Georges Bridel / 06/27/2021 The US fighter jet is good for networked bombing attacks, but bad for Switzerland, says the long-time fighter specialist.
Ed. In response to various publications on fighter jet procurement in the Infosperber, the internationally known Swiss aviation expert Georges Bridel sent us a pointed statement on the controversial arms business. Infosperber puts them up for discussion in full.
Procurement F-35: an incomprehensible preference of the DDPS
In the ongoing discussion about the procurement of a new fighter jet, it is largely only about the aircraft types available for selection. The context, that is, the security and defense policy framework conditions that are essential for Switzerland, is lost.
Exclusion of the security policy context
The requirements of modern air warfare were addressed with mention of the worldwide dangers. But there is largely no realistic classification in the Swiss context: What specific scenarios is Switzerland affected by? This evidently gives rise to priorities that have not been discussed in politics either. For example air-to-ground use. In particular, it is also about the inevitable division of tasks between us and the neighbors, how the most efficient security can be achieved together.
F-35 with a different profile than what we need it to be
The deficit of the F-35 in the air police: A rapid intervention (technical jargon "QRA") fulfills the F35 far less well than the European competitors Eurofighter and Rafale. The time required by the F-35 to intercept an aircraft at 11,000 meters with a climb to 11 kilometers (typical flight altitude of commercial aircraft) and subsequent tracking (supersonic) is at least 50 percent higher than that of a high-performance standard fighter. This takes over 1 minute longer compared to the competition. In aerial warfare, these are ages. The F-35 could not be procured based on this criterion alone: the competition literally flies away from it. The stealth capability of the F-35 plays only a minor role in defensive air defense.
The F-35 is designed for complex and networked air-to-ground air war scenarios (bomb attacks by the editor) with several aircraft. Such an F-35 fleet depends on the support of a variety of other means, such as reconnaissance aircraft, early warning aircraft ("AWACS"), high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft ("HALE"), tanker aircraft, satellites and - depending on the threat in the target area - escort fighters. This is a classic NATO alliance in the NATO scenario. Switzerland will never be able to afford that in a sovereign manner.
Apart from the key question already mentioned: For which Swiss scenarios actually? This would only make sense if the Swiss Air Force also took part in “out-of-area” missions (deployments far beyond the national borders, possibly with the relocation of the aircraft. D. Ed.) And for your own safety together with the other Europeans on the periphery of Europe, namely where real military threats arise - and not over our territory.
Extensive dependence on the USA
As part of the above-mentioned NATO integration, a complete dependency on US industry and the US Department of Defense (DoD) arises. The control particularly affects the most important cross-linking agent, the highly secret "MADL" Datalink. This means that the F-35 is not directly compatible with other European aircraft such as the Eurofighter, Rafale, F-16, Gripen, etc. - but only to a limited extent via the conventional so-called Link-16.
- In contrast to the operation of the F-16 in the smaller NATO countries, the USA operates the F-35 operation exclusively with each individual country and thus hinders the cooperation and the exchange of data with one another.
Opaque cost calculation?
The report in the NZZ, according to which the F-35 (according to Armasuisse) has much lower operating costs than the competition, is apparently based on the simulation of the F-35, which saves flight hours.
On what basis is this result based? According to reports, based on analyzes by the manufacturer Lockheed-Martin. If the three fellow competitors were not asked for such an analysis, the VBS would have a real problem. Because all competitors have extensive simulation facilities with which the flight hours and thus the operating costs of the entire fleet can be reduced considerably. If each individual ability were assessed using such a calculation, unfavorable properties of the F-35 could be offset against the lower flight hour costs and thus put into perspective. That would be absurd.
Now, when it comes to operating costs, it is never possible to rely on the manufacturer alone. Is manufacturer A more honest than manufacturer B? Information on the future development of flight hour costs based on statistics or analyzes must be available to all competitors and presented in a completely transparent manner.
What happens if these costs later turn out to be unexpectedly higher than in the offer? It is completely impossible to provide prospective cost information in relation to the ongoing development of the system (so-called "upgrades"). As the entire trade press and the pronouncements of national control authorities can be seen, the big costs arise there - and from that the whole controversy up to the filthy
naming of the F-35 program ("A piece of shit" the editor.) By a former US -Minister of Defense.
An example: The upgrade block 4 for the 48 F-35s of the RAF / Royal Air Force (software, weapons integration) alone costs between 1 and 2 billion GBP (pound sterling). By the way: The UK cannot afford more than the 48 F-35Bs for the time being and thus equip the two large aircraft carriers with only 24 units each. However, this minus a number of aircraft that have to stay on land for maintenance, training and upgrades anyway. That's pretty poor!
If the DDPS relies only on the manufacturer's information, the whole exercise is not productive.
Missing control instruments?
These as yet unconfirmed facts raise questions about the professionalism of the evaluation. What is the state of the control bodies for armaments procurement? How was it possible that all authorities (Armasuisse, army staff, politics, parliaments) waved through the procurement of Gripen without resistance, even though it was clearly proven back then (2013) that this procurement was not feasible? We should have received the first plane in 2018. Now the first aircraft in Sweden will not be delivered until 2023 (according to the Swedish Air Force in January 2021). This would have doubled our delivery times, namely from 5 to 10 years. It's not about the quality of the Gripen E, which would have been good enough for our services if it existed ...
Obviously, there is a lack of the necessary control bodies in Switzerland as they exist abroad: in the USA the GAO (General Accounting Office) and the congress hearings, in Germany the Federal Audit Office and the very effective parliamentary committees for defense and budget. In France there are a number of control bodies such as the Cour des Comptes, the Inspection générale des Armées and parliamentary commissions.
In Switzerland there are security and financial policy commissions and committees. But the control instruments are obviously underdeveloped.
Conclusion
- The debate about the new aircraft today is far too focused on air warfare and air-to-ground. For decades, however, the "emergency" of the Swiss Air Force has been the responsibility of the air police and the temporary establishment of protection zones at international conferences and major events.
There are always warlike scenarios, but on the periphery of Europe. Air war-like conditions over Western Europe are unlikely. The transition from air police to air warfare is fluid. In any case, the air war, in which Switzerland is affected and possibly plays a role, requires close and fully established cooperation with the neighbors. Even if the networked F-35 aircraft promise a high level of effectiveness in air-to-ground operations (bombing by the editor), it is incomprehensible that the preference for the F-35 is now primarily to serve this air force capability. This preference was only noted as a marginal phenomenon in the previous drafts, including referendums. The evaluation of the fighter aircraft should be scrutinized by independent professional companies in strategy, technology, business, military issues and politics. Because it cannot be assumed that politics and the people will be convinced by a questionable F-35 template.
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