The fact of the matter, is that the Rafale could never do SEAD.
In France, the doctrine is defined by the Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations. The latter has defined the concept of "Neutralisation of enemy air defences".
I have translated some excerpts for you:
First, an extract from the promulgation letter of 22 July 2022 N° 113/ARM/CICDE/NP :
The Joint Exploratory Concept CEIA-3.6.4_SEAD(2022) entitled "Neutralization of Enemy Air Defences", dated 22 July 2022, is promulgated.
Then some elements that shed light on the reasons for the French doctrine:
From the Vietnam War to recent operations
306. The post-Vietnam era saw the development of advanced anti-radar missiles with sometimes radically different technological approaches. But the evolution has also been true for specialised electronic warfare assets or new air tactics for SEAD operations. In response, the complexity of the adversary's IADS has evolved to complicate targeting and provide resilience to air defence systems. The need for agile, efficient, and increasingly resource-intensive SEAD missions will progressively prove to be a key element for air campaigns.
307. Contrary to some preconceptions, the eradication of Iraqi air defence in 1991 was at least a joint affair, setting an example of what becomes possible when the full spectrum is used. The coalition used air, ground, special forces and naval forces to degrade, destroy and suppress Saddam Hussein's air defences, using a variety of weapons and effects. However, the ensuing years have seen a significant reduction in the number of personnel dedicated to SEAD missions, and a sharp reduction in the joint approach. Yet, much of the success of SEAD missions is due to the ability of coalition forces to combat SDAI in a comprehensive, if not holistic, approach.
308. While there have been some great coalition successes in the SEAD domain over time, there are some pet peeves that can hinder the effectiveness of this type of mission. For example, many still believe that the SEAD mission is to use
AGM88 HARM (or equivalent) missiles on a massive scale, and that this miracle weapon will remove any air defence threat. In the field,
it does not take long to realise that this is not true.
309. In Kosovo, for example, despite the fact that NATO SEAD operations accounted for 12% of total combat sorties, Serbian ground/air systems adapted their tactics to increase their survivability (blind fire, etc.) and, as a result, were able to remain partially operational throughout the conflict. NATO forces fired hundreds of anti-radar missiles in 1999, with very little destructive effect against Serbian air defences. Although the neutralisation of enemy air defences was eventually achieved, this was due more to the fact that Serbian weaponry was inferior and suffered from poor logistics than the effectiveness of dedicated weaponry.
310. The need for greater 'inter-arming' of the SEAD mission was perhaps most evident during the Libyan campaign in 2011. During the Libyan campaign, the neutralisation of the enemy SDAI had to be accomplished, by necessity, with a broader scope than the traditional SEAD assets - which were relatively uncommitted to the operation. Among other solutions, for example, offshore attack helicopters flew missions to hit radar sites, often in coordination with fixed-wing aircraft. Similarly, many of the Libyan regime's relatively defended military targets, such as radars, missile launch sites and communication nodes, were struck by sea-launched cruise missiles.
311. Although Libyan weaponry was old and therefore less advanced, the Libyan SDAI was relatively present, but more importantly, unique. Indeed, the latter often used non-military infrastructure for command, control and communications (C3), which complicated targeting for obvious legal and humanitarian reasons. For example, to counteract the targetting inherent in SEAD missions, the Libyan military used civilian air traffic systems, or even recent on-board commercial aviation technology. In addition to supporting the Libyan civilian defence infrastructure, urban areas were instrumentalised by the Libyan regime, using the inherent potential for collateral damage that they represented. This illustrated one of the many problems associated with the complexity of SEAD missions.
312. Three years later, Russia - determined to radically change the face of potential conflict in Europe - has disseminated a multitude of interlocking S300 and S400 air threats for which the West was neither prepared nor trained. New long-range ground/air systems, integrated and redundant command and control networks, a hodgepodge of weapon free zones and weapon engagement zones, and the ability to orchestrate defence across multiple domains have radically changed the SEAD environment. The term 'Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)' quickly became part of the SEAD lexicon.
[...]
318. The wars of the future will undoubtedly be fought in a hybrid environment. The idea that using a few weapons specifically dedicated to anti-radar can then operate in complete freedom is now over. The possibility of severe casualties if the different components do not plan a real joint operation is therefore very high. Each branch and area must work in coordination to achieve the campaign objectives. In other words, interoperability of SEAD operations is a prerequisite for any future high intensity campaign. Given current military capabilities, the two main categories of targeting (lethal and non-lethal) must be addressed to describe the SEAD capabilities that are currently possible.
319. Kinetic SEAD capabilities can be described as an activity in which forces employ lethal munitions or weapons to neutralise/suppress enemy air defence. While specific air vehicles have been developed to employ SEAD weapons, a variety of effectors can effectively contribute to the SEAD mission with a multitude of resources. In addition to dedicated weaponry such as the
AGM88 used by our allies****, stand-off weapons* or cruise missiles** can be used by various aircraft*** against enemy air defences.
* Such as some versions of the AASM.
** Such as the SCALP and navalised SCALP missiles.
*** French policy in terms of military aviation is to favour the versatility of its aircraft. In the framework of anti-radar combat, the French Air Force deploys conventional means (laser-guided bombs, air-to-surface missiles) in close collaboration with electromagnetic intelligence.
**** So not by the French, not to day and not in the futur, except if the doctrine related to "Neutralization of Enemy Air Defences" promulgated in July 2022 is modified. And this is not part of General Mille's remit.
