MMRCA 2.0 - Updates and Discussions

What is your favorite for MMRCA 2.0 ?

  • F-35 Blk 4

    Votes: 32 13.4%
  • Rafale F4

    Votes: 187 78.2%
  • Eurofighter Typhoon T3

    Votes: 4 1.7%
  • Gripen E/F

    Votes: 6 2.5%
  • F-16 B70

    Votes: 1 0.4%
  • F-18 SH

    Votes: 9 3.8%
  • F-15EX

    Votes: 9 3.8%
  • Mig-35

    Votes: 1 0.4%

  • Total voters
    239
Then what you said is the exact opposite of what the IAF should do. "A competitive tender will give them the information they need to go to the next level".
Yes, they can keep doing it for next 20 years while flying Mig -21. It's like a homeless person collecting brochures of high end villas, while sleeping on footpath !!

In advanced air forces, the air forces have requirements and they ask the scientific community on how best to fulfill the requirements. The scientific community then tell the air forces what can be done and cannot be done. But in India, the scientific community is still too young, so the IAF has to rely on foreign scientific communities for the same. But foreign scientific communities will obviously not tell you everything on their own, they need to be coerced or provoked into telling it, hence the need to put them through a competition with a large prize. The bigger the prize, the better the technologies they bring to it.
With all due respect, the above paragraph can be termed as "white noise" in communication terms. Even after the drama of MMRCA 1.0, if IAF folks still don't know what they want and need another round of competition, they should screw themselves.
Your numbers barely scratch the surface. The IAF needs 12 squadrons of SE MRFA and 12 squadrons of TE MRFA, apart from the 6 squadrons of LCA Mk1 and 7 squadrons of AMCA.
Even I need a "Buggati Chiron", but can't afford it !!
Apart from the obvious money issue, we also have the legendary "PROCESS" !! Can we take these parameters into account while guesstimating what IAF "needs" and what it can actually get??
The IAF need 24 new squadrons, not merely 3 more Rafale squadrons as you have noted. And 12-15 of those need to be contracted before 2027, apart from the 6 squadrons of LCA Mk1/A.
I mentioned 2 +3 i.e 5 sdns for Rafale which is possible to be ordered between now and 2027. Where is the money for 12- 15 sdns, when in last 6 years we could afford only 2 ??
 
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As for LCA Mk2, I don't agree with the deadline you've posted since the work required for the program is quite less. The changes required are not radical enough to need more than 3 years of flight testing. And HAL plans to bring in concurrent production in order to not waste time between flight testing and delivery to the IAF. Since the Mk2 is based on an existing design, and the electronics will also be operational before its first flight, the IAF also agrees with the assessment, which is why they abandoned the plans for a second competitive tender between Gripen E and F-16 in favour of the LCA. I don't think there will be any significant delays here.
Haven't we heard enough of these over optimistic plans in the past followed by tons of "reasons" why it couldn't be done ?? When will we learn to be practical and have some realistic expectations ??
 
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Haven't we heard enough of these over optimistic plans in the past followed by tons of "reasons" why it couldn't be done ?? When will we learn to be practical and have some realistic expectations ??
The IAF hasn't declared anything. We're just going on individual speculations here. Optimistic individual speculations at that .

My gut feeling is that the initial MMRCA -2. 0 was conceived as a back up in case the Mk-2 failed / was sub optimal / vastly delayed. Remember these were also the days of deep scepticism about the Mk1, it's stretched TL, it's sub optimal performance, etc by the top brass of the IAF. The one person who broke down the trust deficit & got ADA / HAL & IAF to work together as a team was MP. He came out with a road map for the definitive Tejas - the Mk-2 & a via media in between - the Mk-1a. He also initiated the procurement of the first batch of Rafales along with negotiating the offsets, price negotiations, etc. Modi got most of the credit here.

The MRFA tender today is to my mind more of a tussle between the MoD , RM & CDS to one side pitted against the IAF with the contention being about getting the Rafales ( assuming there's unanimity in getting the Rafales by all the concerned parties) in tranches spanning 10-15 years & getting them in one go vide the tender with the options for the tranches being preferred by the former & the option for the tender being preferred by the latter.

Again, this would be the pre Chinese virus situation. The post Chinese virus situation would see us severely cash strapped. I, personally don't see the option for the tender being exercised. The ACM of the IAF didn't make any commitment regarding the MRFA tender in his recent press briefing if you've noticed except to say that they were discussing the need for a 2nd tranche of Rafales.

One could make the argument that even in case of a tender the outgoing amount would be in tranches & not in 1 go. However, the entire tendering process , the price negotiations, the issue of setting up a plant domestically, the offset issues, etc would consume an inordinate amount of time .

In view of all these developments, I believe we'd see us exercise the option of a GtG agreement for a 2 nd tranche within a year followed by a 3rd tranche by the mid 20's till we get to the numbers that the IAF desires. The MRFA tender would be kept alive till the IOC of the Mk-2 expected by 2026-27.
 
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With all due respect, the above paragraph can be termed as "white noise" in communication terms. Even after the drama of MMRCA 1.0, if IAF folks still don't know what they want and need another round of competition, they should screw themselves.
[/QUOTE]

It's been 10 years since the last evaluations. So naturally a new one is needed. Particularly for next gen technologies coming up in the roadmap.

Even I need a "Buggati Chiron", but can't afford it !!
Apart from the obvious money issue, we also have the legendary "PROCESS" !! Can we take these parameters into account while guesstimating what IAF "needs" and what it can actually get??

Money isn't an issue, priority is. The process will bear fruit only after 2025, payments will go out mainly from 2027 or 2028, expected GDP then is at least $6T, and IAF's capital budget should at least be $12B by then at today's spending rate.

I mentioned 2 +3 i.e 5 sdns for Rafale which is possible to be ordered between now and 2027. Where is the money for 12- 15 sdns, when in last 6 years we could afford only 2 ??

Sure. And MRFA will come in only from 2027 onwards. 2021 for RFP to come out. 2023 for shortlist and L1. 2024-2025 for contract. 2027-28 for first deliveries.

These 12-15 squadrons will take a long time to deliver.

It's actually your 2+3 Rafale squadorns before 2027 that's unaffordable.
 

It's been 10 years since the last evaluations. So naturally a new one is needed. Particularly for next gen technologies coming up in the roadmap.




[/QUOTE]
Of course we need another one to dance around for another 10 years !!





Money isn't an issue, priority is. The process will bear fruit only after 2025, payments will go out mainly from 2027 or 2028, expected GDP then is at least $6T, and IAF's capital budget should at least be $12B by then at today's spending rate.



[/QUOTE]


Ok, so according to you we do not have a priority to acquire new planes while Chinnis are sitting inside our area with a 3 times bigger Air Force and we shall wait till 2028 to get the fist plane!!
Can you please pass on the shit you are smoking :ROFLMAO: ??





These 12-15 squadrons will take a long time to deliver.

It's actually your 2+3 Rafale squadorns before 2027 that's unaffordable.
[/QUOTE]



So we can't afford 5 sdns over next 7-8 years, but suddenly after that we can afford 12 sdns !! Interesting logic indeed !!
 
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The IAF hasn't declared anything. We're just going on individual speculations here. Optimistic individual speculations at that .

My gut feeling is that the initial MMRCA -2. 0 was conceived as a back up in case the Mk-2 failed / was sub optimal / vastly delayed. Remember these were also the days of deep scepticism about the Mk1, it's stretched TL, it's sub optimal performance, etc by the top brass of the IAF. The one person who broke down the trust deficit & got ADA / HAL & IAF to work together as a team was MP. He came out with a road map for the definitive Tejas - the Mk-2 & a via media in between - the Mk-1a. He also initiated the procurement of the first batch of Rafales along with negotiating the offsets, price negotiations, etc. Modi got most of the credit here.

The MRFA tender today is to my mind more of a tussle between the MoD , RM & CDS to one side pitted against the IAF with the contention being about getting the Rafales ( assuming there's unanimity in getting the Rafales by all the concerned parties) in tranches spanning 10-15 years & getting them in one go vide the tender with the options for the tranches being preferred by the former & the option for the tender being preferred by the latter.

Again, this would be the pre Chinese virus situation. The post Chinese virus situation would see us severely cash strapped. I, personally don't see the option for the tender being exercised. The ACM of the IAF didn't make any commitment regarding the MRFA tender in his recent press briefing if you've noticed except to say that they were discussing the need for a 2nd tranche of Rafales.

One could make the argument that even in case of a tender the outgoing amount would be in tranches & not in 1 go. However, the entire tendering process , the price negotiations, the issue of setting up a plant domestically, the offset issues, etc would consume an inordinate amount of time .

In view of all these developments, I believe we'd see us exercise the option of a GtG agreement for a 2 nd tranche within a year followed by a 3rd tranche by the mid 20's till we get to the numbers that the IAF desires. The MRFA tender would be kept alive till the IOC of the Mk-2 expected by 2026-27.
Another issue which comes to my mind as to why the IAF is insisting on a tender is their bad memories stretching back to the 1980's. A brief history would be in order here :

By the early 1980's , the feeling that the former SU was becoming some sort of a monopoly in terms of supplying equipments to the Indian armed forces was gaining ground. The West, particularly the US was inclined to see India as not just in the SU's camp but more as a satellite given the quantum of arms we were procuring from them. In terms of foreign policy too, it was felt that we were losing our autonomy given the mutual support we extended the SU & vice versa.

It was increasingly perceived by IG that she ought to make overtures to the West & rebalance ties now that the memories of 1971 were behind us. Around this time we signed the contract for delivery of 40 Mirages with an option to go in for more. This was as much s response to PAF's procurement of the F-16 as India seeking not to put all its eggs in 1 basket.

France being a non NATO member saw India's attempts at autonomy with more sympathy as opposed to GB & the US which sort of made us natural allies. In President Mitterand both IG & after her RG found the perfect partner as he was a socialist & moreover apart from the soft spot that socialist leaders from western nations had for 3rd world nations , Mitterand had also developed a personal rapport with the latter two. Of course this was preceded by the Jaguar deal for which we killed further iterations of the Marut in the early to mid 70's . Although the deal was negotiated by IG, it was inked by the Morarji Desai government if I'm not mistaken.

2 events in the early 80's prompted a change in our foreign policy & consequently our defence procurement too. In 1979 , the SU invaded Afghanistan. This consolidated Pakistan's status as a front line state in the war against communism. It also consolidated Zia ul Haq's military regime which otherwise was given the short shrift by the US & it's allies especially after Bhutto's hanging. As usual Pakistan used this opportunity to shop for arms to put it in an advantageous position vis a vis India. This is when the F-16s were procured. IG made a visit to the US with a few specific aims - to get the US to withdraw supplies of the F-16 to Pakistan, to explore opportunities to get a similar deal in case the deal to Pakistan wasn't withdrawn & to seek technical assistance for India's fledging LCA program. Of the 3 , only the last deal was fruitful , that too partially & much later although a few of out scientists began their training in RG's tenure.

Incidentally, both India & Pakistan were offered the Northrop F-20 Tiger shark which was specifically developed under a state dpt program to supply these aircrafts to non NATO allies which saw development during Prez Carter's administration though initially it was in competition with the F-16 to fill in the slot for a light combat aircraft within the USAF. In fact India was offered full ToT & indigenous manufacturing of the aircraft & the engine too IIRC. Both Pakistan & India rejected the offer as the latter didn't see any merit in going in for a fighter the USAF had rejected. Whether this was a blunder & the F-20 genuinely didn't meet IAF's requirements is unknown. Perhaps @vstol Jockey can shed more light on it.

In the meanwhile, all these activities by IG was viewed with great alarm by the SU who not only shoved the MiG-29 at very good terms down the IAF's throat but also arm twisted IG into accepting it. IIRC, the IAF planned to get some 80+ Mirages in tranches of which 40 had been procured. IAF eventually capped the numbers of Mirages at some 50+ .

Cut to 1999 & the Mirages awesome performance enthused the IAF to seek more such aircrafts. The initial understanding was to get some 80-100 of them under a GtG agreement with France but George Fernandes chickened out largely due to Jaya Jaitley - his companion being caught in a sting operation exposing corruption in defense procurements by Tehelka magazine. He advised the IAF to come up with a tender. This set into motion the great MMRCA tender. The rest is too well known to bear narration here.

In all this, the IAF was justified in feeling short changed. What was to have been an 80-100 fighter aircraft requirement in the early 80's from a non SU OEM underwent so many twists & turns through 4+ decades that their insistence on a MRFA tender could be their way of securing a fool proof commitment from the GoI to avoid against the Vagaries of a change in government, fickle foreign policy adjustments resulting in changes in defense procurements , etc thus upsetting long term plans of the IAF.
 
Haven't we heard enough of these over optimistic plans in the past followed by tons of "reasons" why it couldn't be done ?? When will we learn to be practical and have some realistic expectations ??

Nothing overoptimistic about LCA Mk2 or AMCA. They are both rather reasonable.
 
Another issue which comes to my mind as to why the IAF is insisting on a tender is their bad memories stretching back to the 1980's. A brief history would be in order here :

By the early 1980's , the feeling that the former SU was becoming some sort of a monopoly in terms of supplying equipments to the Indian armed forces was gaining ground. The West, particularly the US was inclined to see India as not just in the SU's camp but more as a satellite given the quantum of arms we were procuring from them. In terms of foreign policy too, it was felt that we were losing our autonomy given the mutual support we extended the SU & vice versa.

It was increasingly perceived by IG that she ought to make overtures to the West & rebalance ties now that the memories of 1971 were behind us. Around this time we signed the contract for delivery of 40 Mirages with an option to go in for more. This was as much s response to PAF's procurement of the F-16 as India seeking not to put all its eggs in 1 basket.

France being a non NATO member saw India's attempts at autonomy with more sympathy as opposed to GB & the US which sort of made us natural allies. In President Mitterand both IG & after her RG found the perfect partner as he was a socialist & moreover apart from the soft spot that socialist leaders from western nations had for 3rd world nations , Mitterand had also developed a personal rapport with the latter two. Of course this was preceded by the Jaguar deal for which we killed further iterations of the Marut in the early to mid 70's . Although the deal was negotiated by IG, it was inked by the Morarji Desai government if I'm not mistaken.

2 events in the early 80's prompted a change in our foreign policy & consequently our defence procurement too. In 1979 , the SU invaded Afghanistan. This consolidated Pakistan's status as a front line state in the war against communism. It also consolidated Zia ul Haq's military regime which otherwise was given the short shrift by the US & it's allies especially after Bhutto's hanging. As usual Pakistan used this opportunity to shop for arms to put it in an advantageous position vis a vis India. This is when the F-16s were procured. IG made a visit to the US with a few specific aims - to get the US to withdraw supplies of the F-16 to Pakistan, to explore opportunities to get a similar deal in case the deal to Pakistan wasn't withdrawn & to seek technical assistance for India's fledging LCA program. Of the 3 , only the last deal was fruitful , that too partially & much later although a few of out scientists began their training in RG's tenure.

Incidentally, both India & Pakistan were offered the Northrop F-20 Tiger shark which was specifically developed under a state dpt program to supply these aircrafts to non NATO allies which saw development during Prez Carter's administration though initially it was in competition with the F-16 to fill in the slot for a light combat aircraft within the USAF. In fact India was offered full ToT & indigenous manufacturing of the aircraft & the engine too IIRC. Both Pakistan & India rejected the offer as the latter didn't see any merit in going in for a fighter the USAF had rejected. Whether this was a blunder & the F-20 genuinely didn't meet IAF's requirements is unknown. Perhaps @vstol Jockey can shed more light on it.

In the meanwhile, all these activities by IG was viewed with great alarm by the SU who not only shoved the MiG-29 at very good terms down the IAF's throat but also arm twisted IG into accepting it. IIRC, the IAF planned to get some 80+ Mirages in tranches of which 40 had been procured. IAF eventually capped the numbers of Mirages at some 50+ .

Cut to 1999 & the Mirages awesome performance enthused the IAF to seek more such aircrafts. The initial understanding was to get some 80-100 of them under a GtG agreement with France but George Fernandes chickened out largely due to Jaya Jaitley - his companion being caught in a sting operation exposing corruption in defense procurements by Tehelka magazine. He advised the IAF to come up with a tender. This set into motion the great MMRCA tender. The rest is too well known to bear narration here.

In all this, the IAF was justified in feeling short changed. What was to have been an 80-100 fighter aircraft requirement in the early 80's from a non SU OEM underwent so many twists & turns through 4+ decades that their insistence on a MRFA tender could be their way of securing a fool proof commitment from the GoI to avoid against the Vagaries of a change in government, fickle foreign policy adjustments resulting in changes in defense procurements , etc thus upsetting long term plans of the IAF.
There is no denying the fact that SU did try to undercut the M2K deal. But the real culprit in this case was Politics and especially Ex PM VP Singh. The deal for A320 and M2k was signed when RG was our PM. he was an accomplished pilot and knew the merits of these aircraft. In 1990, one A320 crashed in BLR due to pilot error as those monkies did not not understand the automation part of the aircraft. That resulted in grounding of entire A320 fleet in the service of then IA. AND that put paid to the additional M2Ks from France as all deals done by RG with France came under investigation including Bofors deal. As the past now tells us, we lost out due to politics as all three decisions were best decisions for our nation which were changed due to VP Singh.
 
There is no denying the fact that SU did try to undercut the M2K deal. But the real culprit in this case was Politics and especially Ex PM VP Singh. The deal for A320 and M2k was signed when RG was our PM. he was an accomplished pilot and knew the merits of these aircraft. In 1990, one A320 crashed in BLR due to pilot error as those monkies did not not understand the automation part of the aircraft. That resulted in grounding of entire A320 fleet in the service of then IA. AND that put paid to the additional M2Ks from France as all deals done by RG with France came under investigation including Bofors deal. As the past now tells us, we lost out due to politics as all three decisions were best decisions for our nation which were changed due to VP Singh.

The Real Damage done to All our 3 services was UPA's TEN years

Atleast Some damage has been undone and rectified by Modi ever since

If China had started its present aggressive policy in 2015 , we would have simply surrendered
 
Ok, so according to you we do not have a priority to acquire new planes while Chinnis are sitting inside our area with a 3 times bigger Air Force and we shall wait till 2028 to get the fist plane!!Can you please pass on the shit you are smoking :ROFLMAO: ??

It's not to the point where everything has to be thrown aside. For example, adding 2 more Rafale squadrons to the kitty can do the trick, other than that the procurement of jets should continue as is. But what we really need are SAMs, and they are all already contracted and are coming in as we speak.

So we can't afford 5 sdns over next 7-8 years, but suddenly after that we can afford 12 sdns !! Interesting logic indeed !!

5 squadrons over 7 years or 12 squadrons after 7 years (2027) all the way to the next 10 years (2042). The latter is naturally more realistic.

Right now all we can afford over the next 7 years are the 83 new LCAs, a squadron or two of older jets and hopefully 2 more squadrons of Rafale. It's only after these 7 years that MRFA and LCA Mk2 will start coming in.

With the PAF failing to modernise and PLAAF severely restricted due to the geography, modernising the army and navy is far more important. Once we get some LCAs, 2 more squadrons of Rafale, MKI MLU (with Derby ER for the entire MKI fleet) and Jaguar MLU, we will be in a very comfortable position even with just 32 squadrons. What we need then are the SAMs. With IAF having already contracted 5 regiments of S-400, 14 batteries of Akash and 18 batteries of MRSAM, we will be very comfortable once they are all in service. What's really missing right now are new submarines for the navy and armoured vehicles, infantry modernisation and artillery for the army, which are actually more pressing needs than the MRFA and LCA Mk2.
 
There is no denying the fact that SU did try to undercut the M2K deal. But the real culprit in this case was Politics and especially Ex PM VP Singh. The deal for A320 and M2k was signed when RG was our PM. he was an accomplished pilot and knew the merits of these aircraft. In 1990, one A320 crashed in BLR due to pilot error as those monkies did not not understand the automation part of the aircraft. That resulted in grounding of entire A320 fleet in the service of then IA. AND that put paid to the additional M2Ks from France as all deals done by RG with France came under investigation including Bofors deal. As the past now tells us, we lost out due to politics as all three decisions were best decisions for our nation which were changed due to VP Singh.
The Bofors connection & the PVNR government hesitating seems more plausible since VPS was out of power in 1990 , the Airbus crash notwithstanding. In fact that's one of the reasons St Anthony was so hesitant to go in for big ticket procurements was the entire defense ecosystem was infested by middle men. He didn't know whom to trust, knowing that one false move & he'd be in the dock facing prosecution with the Gandhis paying lip sympathy. While he did save his backside the entire procurement plan for all the 3 services went for a toss.
 
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Tenders go back to the independence era. It's not new. It definitely didn't start after Vajpayee came to power.

As for M2000, we ordered 40 and a 110 jet deal was to follow on for license production. The SU scuttled the M2000 deal for 80 Mig-29s instead. And at least that should have followed production of Mig-29, but SU died and that failed. Then MKI program was started. In the meantime, the choice was between MKI and M2000, but the MKIs at just $22M per jet came in cheaper. Plus the air superiority jocks won over the multirole jocks internally. All sorts of new technologies, like PESA radar, advanced IRST and RVV-AE were introduced, along with heavy customisation, which helped the MKI's case against the M2000, so the M2000 requirement was pushed to a later date. Then the Kargil War happened, and M2000 requirement came up again and the govt pursued it. The IAF pointed out the LCC cost of M2000 would make it cheaper than MKI, so they added LCC for MRCA tender and RFIs were sent out (M2000, Gripen C and F-16) in 2001. Then MRCA tender never happened 'cause the govt changed, so it was replaced with MMRCA immediately after UPA came to power.
 
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Tenders go back to the independence era. It's not new. It definitely didn't start after Vajpayee came to power.

As for M2000, we ordered 40 and a 110 jet deal was to follow on for license production. The SU scuttled the M2000 deal for 80 Mig-29s instead. And at least that should have followed production of Mig-29, but SU died and that failed. Then MKI program was started. In the meantime, the choice was between MKI and M2000, but the MKIs at just $22M per jet came in cheaper. Plus the air superiority jocks won over the multirole jocks internally. All sorts of new technologies, like PESA radar, advanced IRST and RVV-AE were introduced, along with heavy customisation, which helped the MKI's case against the M2000, so the M2000 requirement was pushed to a later date. Then the Kargil War happened, and M2000 requirement came up again and the govt pursued it. The IAF pointed out the LCC cost of M2000 would make it cheaper than MKI, so they added LCC for MRCA tender and RFIs were sent out (M2000, Gripen C and F-16) in 2001. Then MRCA tender never happened 'cause the govt changed, so it was replaced with MMRCA immediately after UPA came to power.
So MMRCA2 will not come in to picture if NDA failed to come as victorious in 2024? I think Present political scenario & economic conditions may bring difficult time for this government.
 
The Real Damage done to All our 3 services was UPA's TEN years

Atleast Some damage has been undone and rectified by Modi ever since

If China had started its present aggressive policy in 2015 , we would have simply surrendered
In 1990, we had to also put our gold under mortgage. I hope you remember that. India had no money to buy additonal M2K. Thanks to the complete ruining of our economy by VP Singh and Chandrasekhar after that. In May 1991, RG got assasinated. That killed every chance of getting additional M2ks. BJP that time created a campaign about corruption and PVNR govt was dependent on BJP support to survive. So once again the deal was killed. The financial damages which then IA suffered due to grounding of A320 fleet has not been made up till date. That is why AI+IA were merged to form NACIL. Do you guys know that today NACIL is one of the biggest state run airline with largest fleet of Airbus aircraft?
After PVNR, we had Deve Gowda and Gujral as our PM. They did what has not been done even by Chacha Rangila. They sold the nation.
In 1998, we had BJP forming that 13 month govt followed by Kargil and later Kandhar including attack on Indian Parliament and Op Prakaram.
All this while IAF was shouting about more aircraft but no one listened. Finally, BJP started the process to get additional M2K but then DA played a game and offered Rafale. After that the story is known to all.

The Bofors connection & the PVNR government hesitating seems more plausible since VPS was out of power in 1990 , the Airbus crash notwithstanding. In fact that's one of the reasons St Anthony was so hesitant to go in for big ticket procurements was the entire defense ecosystem was infested by middle men. He didn't know whom to trust, knowing that one false move & he'd be in the dock facing prosecution with the Gandhis paying lip sympathy. While he did save his backside the entire procurement plan for all the 3 services went for a toss.
Antony was the worst of them all. He felt he might become PM of India the day MMS got hospitalised for open heart surgery and he was made the temporary PM. He had blessings of Italian waitress Antonio Maino. Once again, we had all our national security goals derailed for want of bribes. The truth remains that both, DA and EFT, offered bribes. On the date of tender being opened, EFT had advantage as it needed lesser ISE as it had IRST, two way data link for Meteor already but lacked AESA. DA stole a march over EFT by putting an AESA on Rafale while EFT is still without it and all the promises they made have turned out to be false as on date.
My own estimation of Rafale is that it is a non stealth aircraft with superior passive targeting capabilities than a stealth aircraft. A STEALTH AIRCRAFT MUST HAVE VERY GOOD PASSIVE TARGETING CAPABILITY. Maybe a merge of Rafale with F-35/F22 will create a true 6th Gen fighter. OR MSA + RAFALE.
 
In 1990, we had to also put our gold under mortgage. I hope you remember that. India had no money to buy additonal M2K. Thanks to the complete ruining of our economy by VP Singh and Chandrasekhar after that. In May 1991, RG got assasinated. That killed every chance of getting additional M2ks. BJP that time created a campaign about corruption and PVNR govt was dependent on BJP support to survive. So once again the deal was killed. The financial damages which then IA suffered due to grounding of A320 fleet has not been made up till date. That is why AI+IA were merged to form NACIL. Do you guys know that today NACIL is one of the biggest state run airline with largest fleet of Airbus aircraft?
After PVNR, we had Deve Gowda and Gujral as our PM. They did what has not been done even by Chacha Rangila. They sold the nation.
In 1998, we had BJP forming that 13 month govt followed by Kargil and later Kandhar including attack on Indian Parliament and Op Prakaram.
All this while IAF was shouting about more aircraft but no one listened. Finally, BJP started the process to get additional M2K but then DA played a game and offered Rafale. After that the story is known to all.


Antony was the worst of them all. He felt he might become PM of India the day MMS got hospitalised for open heart surgery and he was made the temporary PM. He had blessings of Italian waitress Antonio Maino. Once again, we had all our national security goals derailed for want of bribes. The truth remains that both, DA and EFT, offered bribes. On the date of tender being opened, EFT had advantage as it needed lesser ISE as it had IRST, two way data link for Meteor already but lacked AESA. DA stole a march over EFT by putting an AESA on Rafale while EFT is still without it and all the promises they made have turned out to be false as on date.
My own estimation of Rafale is that it is a non stealth aircraft with superior passive targeting capabilities than a stealth aircraft. A STEALTH AIRCRAFT MUST HAVE VERY GOOD PASSIVE TARGETING CAPABILITY. Maybe a merge of Rafale with F-35/F22 will create a true 6th Gen fighter. OR MSA + RAFALE.
I will differ with you in two. Points
1) V K Krishna menon is the worst DM ever india produced. Antony comes only second to him.
2) I am from, so i know him befor he enters in to national politics. That useless proves his worthless in kerala politics and shifted to center. I dont think that he aspires for PM chair, what he concerned & care most his image of non corrupted. Yeas, he is one of the non corrupted (technically )politician left out in indian politics. But irony is that he achieved that title by not doing any thing meaningful. Just like a ship achieving 100% safety history without going out of harbour.
 
It was 9 years ago!

Rafale in Combat: “War for Dummies”
(Source: defense-aerospace.com; posted May 31, 2011)

RAFALETOWN, Corsica --- French air force Rafale combat aircraft deployed here as part of the UN-sanctioned Libyan No-Fly Zone are for the first time making full use of the aircraft’s “omnirole” capabilities, which allow a single aircraft to carry out the full gamut of missions during a single sortie.

Pilots of the eight-ship Rafale detachment based here at Solenzara air base in Corsica, and provisionally dubbed “Rafaletown,” routinely take off with four MICA air-to-air missiles, three or six AASM Hammer precision-guided bombs, a Thales Damoclès laser targeting pod or a Reco NG reconnaissance pod and two drop tanks. They can be tasked or re-tasked in flight, and routinely are, to fly combat air patrol, precision strike or reconnaissance missions during the same six- or seven-hour sortie.

The AASM, or Armement Air-Sol Modulaire which carries the NATO designation SBU-38, is a precision-guided bomb developed by Sagem, and exists in two versions, with inertial/GPS or inertial/GPS/infrared imaging guidance. A laser-guided version is being developed.

“Rafale was involved in Libya from Day One, and we fly several missions during a single sortie,” says detachment commander Lt. Col. Pierre G., stressing that “Omnirole Rafale” is not simply an advertising slogan but an accurate description of the aircraft’s very real capabilities. “Over Libya, the Rafale flies all kinds of missions, carrying out strike assignments and reconnaissance with the Reco NG pod while conducting our main mission, which is combat air patrol. Pierre G. and other Rafale pilots spoke to reporters during a two-day tour organized by the French defense procurement agency, DGA, and the companies involved in the Rafale program. Because of operational security, pilots are referred to by their first name, or not identified at all.

Pilots say the Rafale’s networked sensors and systems make their job much easier and much more effective than with previous-generation fighters. “Two Rafales carry as much ordnance as two Mirage 2000-5 and four Mirage 2000D combined,” notes Pierre G., adding that their sensor capabilities “are much greater even than that.”

The Rafales work in a truly networked environment, and are fed targeting and other tactical data from a wide range of coalition sources through the Link 16 datalink. Incoming data is combined with that collected by the aircraft’s own sensors – Thales SPECTRA self-protection suite, OSF electro-optics, RBE-2 radar and even the infra-red guided version of MBDA’s MICA air-to-air missile which, as it scans continuously, can provide IR imagery to the central data processing system. “MICA is not just a missile, it’s an extra sensor as well,” says Pierre G., and its detection range is much longer than generally supposed.

Data from all on-board and off-board sensors are combined into a single tactical picture presented to the pilot on the cockpit’s central color display or, if desired, on one of the lateral displays. The pilot can select the data he wants, combine it with other data, and pass it on to his wingman or to other allied aircraft, ships or ground troops through the Link 16, without speaking a single word on the radio and, if not using the radar, without any transmission whatsoever. Link 16 can also be used to de-conflict assignments with other aircraft without using radios.

To illustrate the Rafale’s networking capabilities, one pilot described how the aircraft can receive target coordinates from an AWACS or another aircraft via Link 16. To accept the assignment, the pilot pushes a button, and the coordinates are automatically programmed into the AASM guided bombs, with no further action by the pilot who, once in range (up to 30 nautical miles), again pushes a single button to launch all three – or all six – AASMs to their individual targets. “We can fire the AASM against targets abeam or behind us, and can hit up to six in a single pass,” the pilot continues.

At Solenzara, reporters were shown video footage taken during a ground attack mission in Libya, in which three tanks said to be firing against civilian targets were destroyed by simultaneous direct hits by AASM.

RafalesSolenzara.jpg

To avoid overloading the pilot, the aircraft’s central computer prioritizes targets according to the threat they represent, and there are also modes to de-clutter the radar scope. The pilot can also decide to concentrate on a given aspect of the mission, and come back to others aspects.
In a similar vein, the system analyzes and combines tactical information received from all sensors; for example, “if you receive a track from an AWACS, from your SPECTRA self-protection suite, or from your ‘wingee’ at the same time, the system will analyze all the inputs and show you only one track.”

Another pilot simply says that “the Rafale’s man-machine interface is so good it’s like ‘war for dummies’.”

Rafale pilots are also very complementary about their SPECTRA self-protection suite, which is of critical importance as France does not have any aircraft dedicated to the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions. “SPECTRA allowed us to begin operations over Libya the very same day the political decision was taken, and to fly deep into Libyan territory without an escort,” says one pilot, adding that “the Americans also flew in, but only after they had fired 119 Tomahawks to take out Libyan air defenses.”

Rafale’s capabilities are changing the way the French air force operates. Previously, distinct pilot “communities” developed around each of the main missions flown – air defense, ground attack, strike, etc. – and lived more or less independently of each other. With the Rafale, however, this phenomenon is fading away since any unit, any aircraft and any pilot fly air-defense, strike or ground attack missions, as required. Specialization will disappear, several officers said, to be replaced by fewer but far more flexible aircraft and pilots.

“The idea that a single aircraft can be re-tasked in flight from reconnaissance to strike to interception during the same sortie is truly revolutionary, and we’re just now beginning to understand all that this implies,” says one officer.

This flexibility also translates into a major advantage for operational management, because any available Rafale can be tasked for any mission, without needing, as in the past, for a given aircraft-weapon combination to be available.

Missions from Solenzara are flown in two waves each day, one in daytime and the other at night, and the Rafales fire GPS-guided AASMs or laser-guided GBU-12 bombs on almost every mission. One Rafale also fired two Scalp cruise missiles, but so far the detachment has not fired the 30mm cannon as the minimum altitude mandated by the air staff is too high to use guns to good effect. Transit to Libya is flown at 50% power setting, which translates to Mach 0.9 cruise speed even with six AASM bombs and two large underwing drop tanks.

The detachment deployed at Solenzara comprises eight Rafales – a mix of single- and two-seaters – and three Mirage F-1CR dedicated reconnaissance aircraft, with 20 aircrew and supported by about 100 ground staff, 70% of them for Rafale, and 30 people to operate the intelligence detachment. Since Operation Harmattan (the French designation for enforcing the Libya No-Fly Zone) began on March 19, the detachment has flown 2,200 flight hours with over 1,500 in-flight refuellings, initially from their main operating base at Saint Dizier, in north-eastern France, and subsequently from Solenzara.

Aircraft turn-around, even with live weapons on board, requires only 90 minutes and an engine change requires one hour, although none have been changed during current operations.

Because of the time wasted flying from Solenzara to Libya, France is negotiating to transfer its Rafale detachment to Sigonella air base, in Sicily, which is much closer to the combat area. For the same reason, French air force Mirages have already been redeployed to Crete.

Maintenance requirements of the Rafale are about 25% lower than for the Mirage 2000, and there is no scheduled or preventive maintenance; maintenance depends only on the type of mission flown, and on the condition of components. Pilots at Solenzara say that, in just over two months of operations, no missions were aborted because of aircraft unavailability, and detachment commander Lt. Col. Pierre G. says that the availability rate is close to 100%.

Pilots interviewed for this story clearly love their aircraft. In addition to the electronics, they praise the comfort of their seat and its semi-reclined position, the effectiveness of the cockpit air conditioning (“I’ve never seen any condensation,” says one pilot) and the ease of adapting to the side-stick controller which, on Rafale, replaces the conventional central control stick. These are not necessarily major aspects, notes one pilot, “but after a few days of high-intensity combat, a Rafale pilot will be in much better shape than one flying another aircraft.”
 
It was 7 years ago!

Shooting Down an Aggressor on My Six! Vive la différence!

Transparency: This seems to me the best word to define a week of assessments of Rafale, Dassault’s Omnirole fighter that is now the principal, and soon to be the only, vector of the first line of the Armée de l'Air and Marine Nationale, France´s Air Force and Navy. Abroad, this multirole, or "Omnirole" aircraft as the company prefers to call it, is among the clear favorites in F-X competitions on three continents. Dassault allowed us to test Rafale’s capabilities in detail, all recorded and analyzed with the support of telemetry during all missions. Well, at least nearly all. In fact, we were repeatedly "invisible," letting Rafale fly itself in Terrain Following Mode at more than 450kt (835km/h) below 300 feet altitude (90 meters high) between the mountains outside of Istres, and moving out over the Mediterranean within 30 meters of the water´s surface.

7 for 1

A fighter proven in three recent operations - Afghanistan, Libya and Mali, the Rafale needs no introduction. Several articles and publications describe the models and specifications of the French fighter. We do not intend to write about what you proba-bly already know. It is worth noting, though, that both single-seat and dual-seat air-craft retain the same dimensions and the same percentage of composites on their surface exposed to detection, at 70%. Here, we focus on testing the actual capabili-ties of the airplane that we tested, the Dassault Rafale, in configuration F3-04T. It incorporates the new radar, RBE2, AESA, and MWS (warning of approaching mis-siles,) and FSO, (suite of optical sensors). These improvements, implemented ahead of schedule by the program, helped convince us of the maturation and evolution of the Rafale.

Our evaluations follow from the planning of the mission: a separate chapter for its practicality and versatility, to the digital debriefing, confirmed by telemetry. This helped us to understand the reason for the profound impact that the introduction of the Rafale has had. Dassault´s fighter has changed operational reality and its reflec-tion in the chain of C4ISTR (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelli-gence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance - of the French Armed Forces). See details of our visit to French Air Base 113 - Commandant Antoine de Saint-Exupéry in Saint Dizier, in Part 2 of this review.

The deployment of Dassault´s Rafale was rolled out in spite of the harsh reality of global budget reductions, but with surprising results: A decreased total number of fighter, reconnaissance, and attack aircraft, but with an increase in mission capacity and availability, with a considerable increase in efficiency. In all, seven different air-craft models with specific missions had their designations absorbed in the Rafale. To give you a better idea, consider the savings after the last remaining aircrafts are fully replaced, with a drastic rationalization of human and financial resources, in reason of the standardization of equipment and crews. If we also consider that the very initial conversion of pilots occurring in the same structure (Escadron de Transformation Rafale 02.092 Aquitaine) for both the Air Force and the Navy, we have an idea of just how game changing the decision was in the selection of this “Omnirole” fighter. But after all, what does this term mean in practice?

"Omni" - Dissecting a concept

Could the use of the Latin prefix "Omni", meaning "All” or “Every” be justified beyond an expression of effect, designed by the marketing department? Could Rafale truly be called "Omnirole", hence all-function, instead of the usual "Multirole" for multi-function? It could for me, after this evaluation, and even having assessed other first line fighters that incorporate similar capabilities. I understand that, in addition to the commercial appeals, Dassault wanted to emphasize the practicality and ease of switch, reset and run a wide range of missions on constantly changing scenarios, even during a single flight. The Rafale is what we might call "totally ergonomic,” since Dassault, following the very DNA of the company, builds the aircraft around the pilot as the key element. The aircraft is drawn from the fingertips of those who command it. Obviously in just one week, I am far from an expert on the Rafale, but with the brief intensive instruction I received, I operated it with extreme ease.

To test this capability, with a complex combination of weapons, Rafale fulfilled vari-ous types of missions in a single sortie, performing a flight to simulate the operations run by the French Air Force and Navy in Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali, but in a theater of operations against “stronger hostile forces, and even more prepared.” The set of missions incorporated maritime attacks using the AM39 Exocet, with penetration at very low altitude, AASM attack (Armement Air-Sol Modulaire) on multiple simultaneous targets. Rapidly changing from planned targets to reassigned objectives, both at altitude and in low-level bombing including POP attack. Air superiority with BVR (beyond visual range)engagements and Dogfights at short range, finishing by strafing targets of opportunity with the Nexter 30M 791 cannon with 30mm shells.

Ride along with us in the cockpit of the Rafale, in Part 3 of this test flight, and see videos of our missions on DNTV.

Data Fusion

PCWRITE.
This combination of "letters" appears in the lower left corner of the HLD - Head Level Display, giving a real-time and instant confirmation of which sensors are signaling at that moment. Each letter representing either the RBE2 AESA radar, the Infrared / Laser / TV Front-Sector Optronics (FSO), the internal system of electronic warfare SPECTRA EW, IFF (identification friend-or-foe), are merged into a unified and clear visual symbolism directly on the SA display (situational awareness), and that means keeping the pilot in the situational loop. Rarely (not witnessed at any time during our evaluations) would the pilot ever be unaware of the environment within the 360º “bubble” surrounding the aircraft.

The heart of this data fusion is the MDPU - Processing Unit Data Modules that com-prises 19 LRUs (flight-line replaceable units), each providing a processing capacity up to 50 times greater than the previous generation of fighters. Translation: The pilot has a reduced workload, which enables him to act like a real tactical decision maker, rather than a mere sensor operator.

The key point of this data fusion is to overcome the limitations of any one particular sensor. For example, if it relies on waveforms, frequency, or infrared imaging, and the angle, distance, altitude, weather conditions or even a malfunction pose a limita-tion; other components supplement the formation of the big picture, situationally. The MDPU collects consolidated data from different sources based on various technologies, complementing, organizing and providing information through symbolism refined, reliable and unified.

RBE2 AESA and FSO

The fact that Dassault holds an equity stake in the Thales Group was instrumental in the development of the RBE2AESA - Active Electronically Scanned Radar, for the Rafale, with the speed and autonomy necessary for the viability of the French fighter program. This type of radar, whose transmitter and receiver are composed of numerous independent modules, allows detection in all-aspects: look-down and look-up, and tracking of multiple air targets, even outside the search area, in all weather conditions and even in an environment of interference and electronic countermeasures.

In addition to its clear advantage in air combat and vital and indispensable features in terms of today’s air superiority, the AESA radar provides privileged tactical situational planning, in both ground and maritime attack missions. During our simulated scenarios (Part 3) we employed the RBE2 EASA for real-time generation of three-dimensional maps for Terrain Following Flight mode, and for the capture of high resolution 2D maps for detection and identification of enemies in different environments, both urban and rural, and for designation and tracking of multiple targets on land and at sea.

Among other sensors, the combination of AESA radar with FSO - Front Sector Optronics, embedded in the nose, at the factory - developed by Thales and Sagem for the Rafale - made me feel very comfortable, especially for attesting that the rules of engagement could be easily followed, in terms of friend or foe clear ID. I was al-ways confident in identifying targets to be attacked in the air, on the ground or at sea, thanks to the automatic search and tracking integrated multi-sensor suite. Besides enabling us to execute the mission accurately, Rafale also gave us the ability to document, record, and evaluate, as a Recon.

METEOR and MICA

The MBDA MICA missile (Missile d'interception et de combat aérien) is now the main air-to-air armament of the Rafale - multi-target, all weather, and fire-and-forget. Ex-tremely agile, thanks to TVC - thrust vector control, and its small size, unusual com-pared to similar missiles of short and medium range, MICA has demonstrated its ef-fectiveness from approximately 500 meters to 60 kilometers. IR versions (imaging infra-red homing seeker), and RF (active homing radar seeker), are both equipped with filters that reduce the effectiveness of countermeasures such as flares and chaff. The MBDA MICA is also able to lock-on after launch (LOAL), which means in practice that it will "permit" shooting out of sensor range missile, effecting the acquisition and lock on target after launch, and even a new target designation via aircraft-missile link.

As mentioned before Rafale Data fusion can use visual information from MICA IR infrared seeker, processing and merging data, acting as an extra sensor, while aboard the aircraft rails.

During our assessments, we performed BVR and WVR engagements with the Mirage 2000 C RDI (analyzed in more detail in Part 3 of this test), where we had the opportunity to confirm the combination of the sensibility of SPECTRA EW with the all-aspect launching and target acquisition of MICA IR. This allowed us to designate the target from any source (EM / IR / Laser Threat Detection - Electromagnetic Threat Detection / Infrared / Laser), when the security bubble around the Rafale was invad-ed, and to execute the missile launch “over the shoulder.” Over the shoulder means that a MICA can be fired at a target located at position six o’clock (behind the aircraft) without changing flight direction.

We have been awarded the privilege of accompanying the latest stage of develop-ment of the next air-to-air long range missile to be employed by the Rafale, the MBDA METEOR. The Meteor is driven by a ramjet, a jet engine that has no moving parts, simple and small, but with great speed, at more than Mach 4, and lethal at more than 100 km. We had access to simulator program integration, where the be-havior of the new weapons were tested in conjunction with RBE2 AESA radar and other sensors that comprise the suite of data fusion of Rafale and which guarantees a precise target acquisition and lock. We had the honor of performing some METE-OR launches, which were recorded and added to the database of the program devel-opment program and integration.

Peace of Mind at 900km/h, 20 meters from the ground and surrounded by bad guys

Pilot safety is safeguarded by various systems of the Rafale. Starting with the seat, a tilt of 29º distributes the gravitational effect, preventing G-Loc, even at 9Gs that Dassault’s fighter can pull without surpass the operational load factors parameters, in air-to-air mode. The GPW - Ground Proximity Warning, alerts by audible and visual signals, to avoid colliding with the ground when the attitude and altitude of flight correspond to an approach to the surface. If needed, a pre-programmed recovery system can be accessed by the pilot, and in the case of spatial disorientation, there is an "anti-spin” feature even though the Rafale has not shown any tendency to spin, even in the corners of the envelope. Nevertheless, once anti-spin switch is activated, the flight computers redirect the aircraft to a safe flight regime with wings leveled, 5 degrees of climb, and 350 kts. In the absence of reaction by the pilot, GPW will also automatically initiate a maneuver leading back to the leveling of the airplane’s wings and a positive attitude to climb.

If Rafale safety features prevents CFIT events (controlled flight into terrain), it is ex-actly on the low flight (close to the ground - hilly or flat - or water) that the fighter shows one of its greatest strengths. With a unique capability and clever use of what I call "guerrilla stealth," Terrain Following mode is much more than an aid to agile piloting at very low altitude. It acts as an extra pilot in the cockpit, since the security I felt in the fidelity of the system - which combines the redundancy of AESA radar and the digital database, leave us entirely focused on the tactical objective of the mission: namely, to deliver the "package" in the right place at the right time... and yet, track airborne targets and threats during the raid. (More in Part 2 and 3).

In addition to these piloting protections regarding the safe operation of a high perfor-mance aircraft, the Rafale gives us the feeling of flying in a shielded bubble. The SPECTRA suite of internal Electronic Warfare, developed by Thales and MBDA in-corporates situational awareness features and warning to a large range of different spectral hazards. More than ‘merely’ protection, it puts the pilot out ahead of threats with the benefit of the needed time to make the best decision. SPECTRA also inte-grates the Data Fusion of the Rafale, and allows the locking on to a threat, so in turnabout, the threat becomes the target. See the examples in engagements with the Mirage 2000 C RDI in Part 3.

A Dainty Beast

The thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading of the Rafale allows this "beast" to carry a payload of up to 140% of its own weight. This means more than 24 tons of maximum takeoff weight. When referring to the robustness of Dassault’s aircraft, the figures are practical, real, direct and... unpublished! In Istres, France, we witnessed the deployment of two new stations-hard points-under the wings, with no need of any structural reinforcement. Details to come in the following parts of this assessment.

All this "brutishness" did not detract from Rafale´s performance, verve, and flair, since its agility, acceleration, and flexibility of speed inside the envelope confirm a successful aerodynamic model. Monsieur Marcel Dassault preached that "for an aircraft to fly well, it must be beautiful." In this case, passions and preferences aside, the Rafale is a beautiful aircraft. However, leaving aside the cult of the beautiful, native to the land of Exupéry and Clostermann, and returning to cold numbers, you can see from inside the cockpit a little demonstration of Rafale’s handling characteristics. There is demonstrated on video telemetry, attached to this Part (see on DNTV - link - DefesaNet - DNTV - RAFALE - Manobras em Baixa Velocidade), the fighter entering the loop at low speed, starting at 190 kts., dropping to 128 kts., at the top, and spanning only 2,300 feet. Follow the indications of speed and altitude to the left and to the right upper corners of the HUD projection. Readers can draw their own conclusions.

We hope we have piqued your interest enough to continue reading the following parts of this public version of our week of testing. Oh, one more thing: the impressive short landing feature of the Rafale. Even on those days with gusty winds, and which demanded my full attention, Rafale landed safely in less than 650 meters, with 510 kg of fuel remaining, two MICAs and a supersonic external belly tank - still a heavy load in high wind. By the way, “Rafale” is French for gust.

 
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So MMRCA2 will not come in to picture if NDA failed to come as victorious in 2024? I think Present political scenario & economic conditions may bring difficult time for this government.

Not if the MMRCA 2.0 is already in contract negotiations stage by then. Otherwise tenders have a habit of being reissued with change in govt.
 
Not if the MMRCA 2.0 is already in contract negotiations stage by then. Otherwise tenders have a habit of being reissued with change in govt.
MMRCA 1 was in final stages in 2014,yet failed to launch. Hope we will finalise the processes & sign the deal asap. Most likely Rafale will come as L1 & Raga & Congress will not choose rafale for sure if we didn't sign the deal befor 2024.
 
but then DA played a game and offered Rafale. After that the story is known to all.

Actually Boeing offered the SH. Only after that France offered the Rafale. If you recall, the French wanted the IAF to buy the M2000, instead of Rafale, which is why they offered the full production rights of the M2000 in exchange for the cancellation of MMRCA.
 
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