Only Arab states with coffers overflowing with petro-dollars could afford 3 top of the line fighters simultaneously. You can count on Ms. Sitharaman to shoot down any such proposal with 100% SSKP before it even made it to DAC.
MMRCA 2.0 - Updates and Discussions
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3 is unrealistic. But two type is necessary, MMRCA and F35 or F15EX as Jaguar replacement.
We made a mistake by note inducting mig 31 as mig 25 replacement and we paid a price on feb 27-2019.
We should not repeat similar mistake again.A proper replacement is required for Jaguar, if rafale wins mmrca, then F15EX should be the Jaguar replacement, if F15EX, then F35/Rafale should be that aircraft.
The problem is that in peace time (if this term may be used for the India - Pk situation. Let's say cold time) the fighters in the air sometimes even don't carry missile ! or just one (french case).
You may have Mig31, if they are not in the air in the right time, with a proper amount of fuel and a missile load, you are nude.
The F-35 can't do low and slow CAS/anti-armour runs like the A-10. Yet, the USAF planned to replace it with the multi role F-35 (until the US Congress decided otherwise).
The IAF too is moving away from dedicated DPSA toward MR. It needs to standardize the fleet and make all ac types compatible with the weapons we currently have.
Imo, Rafale can fill the Jag's role until LCA MK2 and later AMCA take over. Given the dense AD networks we face on both borders, high value targets are best hit with stand-off weapons and UAVs.
The biggest failiure from our side on that day was, we could not target PAF's AEWS & EW aircraft flying. A pair of mig 31 could have destroyed those aircraft.
It's either Rafale or bust. Has been like that since day one and will continue to remain so as there is/was/ever will be no plan-B.
And lol at F-15EX suggestion
. We have world's best semi-indigenous(literally fully indigenous post upgrade) 4.5 gen fighter in Su-30MKI which is superior to advance eagle in literally every way. Rafale is the best team-mate for MKI along with Tejas series and AMCA. Others are not needed for us. Period(Only exception Su-57/60MKI).
And lol at F-15EX suggestion
. We have world's best semi-indigenous(literally fully indigenous post upgrade) 4.5 gen fighter in Su-30MKI which is superior to advance eagle in literally every way. Rafale is the best team-mate for MKI along with Tejas series and AMCA. Others are not needed for us. Period(Only exception Su-57/60MKI).World's best 4.5 gen fighter is MKI, the dumbest of dumbest statement ever.It's either Rafale or bust. Has been like that since day one and will continue to remain so as there is/was/ever will be no plan-B.
And lol at F-15EX suggestion
Go and find a maws first on mki before you equate wih eagle.It's either Rafale or bust. Has been like that since day one and will continue to remain so as there is/was/ever will be no plan-B.
And lol at F-15EX suggestion
Mig31 is the best choice for such quick response.
Exactly. This would be a nightmare to manage and extremely expensive.
Dassault is the only one that makes sense for India from all perspectives. For the amount of time that this MRFA or whatever has been going on India could have jointly developed its own plane with the needed characteristics. Do not understand how DoD procurement works in India.
It is like people are playing fantasy football here and in Government departments as well.
"Add a Ronaldo, add a Messi, add a Ronaldinho, and add a this or that."
Okay. What is the budget - 100 Million USD.
"How much for these". "700 Million USD" .
"Ahhh....the price is too much and xyz reasons etc.(politics...blah blah...yeah...yeah)". "I will call you back in 5 years....will definitely buy them then"
X YEARS later:
"How much now"
"A few have retired now". " A new team with better specs...special price for you....800 Million USD"
"No...that's too much." "See you again in 4 years".
Repeat loop
Could a 'Transactional' Trump Leverage the Pannun Case to Get Modi to Buy US Fighter Aircraft?
Chandigarh: Donald Trump’s comeback to the US presidency has spawned optimistic speculation in Indian security and defence circles – that a line is likely to be drawn by his incoming administration under the disquieting issue regarding the Modi government’s alleged involvement in Sikh separatist leader Gurpatwant Pannun’s planned assassination in New York last year.
But a cross section of senior military veterans and analysts believe that any US willingness to help Modi bury l’affaire Pannun could come at a heavy price under Trump, which they anticipate may well be the $25-billion purchase of 114 US fighters by the Indian Air Force (IAF) as part of its long-pending Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) requirement.
“The MRFA is needed as of yesterday,” Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh had declared last month in his annual presser, highlighting the criticality of timely platform procurements to sustain the IAFs operational readiness by boosting its fighter squadron numbers that had declined to 29-30 from a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons. This former number will reduce further imminently, after the IAF’s two remaining ground attack MiG-21’Bison’ squadrons, comprising 40 legacy platforms, are number-plated or decommissioned next year.
Three US-origin combat aircraft are amongst eight overseas fighters potentially vying for the IAF’s MRFA buy. Analysts are of the view that the inbound Trump administration could possibly use the political leverage it clearly has over Delhi to acquire one such fighter type as an undeclared form of ‘blood money’ for Washington to diplomatically entomb the Pannun dispute. To be sure, legal proceedings on the Pannun case would continue in a New York court but care would then be taken to firewall the Indian establishment and its senior officials and leaders from embarrassing allegations of involvement.
The 78-year-old president-designate fancies himself as a master negotiator, capable of deploying his business acumen into the world of politics and diplomacy, especially by taking advantage of potentially profitable, but questionable, deals, including those involving allies.
In official circles in Delhi, Trump’s return to the White House is widely viewed as a boost for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP-led government that has faced a certain amount of unwelcome scrutiny from the Biden administration and Democratic lawmakers for avidly propagating Hindu nationalist policies domestically, and more, recently, allegedly planning and executing extra-judicial killings in the US and Canada.
A recent Bloomberg analysis of which world leaders would profit or lose from Trump’s return, anticipated that Modi would agree to deals with Washington, without the ‘finger wagging’ he has had to recently endure. It also goes on to state that a Trump presidency may not support Canada’s push to hold the Indian government accountable for the killing of Sikh separatist leader Hardeep Nijjar in British Columbia last June. Trump’s animosity towards and disdain for Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is well known.
Other diplomatic and policy analysts in Delhi suggest that, for assorted security, strategic and commercial considerations, and in consonance with Trump’s personal equation with Modi, Washington’s new administration would summarily move towards concluding the Pannun affair, albeit gainfully, perhaps in exchange for US fighters for the IAF.
No serving or retired Indian military or security official, or diplomat, was willing to be named in commenting on such a sensitive and speculative matter, but many privately conceded that such a ‘trade-off’ could ensue, given Trump’s widely acknowledged ‘transactional’ propensities. “Trump is a typical businessman, forever looking to leverage his advantage for profit,” said a retired three-star IAF officer. It’s quite conceivable that Trump, along with his like-minded cabinet, could foresee a ‘ripe deal’ in settling the Pannun matter to suit a panicked Indian government, by manoeuvring it to their pecuniary benefit.
But what, after all, is the putative MRFA procurement, who are the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) competing for it and how favourably does the US line up in this race?
Delays in inducting some 180 variants of the indigenously developed Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) to replace legacy fighters like the MiG-21’s and 100-115 ageing SEPECAT Jaguars has prompted the MRFA acquisition, the request for proposal (RfP) or tender for which is likely to be dispatched sometime in 2025 or early the following year. In his October presser, ACM Singh had declared that if the under development advanced LCA- Mk2 and the MRFA purchase progress as planned, the IAF could conceivably deploy 36 fighter squadrons over the next decade.
The MRFA procurement envisages importing a squadron of 18 fighters in flyaway condition from a shortlisted OEM, six of whom responded to the IAFs April 2019 request for information (RfI) offering eight fighter types. The remaining 96 platforms would be built indigenously, via a collaborative venture between the qualified OEM and a domestic strategic partner (SP) from either the private or public sector, with progressively enhanced levels of indigenisation in a deal, currently estimated at around $25 billion.
The OEMs who responded to the RfI include Dassault (Rafale), Eurofighter (Typhoon), Sweden’s Saab (Gripen-E), Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and Sukhoi Corporation (MiG-35 ‘Fulcrum-F’ and Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’ respectively) and the US’s Boeing and Lockheed Martin (F/A-18E/F ‘Super Hornet’ and F-15EX ‘Eagle’ II and the F-21, principally an upgraded F-16 derivative, configured specially for the IAF).
In view of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, evaluating the two fuel-intensive Russian fighters for eventual IAF acquisition was, according to senior officers ‘ totally irrational’, considering the grave spares and components crisis the force is facing with regard to its fleet of 259 multi-role Sukhoi-30 MKI’s and some 60 MiG-29UPG fighter-bombers.
“Delhi’s druzhba or friendship with Moscow, which sustained prodigious bilateral military commerce between the two, worth over $70 billion over nearly six decades, seems to have more-or-less run its course,” said former MoD acquisitions advisor Amit Cowshish. The materiel road for India, he added, now leads to Western vendors and towards fast-tracking ‘atmanirbharta‘ to indigenously develop weapon systems and platforms, or to a practical blend of the two, underscored by technology transfers.
The Typhoon had been rejected earlier during trials conducted 2010 onwards for the IAFs binned Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract floated in 2007, as were the Gripen-E and the US’s F-18 and the F-16 – the precursor to the F-21 – on multiple operational capability counts. Moreover, the Gripen-E and the F-21 were single-engine platforms, and though the MRFA RfI had not specified any preference for fighters with single or dual power packs, the IAFs intrinsic preference for the latter remains unstated. And though the OEM’s claimed that their platforms had since been equipped with newer and more advanced technologies and weaponry, the IAF, it seems, remained unimpressed.
The Rafale, on the other hand, is favourably placed in the MRFA sweepstakes, due not only to its operational superiority over its competitors, as acknowledged by the IAF but more recently by the Indian Navy (N), that is negotiating the purchase of 26 Rafale-M (Maritime) fighters for deployment aboard INS Vikrant, India’s indigenously built aircraft carrier. Dassault had also recently secured clearance to establish a fully self-owned maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility near Jewar International airport in Uttar Pradesh to support not just the IAFs fleet of some-50-odd Mirage 2000Hs fighters and eventually 62 Rafales, including 26 of the IN, but also the 42 Rafale’ operated by the Indonesian Air Force, thereby enhancing its MRFA acceptability.
Once the purchase of 26 Rafale-Ms by the IN is completed, the Indian military would have an aggregate of 62 of these French fighters in its inventory. “Adding to these numbers makes eminent commercial, logistical and operational sense”, said military analyst Air Marshal V K ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia (retd). Besides, acquiring supplementary Rafales under the MRFA purchase, he added would also streamline the IAFs diverse fighter catalogue, which currently features seven different aircraft types, sustaining all of which was not only an enduring logistical challenge, but also a hugely expensive affair for the financially overstretched force.
But despite these obvious advantages favouring the Rafale, a slew of recent media reports, quoting unnamed official sources, ruled the French fighter out of the MRFA contest. These stated that the government wanted to ‘play safe’ by pursuing a ‘non-controversial path’ in executing the MRFA buy, since the IAFs 2016 purchase of 36 Dassault Rafale’s for around Rs 59,000 crore via a government-to-government deal, had become hugely contentious and a major parliamentary election issue in the 2019 polls. Allegations of wrongdoing in this purchase had also featured in the Supreme Court, where matters of national security were, perforce, made public, these reports claimed.
Moreover, these media accounts quoted unidentified defence officials as stating that even in the event of the Rafale being shortlisted as the IAFs MRFA choice, Dassault would be unable to supply the platforms for at least 10 years due to pending orders from various other countries. Such delays, the reports added, would undermine the MRFA programme’s urgency in making up IAF fighter squadron numbers swiftly, adversely impacting Rafale’s chances in the MRFA contest.
Hence, this process of elimination leaves only Boeing’s twin-engine F-15EX Eagle II all-weather multirole 4.5 generation fighter in the fray. Derived from the erstwhile McDonnell Douglas F-15E ‘Strike Eagle’ model dating back to the mid-1980s, the upgraded Eagle II conducted its first flight in 2021 and become operational in June 2024 with the US Air Force that, so far, has placed an order for 104 units.
Trump’s possible ‘aircraft-for-Pannun’ gambit would eventually depend on the culpability levels of India’s security establishment in the Sikh activist’s intended killing, and the credibility of its denials which, so far, has been somewhat questionable. If so, it’s conceivable that Trump’s scheme could prevail and perhaps lead to the IAF spending $25 billion to acquire a US-origin fighter.
What are you talking about? In Desert Storm the A-10 was pulled from attacking Republican Guard armored units because they were getting chewed up, guess what replaced the A-10's.... F-16's! The F-16's did a better job at taking out RG armored units AND CAS.
Marine General disagrees with your "opinion" whether F-35 can do CAS.
BTW my original point was about the F-15 being overkill for the DPSA role of the Jaguar in IAF service.
The F-35 was always meant to replace the A-10 and F-16 so, of course, it can do CAS.
But can it provide the persistence and withering firepower at low altitude of an armoured monster like the A-10? No.
During DS, the A-10s didn't have PGM capability which meant they had to operate head-on against AAA (much like RAF Jaguar). That is no longer the case today.
F-16s and F-35 can get into action much faster than the subsonic A-10 and take our targets from on high which makes them a more survivable and responsive option for CAS calls.
And when was the last time the F-35 flew CAS against a near peer military (as against ragtag militia) again?
That's nonsense. People on BRF are likely your regular joe civilians. If someone like Indranil is considered knowledgeable, then that's the limit there.
GSQRs are based on real world requirements, not based on what's technologically available. Some things may appear to look like sci-fi, but that's only to civilians. The greater issue is foreign vendors do not want to develop products specifically for India, they want us to buy what they already have.
What's that got to do with the army?
DRDO themselves admitted to failures in all three areas. NAG failed desert trials early on, caught up only recently. ATAGS has been demoted from all-terrain to sea level. WhAP failed IA's trials as well. All three programs were not official IA programs, just things DRDO developed in-house and thrust down the IA's throats. The same with Arjun.
As for others choosing WhAP and ATAGS, both cleared IA's plains and desert trials, so some countries bought it for such environments. Many countries base their procurement decisions based on what Indian forces discover during trials. I guess only the APC version cleared mountain trials.
I was referring to a ship-based nuclear reactor. The industry needs 20 years to deliver one, as per BARC. And the IN's focus is now on indigenous IEP.
Our deployment process has been rejigged for a 24-hour response, up from the previous 2 weeks in 2002. Meaning, the army has positioned themselves in such a way that civilian leadership has significantly less than 24 hours to stop armed action. Responding to any "exercise" is a civilian problem.
Nonsense spread by vested interests. The "flat refusal" wasn't due to a turf battle, the helicopter in question was simply not capable of operating at those heights, hence the development of LCH. A quick google search would tell you the service ceiling of IAF's then attack helicopters was below 4500m. Only today's Apache and LCH can meet those requirements.
That's not the issue. The issue is the unqualified people in the MoD who do not understand what you just said. They hold programs hostage. The same with politicians. Do you think we don't have an aeroengine because our scientists are morons? You've worked in a DPSU, so imagine a bureaucracy ten times worse.
Just apply common sense and it's very easy to arrive at all the answers you want. A highly aerodynamic structure like a trainer requires 5-8 years of flight testing. 5 years to get the work done, 3 years to bring in fixes. Add 4 years before first flight and 2 years after first flight before the client gets their first delivery. That's HTT-40's timeline, at least a 11 to 14-year process. That's the common sense process here.
With work beginning in 2012 and first delivery expected in 2025, we have a pretty decent 13-year timeline. The problem is in people refusing to believe in reality and instead relying on feelings. And this is how bureaucracy functions. They can't wait 11-14 years, they want it in 3 years. 5 year at best. Then it's retirement time. Good luck telling a 55-year old he won't be around for the party.
LCA? Already done.
LCA cannot adapt to larger engines with its current design, but it can adapt to multiple engines that are in the Kaveri class. Right now, it can handle 3 engines, and up to 5 with some additional work.
The issue here is time, for Mk1/A. Replacing the engine requires new prototypes and a new testing regimen, whereas the IAF wants it today.
Going for GE initially for Mk2 was a financial decision, but political progress made under Obama cemented its status in the program. That's also why F414 was chosen without contest for AMCA. It was in fact going to be the definitive engine before a design overhaul. The counterweights were going to be Rafale via MMRCA and the already present Russian option with MKI and FGFA.
People forget that MKI was mooted as a testbed for Kaveri a few years ago. An AL-31FP would be replaced with Kaveri for that purpose.
Kaveri was designed for 78 kg/s air flow, so pretty much all engines in the sub 4.2m category are suitable for LCA.
LCA can manage RD-93, EJ-200, M88, F404/414 and Kaveri.
They are just not dropfit though, requires a bit of work due to the different interfaces.
It's actually a necessary condition. I don't see India operating nearly 200 Rafales without any say in its development.
I wonder if Indonesia will meet the numbers expectations. UAE could exceed 100.
The last thing the Americans want is India to develop a transactional relationship with the US when they want India as an ally, preferably a treaty ally.
Anyway, unless it's the F-35, they have no chance. A better option is to offer future programs for partnership.
And India dealing with the US at any level with regards to Pannun is just falling into a ridiculous trap.