Syrian Civil War - News & Discussions

Some possibility of it having been stage-managed by traitors within Assad's circle.

 

The Russians were not told about it. I guess Assad was told to leave at the last minute.
 

Ah, yes. Let's remove Al Qaeda and ISIS from the UN terror list.

They should apply for NATO membership.
 
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randomradio said:
It's temporarily bad for Iran and Russia, the region is within their sphere of influence after all. The Iranians need a proper conventional military that can at least challenge Turkey, particularly an air force. And Russia needs to build up its capabilities vis-a-vis NATO at the higher end. So my guess is they are going to use the Trump era to buy time to arm themselves before getting back into it. So nothing directly before 2030.
Click to expand...
While Russia under a Trump presidency might be able to rearm somewhat, I think Iran is in for a world of hurt. Trump went out of his way to make life difficult for Iran in his first term and back then the Iranians were more open to reconciliation. The Iranians recently plotted to assassinate Trump and undermine his campaign... and if we know nothing else about Trump it's that he is vengeful and capricious. Iran will be on the back foot for the next 4 years. Israel will be given a blank check to do whatever and Trump's State dept will put pressure towards balkanizing Iran. The Turks will also smell the blood in the water and expand their influence wherever they can.

randomradio said:
In the meantime, I think the US, Europe and Israel will have to deal with the Turkey-led HTS/ISIS combo. Russia and Iran can find opportunities to turn these groups into their own proxies. There's a limit to how much the US and Israel can maintain peace among the Sunni rebels with just money. They will eventually become fat and restless. The average Sunni-joe is not an expert in politics.
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I personally don't think either Europe or America really care if Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism or Netanyahu's greater-Israel or whatever else triumphs as long as the regional hegemon doesn't interfere with Western trade interests. If anything the West will give Erdogan more leeway to expand in the Levant in exchange for stemming refugee streams.

At the end of the day, I wouldn't be surprised if the West just continues to arm both emerging sides, and let them wear each other out. A new middle-eastern cold war. As for the Sunni fanatics, they'll have enough to chew on by decimating the Kurds, Shiites, Alawaites, etc in the region for another 10-15 years before they start to spill out.

randomradio said:
I have a different take on the Azeris. The Ukraine war, the fall of Syria, and India's entry into Armenia and the Middle East have made things more peaceful around the Caspian. Even Turkey is going to want a peaceful eastern border while they deal with Syria. With Armenia militarizing very quickly, I don't think the Azeris are going to create new problems with Iran. Certainly not when both sides are seeing a thaw in relations.
Click to expand...
We'll have to wait and see. I am not optimistic about the future of the Armenian state in the near-mid term. Even if they have begun to rearm, they cannot resist an Azerbaijan supported by both Turkey and Israel. Especially after they turned their backs on Russia and Iran is being crippled. The Azeris may not move into Iran proper but they will absolutely move to make their corridor a reality and spread more influence into bordering Iranian regions.

All of this will be while Iran will have to endure assassinations against their generals and scientists as well as numerous air strikes against their weapons depots, nuclear facilities and whatever IRGC installations remain throughout the region. The Turks, Israelis, and Americans will erode them over time.

I believe the Iranians will run towards nuclear breakout over the next few years. I am doubtful this will be enough to reverse the strategic losses though. They will have to minituraize the warheads and create enough warheads to present a credible deterrance. Again, while suffering countless airstrikes. I do think that the Iranians will be able to presevere themselves in the way North Korea has. But that will be the extent of it. They will almost certainly lose their grip on outlaying provinces but their core will be protected.
 
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randomradio said:
The GCC is supporting the SDF fighting from Kurdish territory. They are also supporting the rebel actions in the South, like Darra.

But the removal of Assad has become a problem for them. They had normalized relations with Assad over the last few years, and now they are back to square one. I guess they did not want new problems beyond Iran and Yemen.

If they successfully form that corridor with the US to Kurdish territory, I think the creation of the buffer zone should work out for them. For India too, this will provide us much easier access to Europe via Israel.

If the West finds a way to militarily deal with HTS and ISIS as well, this would actually become a big victory for the GCC. They can deal with Yemen after that.
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Makes sense. I knew in the past they skirmished with Iran and vied for influence with Turkey. I was kind of under the impression that, nowadays, the Gulf States are just trying to stay neutral and focus on their future economic development. They will play nice with everybody and try to stay under the radar.

I think they realize that without hard power they are just ripe for the taking. I wouldn't be surprised to see some hardliner Islamist movements try to topple these monarchies for becoming too liberal.
 
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Still remember when it all started.... First time we saw such detail camera footages of tanks, cities & humans getting shattered..... Those "alla-hu-snack bar" shoutings while firing & missing all their targets will be missed.
 
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Ginvincible said:
Makes sense. I knew in the past they skirmished with Iran and vied for influence with Turkey. I was kind of under the impression that, nowadays, the Gulf States are just trying to stay neutral and focus on their future economic development. They will play nice with everybody and try to stay under the radar.

I think they realize that without hard power they are just ripe for the taking. I wouldn't be surprised to see some hardliner Islamist movements try to topple these monarchies for becoming too liberal.
Click to expand...
Well the Gulf state are blessed to be under protectorate of USA, also they deal with other player's who can help them out if any Islamist moments starts, Syrian civil war won't have reached at these level if the CIA didn't had poured money initially, as per my view gulf state can't project power in the middle East, as they lack the military might & military brains, that's why Iranians & Turkish have so much of influence in the Arab States conflicts, Saudis, UAE, Qatar do have the money but they don't have influence,

Iran is on back foot, loosing the ground in Syria, hezabolah being half dead, IRGC pulled back to Iran, they suffering losses losing thier generals, and Russians leaving the middle East, they are now at the weakest stage of the last two decade,
 
_Anonymous_ said:
Ah ! Assad's been deposed eh ? That's pretty quick by ME standards too. One week & poof , he's gone. Wonder what's in store for the region & its players ?

Let's crystal gaze & (ATTEMPT to) make some predictions (R̶S̶T̶ s̶t̶y̶l̶e̶) , shall we :-

For starters the Syria in the form we knew it is history. It's going to be a fractured & severely contested land from here on. But that's a no brainer. I'd try to see what does Syria rather its constituents hold for both the short & long term .

In the short term Assad's tribe the Alawites have had it . They're going to be the most persecuted sect in Syria & the ME with no fall back options too. Their only protector in the immediate region the Hezbollah is down though not out. I'd expect them or what remains of them to seek shelter in Lebanon mostly , some enclaves in Syria in their strong hold & the rest will try for Turkey.

Ditto for the rest of the minorities there except ones who border countries like Lebanon or Israel with decent populations of their own there like the Druze. They will carve out their own enclaves with their safety guaranteed by Israel & the west i.e the US.

The Sunni areas will by the looks of it be dominated by the ISIS / AQ type militias which means it keeps simmering like a cauldron. That means it continues to be a threat to all its neighbours especially the Shi'as & the Kurds. This also means that the whole region would keep relying on outside powers to stabilize the situation there. Long term - too much of enforced religion & its practises sickens its believers & turns them away from it like we're seeing in Iran & will see in AfPak.

The biggest losers right now are Assad his tribe , loyalists & his backers - Iran which most likely precipitated / helped precipitate the events of 10/7 is down though not out with their neo Sassanid Empire masquerading as a Shi'a enterprise in total shambles. Their proxies be it the Hamas or Hezbollah are severely debilitated with the regime in Syria having collapsed.

I suspect all those groups opposed to the mullahs in Iran will start baring their fangs be it in Iran or outside most notably in Iraq & Lebanon where forces inimical to Iran & its proxies will raise their heads .

Russia is now officially a power in decline. It's just about managing to keep itself afloat what with the war in Ukraine & unable to secure its own interests outside where all regimes associated with it are gradually collapsing or shifting allegiance in order to survive.

Turkey in the short run may appear to be the winner but in the long run will be the biggest loser. The collapse of a country like Syria apart from Iraq previously ( whatever territorial integrity one's seeing today is a a sham in Iraq ) unleashes the Kurds who after enjoying 3 plus decades of quasi freedom in Iraq & now in Syria will be hard to contain as & when these forces start raising the banner of revolt in Turkey.

The regime in Iran is on borrowed time. If there were strong speculations on this before it's official now. When & how it collapses is a matter of debate but collapse it will , not without a - hum toh doobe sanam , saath tumhe bhi le doobenge attitude . A collapse here also encourages the Kurds to strive for freedom in the West /NW / SW of Iran.

Israel is the biggest beneficiary of this entire churn in the region. But they'd not know peace & what's more they know it besides being used to it . Wish our people who take our freedoms & privileges for granted learn something from the Jews in Israel (for in the coming decades especially from mid century onwards we'd be severely tested what with the events in Bangladesh serving as a wake up call eventually spilling over to the NE & the rest of India apart from Paxtan which is on the brink of an implosion ). The latter are prepared to defend it with their very lives.

As usual the US can get away like it always has ( 9/11 was & will be an aberration ) playing God across the world. Timely lesson for everyone who takes the US & its capabilities lightly. Nicely played this one with Israel ( getting it into a CF with Hezbollah ) & Turkey ( long term sucker & loser thanks to Sultan Turdogan's extremely short sighted policies laying the seeds of Turkey's own possible disintegration down the years & if not that the power of leverage with outside powers notably the US ).

I count this one as another feather in the cap of Irish Joe & a parting shot much like his pardon of his son to the establishment in the US for treating him shabbily. They'd appreciate him better once he's gone. Ditto for the Paddy's . They'd know the true worth of Irish Joe decades if not centuries after he's kicked the bucket in true Paddy style.

As far as the GCC , Egypt & Jordan go they were casual by standers right from the beginning with not much at stake here for they didn't stake anything , learning from the past one assumes that all that glitters isn't gold especially in the ME resisting all temptations , though a more mundane explanation could also detail the reasons they weren't too involved nor wanted to be so for they had too much of their own internal problems on the plate , that needed handling.

Trust I've covered all the quarters here.
Click to expand...

This analysis of events in post-Assad Syria is full of conjecture and is based on a number of historical and geopolitical dynamics. Here are a few salient and critical points to raise:

A fractured Syria: The idea of a Syria divided into ethnic and sectarian enclaves (Alawites, Druze, Sunnis, Kurds) is credible. The fall of Assad would probably lead to a political vacuum in which non-state actors such as jihadist militias (e.g. ISIS, AQ) could gain a foothold in Sunni areas, while minorities seek safe havens.

The fate of the Alawites: Their likely persecution is logical, as they have been associated with the Assad regime. Their withdrawal to Lebanon or to their Syrian coastal strongholds (Latakia, Tartous) is plausible. Hezbollah, although weakened, would remain a potential protector because of its sectarian and strategic links.

The Kurds and Turkey: This prediction of a Turkey that wins in the short term but loses in the long term is interesting. The emergence of autonomous Kurdish areas in Syria (as in Rojava) could galvanise Kurdish movements in Turkey, complicating internal stability for Ankara. Turkey sees this as an existential threat.

Iran and its proxies: The analysis describes a significant weakening of Iran, whose strategy of regional influence (via Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias and support for Assad) would be undermined. However, Iran has shown remarkable resilience despite international pressure. A collapse of the Iranian regime remains speculative, even if economic and political attrition is a real factor.

Russia: The comment about Russia as a declining power is a valid one, especially in a context where it is struggling to support several fronts (Ukraine, Syria). However, Russia would not easily give up its strategic access to the Mediterranean (Tartous naval base).

Israel: The analysis describes Israel as the beneficiary of this instability, which is debatable. Admittedly, the collapse of hostile regimes weakens adversaries such as Iran and Hezbollah, but a chaotic Syria could also strengthen Sunni terrorist groups. Israel's northern border would become even more volatile.

United States: The idea that the United States could take advantage of the situation thanks to its capacity for global influence is a classic one. Its limited intervention in Syria (compared with Iraq) has enabled it to minimise losses while playing a key role in the fight against ISIS.

Arab neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, GCC): Their active non-involvement in the Syrian crisis is well noted. These states preferred to avoid costly adventures, focusing their efforts on their own internal challenges (economy, social stability).
 
The evacuation of Russian forces from Tartous and Latakia is a major development in the Syrian theatre:

1. The loss of Tartous and Latakia: a strategic blow for Russia

Tartous is Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean. It serves as an essential logistical support point for Russian naval operations in this strategic area.

Latakia is a vital military hub where Russia has deployed troops and systems such as the S-400 to protect the Assad regime and consolidate its influence in Syria.

The loss or evacuation of these positions would mean a major setback for Russia in the Middle East, reducing its ability to :

Project its naval power into the eastern Mediterranean.

Maintain a dominant role in Syria, where it had established itself as the guarantor of the Assad regime since 2015.

2. Possible causes of the evacuation

Collapse of the Assad regime: If the fall of Damascus is confirmed, Russia may find its positions untenable without solid logistical and political support on the ground.

Increased security threats: The rapid deterioration of the situation in Syria and the emergence of hostile armed groups, particularly in Sunni regions, could pose a direct threat to Russian installations.

Limited capabilities: Russia is already under extreme pressure on its military and logistical resources as a result of the war in Ukraine. It may have decided to prioritise Ukraine rather than getting bogged down in a Syrian theatre that has become too costly.

3. Geopolitical consequences

a) For Russia :

A strategic humiliation, reducing its credibility as a global power capable of protecting its allies.

The end of a Russian military presence in the eastern Mediterranean would diminish its influence with regional players, notably Iran and Turkey.

A signal that Russia can no longer sustain its external commitments in the face of pressure in Ukraine.

b) For the United States and NATO:

The evacuation of the Russians opens up a strategic vacuum that the United States could exploit to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean. This is in line with recent US strikes against ISIS.

It simplifies allied operations in the region by eliminating a potential disruptive actor.

c) For Iran and its allies:

Iran, Assad's main partner along with Russia, risks being isolated in Syria. Pro-Iranian Shiite militias, such as Hezbollah, will have to manage local pressure on their own without Russian logistical support.

A weakening of the Moscow-Tehran-Damascus axis would benefit their regional adversaries (Israel, Turkey and the Gulf monarchies).

d) For Turkey:

Turkey could seek to exploit this vacuum to strengthen its positions in northern Syria and weaken the Kurds.

However, this could also exacerbate instability on its borders in the event of a total collapse of the Assad regime.

e) For Israel :

Israel would benefit directly from a weakening of the Shiite axis supported by Russia and Iran.

This would facilitate Israeli strikes against Iranian positions in Syria, without having to avoid Russian systems such as the S-300 and S-400.

4. The Russian fleet in the Mediterranean

The evacuation of the Russian fleet, in particular the frigate Admiral Grigorovich, shows that Moscow prefers to preserve its ships rather than expose them to a deterioration in the situation.

A possible ban on access to Tartous would prevent Russia from maintaining a continuous military presence in the Mediterranean, limiting its maritime ambitions in this key area.

5. Future scenarios

If the Russian evacuation continues, there are several possible scenarios:

The United States and its allies (NATO, Israel) occupy the strategic vacuum left by Moscow.

Iran tries to compensate for the Russian withdrawal by strengthening its own positions, but with limited means.

Turkey and Sunni Islamist groups could intensify their fight for control of the territories left vacant.

Prolonged chaos in Syria, with a possible resurgence of ISIS in uncontrolled areas.

Conclusion

If Russia does indeed evacuate its positions in Syria, it would mark a tectonic shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. Russia, pressed by the war in Ukraine, no longer seems in a position to play a stabilising or dominant role in the region. This offers a window of opportunity for regional powers and the United States, but also increases the risks of fragmentation and chaos in Syria.
 
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So now we are going to see ISIS 2.0 version. Looks like there is a sinister project to redraw the boundaries from egypt to himalayas.
 
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This collapse of Assad is a deal between Russia and USA. You will see that in next few days the Ukraine-Russia war will also end with large territorial gains for Russia.
 
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Picdelamirand-oil said:
This analysis of events in post-Assad Syria is full of conjecture and is based on a number of historical and geopolitical dynamics. Here are a few salient and critical points to raise:

A fractured Syria: The idea of a Syria divided into ethnic and sectarian enclaves (Alawites, Druze, Sunnis, Kurds) is credible. The fall of Assad would probably lead to a political vacuum in which non-state actors such as jihadist militias (e.g. ISIS, AQ) could gain a foothold in Sunni areas, while minorities seek safe havens.

The fate of the Alawites: Their likely persecution is logical, as they have been associated with the Assad regime. Their withdrawal to Lebanon or to their Syrian coastal strongholds (Latakia, Tartous) is plausible. Hezbollah, although weakened, would remain a potential protector because of its sectarian and strategic links.

The Kurds and Turkey: This prediction of a Turkey that wins in the short term but loses in the long term is interesting. The emergence of autonomous Kurdish areas in Syria (as in Rojava) could galvanise Kurdish movements in Turkey, complicating internal stability for Ankara. Turkey sees this as an existential threat.

Iran and its proxies: The analysis describes a significant weakening of Iran, whose strategy of regional influence (via Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias and support for Assad) would be undermined. However, Iran has shown remarkable resilience despite international pressure. A collapse of the Iranian regime remains speculative, even if economic and political attrition is a real factor.

Russia: The comment about Russia as a declining power is a valid one, especially in a context where it is struggling to support several fronts (Ukraine, Syria). However, Russia would not easily give up its strategic access to the Mediterranean (Tartous naval base).

Israel: The analysis describes Israel as the beneficiary of this instability, which is debatable. Admittedly, the collapse of hostile regimes weakens adversaries such as Iran and Hezbollah, but a chaotic Syria could also strengthen Sunni terrorist groups. Israel's northern border would become even more volatile.

United States: The idea that the United States could take advantage of the situation thanks to its capacity for global influence is a classic one. Its limited intervention in Syria (compared with Iraq) has enabled it to minimise losses while playing a key role in the fight against ISIS.

Arab neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, GCC): Their active non-involvement in the Syrian crisis is well noted. These states preferred to avoid costly adventures, focusing their efforts on their own internal challenges (economy, social stability).
Click to expand...
I almost forgot THE most salient & critical point to consider from Europe's or specifically the EU's & by extension le Francais PoV .

In the recent past every time there's an upheaval in the near East or the Middle East or the Maghreb or the Sahel , it's the EU which bears the brunt of it in the form of illegal immigration. Why should it be different this time when it wasn't so earlier ?

I'm expecting further waves of illegal immigrants into EU especially Western Europe including France now that a fresh cycle of violence & retribution occurs greatly facilitated by Turdogan's Turkiye.

What that holds for the future of French society will manifest itself in another 2-3 generations which means 60-75 years likely earlier but early indications of which may well be seen now in the form of early elections ..

www.bbc.com

Michel Barnier: Macron to address nation after government collapse

The prime minister will stay on as caretaker while President Emmanuel Macron chooses a successor.
www.bbc.com www.bbc.com
 
Ginvincible said:
While Russia under a Trump presidency might be able to rearm somewhat, I think Iran is in for a world of hurt. Trump went out of his way to make life difficult for Iran in his first term and back then the Iranians were more open to reconciliation. The Iranians recently plotted to assassinate Trump and undermine his campaign... and if we know nothing else about Trump it's that he is vengeful and capricious. Iran will be on the back foot for the next 4 years. Israel will be given a blank check to do whatever and Trump's State dept will put pressure towards balkanizing Iran. The Turks will also smell the blood in the water and expand their influence wherever they can.
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Gotta agree with Iran being in the doghouse now. But I think whether things work out for them or not depends on how Trump's negotiations go with Russia and China. In the meantime, the Iranians have to work on their own domestic industry anyway, not to mention aerospace deals take years to materialize.

Politically too, Russia and China will prioritize Iran, even if in secret. There are rumors about Iran shopping for aircraft in both countries.

Ginvincible said:
I personally don't think either Europe or America really care if Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism or Netanyahu's greater-Israel or whatever else triumphs as long as the regional hegemon doesn't interfere with Western trade interests. If anything the West will give Erdogan more leeway to expand in the Levant in exchange for stemming refugee streams.
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The West is divided when it comes to Erdogan and Turkey. For example, Cyprus, Greece and France. Erdogan is working against Western interests in Libya as well.

Ginvincible said:
At the end of the day, I wouldn't be surprised if the West just continues to arm both emerging sides, and let them wear each other out. A new middle-eastern cold war. As for the Sunni fanatics, they'll have enough to chew on by decimating the Kurds, Shiites, Alawaites, etc in the region for another 10-15 years before they start to spill out.
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Fighting the Kurds exposes the Sunnis to the US. We can't rule out terrorism in the West. Even one major attack could bring the West into Syria, and I won't be surprised if that's the plan. These guys are literally Al Qaeda, this time with their own country.

Ginvincible said:
We'll have to wait and see. I am not optimistic about the future of the Armenian state in the near-mid term. Even if they have begun to rearm, they cannot resist an Azerbaijan supported by both Turkey and Israel. Especially after they turned their backs on Russia and Iran is being crippled. The Azeris may not move into Iran proper but they will absolutely move to make their corridor a reality and spread more influence into bordering Iranian regions.
Click to expand...

There are a few things to note. For now, the Kurds can now concentrate entirely on Turkey and its proxies, so Turkey's going to face new problems soon. It's possible that Russia and Iran will fund the Kurds in that project, not just the US.

Israel is yet to deal with Hezbollah. While they will like Iran to be distracted elsewhere, like your Azeri calculus, any new action on Lebanon will mean pissing off a lot of liberals in the West. So first they will have to find a way to destabilize Syria and push Turkey into some sort of conflict. Even Turkey is Israel's enemy after all, never mind Al Qaeda.

Iran is not crippled, at least when it comes to dealing with their immediate neighbors. I won't be surprised if Iran ends up intervening in Armenia. Pushing them out of Syria means they have both the financial muscle and manpower to do new things elsewhere. Worst case, Iran could end up acting against the Azeris first. They quite literally have nothing to do right now. Best case, they stay quiet in Lebanon and quietly foment trouble for the Turks.

Then there's Trump. I'm not sure how well he's gonna receive an Azeri invasion of Armenia for the Zanzegur Corridor. And I'm not sure if the Azeris will be interested in trying anything new against Armenia until he's gone. Trump has attacked the Democrats for their inaction against the Azeris and he has good relations with both countries.

The biggest wild card is Russia. People incorrectly believed they backed out of Syria on their own, instead we now know Assad's traitors decided to push them out. So even they are now being presented with new options. The Armenians have gained the opportunity for Russia to act more neutrally with them. If that fails, then that's going to be a problem. Worst case, Russia pressures the Azeris to go for the corridor, but that can happen only if Russia's relations with Trump goes bad. It's in Russia's interests to stay more focused on Ukraine/NATO as well.

So I believe that if the Armenians find more neutral ground with Russia and create good relations with Trump, they will have a pretty peaceful decade.

Ginvincible said:
All of this will be while Iran will have to endure assassinations against their generals and scientists as well as numerous air strikes against their weapons depots, nuclear facilities and whatever IRGC installations remain throughout the region. The Turks, Israelis, and Americans will erode them over time.
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Iran will just threaten to go nuclear. Unless the Americans invade Iran, the Iranians have other options.

Ginvincible said:
I believe the Iranians will run towards nuclear breakout over the next few years. I am doubtful this will be enough to reverse the strategic losses though. They will have to minituraize the warheads and create enough warheads to present a credible deterrance. Again, while suffering countless airstrikes. I do think that the Iranians will be able to presevere themselves in the way North Korea has. But that will be the extent of it. They will almost certainly lose their grip on outlaying provinces but their core will be protected.
Click to expand...

Threatening to make nukes is a lot more advantageous than actually having them at this point. They quite literally need to build an air force and BMD before they go nuclear, or it makes no difference; preferably Russian or Chinese. The Israelis held back the first time the Iranians attacked, and pursued limited engagement the second time, so I don't think they have the stomach to go full monty on Iran yet.

The West won this round, so the best course of action for Russia is to concentrate on Ukraine and for Iran to just stay quiet, both could continue fomenting trouble elsewhere; Africa, the Balkans and the ME.
 
Ginvincible said:
Makes sense. I knew in the past they skirmished with Iran and vied for influence with Turkey. I was kind of under the impression that, nowadays, the Gulf States are just trying to stay neutral and focus on their future economic development. They will play nice with everybody and try to stay under the radar.
Click to expand...

What you said is the goal, but they still have to deal with all the main threats.

So yeah, the Sunni Islamists are slowly becoming the GCC's main threat. That and low birthrate.

Ginvincible said:
I think they realize that without hard power they are just ripe for the taking. I wouldn't be surprised to see some hardliner Islamist movements try to topple these monarchies for becoming too liberal.
Click to expand...

It's quite ironic, but 50% of the people in Saudi/UAE and 70% in Iran no longer identify with Islam. It will be interesting to see what becomes of Iran after Khamenei dies, he's already 85. And Saudi is just one assassination away. We could see the rise of communism in the GCC and Iran over the next decade.

www.dw.com

Middle East: Are people losing their religion? – DW – 02/04/2021

Recent surveys indicate strongly that across the Middle East and Iran, almost half the population is loosening their ties to Islam. Governments have reacted differently to calls for reforms of institutional religion.
www.dw.com www.dw.com

I guess one of the biggest reasons is literacy has helped them understand the Quran, so blind faith has given way to reason.
 
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Picdelamirand-oil said:
The evacuation of Russian forces from Tartous and Latakia is a major development in the Syrian theatre:

1. The loss of Tartous and Latakia: a strategic blow for Russia

Tartous is Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean. It serves as an essential logistical support point for Russian naval operations in this strategic area.

Latakia is a vital military hub where Russia has deployed troops and systems such as the S-400 to protect the Assad regime and consolidate its influence in Syria.

The loss or evacuation of these positions would mean a major setback for Russia in the Middle East, reducing its ability to :

Project its naval power into the eastern Mediterranean.

Maintain a dominant role in Syria, where it had established itself as the guarantor of the Assad regime since 2015.

2. Possible causes of the evacuation

Collapse of the Assad regime: If the fall of Damascus is confirmed, Russia may find its positions untenable without solid logistical and political support on the ground.

Increased security threats: The rapid deterioration of the situation in Syria and the emergence of hostile armed groups, particularly in Sunni regions, could pose a direct threat to Russian installations.

Limited capabilities: Russia is already under extreme pressure on its military and logistical resources as a result of the war in Ukraine. It may have decided to prioritise Ukraine rather than getting bogged down in a Syrian theatre that has become too costly.

3. Geopolitical consequences

a) For Russia :

A strategic humiliation, reducing its credibility as a global power capable of protecting its allies.

The end of a Russian military presence in the eastern Mediterranean would diminish its influence with regional players, notably Iran and Turkey.

A signal that Russia can no longer sustain its external commitments in the face of pressure in Ukraine.

b) For the United States and NATO:

The evacuation of the Russians opens up a strategic vacuum that the United States could exploit to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean. This is in line with recent US strikes against ISIS.

It simplifies allied operations in the region by eliminating a potential disruptive actor.

c) For Iran and its allies:

Iran, Assad's main partner along with Russia, risks being isolated in Syria. Pro-Iranian Shiite militias, such as Hezbollah, will have to manage local pressure on their own without Russian logistical support.

A weakening of the Moscow-Tehran-Damascus axis would benefit their regional adversaries (Israel, Turkey and the Gulf monarchies).

d) For Turkey:

Turkey could seek to exploit this vacuum to strengthen its positions in northern Syria and weaken the Kurds.

However, this could also exacerbate instability on its borders in the event of a total collapse of the Assad regime.

e) For Israel :

Israel would benefit directly from a weakening of the Shiite axis supported by Russia and Iran.

This would facilitate Israeli strikes against Iranian positions in Syria, without having to avoid Russian systems such as the S-300 and S-400.

4. The Russian fleet in the Mediterranean

The evacuation of the Russian fleet, in particular the frigate Admiral Grigorovich, shows that Moscow prefers to preserve its ships rather than expose them to a deterioration in the situation.

A possible ban on access to Tartous would prevent Russia from maintaining a continuous military presence in the Mediterranean, limiting its maritime ambitions in this key area.

5. Future scenarios

If the Russian evacuation continues, there are several possible scenarios:

The United States and its allies (NATO, Israel) occupy the strategic vacuum left by Moscow.

Iran tries to compensate for the Russian withdrawal by strengthening its own positions, but with limited means.

Turkey and Sunni Islamist groups could intensify their fight for control of the territories left vacant.

Prolonged chaos in Syria, with a possible resurgence of ISIS in uncontrolled areas.

Conclusion

If Russia does indeed evacuate its positions in Syria, it would mark a tectonic shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. Russia, pressed by the war in Ukraine, no longer seems in a position to play a stabilising or dominant role in the region. This offers a window of opportunity for regional powers and the United States, but also increases the risks of fragmentation and chaos in Syria.
Click to expand...

It's not possible for the Russians to keep the naval base. Any attempt to retain it would mean they have to support it from the Baltic, quite an implausible exercise . And they evacuated the S-400 from Latakia even before Hama was captured. It's a total loss for the Russians.

Most Iranians are withdrawing to Iraq and Lebanon. If the US creates their corridor, that will shut Iran out of Syria.

And it's unclear if the Alawites can hold the coast. There's no one to supply them unless NATO picks up the tab.

Right now, Al Qaeda is "allied" with Israel and the West. But once they cement themselves in Syria, they are likely to become a threat to both Israel and Europe in the long term, especially if the US continues supporting the Alawites and Kurds. HTS could push for the handover of Daraa to them. So there's plenty of potential for new friction points between HTS and the West.
 
vstol Jockey said:
This collapse of Assad is a deal between Russia and USA. You will see that in next few days the Ukraine-Russia war will also end with large territorial gains for Russia.
Click to expand...

If the Russians manage to hold Tartus, then it's possible. But if the Russians are forced to evacuate, then it's a meaningless deal for them.

And the Democrats want the war in Ukraine to continue. They are planning to pump more weapons and money in before handing over power to the Republicans. Given the situation, if there is any peace deal, it can only happen under Trump. Lavrov is openly complaining about Biden, so that shows there's no deal.
 
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