backlog.
  • Currently, the programme averages 13 certifications per month.
  • It will take about a year to deliver the parked aircraft once the TR-3 software has been completed and certified.
  • Workforce and scheduling issues could lead to coordination difficulties between Lockheed Martin and the Defense Contract Management Agency office.
  • The unique stockpiling situation for the F-35 presents financial and schedule risks for the Department of Defense.
  • TR-3 delays have contributed to delays in the development, testing and delivery of Block 4 capabilities.
  • The F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER programme has prioritised the TR-3 effort, absorbing most of the current test capability in software labs and flight test.
  • The programme is using fewer test resources to mature the development of Block 4 capabilities, creating a risk of delay.
  • The TR-3 software release to exploit the new Block 4 capabilities has been delayed until 2025.
  • The Block 4 capabilities depend on the TR-3 hardware and software to operate, delaying their entry into service.
  • The original plan was to deliver aircraft with TR-3 and Block 4 capabilities from July 2023.
  • The longer the TR-3 software is delayed, the longer the fighter will have to wait for the mission-critical capabilities of Block 4.
  • From February 2024, the programme office will reassess the Block 4 effort to document its overall cost, schedule and scope.
  • Block 4 and TR-3 elements will be managed as a major subprogram in accordance with FY 2024 NOAA requirements.
  • Congress will have insight into the costs, schedule and performance of Block 4 to make more informed decisions.
  • The programme assessed the technical aspects of the Block 4 capability delivery schedule and proposed 84 recommendations to improve it.
  • The recommendations included building additional laboratories, extending the life of test aircraft and using new predictive planning tools.
  • No decision had been taken on these recommendations by February 2024.
  • The programme has not yet published a timetable and updated cost estimate for Block 4.
  • The scope of Block 4 will change, removing capabilities that cannot be supported by the current F-35 engine and thermal management system.
  • Capabilities requiring more power and cooling will be reclassified as 'post-Block 4' for future development.
  • Post-Block 4 capabilities will be delivered no earlier than 2029.
  • In 2023, the programme changed its procurement strategy for Block 4.
  • The Block 4 contract, awarded in May 2023, allows technical guidance to be refined and capacity priorities to be redefined without amending the contract.
  • The Block 4 contract provides two key decision points in the development process.
  • The first decision point initiates the advanced development of a capability up to the preliminary design stage.
  • The second decision point confirms the specifics of the capability after preliminary design, setting a commitment date for production.
  • The programme takes steps to increase test capacity for Block 4 and the TR-3.
  • The current development test fleet comprises four flight science aircraft, which are over 10 years old and have frequent maintenance problems.
  • The maintenance problems of the test fleet are exacerbated by increasing difficulties in obtaining spare parts.
  • Three of the four test aircraft were grounded simultaneously for maintenance, limiting testing.
  • An F-35B development test aircraft was grounded for an extended period of maintenance, delaying the associated weapons tests.
  • Delayed deliveries of TR-3 and Block 4 software enabled the schedule to be met despite the maintenance problems.
  • The programme is building four modified development test aircraft, scheduled for 2026, to help meet the current test schedule.
  • The programme is currently borrowing test aircraft from other test fleets to mitigate delays.
  • The programme plans to replace the current test fleet with nine new full development test aircraft.
  • The acquisition of six of these new development test aircraft was authorised in March 2024.
  • The new development test aircraft will be completed and available between 2029 and 2034.
  • The new aircraft will be produced in staggered series of three at a time.
  • The current replacement plan leaves the programme without available test aircraft in 2028 and 2029.
  • In March 2023, MoD officials announced the engine upgrade to enable post-Block 4 capabilities beyond 2029, but without an awarded development contract.
  • The programme is considering options to upgrade the thermal and power management system (PTMS) required for additional cooling of the aircraft's sub-systems.
  • The MoD will manage the engine and thermal management upgrade effort as a major sub-programme with its own costs, schedule and performance benchmarks.
  • In March 2023, the programme decided to upgrade the engine for post-Block 4 capability beyond 2029.
  • The programme assessed options for upgrading the engine to provide additional power and cooling, detailed in a May 2023 report.
  • Upgrading the engine core unit (ECU) is being considered, which would upgrade the power module and gearbox, reducing overall costs and enabling increased capabilities for future mission systems.
  • Risk reduction and technical maturation efforts for the ECU have been ongoing since the decision to modernise the engine was taken.
  • A preliminary design review of the ECU took place in February 2024, with another scheduled for May 2024.
  • A contract for the development of the ECU could be finalised in autumn 2024, with a duration of 7 years for the development, testing and integration of the associated subsystems, delivering aircraft equipped with the modernised engine in 2032.
  • The programme envisages upgrades to the PTMS, electrical power system and thermal fuel management system for post-Block 4 capabilities.
  • In February 2024, the programme is examining options for upgrading the current PTMS or developing a new PTMS, with varying costs, timescales and cooling capabilities.
  • A contract for a lead system integrator to modernise these sub-systems is planned for August 2024.
  • Prior to selecting a modernization solution, the programme and the system integrator will conduct technology maturation and risk reduction activities.
  • A specific retrofit option will be selected by the end of 2026, with improvements delivered by the contractor.
  • Current cooling capacity limitations could hamper post-Block 4 mission capabilities and systems as early as 2029.
  • The envisaged upgrades to the thermal management system could not be implemented until 2030, with realistic delivery of the upgraded sub-systems in 2032.
  • The programme envisages transferring Block 4 capabilities requiring more power and cooling to the post-Block 4, scheduled to start in 2029.
  • A delay in thermal management system upgrades after 2029 could also delay post-Block 4 capabilities.
  • The programme is currently assessing how this potential power and cooling shortfall will affect the delivery of post-Block 4 capacity and possible measures to address it.
Then if I want to cover a subject I select the atoms of information that are relevant to the subject, consult the source articles for those atoms, cross-check and analyse and produce a text... and then I just have to wait for @Optimist to say that I'm trolling.
 
Pic is Don Quixote and Herciv is Pancho. Attacking windmills to save the world, from what they think are dragons. Funny as F

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Pic, you have been a busy boy. how many hours a day do you do this?




Playing with ChatGPT to generate dummy/fake data.

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DEV Community
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5 Mar 2023 — Therefore, we can call FakerPHP helper methods to generate dummy or fake data for us. But with all these libraries we can't see the generated ...

Generating fake data with ChatGPT

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Generating fake data with ChatGPT.

Generating Test Data With ChatGPT

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23 June 2023 — Creating test data for an Oracle database involves generating fake data and then inserting that data into the database. ... ChatGPT does 10K ...

ChatGPT for building fake data - by Aleksander Lütken

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Medium · Aleksander Lütken
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Use OpenAI's ChatGPT to easily build your own fake dataset. When I am learning about new topics in data science I usually need some practice ...

Create Dummy Data With ChatGPT

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Historically, creating dummy data was a tedious and fairly manual process. Now ChatGPT Plus makes it easy. Take a look at an example below. I wanted a dummy ...

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Using ChatGPT To Create Fake Datasets
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Let ChatGPT create Dummy Data for your Excel Projects ...
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Generate any type of sample data with ChatGPT
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ChatGPT can make fake SharePoint data for you in a flash!
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There are those who know how to use chatGPT and those who don't. For example, I go back to the source of the information, which I have linked for each atom of information, before using it for my analyses and I have trained ChatGPT to extract all the atoms of information, just the atoms of information from the texts I submit to it.
 
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Pic, you are funny with your pre data altered ChatGPT. Sad when you make up your own troll.
It's like when you quoted a fellow air-defense.net guy who wrote his first article on a blog.. It all means nothing.

Since when I mention the GAO as a source you say that official sources are OK,
I suggest that you point out one of my atoms of information that you believe to be false and I will point out the source preferably from an official document and even from a GAO document that contains this information with the page and paragraph plus the full quote. And if you want to point out more than one, I'll be happy to answer them all.
 
And since we've been talking about it, I've also extracted the following information:
  • The F-35 programme will manage the modernisation of the engine and thermal management systems as a major sub-programme.
  • This follows a May 2023 recommendation and is consistent with an NDAA provision for fiscal year 2024.
  • Concept of operations approved in November 2023.
  • Engine upgrade to enable post-Block 4 capabilities beyond 2029 announced in March 2023.
  • Engine upgrade options evaluated to provide more power and cooling.
  • Core engine control unit (ECU) upgrade considered.
  • Preliminary upgrade requirements defined in August 2023.
  • Preliminary ECU design review held in February 2024, with another scheduled for May 2024.
  • Requirements expected to be finalised on award of engine modernisation development contract in autumn 2024.
  • ECU development, testing and integration over a 7-year period, with aircraft equipped with the modernised engine scheduled for delivery in 2032.
  • Examination of upgrade options for the PTMS, electrical power system and thermal fuel management system.
  • Award of contract to lead system integrator planned for August 2024.
  • Selection of a specific upgrade option expected by the end of 2026.
  • Delivery of upgraded subsystems planned for 2032.
  • Risks associated with defining requirements, maturing technologies and assessing costs.
  • May 2023 recommendation to re-evaluate modernization options analysis after requirements are defined.
  • The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Support approved a new F-35 acquisition strategy in January 2024.
  • 17 technical studies identified to determine lower level requirements for the PTMS and other related subsystems.
  • The results of all studies will not be available until the development contract is awarded.
  • Current cooling capacity limitations could hamper post-Block 4 mission capabilities and systems as early as 2029.
  • Upgrades to the thermal management system could not be implemented until 2030 at the earliest, with realistic delivery in 2032.
  • Proceeding with the development of the engine modernization without having defined the requirements for the associated subsystems increases the risk that the engine and thermal management modernization sub-programme will not meet its cost, schedule and performance objectives.
  • Five engine sub-component technologies are immature.
  • One sub-component is at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4 (validated only in the laboratory).
  • The other sub-components need to reach TRL 5 (validated in a relevant environment).
  • Recommendation to bring all technologies to TRL 7 before development (fully functional prototype demonstrated in an operational environment).
  • Development of the modernised engine does not include demonstration in an operational environment during development.
  • Technologies will remain immature until ground testing in 2026.
  • PTMS designs available at different TRLs, all at TRL 5 or below.
  • Related systems (thermal fuel management and electrical power system) also immature at various levels.
  • Risk reduction studies underway to identify technical gaps in interdependent sub-systems.
  • Major integration challenges, including heat removal from mission systems.
  • Plans to mature PTMS and related subsystem technologies following risk reduction studies.
  • Recognition by programme management that synchronisation of engine and thermal management system development efforts is a significant risk.
  • Progress in estimating development costs for the engine upgrade.
  • Lack of estimates for other related subsystems (PTMS, electrical power system, fuel thermal management system).
  • Recommendation of May 2023 to estimate full life cycle costs and obtain an independent cost estimate for all upgrade items.
  • Programme has produced its own estimates for the engine upgrade.
  • Progress towards an independent cost estimate with estimates ranging from $3.7 billion to $4.5 billion.
  • In January 2024, the Programme is working on a full cost estimate for the Engine and Thermal Management sub-programme using information from ongoing studies.
  • Continuous monitoring of progress in defining requirements, maturing technologies and assessing the costs of engine and thermal management modernization systems.
 
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Good Policy for Pentagon Will Focus Military Spending on What Works

By Ben Russo
July 30, 2024

What will the world be like in the year 2075? Come on, it is only 50 years from now. There are not many variables to think about. Technology doesn’t move that fast, right?

Wrong.

There is no way to accurately predict what the world will look like in five decades. However, the Pentagon thinks it has an answer: it still expects to be relying on the F-35, and only the F-35, a jet first proposed during the 1990s, right on into (and beyond) 2085. Defense News reports, without irony: “In the new report to lawmakers, GAO said the Defense Department now plans to fly the F-35 through 2088, 11 years longer than services most recently anticipated.”

The Government Accountability Office notes that the lifetime cost of the F-35 will increase, surpassing $2 trillion, if it remains in service for that long. In a perfect example of circular reasoning, the Pentagon intends to stay with the F-35 because it costs so much, even though it costs so much (in part) because the Pentagon intends to stay with it for so long. Oddly, as the cost goes up, the usefulness of the jet goes down. GAO adds that the “Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps project they will fly the F-35 aircraft less than originally estimated on an annual basis.”

Of course, the cost isn’t even the biggest problem with this approach. We live in a world governed by Moore’s law, which indicates that technology tends to double every 18 months. There is no way that a plane designed in the early 2000s could keep up with that pace. The F-35 is risking obsolescence today, let alone a half-century from now. The DoD has continuously misjudged how fast the Chinese would be able to update and expand their military defensive and power projection capabilities. Why should we expect that the DoD will do any better in the future with counter military programs if they continue down the same planning cycle pathway?

So, what is the answer? The Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.

NGAD fuels innovation in the military space. “The technologies involved in NGAD are being developed to provide air dominance,” as the U.S. Naval Institute explains. “Part of the program’s goal is to determine how to achieve that end, independent of traditional ideas.”

The key is to keep the program open-ended. Rather than dictate what the outcome should be, NGAD encourages experimentation. “NGAD could take the form of a single aircraft and/or a number of complementary systems—manned, unmanned, optionally manned, cyber, electronic—forms that would not resemble the traditional ‘fighter.’”

Some are trying to delay the NGAD approach, hoping that slowing down innovation will benefit the problematic F-35 program. Our peer adversaries, though, will harness artificial intelligence and utilize deep data lakes in ways that we cannot foresee. Their OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) will operate more efficiently and effectively than ours, “leapfrogging” over our technologies and out-stripping our ability to react in a timely manner.

The Chinese are counting on the United States entrenched bureaucratic and capitalistic mindset in defense program development. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China has identified a “historic opportunity” for national security leapfrog technologies; essentially what is behind technologically can be skipped developmentally and adopt the next generation. Meanwhile, the US will proceed as normal and continue to remain behind schedule, under perform, and over budget.

The F-35 is “a fighter jet that exhibits everything from structural cracks to cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Twenty years in development — and it still can’t shoot straight and is rarely ready to fly when it is needed,” commentator Dan Grazier wrote in The Hill a few years ago. “Billions of dollars in, and with nearly 900 documented design flaws — many potentially fatal and with no fix in the works — and the federal government cannot seem to break free of this budget albatross.”

The best way to leapfrog the incremental and delayed updates of the F-35 would be to encourage innovation through NGAD. The DoD needs to embrace with open arms a wider network of the US’s industrial brainpower and bring innovation to bear faster than ever before. They need to adopt open architecture platforms to encourage continuous competition in future upgrades rather than remain mired in forever contracts that will increase costs at the detriment of the taxpayer. Stop with the status quo of acquisitions and political “priorities”.

Instead of continuously trying to play catch-up with the F-35’s perceived advancement plans, let’s find ways to soar past it, and keep several technological generations ahead of potential enemies in Russia and China. That’s the way to an unmatched military future.

Ben Russo is Retired Lt Col. and Former strategic and operational planner within PACOM, EUCOM, and Air Mobility Command.
 
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