MMRCA 2.0 - Updates and Discussions
- Thread starter Picdelamirand-oil
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RFP is just the basic, and then the DEF MIN will come up with set of requirements so as to not make it single vendor requirement.
We already know why GoI could not sign the 126 MRCA thanks to the French trying to be too smart. but now GoI will be very cautious.
If GoI wanted to order Rafale, they would have just gone for G2G way, so whats stopping them? thats the question
We already know why GoI could not sign the 126 MRCA thanks to the French trying to be too smart. but now GoI will be very cautious.
If GoI wanted to order Rafale, they would have just gone for G2G way, so whats stopping them? thats the question
I am not sure about planets, but certainly the RFP norms are.
ummm or should the question be, " even after completetion of negotiations, why was the order for 126 MRCA cancelled?? "
Because the indian exigeance about the warranty to be given by Dassault to 108 x HAL product Rafale was unsuportable. The risk in term of money and réputation was far too big.
And it would have been the same case with Eurofighter, Saab, Boeing, LM.
Don't forget Dassault didn't have a sole export customer in this time, so they were ready to do big effort. But Indian negotiators were too greedy. It's mainly a loss for India, because you will never have the same conditions now or tomorrow.
HAL make shoddy products, I wouldn't trust them building an Ikea bookshelf, let alone a combat aircraft.
Why do you think HAL wanted Dassault to be responsible for the quality of HAL products? Why didn't they want to be responsible for the quality of what they build? Even then Dassault was willing to accept, but at the condition they get oversight on HAL's assembly lines to make sure they don't bungle it, and HAL absolutely refused this compromise. Also HAL wanted to be paid nearly twice what Dassault was paid for each aircraft. They claimed they needed 1.7 times as much manpower as Dassault to make the aircraft.
It should be an alarm bell in any sort of negotiation when one side wants all of the money and none of the responsibilities.
HAL's dismal engineering practices were also denounced by other international companies, such as Boeing. You've seen the articles. And HAL is so greedy that they may end up killing the Tejas by asking for too much money for it. For the price of 7 Tejas Mk1A built by HAL, you can get 10 Su-30MKI off-the-shelf. HAL is like that because they never had to be competitive, they never were at risk, so they could afford to grow complacent and sclerotic.
The MMRCA deal was killed because it involved HAL. MMRCA 2.0 does not force HAL to be the Indian partner, so it has a much greater chance of success.
Why do you think HAL wanted Dassault to be responsible for the quality of HAL products? Why didn't they want to be responsible for the quality of what they build? Even then Dassault was willing to accept, but at the condition they get oversight on HAL's assembly lines to make sure they don't bungle it, and HAL absolutely refused this compromise. Also HAL wanted to be paid nearly twice what Dassault was paid for each aircraft. They claimed they needed 1.7 times as much manpower as Dassault to make the aircraft.
It should be an alarm bell in any sort of negotiation when one side wants all of the money and none of the responsibilities.
HAL's dismal engineering practices were also denounced by other international companies, such as Boeing. You've seen the articles. And HAL is so greedy that they may end up killing the Tejas by asking for too much money for it. For the price of 7 Tejas Mk1A built by HAL, you can get 10 Su-30MKI off-the-shelf. HAL is like that because they never had to be competitive, they never were at risk, so they could afford to grow complacent and sclerotic.
The MMRCA deal was killed because it involved HAL. MMRCA 2.0 does not force HAL to be the Indian partner, so it has a much greater chance of success.
MMRCA 2.0: The Russian Monster – Mig-35
The Russians offered the same jet for MMRCA 1.0 and they are again pitching the same aircraft for MMRCA 2.0 also. No major changes have taken place to the aircraft, other than the fact that the Russian Air Force and the Egyptian Air Force has placed an order for it. Some reports suggest that the Iraqis have also ordered the same.
The MiG-35 is essentially a MiG-29 on steroids. It’s a very refined and heavily re-engineered version of the MiG-29M, which in fact is an advanced variant of the MiG-29K. It was initially named the MiG-33 and later paved way for the MiG-35.
MMRCA 2.0: The Russian Monster - Mig-35
The Russians offered the same jet for MMRCA 1.0 and they are again pitching the same aircraft for MMRCA 2.0 also. No major changes have taken place to the aircraft, other than the fact that the Russian Air Force and the Egyptian Air Force has placed an order for it. Some reports suggest that the Iraqis have also ordered the same.
The MiG-35 is essentially a MiG-29 on steroids. It’s a very refined and heavily re-engineered version of the MiG-29M, which in fact is an advanced variant of the MiG-29K. It was initially named the MiG-33 and later paved way for the MiG-35.
MMRCA 2.0: The Russian Monster - Mig-35
To Save Time Govt May Bypass Field Trials in MMRCA 2.0
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is working on formulating a set of QRs (qualitative requirements) against which it is likely to benchmark the bids submitted by six major aircraft manufacturers for supply of 110 fighter jets, instead of going through the tortuous process of field trials and evaluation, as was done in the previous such competition, more popularly known as the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender, which underwent a long process for eight years.
The latest competition, announced in April, was open to both single and twin engine combat jets like last time. The deadline to submit the bids was 6 July. All the six competitors–American firms Boeing and Lockheed Martin, Russian Aircraft Corporation, Dassault of France, Swedish manufacturer Saab and European consortium, Eurofighter GmbH–had also participated in the earlier tender for supply of 126 fighters which was eventually withdrawn before India decided to buy 36 Rafale jets from the French under a G-to-G (government to government) deal signed in September 2016.
Having tested the six aircraft in contention during the extensive field trials in the earlier competition, the IAF more or less knows the capabilities that each of the aircraft bring to the table. The Request for Information (RFI), put out in April had a detailed questionnaire for all competitors, seeking details of upgrades that the aircraft fielded for the latest tender would have undergone in the intervening years since the fields trials under MMRCA took place. The aircraft are: four twin-engine fighters–the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Block III, Eurofighter Typhoon, MiG-35 and Rafale and two single-engine jets– F-16 Block 70 and Gripen E.
The IAF’s acquisition branch is now scrutinising all the six bids, running into thousands of pages. The exercise is likely to take at least three-four months before all the six documents are placed in a common matrix and then evaluated against the set of QRs that are being prepared separately. The next step, according to informed sources, will be to shortlist two or three aircraft that meet the air force requirement. “Another round of field trials is not necessary given that we already know the capability of each of the aircraft. Since our fighter squadron strength is now in a precarious position, we need to close this deal as fast as possible,” explained a defence official familiar with the process.
Once the shortlist is ready, the IAF will take the matter to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and seek directions on the next steps. The government will have to decide quickly on how to make the final selection.
Top decision makers in the government have pointed out that none of India’s fighter jet acquisitions in the past have come through a competitive bidding. The only time it was tried was in the MMRCA tender. Finally though the process had to be scrapped and the Rafales bought through a G-to-G deal because of differences in calculating the cost of manufacturing. So, a repeat of that process in MMRCA 2.0 looks unlikely. Although there is merit in this approach, the final decision will depend on how the government wants to use this huge purchase order to its advantage and what the strategic environment is when the time to make the choice comes which, by all indications, will be after the next general elections at the earliest.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is working on formulating a set of QRs (qualitative requirements) against which it is likely to benchmark the bids submitted by six major aircraft manufacturers for supply of 110 fighter jets, instead of going through the tortuous process of field trials and evaluation, as was done in the previous such competition, more popularly known as the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender, which underwent a long process for eight years.
The latest competition, announced in April, was open to both single and twin engine combat jets like last time. The deadline to submit the bids was 6 July. All the six competitors–American firms Boeing and Lockheed Martin, Russian Aircraft Corporation, Dassault of France, Swedish manufacturer Saab and European consortium, Eurofighter GmbH–had also participated in the earlier tender for supply of 126 fighters which was eventually withdrawn before India decided to buy 36 Rafale jets from the French under a G-to-G (government to government) deal signed in September 2016.
Having tested the six aircraft in contention during the extensive field trials in the earlier competition, the IAF more or less knows the capabilities that each of the aircraft bring to the table. The Request for Information (RFI), put out in April had a detailed questionnaire for all competitors, seeking details of upgrades that the aircraft fielded for the latest tender would have undergone in the intervening years since the fields trials under MMRCA took place. The aircraft are: four twin-engine fighters–the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Block III, Eurofighter Typhoon, MiG-35 and Rafale and two single-engine jets– F-16 Block 70 and Gripen E.
The IAF’s acquisition branch is now scrutinising all the six bids, running into thousands of pages. The exercise is likely to take at least three-four months before all the six documents are placed in a common matrix and then evaluated against the set of QRs that are being prepared separately. The next step, according to informed sources, will be to shortlist two or three aircraft that meet the air force requirement. “Another round of field trials is not necessary given that we already know the capability of each of the aircraft. Since our fighter squadron strength is now in a precarious position, we need to close this deal as fast as possible,” explained a defence official familiar with the process.
Once the shortlist is ready, the IAF will take the matter to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and seek directions on the next steps. The government will have to decide quickly on how to make the final selection.
Top decision makers in the government have pointed out that none of India’s fighter jet acquisitions in the past have come through a competitive bidding. The only time it was tried was in the MMRCA tender. Finally though the process had to be scrapped and the Rafales bought through a G-to-G deal because of differences in calculating the cost of manufacturing. So, a repeat of that process in MMRCA 2.0 looks unlikely. Although there is merit in this approach, the final decision will depend on how the government wants to use this huge purchase order to its advantage and what the strategic environment is when the time to make the choice comes which, by all indications, will be after the next general elections at the earliest.
Rafale going for HX
ON JULY 18, 2018 BY CORPORAL FRISKIN AIR, FINLAND
In a world where the transatlantic link is looking surprisingly shaky, the French charm offensive is continuing. And as some of the competition are fighting delays, cost overruns, and uncertainties, the Rafale is steaming on ahead seamingly without any major hiccups. In the short term, that means rolling out the F3R standard which will sport AGCAS (Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System), introduction of the MBDA Meteor long-range missile, and a host of other less noticeable upgrades to the aircraft. The F3R is an intermediate step, building on the current F3 model. The big step will then be the F4, which is expected in the 2023 to 2025 timespan, coinciding with the deliveries of the first HX-fighters in initial operational capability, which is set to happen in 2025.
Rafale B ‘4-HP’ from SPA 37 “Charognard” of EC 1/91 “Gascogne”. EC 1/91 has been actively taking part in most recent French operations, including combat over Libya, Mali, and Syria/Iraq. The two-seat B-version is every bit as combat capable as the single-seater. Source: Own picture
If Rafale would win HX, it is the F4 standard which would be delivered to the Finnish Air Force. Dassault is expecting that the French baseline will suit Finland just fine, though they leave the door open for the Finnish aircrafts to have unique weapons and external sensors if so required. Dassault is keen to point out the benefits of this model, making sure the Rafale is sporting mature but modern technologies through incremental upgrades according to the roadmap laid forward by the DGA, the French Directorate General of Armaments.
At the heart of the Rafale’s impressive low-level performance is the huge delta wing and close-coupled canard. Source: Own picture
One point which Dassault brings up when I meet them at this year’s air show which wasn’t discussed last year is the capability per aircraft. While the ‘how much bang can you create for 10 billions?’-approach of the HX-tender might hand an edge to some contenders, the politically motivated decision to acquire exactly 64 aircraft will on the other hand favour more capable aircraft. This is where Dassault see their strengths. The Rafale is largely assumed to be second only to the F-35 when it comes to signature reduction amongst the HX contenders. At the same time the Rafale is from the outset designed to be able to operate with limited support and low maintenance hours, a feature stemming both from the requirement to be able to operate from the relatively small French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as well as from replacing the sturdy Jaguar and Mirage F1 in operations in austere conditions, often in Africa and in the Middle East. The latter is in marked contrast to some other contenders, and Dassault likes to point out that this is not just a design concept, but something the aircraft does every day.
And here the Rafale is able to provide serious hours of combat potential, both on a daily basis as well as for prolonged periods of time. The Rafale can do 10 hour CAP-missions, and is able to surge over 150 monthly flight hours per aircraft. The latter has been demonstrated repeatedly during combat operations such as Operation Chammal, the French strikes in Syria and Iraq. The single most high-profile mission in the area is without doubt the strike on Syrian regime chemical warfare installations earlier this year. Here, the Rafale demonstrated the “seamless plug and play” capability of the Rafale to integrate with other NATO-assets to carry out a complex long-range mission. Five Rafales, including two-seaters, flew out of bases in France to strike two facilities at Him Shinshar, one of which was targeted together with US Navy, Royal Air Force, and the French Navy, while the other was struck solely by the Rafales. As was noted in the immediate aftermath of the strikes, they took out all intended targets without interference from neither the Russian nor the Syrian air defences.
Another benefit the Rafale brings to the table is the second engine. While the benefit of twin engines for normal flight safety redundancy is limited these days, in combat the ability to lose an engine and still limp home is an asset. “It’s more comfortable,” as a former Mirage 2000-pilot puts it.
The Rafale dynamic duo display at the Finnish Air Force 100 year air show in Tikkakoski. Source: Own picture
Last time around the Mirage 2000 was the only fighter other than the F/A-18C Hornet to meet the requirements of the Finnish Air Force, but suffered from what the evaluation thought of as a “maintenance system which would be difficult for us”. This is not something Dassault expects will be repeated, as the maintenance requirements for the Rafale is one of the areas which have seen vast improvement. The Rafale feature a fully digital mock-up which has provided the basis for the maintenance studies. These theoretical calculations have then been validated by comparison to an airframe which has been tortured in Dassault’s laboratory. The final outcome is a maintenance program centered around on-condition maintenance rather than the traditional by flight hour system, and a scheduled airframe maintenance which is halved compared to that of the current F/A-18C/D Hornets. While the Rafale is not unique amongst the HX-contenders in taking maintenance to the next level, it is hard to see the aircraft being dropped on what was a weak point for the Mirage 2000.
In the end, talk about the Rafale always comes back to the ‘here and now’. This is an aircraft that is immediately available, ‘fly before you buy’ as Dassault puts it, and keeps balancing nicely on the edge between maturity and cutting edge. The key role it plays in French defence also means that it will continue to be kept updated throughout the lifespan of HX. Like Eurofighter, Dassault is keen to point out that Rafale will also play a part in the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which true to it name is a system and not just a new fighter. The Rafale stands out in many ways from the competition, offering a number of unique solutions and concepts. Time will tell if these will catch the interest of the Finnish Air Force, or if a more conservative solution will be sought.
A pair of Rafale’s being prepared in their light shelters at the Jordanian Prince Hassan air force base during Operation Chammal, French the strikes against IS. Source: © Dassault Aviation – A. Paringaux
Rafale going for HX
ON JULY 18, 2018 BY CORPORAL FRISKIN AIR, FINLAND
In a world where the transatlantic link is looking surprisingly shaky, the French charm offensive is continuing. And as some of the competition are fighting delays, cost overruns, and uncertainties, the Rafale is steaming on ahead seamingly without any major hiccups. In the short term, that means rolling out the F3R standard which will sport AGCAS (Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System), introduction of the MBDA Meteor long-range missile, and a host of other less noticeable upgrades to the aircraft. The F3R is an intermediate step, building on the current F3 model. The big step will then be the F4, which is expected in the 2023 to 2025 timespan, coinciding with the deliveries of the first HX-fighters in initial operational capability, which is set to happen in 2025.
Rafale B ‘4-HP’ from SPA 37 “Charognard” of EC 1/91 “Gascogne”. EC 1/91 has been actively taking part in most recent French operations, including combat over Libya, Mali, and Syria/Iraq. The two-seat B-version is every bit as combat capable as the single-seater. Source: Own picture
Everyone can improve technology, but you can’t change the concept […] France can’t operate dedicated aircraft
The benefit from a Finnish viewpoint is that besides the Swedish Air Force JAS 39E Gripen, the French offer will be the only one which will be operated by the host country’s single-aircraft air force (though both the JAS 39C/D and Mirage 2000 will linger on for a few years more). The lack of dedicated fast jets for different roles ensures full support for the multirole capability from the host, something which certainly would make the Finnish Logistics Command sleep easier at night.
At the heart of the Rafale’s impressive low-level performance is the huge delta wing and close-coupled canard. Source: Own picture
We have over 30,000 flight hours in combat
When it comes to combat, the keyword is ‘agile’. Rafale is able to adapt to different scenarios and conflict levels, thanks to the multitude of sensors and weapons available to the pilot (and WSO in the case of the Rafale B). These capabilities goes all the way to peacetime, where the Rafale has provided assistance to emergency authorities by documenting natural disasters and floods with their dedicated reconnaissance pods. But while peacetime assistance is a nice bonus, HX will be bought for its combat potential.And here the Rafale is able to provide serious hours of combat potential, both on a daily basis as well as for prolonged periods of time. The Rafale can do 10 hour CAP-missions, and is able to surge over 150 monthly flight hours per aircraft. The latter has been demonstrated repeatedly during combat operations such as Operation Chammal, the French strikes in Syria and Iraq. The single most high-profile mission in the area is without doubt the strike on Syrian regime chemical warfare installations earlier this year. Here, the Rafale demonstrated the “seamless plug and play” capability of the Rafale to integrate with other NATO-assets to carry out a complex long-range mission. Five Rafales, including two-seaters, flew out of bases in France to strike two facilities at Him Shinshar, one of which was targeted together with US Navy, Royal Air Force, and the French Navy, while the other was struck solely by the Rafales. As was noted in the immediate aftermath of the strikes, they took out all intended targets without interference from neither the Russian nor the Syrian air defences.
Another benefit the Rafale brings to the table is the second engine. While the benefit of twin engines for normal flight safety redundancy is limited these days, in combat the ability to lose an engine and still limp home is an asset. “It’s more comfortable,” as a former Mirage 2000-pilot puts it.
The Rafale dynamic duo display at the Finnish Air Force 100 year air show in Tikkakoski. Source: Own picture
In the end, talk about the Rafale always comes back to the ‘here and now’. This is an aircraft that is immediately available, ‘fly before you buy’ as Dassault puts it, and keeps balancing nicely on the edge between maturity and cutting edge. The key role it plays in French defence also means that it will continue to be kept updated throughout the lifespan of HX. Like Eurofighter, Dassault is keen to point out that Rafale will also play a part in the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which true to it name is a system and not just a new fighter. The Rafale stands out in many ways from the competition, offering a number of unique solutions and concepts. Time will tell if these will catch the interest of the Finnish Air Force, or if a more conservative solution will be sought.
A pair of Rafale’s being prepared in their light shelters at the Jordanian Prince Hassan air force base during Operation Chammal, French the strikes against IS. Source: © Dassault Aviation – A. Paringaux
Rafale going for HX
You got that wrong. HAL wanted to be responsible for HAL made jets, which Dassault supported. It was MoD that pushed for Dassault to guarantee HAL made jets.
The prices thrown around are all wrong. The officials have argued that the Gripen E costs $80M. Would you agree with that?
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Aircraft prices that the Mk1A is being compared to.
Basic Rafale - $98M... No clue what they mean by Basic. Perhaps without customised stuff.
Gripen E - $80M
LCA Mk1A - $68M
HAL MKI - $60M
F-16 - $56M
LCA Mk1 - $53M
Russian MKI - $48M
Can't compare the MKI because it's based on 4th gen technologies. Bringing it up to current specs will add a lot of its price. You can say the IAF will be happy if the upgrade is about 80% of the unit cost, so it's gonna be high. So if you remove MKI, you are left with:
Basic Rafale - $98M
Gripen E - $80M
LCA Mk1A - $68M
F-16 - $56M
LCA Mk1 - $53M
One of the biggest reasons why the Mk1A is more expensive is because its import content is greater than domestic content. But the actual reason for its greater cost is due to the Mk1 itself being very expensive in the first place. It should have originally been around the $25M mark. But then, this price was decided when the rupee was 40-45 to a dollar. Now it's 68 to a dollar. And since then they have also added a lot of stuff that wasn't considered in the initial price, ie, HMDS, midair refueling, new weapons etc. So, apart from the exchange rate and inflation, stuff has piled on since the first pricing.
What has further compounded the problem is the requirement for fast production. IAF wants a squadron a year, and have only ordered 83 jets. Out of which 10 are trainers and not kitted to the full Mk1A spec. So the number's only 73 Mk1A. 1 squadron a year for such a low number of aircraft makes it unrealistic to get optimised pricing. It's just 4 years of production.
Parrikar got HAL to outsource most of LCA Mk1A's production. So you will see 70% of the LCA being made by private companies. What HAL does is they add 30% to the price of the outsourced work. So apart from the private company's own price with profits, HAL tags on a 30% markup on the final price. So this is where the biggest impact really comes from.
Otoh, Dassault only charges 7% as profit to the ADLA/MN, 6.93%, I believe.
Forcing HAL to reduce their profit margins will take care of the pricing issue.
So, @A Person, @Picdelamirand-oil, it has nothing to do with incompetence. It's just a combination of small orders, bad exchange rate and a ridiculously high profit margin. Of course, we don't know what else has been included along with the aircraft itself, it's not necessarily the unit flyaway price. You already know that unit costs and procurement costs are not the same, but no effort is made to differentiate between the two in the Indian media most of the time.
Not everything is clear yet.
HAL pegs price of Tejas fighter at Rs 162 crore
The Tejas Mark I will be one of the world's most affordable fighters in its class. Ministry of Defence (MoD) sources tell Business Standard that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has quoted a price of Rs 162 crore per aircraft for the first 20 Tejas fighters that have begun production in Bangalore. That translates into a dollar price of approximately $26 million a fighter.
Basic Rafale - $98M... No clue what they mean by Basic. Perhaps without customised stuff.
Gripen E - $80M
LCA Mk1A - $68M
HAL MKI - $60M
F-16 - $56M
LCA Mk1 - $53M
Russian MKI - $48M
Can't compare the MKI because it's based on 4th gen technologies. Bringing it up to current specs will add a lot of its price. You can say the IAF will be happy if the upgrade is about 80% of the unit cost, so it's gonna be high. So if you remove MKI, you are left with:
Basic Rafale - $98M
Gripen E - $80M
LCA Mk1A - $68M
F-16 - $56M
LCA Mk1 - $53M
One of the biggest reasons why the Mk1A is more expensive is because its import content is greater than domestic content. But the actual reason for its greater cost is due to the Mk1 itself being very expensive in the first place. It should have originally been around the $25M mark. But then, this price was decided when the rupee was 40-45 to a dollar. Now it's 68 to a dollar. And since then they have also added a lot of stuff that wasn't considered in the initial price, ie, HMDS, midair refueling, new weapons etc. So, apart from the exchange rate and inflation, stuff has piled on since the first pricing.
What has further compounded the problem is the requirement for fast production. IAF wants a squadron a year, and have only ordered 83 jets. Out of which 10 are trainers and not kitted to the full Mk1A spec. So the number's only 73 Mk1A. 1 squadron a year for such a low number of aircraft makes it unrealistic to get optimised pricing. It's just 4 years of production.
Parrikar got HAL to outsource most of LCA Mk1A's production. So you will see 70% of the LCA being made by private companies. What HAL does is they add 30% to the price of the outsourced work. So apart from the private company's own price with profits, HAL tags on a 30% markup on the final price. So this is where the biggest impact really comes from.
Otoh, Dassault only charges 7% as profit to the ADLA/MN, 6.93%, I believe.
Forcing HAL to reduce their profit margins will take care of the pricing issue.
So, @A Person, @Picdelamirand-oil, it has nothing to do with incompetence. It's just a combination of small orders, bad exchange rate and a ridiculously high profit margin. Of course, we don't know what else has been included along with the aircraft itself, it's not necessarily the unit flyaway price. You already know that unit costs and procurement costs are not the same, but no effort is made to differentiate between the two in the Indian media most of the time.
Not everything is clear yet.
HAL pegs price of Tejas fighter at Rs 162 crore
The Tejas Mark I will be one of the world's most affordable fighters in its class. Ministry of Defence (MoD) sources tell Business Standard that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has quoted a price of Rs 162 crore per aircraft for the first 20 Tejas fighters that have begun production in Bangalore. That translates into a dollar price of approximately $26 million a fighter.
Another non french Rafale fan.... Nice !!!Rafale going for HX
ON JULY 18, 2018 BY CORPORAL FRISKIN AIR, FINLAND
In a world where the transatlantic link is looking surprisingly shaky, the French charm offensive is continuing. And as some of the competition are fighting delays, cost overruns, and uncertainties, the Rafale is steaming on ahead seamingly without any major hiccups. In the short term, that means rolling out the F3R standard which will sport AGCAS (Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System), introduction of the MBDA Meteor long-range missile, and a host of other less noticeable upgrades to the aircraft. The F3R is an intermediate step, building on the current F3 model. The big step will then be the F4, which is expected in the 2023 to 2025 timespan, coinciding with the deliveries of the first HX-fighters in initial operational capability, which is set to happen in 2025.
Rafale B ‘4-HP’ from SPA 37 “Charognard” of EC 1/91 “Gascogne”. EC 1/91 has been actively taking part in most recent French operations, including combat over Libya, Mali, and Syria/Iraq. The two-seat B-version is every bit as combat capable as the single-seater. Source: Own picture
If Rafale would win HX, it is the F4 standard which would be delivered to the Finnish Air Force. Dassault is expecting that the French baseline will suit Finland just fine, though they leave the door open for the Finnish aircrafts to have unique weapons and external sensors if so required. Dassault is keen to point out the benefits of this model, making sure the Rafale is sporting mature but modern technologies through incremental upgrades according to the roadmap laid forward by the DGA, the French Directorate General of Armaments.
Everyone can improve technology, but you can’t change the concept […] France can’t operate dedicated aircraftThe benefit from a Finnish viewpoint is that besides the Swedish Air Force JAS 39E Gripen, the French offer will be the only one which will be operated by the host country’s single-aircraft air force (though both the JAS 39C/D and Mirage 2000 will linger on for a few years more). The lack of dedicated fast jets for different roles ensures full support for the multirole capability from the host, something which certainly would make the Finnish Logistics Command sleep easier at night.
At the heart of the Rafale’s impressive low-level performance is the huge delta wing and close-coupled canard. Source: Own picture
One point which Dassault brings up when I meet them at this year’s air show which wasn’t discussed last year is the capability per aircraft. While the ‘how much bang can you create for 10 billions?’-approach of the HX-tender might hand an edge to some contenders, the politically motivated decision to acquire exactly 64 aircraft will on the other hand favour more capable aircraft. This is where Dassault see their strengths. The Rafale is largely assumed to be second only to the F-35 when it comes to signature reduction amongst the HX contenders. At the same time the Rafale is from the outset designed to be able to operate with limited support and low maintenance hours, a feature stemming both from the requirement to be able to operate from the relatively small French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as well as from replacing the sturdy Jaguar and Mirage F1 in operations in austere conditions, often in Africa and in the Middle East. The latter is in marked contrast to some other contenders, and Dassault likes to point out that this is not just a design concept, but something the aircraft does every day.
We have over 30,000 flight hours in combatWhen it comes to combat, the keyword is ‘agile’. Rafale is able to adapt to different scenarios and conflict levels, thanks to the multitude of sensors and weapons available to the pilot (and WSO in the case of the Rafale B). These capabilities goes all the way to peacetime, where the Rafale has provided assistance to emergency authorities by documenting natural disasters and floods with their dedicated reconnaissance pods. But while peacetime assistance is a nice bonus, HX will be bought for its combat potential.
And here the Rafale is able to provide serious hours of combat potential, both on a daily basis as well as for prolonged periods of time. The Rafale can do 10 hour CAP-missions, and is able to surge over 150 monthly flight hours per aircraft. The latter has been demonstrated repeatedly during combat operations such as Operation Chammal, the French strikes in Syria and Iraq. The single most high-profile mission in the area is without doubt the strike on Syrian regime chemical warfare installations earlier this year. Here, the Rafale demonstrated the “seamless plug and play” capability of the Rafale to integrate with other NATO-assets to carry out a complex long-range mission. Five Rafales, including two-seaters, flew out of bases in France to strike two facilities at Him Shinshar, one of which was targeted together with US Navy, Royal Air Force, and the French Navy, while the other was struck solely by the Rafales. As was noted in the immediate aftermath of the strikes, they took out all intended targets without interference from neither the Russian nor the Syrian air defences.
Another benefit the Rafale brings to the table is the second engine. While the benefit of twin engines for normal flight safety redundancy is limited these days, in combat the ability to lose an engine and still limp home is an asset. “It’s more comfortable,” as a former Mirage 2000-pilot puts it.
The Rafale dynamic duo display at the Finnish Air Force 100 year air show in Tikkakoski. Source: Own picture
Last time around the Mirage 2000 was the only fighter other than the F/A-18C Hornet to meet the requirements of the Finnish Air Force, but suffered from what the evaluation thought of as a “maintenance system which would be difficult for us”. This is not something Dassault expects will be repeated, as the maintenance requirements for the Rafale is one of the areas which have seen vast improvement. The Rafale feature a fully digital mock-up which has provided the basis for the maintenance studies. These theoretical calculations have then been validated by comparison to an airframe which has been tortured in Dassault’s laboratory. The final outcome is a maintenance program centered around on-condition maintenance rather than the traditional by flight hour system, and a scheduled airframe maintenance which is halved compared to that of the current F/A-18C/D Hornets. While the Rafale is not unique amongst the HX-contenders in taking maintenance to the next level, it is hard to see the aircraft being dropped on what was a weak point for the Mirage 2000.
In the end, talk about the Rafale always comes back to the ‘here and now’. This is an aircraft that is immediately available, ‘fly before you buy’ as Dassault puts it, and keeps balancing nicely on the edge between maturity and cutting edge. The key role it plays in French defence also means that it will continue to be kept updated throughout the lifespan of HX.Like Eurofighter, Dassault is keen to point out that Rafale will also play a part in the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which true to it name is a system and not just a new fighter. The Rafale stands out in many ways from the competition, offering a number of unique solutions and concepts. Time will tell if these will catch the interest of the Finnish Air Force, or if a more conservative solution will be sought.
A pair of Rafale’s being prepared in their light shelters at the Jordanian Prince Hassan air force base during Operation Chammal, French the strikes against IS. Source: © Dassault Aviation – A. Paringaux
Rafale going for HX
It was part of then RFP that the partner would be HAL, and that was signed by all parties, but after Rafale was declared L1 then Dassault started to have all the objections. That is because, the Indian DPP did not allow for the govt to discuss with L2 in case the discussions with L1 did not conclude positively, and that would mean another RFP etc. The French knew the game, they were being guided from inside.
Rather since Dassault after being qualified as L1 now went against what they had agreed in their signed RFP (That HAL would be the lead integrator for the 108 planes made in India, and they started to then try nego for higher price) the very same time they should have been disqualified for not honouring the RFP they had signed, Why was our defence ministry this weak? It was compromised.
Rather since Dassault after being qualified as L1 now went against what they had agreed in their signed RFP (That HAL would be the lead integrator for the 108 planes made in India, and they started to then try nego for higher price) the very same time they should have been disqualified for not honouring the RFP they had signed, Why was our defence ministry this weak? It was compromised.
And that's why the MMRCA was killed off, while the MMRCA 2 does not require that HAL be the partner. HAL sucks, get over it.
Nobody gives a fart about the RFP from a canceled tender anymore.
Bla Bla Bla.
At those time Dassault had not export customer.
They really wanted to got the first one, specially for 126 planes. So please, stop with all that kind of BS around the objections of Dassault.
It was HAL and the indian bureaucraty to blame for.
End of the story, a story you know perfectly well until some years. Keep your french bashing down.
A very interesting document in French "Special Make in India" . It is an internal Dassault document
dassault mag.pdf
From Trappier Editorial:
Translation
The success of the Rafale in India is part of the Make in India initiative launched by Prime Minister Naranda Modi. From this contractual obligation, we make a strategic partnership with ambitious objectives: obtain new Rafale orders, gain competitiveness in business aviation, multiply projects in high technology. Our plant in Nagpur, in the centre of the country, will soon produce Falcon 2000 parts and sub-assemblies, then Rafale. We are creating a structure dedicated to civil and military engineering works in the Silicon Valley of Pune, near Bombay. We are studying R&D projects with the Indian Ministry of Defence. As you will read in the pages of this Special Make in India magazine, the members of the management committee, meeting in New Delhi in April, enthusiastically commit themselves to do everything possible to carry out, with their teams, these large-scale projects. I count on you as I count on them.
dassault mag.pdf
From Trappier Editorial:
Translation
The success of the Rafale in India is part of the Make in India initiative launched by Prime Minister Naranda Modi. From this contractual obligation, we make a strategic partnership with ambitious objectives: obtain new Rafale orders, gain competitiveness in business aviation, multiply projects in high technology. Our plant in Nagpur, in the centre of the country, will soon produce Falcon 2000 parts and sub-assemblies, then Rafale. We are creating a structure dedicated to civil and military engineering works in the Silicon Valley of Pune, near Bombay. We are studying R&D projects with the Indian Ministry of Defence. As you will read in the pages of this Special Make in India magazine, the members of the management committee, meeting in New Delhi in April, enthusiastically commit themselves to do everything possible to carry out, with their teams, these large-scale projects. I count on you as I count on them.
The main paragraphs are
Translation
Translation
- Military support
- Produce in India
- A methodical quality approach
- The local economic fabric in support
- Close digital cooperation
- India's land of conquest for the Falcons
- Pilot in India a challenge for programme managers
- Working in India a rewarding opportunity
- Optimized digital monitoring in production
- Development of intelligent air systems
Page 17/45
Translation
With a futures market of 200 Rafale and production costs that place us at the heart of competition in the global civil market, the potential offered by India are as many reasons for us to succeed with our Make in India and to make our establishment in this country a complete success.
Translation
With a futures market of 200 Rafale and production costs that place us at the heart of competition in the global civil market, the potential offered by India are as many reasons for us to succeed with our Make in India and to make our establishment in this country a complete success.
Page 19/45
Translation
Training: accompanying our Indian partners
For the Indian government, Skill India, i.e. local education, is a necessary challenge for the country's economic development. For us and for the success of Make in India, it is therefore essential to accompany our customer by an adapted training.
Bruno Penot, head of the DGSM's training department, explains that "this programme could involve setting up an aeronautics department within an existing local school, the Governement Industrial Technical Institute (ITI), located in the Nagpur region, to train companions and technicians.
Today, the new challenge for our company is to develop an aeronautical professional baccalaureate program, to provide the DRAL joint venture with qualified and quality personnel. This ambitious project is perfectly in line with our client's industrial policy.
Translation
Training: accompanying our Indian partners
For the Indian government, Skill India, i.e. local education, is a necessary challenge for the country's economic development. For us and for the success of Make in India, it is therefore essential to accompany our customer by an adapted training.
Bruno Penot, head of the DGSM's training department, explains that "this programme could involve setting up an aeronautics department within an existing local school, the Governement Industrial Technical Institute (ITI), located in the Nagpur region, to train companions and technicians.
Today, the new challenge for our company is to develop an aeronautical professional baccalaureate program, to provide the DRAL joint venture with qualified and quality personnel. This ambitious project is perfectly in line with our client's industrial policy.
Its not a Bla bla but a known fact
Dassault had signed the RFP which did mention that HAL would be the lead and thus Dassault had to work with HAL and Dassault had signed that document to be part of RFP .. FACT
After Dassault was decalared L1 they started questioning the ability of HAL, were they not aware of HALs ability and since they were they should have given their actual RFP based on facts known to them and that would have made sure that Dassault was not going to be L1.. So Dassaul kept quiet and made sure it was L1 and then started to have objections about things that it had agreed in RFP earlier.. this is fact.
Actually all the costs that were then put in front of AK Anthony, he was sure that it would be a scam and there would be no chance for UPA then to win election for next two decades. So AK Anthony decided to just keep quiet, Of course he had lot of time to sign the deal, what stopped him then?
When NDA came to power and became aware of this hot potato, they too were faced with same questions as AK Anthony, if they signed the deal in that form., it would be too expensive touching almost 40+ billion only for planes and the lines. Thus they thought it would be better to either go for more Su-30 MKI which IAF chief Raha was against saying like a spoilt brat.. " .. there is no plan B" having such compromised guys as IAF chief the best course of action became to just go for the minimal 36 planes thats all. Thus ensuring win win situation for GoI. and face saver for France,. Also they made it a G2G deal thus in a way ensuring that there are less chances of kickbacks involved. At least the GoI was not party to it.
Dassault had signed the RFP which did mention that HAL would be the lead and thus Dassault had to work with HAL and Dassault had signed that document to be part of RFP .. FACT
After Dassault was decalared L1 they started questioning the ability of HAL, were they not aware of HALs ability and since they were they should have given their actual RFP based on facts known to them and that would have made sure that Dassault was not going to be L1.. So Dassaul kept quiet and made sure it was L1 and then started to have objections about things that it had agreed in RFP earlier.. this is fact.
Actually all the costs that were then put in front of AK Anthony, he was sure that it would be a scam and there would be no chance for UPA then to win election for next two decades. So AK Anthony decided to just keep quiet, Of course he had lot of time to sign the deal, what stopped him then?
When NDA came to power and became aware of this hot potato, they too were faced with same questions as AK Anthony, if they signed the deal in that form., it would be too expensive touching almost 40+ billion only for planes and the lines. Thus they thought it would be better to either go for more Su-30 MKI which IAF chief Raha was against saying like a spoilt brat.. " .. there is no plan B" having such compromised guys as IAF chief the best course of action became to just go for the minimal 36 planes thats all. Thus ensuring win win situation for GoI. and face saver for France,. Also they made it a G2G deal thus in a way ensuring that there are less chances of kickbacks involved. At least the GoI was not party to it.