National Security Architecture Reforms & Theatre Commands : Discussions

Army, Navy and IAF Continue Spadework on Theatre Commands amid Delays in Appointment of Next CDS​

While the Narendra Modi government is yet to appoint the next Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the Indian military’s plans to transition into integrated theatre commands are in progress, with at least two meetings held since January this year to discuss their structure and other facets of their operations, News18 has learnt.

The latest of these took place in Lucknow last week and was attended by at least three Army commanders and one commander-in-chief each from the Navy and the Indian Air Force (IAF). Prior to that, in January, another discussion between top officers of the three services had taken place in Jaipur.

As per government sources, some internal deliberations on theaterisation had also taken place within the Army in the last week of January. Aside from these meetings, the services are also carrying out internal discussions to fine-tune the modalities.

In the two major tri-service discussions held at the Army’s southwestern command in Jaipur and central command in Lucknow, aspects of employment of theatres in different operational scenarios were discussed, the sources said.

The sources told News18 that the IAF is examining its options and feasibility of employing its resources permanently in different theatres, even as the three services continue fleshing out the finer details of the theaterisation process and reaching a consensus on them.

The Indian Army, Navy and Air Force currently have 17 commands together. The plans, at present, are to roll them into four integrated theatre commands — one maritime theatre command, one air defence command and the two land-based western and eastern theatre commands.

The Army’s northern command and the AOC (J&K) of the IAF will be kept out of the theatre commands at present, keeping in mind security implications.

Driving the theaterisation process was among the top charters of the Chief of Defence Staff and India’s first CDS General Bipin Rawat was actively driving this transition by overseeing a series of studies and simultaneous deliberations between the three services.

As reported by News18 in September last year, the creation of the joint theatre commands was to take three to four years with four commanders-in-chief from the Army, Navy and Air Force first defining the organisational structure of the theatre commands and their composition.

They were to submit their reports within a year, based on which their structure would be finalised.

A senior government official said that the challenge to balance the needs of the three services will continue before the new CDS.

“The current series of meetings between Army’s commanders-in-chief and their equivalents in the IAF and Navy is laying down the groundwork for restructuring of the forces into the various identified theatres. The new CDS, once appointed, would continue from there,” the official said.

Once operational, the western theatre command is likely to be headquartered in Jaipur, while the eastern theatre command will likely be based out of Kolkata or Lucknow.

The air defence command will be headquartered in either Jodhpur, Gandhinagar or Allahabad and the maritime theatre likely in Karwar.

Once the theatre commands are formed, the operations branch from the existing commands will go to the theatre commands first. Subsequently, logistics and other departments will be subsumed into the theatre commands from the existing commands, after which they will cease to exist.
 
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‘Agnipath’ scheme for military has good intentions. But Modi govt should conduct trials first​

From the ongoing Ukraine war, some reminders are knocking on the doors of India’s statecraft and in particular, its defence reforms. Admittedly, the context of the war is different, and therefore, extrapolation would be an erroneous approach. However, since all wars imply the use of violence for political purposes, there is some scope that reveals lessons to inform the trajectory of India’s military reforms. For sure, in the course of time, the Ukraine war will be studied both globally and in India. We examine two issues relevant to the Indian context and immaterial to the future course of the Ukraine war — displacement of the civilian population and the management of military manpower. An examination of both these aspects would provide some useful insights into shaping and wielding India’s military power.


Displacement of civilian population


The attention that Western media has given to the displacement of Ukraine’s civilian population has revealed the nature, scope, and scale of the humanitarian catastrophe caused by Russia’s invasion. Such catastrophes are endemic to most wars of territorial aggression that force changes in a region’s geopolitics. The higher the population density of the contested areas, the greater the scale of suffering for civilians. Seeking refuge by moving to areas that are expected to provide safety, security, food, and habitat is a natural fallout.



In the Indian context, civil wars in neighbouring countries have the potential for causing large masses to seek refuge in India. East Pakistan in 1971 and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) uprising in the late 1980s caused an influx of refugees that resulted in wars. With the trajectory of internal strife in Pakistan perpetually threatening to upend its cohesion, there is a possibility, even if remote, that a civil war could unleash another refugee crisis. In such an eventuality, there is hardly any place for Pakistanis to move except eastwards. The Arabian Sea in the south-west, Afghanistan in the west, and the mountainous terrain in the north hold very little promise of succour.


To those Indians who wish and hope for the implosion of Pakistan as a nation-state, their wishes might turn out to be self-defeating. Pakistan has a population of 229.50 million, and even if one per cent of that population seeks refuge in India, the probability of lighting up India’s communal pot is real. Fueled by regional and global religious extremist forces, India’s social cohesion can be threatened and may eventually cause irreparable damage to it. The threat may seem remote, but that should not be allowed to conceal its lethal nature.


Managing military manpower


India’s contested land borders are already stretching its scarce resources. Among them are the costs of maintaining high-quality, full-time professional Armed Forces based on a voluntary recruitment model. In the Ukraine war, one of the obvious issues that have surfaced is the poor performance of Russian conscripts, whose terms were reduced from 24 months to 12 in 2008. The active-duty military is composed of nearly 25 per cent conscripts. Their poor professional quality and motivation were evident, and Ukraine even utilised the images of Russian prisoners of war conscripts being allowed to speak to their parents as a weapon in its information warfare.


The performance of Russia’s conscript model has some relevance to the current move of introducing the Tour of Duty (TOD) or the Agnipath scheme in India’s Armed Forces. The scheme covers the recruitment of soldiers and not of officers. The three-year tenure, with the provision of pension substituted with a payout, is combined with priority recruitment in the Central Armed Police Forces(CAPF) and some government jobs. The primary driver of the scheme is an attempt to reduce the burgeoning pension payout. The other payoffs cited are of strengthening the connection between society and the military, instilling nationalism among the youth, reducing age profile, and providing an opportunity for the youth to fulfil their aspiration of serving in the Armed Forces.



The TOD path may be paved with good intentions. But to reduce the burgeoning pension outgo problem, the three Services will have to identify a sufficient number of trades that require less time for skilling and whether the three-year turnover adversely impacts military effectiveness. With increased emphasis on replacing manpower with machines, more time will be required for skilling than before. Even an infantry soldier has to be technologically savvy to use a plethora of weapons and communication devices. The moot point is that the three Services would find it extremely difficult to identify trades that can be slotted for the TOD. Without sufficient numbers, the primary aim of reducing pension outgo will not be met.


If the Services do manage to identify sufficient slots, the large turnover resulting from a three-year TOD can have a major impact on military effectiveness. Apart from continuously losing skilled manpower, the problem is one of motivation. Persons opting for the TOD scheme would be drawn from the expanding pool of India’s unemployed and underemployed. A three-year TOD would mostly attract those who are desperately looking for a job. Although recruitment in other agencies has been talked about, the insecurity associated with the lack of guaranteed employment after three years can adversely impact motivation levels. Priority recruitment in other government agencies may hold promise on paper. But in practice, it is easier said than done due to the resistance to such induction by other government agencies that would perceive it as an encroachment on their vacancies. The issue is further connected to seniority and promotion issues.


Instead of the TOD scheme, the Narendra Modi government could consider the Human Capital Investment Model for India’s national security system as explained in this Takshashila Discussion Document. The solution proposed envisages an inverse lateral movement of armed forces personnel into the national security system. Inverse, because original agencies like the CAPF do the recruiting and send them to the Armed Forces for five to seven years, after which they return to their parent agency. The Armed Forces are relieved of their pension outgo and military effectiveness is sustained. The parent agency benefits from the enhanced skills and experience. More importantly, the model can be scaled up substantially and linked to common skill sets in various segments of the government.


The TOD scheme should first undergo trials before finding military acceptance. There could be a political push to implement the scheme without trials. But due to obvious concerns about the impact on operational effectiveness, the military leadership must insist otherwise.


Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
 
There is a thought process that the post of the CDS and the Secretary DMA could be split. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC), which is equivalent to a ‘commander’ rank, could be made the Secretary DMA and he will report to the CDS,” a source in the defence and security establishment said.

 
There is a thought process that the post of the CDS and the Secretary DMA could be split. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC), which is equivalent to a ‘commander’ rank, could be made the Secretary DMA and he will report to the CDS,” a source in the defence and security establishment said.


Babugiri, babugiri and more babugiri. CDS, CDIS, CDSSIS, CDISAS. All ball talks. We still do not have a CDS. Shows how important this post is. No contigency planning. Only 100 dimensional chanakya chess.
 
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Babugiri, babugiri and more babugiri. CDS, CDIS, CDSSIS, CDISAS. All ball talks. We still do not have a CDS. Shows how important this post is. No contigency planning. Only 100 dimensional chanakya chess.
Its been months, still not appointed new CDS. Either CDS post was given to him as a compensation for what he has done to political leadership or GOI might have found CDS position has affected military modernisation & interservice co ordination in a bad way.
Any way i am. Happy that new CDS is not appointed, i beleive its really an unnecessary post.
 
Its been months, still not appointed new CDS. Either CDS post was given to him as a compensation for what he has done to political leadership or GOI might have found CDS position has affected military modernisation & interservice co ordination in a bad way.
Any way i am. Happy that new CDS is not appointed, i beleive its really an unnecessary post.
Most Likely Lt. Gen. YK Joshi (Retd.) will be appointed the CDS. He has retd as the Northern Commander on 31st Jan and is senior to all present Chiefs.
 
If
Most Likely Lt. Gen. YK Joshi (Retd.) will be appointed the CDS. He has retd as the Northern Commander on 31st Jan and is senior to all present Chiefs.
If at all they gonna for CDS, and If GOI wants a professional personality as CDS, they should appoint RKS Bhadauria as next CDS. He who knows the meaning of "mutual respect". And probably will give boost to the materialisation of MRFA tendering.

My personal opinion.
 
If
If at all they gonna for CDS, and If GOI wants a professional personality as CDS, they should appoint RKS Bhadauria as next CDS. He who knows the meaning of "mutual respect". And probably will give boost to the materialisation of MRFA tendering.

My personal opinion.

Gen Joshi is a legend. Was involved in both Kargil and the Galwan response. Also, he happens to be a China expert.
 
Gen Joshi is a legend. Was involved in both Kargil and the Galwan response. Also, he happens to be a China expert.
CDS is like a managerial post, more than expertise in specific field it require some other qualities like not being a loud mouth, professionalism & beleive in synergy etc.
 
CDS is like a managerial post, more than expertise in specific field it require some other qualities like not being a loud mouth, professionalism & beleive in synergy etc.

And your opinion is Gen Joshi is not all this? Maybe, you need to spend a bit of time reading up on him. You think Generals in the IA do not know management?
 
And your opinion is Gen Joshi is not all this? Maybe, you need to spend a bit of time reading up on him. You think Generals in the IA do not know management?

This statement has given enough damage to us, and i dont think other IA generals have different opinion on what Rawat ji said on IAF.
 

This statement has given enough damage to us, and i dont think other IA generals have different opinion on what Rawat ji said on IAF.

This has more to do with the IAF wanting to protect its turf and the General putting them in their place. Understand context before jumping the gun. The IAF wanted to control the Apaches too. To do what? The weakest chink in our armour today is the IAF and will remain so till the mid 2030s.
 
This has more to do with the IAF wanting to protect its turf and the General putting them in their place. Understand context before jumping the gun. The IAF wanted to control the Apaches too. To do what? The weakest chink in our armour today is the IAF and will remain so till the mid 2030s.
IAF knows what to do & what should be the its structure, not a random IA general. If his poking in to IAF's nose is making sense asper u, go and see the post#232
 
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IAF knows what to do & what should be the its structure, not a random IA general. If his poking in to IAF's nose is making sense asper u, go and see the post#232
Enjoy your denial as in all threads. There was a reason the CDS post was created. And your logic of its a management position. Dude, anything over Colonel is a management position. Are you even aware of the courses they need to do?

Please stop responding if you have no idea.
 
His statement , his behavior during the tenure will tell everything.
IAF knows what to do & what should be the its structure, not a random IA general. If his poking in to IAF's nose is making sense asper u, go and see the post#232

Ahh so you are also one of those in the likes of HS Panag and the entire Chandigarh lobby who disrespect and think Gen Bipin Rawat was no good for the armed forces cuz for no apparent reasons many in forces didn't like him. I honestly wonder how do you people think of yourself as so high and knowledgeable when you are just a someone who buys an trash made trust me bro propaganda on the internet.