I think the US procurement plan is being underestimated.
Take the unknown variables for example, the AF-NGAD and B-21. If you consider 2400+ F-35s along with up to 175 B-21s and anywhere between 500 and 1000 NGADs, we are talking about a very sizable and powerful force.
It's easy to criticise the USAF mainly because they are in a transitioning phase and the full picture is not clear yet. Otoh, for most other air forces, except China, the transition phase is easy to speculate. The USAF force structure is actually the hardest to speculate even though they are quite open about it because the transition of their secret capabilities happens quite quickly since we get to know about it only after it has achieved a certain milestone.
NGAD is currently in the TD phase, as per Roper, which is reliable information. So we may be talking about a 2024-25 test flight for a prototype, and a possible IOC induction in its 5-7th year. So that's anywhere between 2029 and 2032. And the B-21 may end up flying next year with introduction 3 years later.
People unfortunately look at their helplessness today and think it's going to persist. Most of their 4th gen jets will only last until the end of the transition period after all. Like 300 F-16s will exit before 2050 and the only jets left by then would be 50-150 F-15EX. That's only 400+ 4th gen jets after 2035.
From a retire F-15 pilot :
"
The F-15EX naysayers often contend that even the most advanced fourth-generation fighters won’t be able to operate in future contested environments, that they are “
incapable of participating against peer threats” — some have even gone as far as calling the idea of buying the F-15EX
a moral issue. A
think tank analysis best summarizes this camp’s flawed logic: “It is hard to imagine any high-end scenario where [these] fighters will be able to operate.”
Recall that strategic competition is largely about generating disruption. Broadly speaking, disruption typically happens in two ways. At one end is innovation, which military leadership has been
endlessly calling for. This is reflected in the
surge of
research and development funding to explore promising new technology that takes many years to mature and manifest (if ever). At the other end is adaption, where users of equipment find new ways to use combinations of what is available. Where the former is slow, bureaucratic, and well-funded, the latter is exactly the opposite.
Adaption, not innovation, is the compelling variable in rapidly linking emergent strategies with deliberate strategies in strategic competition. Operators live in a world where the hope of innovation is not an option — we go to war with what we have. We adapt by embracing industriousness, ingenuity, and creativity to generate advantages on the battlefield and in the sky — we call this
being tactical. Applying this mentality strategically would get the Air Force off the beaten path to find more rapid and disruptive ways to economically compete. Stop thinking about the F-15EX as a fighter and start viewing it as an adaptable platform."
The fallout from the U.S. Air Force’s request to buy F-15EX fighter jets to replace the aging F-15C/D Eagle has certainly been entertaining. Largely
warontherocks.com
As for the Rafale.