The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions
- Thread starter Ashwin
- Start date
SDF destroyer, fishing boat collide in East China Sea
KYODO NEWS - Mar 31, 2020
A Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer and a Chinese fishing boat collided on the high seas off the coast of Shanghai on Monday, the Japan Coast Guard said.
No one was injured in the incident that occurred at around 8:30 p.m. in the East China Sea, the Self-Defense Forces' Joint Staff said. The MSDF said its destroyer and the Chinese vessel, which had 13 crew members aboard, are both still able to sail under their own power.
According to the Defense Ministry, the destroyer Shimakaze received damage on its port side. The vessel was on patrol after departing from Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture on Sunday morning.
The ministry said it will cooperate with the coast guard's investigation while launching a probe panel within the MSDF as well.
SDF destroyer, fishing boat collide in East China Sea
KYODO NEWS - Mar 31, 2020
A Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer and a Chinese fishing boat collided on the high seas off the coast of Shanghai on Monday, the Japan Coast Guard said.
No one was injured in the incident that occurred at around 8:30 p.m. in the East China Sea, the Self-Defense Forces' Joint Staff said. The MSDF said its destroyer and the Chinese vessel, which had 13 crew members aboard, are both still able to sail under their own power.
According to the Defense Ministry, the destroyer Shimakaze received damage on its port side. The vessel was on patrol after departing from Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture on Sunday morning.
The ministry said it will cooperate with the coast guard's investigation while launching a probe panel within the MSDF as well.
SDF destroyer, fishing boat collide in East China Sea
Australia’s Big Stake in India’s Military Reorganization
COVID-19 will no doubt have many long-term consequences for the Indo-Pacific region that we can now only begin to imagine. One consequence that is easy to imagine in the face of a distracted and internally focused United States will be Australia’s greater reliance on regional security partners, such as Japan and India. This includes an ever-greater stake in the effectiveness of the Indian military, and especially its navy.
India has just started to reorganize its outdated and highly inefficient structures. There have been positive developments, but a lot of problems ahead. Rhetoric aside, Australia will need a sober understanding of India’s likely future abilities to act as a regional security provider across our shared oceanic space.
First, the good news. Last December, after decades of inaction, the government appointed General Bipin Rawat as India’s first chief of defense staff, theoretically bringing India’s three armed services under unified command for the first time. The chief of defense staff supposedly provides a single point of advisor to the government on military affairs. But Rawat will still only be regarded as the “first among equals” with the other service chiefs, and the extent of his powers is not yet clear.
The chief of defense staff replaces an organizational model for India’s armed forces that was put in place as a temporary measure by the British in 1947. Importantly, this appointment is just the first step in what may become the most significant military reorganization ever undertaken by India.
From independence, Nehru and the Congress Party kept the military divided, siloed, and deeply subordinated to the civilian bureaucrats of the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the military has often been only at the periphery of governmental decision-making about defense issues.
Tight civilian control of India’s military ensured that it stayed well clear of politics. Unlike many post-colonial states, India has not suffered from coups or the hijacking of resources or foreign policy by the military. Even today, the idea of a single chief of armed forces remains somewhat controversial. Fears of militarism and military coups likely still exist within the opposition Congress Party.
But the system also comes with significant costs to military effectiveness. Indian armed forces are highly disjointed with each of the services doing its own strategy, war planning and capability planning. The army would, for example, have little if any input into the navy’s strategy or doctrine and vice versa.
Operational command was also separated. The army and air force each maintain their own western, central, and eastern commands, but they are all located in different places, making joint operations difficult.
One of Rawat’s first acts upon his appointment as chief of defense staff was to propose the reorganization of the Indian armed forces into unified theater commands, in addition to tri-service commands for cyber, space, and special forces. This has the long-term potential to transform India’s armed forces into a modern joint military and considerably enhance its effectiveness.
Indeed, the navy, the only service with a strong power projection mentality, has been among the strongest supporters of joint commands. The navy currently runs India’s only theater command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, seen by some as important to India’s ability to project power into the Pacific. The Indian Navy, which inherited the British Royal Navy’s global perspectives, sees its role as protecting India’s interests wherever they may be, primarily between Hormuz and Singapore, but also potentially much further afield.
But the navy might find that the proposed reorganization will actually be restrictive. Rawat has also proposed merging the navy’s eastern and western commands, headquartered on India’s east and west coasts, into a single new “Peninsular Command.” This smacks of continentalist thinking, positioning the navy as principally a coastal defense force whose main job is to defend India’s maritime borders.
There are also real concerns about India’s defense (and, particularly, naval) spending. Growth in spending has largely stalled in the face of a weak economy, and we should assume that there will likely be major cuts in defense spending in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.
That could hit India’s military modernization plans hard. Its bloated ground force of 1.2 million regular troops and 960,000 reserves means that the army swallows up most of the defense budget. There may be little left to spend on modernization.
The Indian Navy has long been the “Cinderella Service” with the smallest budget. In recent years, its share of the defense budget has fallen further, from 18 percent in 2012–13 to 13 percent in 2019–20. To put this in context, Australia probably spends considerably more overall than India on maritime security (although Australia’s maritime spending is split between the navy and air force).
Budget cuts have already hit the Indian Navy’s plans. Its total planned ships by 2027 have now been reduced from 200 to 175. Future acquisitions of P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft may be reduced. As foreshadowed by this author in 2018, Gen. Rawat is also questioning whether the navy should go ahead with its planned third aircraft carrier, suggesting instead that it make greater use of airfields on India’s island territories. The navy argues that this would not be an acceptable substitute.
These developments contrast with China’s military modernization program. This included the establishment of five fully integrated theater commands in 2016, bringing together the army, air force, navy, and rocket forces. The People’s Liberation Army’s troop numbers are also steadily being reduced, freeing up money for modernization and naval spending.
Australia has a big stake in the ability of the Indian military, and particularly its navy, to deliver effective outcomes right across our shared maritime domain. We need to ask some hard questions about India’s capabilities as a regional security provider in the Indian Ocean in coming decades.
Australia’s Big Stake in India’s Military Reorganization - War on the Rocks
COVID-19 will no doubt have many long-term consequences for the Indo-Pacific region that we can now only begin to imagine. One consequence that is easy to imagine in the face of a distracted and internally focused United States will be Australia’s greater reliance on regional security partners, such as Japan and India. This includes an ever-greater stake in the effectiveness of the Indian military, and especially its navy.
India has just started to reorganize its outdated and highly inefficient structures. There have been positive developments, but a lot of problems ahead. Rhetoric aside, Australia will need a sober understanding of India’s likely future abilities to act as a regional security provider across our shared oceanic space.
First, the good news. Last December, after decades of inaction, the government appointed General Bipin Rawat as India’s first chief of defense staff, theoretically bringing India’s three armed services under unified command for the first time. The chief of defense staff supposedly provides a single point of advisor to the government on military affairs. But Rawat will still only be regarded as the “first among equals” with the other service chiefs, and the extent of his powers is not yet clear.
The chief of defense staff replaces an organizational model for India’s armed forces that was put in place as a temporary measure by the British in 1947. Importantly, this appointment is just the first step in what may become the most significant military reorganization ever undertaken by India.
From independence, Nehru and the Congress Party kept the military divided, siloed, and deeply subordinated to the civilian bureaucrats of the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the military has often been only at the periphery of governmental decision-making about defense issues.
Tight civilian control of India’s military ensured that it stayed well clear of politics. Unlike many post-colonial states, India has not suffered from coups or the hijacking of resources or foreign policy by the military. Even today, the idea of a single chief of armed forces remains somewhat controversial. Fears of militarism and military coups likely still exist within the opposition Congress Party.
But the system also comes with significant costs to military effectiveness. Indian armed forces are highly disjointed with each of the services doing its own strategy, war planning and capability planning. The army would, for example, have little if any input into the navy’s strategy or doctrine and vice versa.
Operational command was also separated. The army and air force each maintain their own western, central, and eastern commands, but they are all located in different places, making joint operations difficult.
One of Rawat’s first acts upon his appointment as chief of defense staff was to propose the reorganization of the Indian armed forces into unified theater commands, in addition to tri-service commands for cyber, space, and special forces. This has the long-term potential to transform India’s armed forces into a modern joint military and considerably enhance its effectiveness.
Indeed, the navy, the only service with a strong power projection mentality, has been among the strongest supporters of joint commands. The navy currently runs India’s only theater command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, seen by some as important to India’s ability to project power into the Pacific. The Indian Navy, which inherited the British Royal Navy’s global perspectives, sees its role as protecting India’s interests wherever they may be, primarily between Hormuz and Singapore, but also potentially much further afield.
But the navy might find that the proposed reorganization will actually be restrictive. Rawat has also proposed merging the navy’s eastern and western commands, headquartered on India’s east and west coasts, into a single new “Peninsular Command.” This smacks of continentalist thinking, positioning the navy as principally a coastal defense force whose main job is to defend India’s maritime borders.
There are also real concerns about India’s defense (and, particularly, naval) spending. Growth in spending has largely stalled in the face of a weak economy, and we should assume that there will likely be major cuts in defense spending in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.
That could hit India’s military modernization plans hard. Its bloated ground force of 1.2 million regular troops and 960,000 reserves means that the army swallows up most of the defense budget. There may be little left to spend on modernization.
The Indian Navy has long been the “Cinderella Service” with the smallest budget. In recent years, its share of the defense budget has fallen further, from 18 percent in 2012–13 to 13 percent in 2019–20. To put this in context, Australia probably spends considerably more overall than India on maritime security (although Australia’s maritime spending is split between the navy and air force).
Budget cuts have already hit the Indian Navy’s plans. Its total planned ships by 2027 have now been reduced from 200 to 175. Future acquisitions of P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft may be reduced. As foreshadowed by this author in 2018, Gen. Rawat is also questioning whether the navy should go ahead with its planned third aircraft carrier, suggesting instead that it make greater use of airfields on India’s island territories. The navy argues that this would not be an acceptable substitute.
These developments contrast with China’s military modernization program. This included the establishment of five fully integrated theater commands in 2016, bringing together the army, air force, navy, and rocket forces. The People’s Liberation Army’s troop numbers are also steadily being reduced, freeing up money for modernization and naval spending.
Australia has a big stake in the ability of the Indian military, and particularly its navy, to deliver effective outcomes right across our shared maritime domain. We need to ask some hard questions about India’s capabilities as a regional security provider in the Indian Ocean in coming decades.
Australia’s Big Stake in India’s Military Reorganization - War on the Rocks
Exploring The Potential of An India-Japan Naval Treaty
April 16, 2020
by Siddharth Anil Nair
Photo : Ships from the Indian navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S. Navy are underway together during a group sail signifying the end of Malabar 2016
For decades, Japan’s military capability has been restrained by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, the introduction of two documents—the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (2015) (henceforth, the “Guidelines”), and Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security (2016) (henceforth, the “Legislation”)—have expanded the conditions that allow for Japan’s use of force, and reduced the geographic limitations of the Japanese Self-Defence Force’s (JSDF) involvement beyond national waters.
This commentary will suggest that these two documents can inspire a potential India-Japan Naval Treaty that could help secure the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) against Chinese expansionism.
The Guidelines And The Legislation
The dynamic shift in the geopolitics of the IPR and the East and South China Seas (ECS; SCS)—courtesy of Chinese expansionism, North Korean belligerence, and US policy uncertainty—has expedited Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambition to amend Article 9 of the Constitution. This is aimed at developing credible defensive capabilities independent of the US’ security umbrella.
The foundation of this ambition was laid down by the 2015 Guidelines, which broadened Japanese participation in US and other allies’ missions around the world by including mutual asset protection, logistical support, non-combatant rescue operations, etc. The February 2020 deployment of helicopter-destroyer Takanami to the Gulf of Oman is a direct consequence of this document. The ‘information gathering mission’ is operating far beyond Japanese waters, and in close proximity to the US-led naval protection operation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Photo : INS Kolkata(D63) destroyer entering the Cohin dock.
The 2016 Legislation was a result of parliamentary consensus, and includes new rules-of-engagement (RoE) for Japanese troops involved in UN peacekeeping missions, protection of Japanese nationals abroad, conducting ship-inspection missions, etc. The most significant change is the introduction of ‘Three New Conditions’ that determine the level of Japan’s military responses to attacks not only at home, but also in a “foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan…” when it threatens Japan’s survival.
While still an “exclusively defence-oriented” policy, the changes instituted by the Guidelines and Legislation, along with increases in defence expenditure and power projection capabilities (such as the purchase of 147 F-35 A/B fighter aircraft and the reconfiguration of helicopter-carrier Izumo), allow Japan to manifest a proactive, independent geo-strategic posture vis-à-vis China. These qualitative changes are a bonus to Indian interests in the region, and offer a blueprint to take the joint India-Japan approach to the IOR and IPR, to a higher level.
What Could An India-Japan Naval Treaty Look Like ?
Both India and Japan uphold the principles of democracy, freedom of navigation, a rules-based order, and open trade. This is reflected in their “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR) and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” policies, respectively. These convergent principles have resulted in synergies in humanitarian aid/disaster relief (HA/DR) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities, while simultaneously encouraging joint-development of transcontinental infrastructure and economic partnerships in the IOR and IPR.
However, of serious concern today are the common Indian and Japanese threat perceptions of China’s naval and military build-up in these regions. Both India and Japan wish to develop adaptable and rapid responses to Chinese expansionism, and their main priorities are securing trade routes, oil supplies, and deterring Chinese incursions into sovereign territory. Their involvement in the US-India-Japan-Australia Quadrilateral, along with other trilateral initiatives, have been formulated to achieve these priorities. However, US policy uncertainty in the post-Trump era leads to the consideration of both India and Japan developing a security arrangement insulated from changing US priorities.
Photo : JS SAMIDARE (DD106) and INS Rajput(D51) during a joint exercise off the coast of Vizag.
This arrangement could come in the form of a naval treaty based on existing bilateral convergences. Designing such a treaty now will be effective given the expansion in Japanese RoEs and its use of force. Official discussions on this subject, among other cooperative arrangements, have already gained momentum; in 2019, negotiations began for an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
A potential naval treaty between India and Japan could be based on Sections A and B of the Guidelines, i.e. ‘Cooperative Measures from Peacetime’, and ‘Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security’ respectively. These two sections cover the mechanisms that determine cooperation in areas of intelligence/reconnaissance, air and missile defence, logistical support, training and exercises etc. The ‘Three New Conditions’ of the Legislation on the other hand could be extended to India and its interests in the IOR and IPR (given that the Diet approves of this extension). Further, the Japanese Defence Programs and Budget for 2020 outlines the need to improve cyber, space, electronic warfare, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities, which perfectly match India’s current capacity-building initiative in the maritime space, particularly submarine, surveillance, and BMD technologies.
Conclusion
While Chinese dominance in the region must be curtailed primarily through economic means—such as infrastructure, aid, trade, etc.—securing these interests calls for a comprehensive linkage of naval priorities as well. India-Japan maritime surveillance and BMD cooperation could lead to more tangible results than the informal Quadrilateral, or sole reliance on the US. The legal changes to the JSDF’s operational capabilities create conditions for a naval treaty between India and Japan, and based on a non-coercive principle of mutual security, such a treaty could operate as a powerful force in the IOR, IPR, and SCS.
Siddharth Anil Nair is a Research Intern with the South East Asia Research Programme (SEARP), IPCS
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16042...tial-of-an-india-japan-naval-treaty-analysis/
April 16, 2020
by Siddharth Anil Nair
Photo : Ships from the Indian navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S. Navy are underway together during a group sail signifying the end of Malabar 2016
For decades, Japan’s military capability has been restrained by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, the introduction of two documents—the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation (2015) (henceforth, the “Guidelines”), and Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security (2016) (henceforth, the “Legislation”)—have expanded the conditions that allow for Japan’s use of force, and reduced the geographic limitations of the Japanese Self-Defence Force’s (JSDF) involvement beyond national waters.
This commentary will suggest that these two documents can inspire a potential India-Japan Naval Treaty that could help secure the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) against Chinese expansionism.
The Guidelines And The Legislation
The dynamic shift in the geopolitics of the IPR and the East and South China Seas (ECS; SCS)—courtesy of Chinese expansionism, North Korean belligerence, and US policy uncertainty—has expedited Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambition to amend Article 9 of the Constitution. This is aimed at developing credible defensive capabilities independent of the US’ security umbrella.
The foundation of this ambition was laid down by the 2015 Guidelines, which broadened Japanese participation in US and other allies’ missions around the world by including mutual asset protection, logistical support, non-combatant rescue operations, etc. The February 2020 deployment of helicopter-destroyer Takanami to the Gulf of Oman is a direct consequence of this document. The ‘information gathering mission’ is operating far beyond Japanese waters, and in close proximity to the US-led naval protection operation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Photo : INS Kolkata(D63) destroyer entering the Cohin dock.
The 2016 Legislation was a result of parliamentary consensus, and includes new rules-of-engagement (RoE) for Japanese troops involved in UN peacekeeping missions, protection of Japanese nationals abroad, conducting ship-inspection missions, etc. The most significant change is the introduction of ‘Three New Conditions’ that determine the level of Japan’s military responses to attacks not only at home, but also in a “foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan…” when it threatens Japan’s survival.
While still an “exclusively defence-oriented” policy, the changes instituted by the Guidelines and Legislation, along with increases in defence expenditure and power projection capabilities (such as the purchase of 147 F-35 A/B fighter aircraft and the reconfiguration of helicopter-carrier Izumo), allow Japan to manifest a proactive, independent geo-strategic posture vis-à-vis China. These qualitative changes are a bonus to Indian interests in the region, and offer a blueprint to take the joint India-Japan approach to the IOR and IPR, to a higher level.
What Could An India-Japan Naval Treaty Look Like ?
Both India and Japan uphold the principles of democracy, freedom of navigation, a rules-based order, and open trade. This is reflected in their “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR) and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” policies, respectively. These convergent principles have resulted in synergies in humanitarian aid/disaster relief (HA/DR) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities, while simultaneously encouraging joint-development of transcontinental infrastructure and economic partnerships in the IOR and IPR.
However, of serious concern today are the common Indian and Japanese threat perceptions of China’s naval and military build-up in these regions. Both India and Japan wish to develop adaptable and rapid responses to Chinese expansionism, and their main priorities are securing trade routes, oil supplies, and deterring Chinese incursions into sovereign territory. Their involvement in the US-India-Japan-Australia Quadrilateral, along with other trilateral initiatives, have been formulated to achieve these priorities. However, US policy uncertainty in the post-Trump era leads to the consideration of both India and Japan developing a security arrangement insulated from changing US priorities.
Photo : JS SAMIDARE (DD106) and INS Rajput(D51) during a joint exercise off the coast of Vizag.
This arrangement could come in the form of a naval treaty based on existing bilateral convergences. Designing such a treaty now will be effective given the expansion in Japanese RoEs and its use of force. Official discussions on this subject, among other cooperative arrangements, have already gained momentum; in 2019, negotiations began for an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
A potential naval treaty between India and Japan could be based on Sections A and B of the Guidelines, i.e. ‘Cooperative Measures from Peacetime’, and ‘Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security’ respectively. These two sections cover the mechanisms that determine cooperation in areas of intelligence/reconnaissance, air and missile defence, logistical support, training and exercises etc. The ‘Three New Conditions’ of the Legislation on the other hand could be extended to India and its interests in the IOR and IPR (given that the Diet approves of this extension). Further, the Japanese Defence Programs and Budget for 2020 outlines the need to improve cyber, space, electronic warfare, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities, which perfectly match India’s current capacity-building initiative in the maritime space, particularly submarine, surveillance, and BMD technologies.
Conclusion
While Chinese dominance in the region must be curtailed primarily through economic means—such as infrastructure, aid, trade, etc.—securing these interests calls for a comprehensive linkage of naval priorities as well. India-Japan maritime surveillance and BMD cooperation could lead to more tangible results than the informal Quadrilateral, or sole reliance on the US. The legal changes to the JSDF’s operational capabilities create conditions for a naval treaty between India and Japan, and based on a non-coercive principle of mutual security, such a treaty could operate as a powerful force in the IOR, IPR, and SCS.
Siddharth Anil Nair is a Research Intern with the South East Asia Research Programme (SEARP), IPCS
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16042...tial-of-an-india-japan-naval-treaty-analysis/
Australia pitches for trilateral cooperation with India, Indonesia
By Dinakar Peri & Suhasini Haidar
NEW DELHI:, April 23, 2020 13:54 IST
File photo of Barry O’Farrell | Photo Credit: AFP
We should build on last year’s successful trilateral maritime security workshop with Indonesia to identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean, says Barry O’Farrell, Australian High Commissioner-designate
India and Australia will face common challenges in the Indo-Pacific as the COVID-19 pandemic is stretching much of the world’s governmental capacity, said Barry O’Farrell, Australian High Commissioner-designate, in an address to the National Defence College (NDC) while calling for greater cooperation especially stressing on trilateral cooperation between India, Australia and Indonesia.
In this regard, observing that cooperation between India and Australia in Southeast Asia was a natural fit, he said in the address through videoconference, “As a starting point, we should build on last year’s successful trilateral maritime security workshop with Indonesia to identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean.”
In a separate development, the Australian High Commission, in coordination with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), gave a ride to India’s Ambassador to Indonesia Pradeep Rawat and his family in one of the repatriation flights to Australia that had a stopover at Denpasar in Indonesia, official sources said.
“Australia was very happy and keen to help two of our strongest Indo-Pacific partners, India and Indonesia, in this matter,” diplomatic sources said adding the trilateral cooperation had been growing and would continue to be important as we considered the implications of COVID-19 for Indo-Pacific regional order.
Interoperability
Stating that COVID-19 would not necessarily change the nature of threats faced but would hasten the pace at which they were developing, Mr. O’Farrell said even allowing for COVID, the Indo-Pacific would continue to be the engine of the global economy in the decades to come.
On the likely impact of the pandemic on the global and regional dynamics, he said it would take time to play out. “But I see a U.S. far more cautious about exercising global leadership than in the past. I see even faster shifts in the Indo-Pacific power balance, with an associated sharpening of strategic competition. And an even more factious multilateral system,” he stated.
On enhancing bilateral cooperation, he said there were many ways the two could reinforce each other’s efforts and one of the ways was “we can make defence facilities available to each other to expand our militaries’ respective operational reach.” This was already an evolving area with a logistics support agreement in the final stages of being concluded.
The High Commissioner designate also referred to the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region which is emerging as a regional hub for monitoring maritime movements and cooperation. “We’re glad to be contributing a Liaison Officer to it in due course,” he stated.
He also noted the increasingly common platforms operated by the two militaries acquired from the U.S., the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft, and India’s soon-to-be-acquired MH-60 Romeo multi-role helicopters.
Australia pitches for trilateral cooperation with India, Indonesia
By Dinakar Peri & Suhasini Haidar
NEW DELHI:, April 23, 2020 13:54 IST
File photo of Barry O’Farrell | Photo Credit: AFP
We should build on last year’s successful trilateral maritime security workshop with Indonesia to identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean, says Barry O’Farrell, Australian High Commissioner-designate
India and Australia will face common challenges in the Indo-Pacific as the COVID-19 pandemic is stretching much of the world’s governmental capacity, said Barry O’Farrell, Australian High Commissioner-designate, in an address to the National Defence College (NDC) while calling for greater cooperation especially stressing on trilateral cooperation between India, Australia and Indonesia.
In this regard, observing that cooperation between India and Australia in Southeast Asia was a natural fit, he said in the address through videoconference, “As a starting point, we should build on last year’s successful trilateral maritime security workshop with Indonesia to identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean.”
In a separate development, the Australian High Commission, in coordination with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), gave a ride to India’s Ambassador to Indonesia Pradeep Rawat and his family in one of the repatriation flights to Australia that had a stopover at Denpasar in Indonesia, official sources said.
“Australia was very happy and keen to help two of our strongest Indo-Pacific partners, India and Indonesia, in this matter,” diplomatic sources said adding the trilateral cooperation had been growing and would continue to be important as we considered the implications of COVID-19 for Indo-Pacific regional order.
Interoperability
Stating that COVID-19 would not necessarily change the nature of threats faced but would hasten the pace at which they were developing, Mr. O’Farrell said even allowing for COVID, the Indo-Pacific would continue to be the engine of the global economy in the decades to come.
On the likely impact of the pandemic on the global and regional dynamics, he said it would take time to play out. “But I see a U.S. far more cautious about exercising global leadership than in the past. I see even faster shifts in the Indo-Pacific power balance, with an associated sharpening of strategic competition. And an even more factious multilateral system,” he stated.
On enhancing bilateral cooperation, he said there were many ways the two could reinforce each other’s efforts and one of the ways was “we can make defence facilities available to each other to expand our militaries’ respective operational reach.” This was already an evolving area with a logistics support agreement in the final stages of being concluded.
The High Commissioner designate also referred to the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region which is emerging as a regional hub for monitoring maritime movements and cooperation. “We’re glad to be contributing a Liaison Officer to it in due course,” he stated.
He also noted the increasingly common platforms operated by the two militaries acquired from the U.S., the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft, and India’s soon-to-be-acquired MH-60 Romeo multi-role helicopters.
Australia pitches for trilateral cooperation with India, Indonesia
Got the original transcript :
Australia-India relations and the Western Pacific
Address to the National Defence College by Australian High Commissioner-designate, Barry O’Farrell
22 April 2020
Address to the National Defence College by Australian High Commissioner-designate, Barry O’Farrell
22 April 2020
Introduction
Good morning. It’s a real pleasure to join you today. I’d like to extend my thanks to Air Marshal Choudhury for the opportunity to do so. This is a valuable chance for me to speak with you because almost as soon as I arrived in New Delhi, the COVID-19 crisis enveloped us all. I haven’t yet been able to visit the NDC, though I remain keen to do so, and I’m very pleased we could arrange this teleconference in the meantime.
As you might imagine in recent weeks my focus has largely been on providing consular support to Australians stranded in India because of the flight ban. And on finding ways to do the business of diplomacy by distance; hardly a traditional introduction to diplomatic life !
But it’s important that we keep our eyes on the horizon – on the things that matter to our nations in the long term. So I’m glad to be engaging on defence and strategic issues, and with you all, even if remotely. Regrettably, this morning my time is restricted and I can only join you for an hour as we are about to announce further repatriation flights for our citizens.
However the timing of this engagement is auspicious. On Saturday Australia and New Zealand will commemorate ANZAC day. It’s a chance for us to reflect on the sacrifices our service members made in the First World War and subsequent conflicts. For me it will also be a day of personal reflection, as the son of a career soldier and the father of an infantry officer.
For Australia and India, it’s an important reminder of how far back our defence relationship goes. Fourteen thousand Indian soldiers fought at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles, which was Australia’s most remembered battle. So you could say our defence relationship goes back more than a century.
The National Defence College has a sterling reputation for producing thoughtful leaders. That’s why we’ve sent students here nearly every year since 1966, including of course former Governor-General of Australia, General Sir Peter Cosgrove. It’s also why I’m pleased that our next Defence Adviser to New Delhi, Group Captain Terry Deeth, joins you on NDC course 60. Terry, I’m looking forward to working with you.
The COVID-19 crisis reminds us that more than ever we need leaders who – like General Cosgrove – can confront ambiguity. Who think creatively, not just critically. And who act decisively. I have every confidence that the NDC and the Diamond Jubilee course are up to the challenge.
Part 2
I’ve been asked to talk about the India-Australia relationship, and about the geopolitics of the Pacific, right when COVID-19 is prompting many in the international community to question strategic assumptions. Our strategic thinkers are asking :
- What does the pandemic mean for the US’s global leadership? For its strategic influence relative to China ?
- Will COVID cause a longer-term global retreat into nationalism and protectionism ?
- Which countries will emerge from the crisis stronger than others, and capable of shaping the post-COVID world ?
They’re fascinating questions, the answers to which will emerge over your time at NDC. But for our discussion today I’ll make two key points.
Firstly, Australia’s fundamental national values won’t change, even as our strategic environment does. We’re a country committed to rule of law. To political, economic and religious freedom. Liberal democracy. And equality. Those values fundamentally shape Australians’ way of life – and our approach to strategy and diplomacy. Regardless of COVID-19’s lasting impacts on the world, Australia will always seek a strategic environment where the rights of all states are respected. Where open markets facilitate the flow of free trade. And where disputes are managed peacefully, legally and without coercion.
Secondly, I can’t predict the future. But I’m bold enough to say this: If the pandemic is to have any influence on Australia’s strategy, it will be to accelerate the very trends that brought Australia and India so close together, and have shaped our approach to the Indo-Pacific. I’d like to explore this second point for a moment, because if I’m right, now is the time for us to redouble our efforts and work on shaping the post-COVID world.
Part 3
My predecessor Harinder Sidhu is a big fan of the NDC, and spoke there regularly. She outlined the trends that were shaping Australia’s strategic outlook, and in turn guiding the approaches we articulated in our Foreign Policy White Paper and associated Indo-Pacific strategy. These documents describe the shift of global power from West to East. To the Indo-Pacific in particular – a region projected to deliver over two thirds of the world’s growth.
Even allowing for COVID, the Indo-Pacific will continue to be the engine of the global economy in the decades to come. Military spending reflects the economic weight of the Indo-Pacific. Six of the world’s ten biggest military spenders are in this region.
But we are also seeing deepening rivalries and growing strategic competition. And international law and institutions coming under greater pressure. Including ASEAN, an institution that both India and Australia recognise as core to regional security and stability.
In fact nations are becoming more tempted to use power coercively. Across the Indo-Pacific we are seeing increasing strategic competition driving exploitation of some of the more fragile developing states. In the race to secure economic and strategic advantage through port access and military reach, great power rivalry is testing state sovereignty of our more vulnerable regional partners.
But what do we see now, in light of COVID-19 ? It will take time to play out. But I see a US far more cautious about exercising global leadership than in the past. I see even faster shifts in the Indo-Pacific power balance, with an associated sharpening of strategic competition. And an even more factious multilateral system.
The current pandemic is stretching much of the world’s governmental capacity. A natural disaster is difficult enough to respond to; trying to do so when you’re already containing a pandemic tests even the most capable nations. We’re seeing this challenge unfold in the Pacific as we speak, in the wake of Tropical Cyclone Harold. And of course there’s no shortage of terrorists who would exploit insecurity and diminished government capacity for their own ends – and would look to foster communal tension amid a crisis.
In other words, before COVID-19 became our reality, Australia was already approaching the Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific, with these concerns in mind. As was India. I don’t think COVID will necessarily change the nature of threats we face. But it will hasten the pace at which they are developing.
And so I believe this crisis will bring Australia and India even closer together as two Indian Ocean democracies with complementary values. And India – a civilizational power – will have an enormous role to play in shaping the post-COVID world. It’s well placed to do this as one of the very few economies currently projected to emerge from this crisis not in recession.
Part 4
We’ve seen some remarkable leadership from India since this crisis began. The world is facing an unprecedented health challenge for which no government has a perfect answer. It’s laudable not just that the Indian government acted so quickly to stem the virus’s spread, but also that it continues working to mitigate the lockdown’s impact on India’s most vulnerable.
It’s an enormous challenge for the world’s most populous nation. And amid the enormity of the task, India’s armed forces have played their part. The military has provided evacuation flights, delivered critical supplies, and readied facilities in preparation for quarantine and medical treatment. The armed forces prepared something like 10 thousand hospital beds, and nearly as many doctors and support staff, to augment civilian efforts.
India has also kept a thoughtful eye on the region. Your military delivered medical supplies to most of India’s neighbours. The Indian Air Force flew a medical rapid response team to Kuwait, and transported essential goods to the Maldives.
Prime Minister Modi established the PM’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations fund. And although he was no doubt heavily engaged with the domestic implications of this pandemic, he was routinely on the telephone with bilateral partners – including Australia – as the pandemic has unfolded.
It was Modi who led nations of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to coordinate pandemic responses – and establish the SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund – almost as soon as the crisis began. Your Prime Minister is also one of the leading voices shaping the G20 into a body instrumental in leading the world into post-COVID recovery, and was an early voice advocating for reforms to the World Health Organisation. These regionally focused steps are consistent with the increasing international leadership role we’ve seen India take in support of a free, open and inclusive region. After Prime Minister Modi articulated his vision for the Indo-Pacific in 2018, India’s External Affairs Ministry moved to establish a dedicated Indo-Pacific division.
India deepened its engagement with Southeast Asia, including through the upgrade of its relationship with Indonesia to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. And it finalised construction of the Sittwe Port in Myanmar, one of India’s signature infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia.
You’d have heard of course of the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region. This is an important means of monitoring and securing the Indian Ocean – an ocean we share – and a key example of Indian leadership in the region. We’re glad to be contributing a Liaison Officer to it in due course. These are all important signals of India’s seriousness in implementing its Act East Policy and broader strategic agenda – irrespective of what crisis of the day it is confronting.
Part 5
And what of Australia ? As you may know, we too have developed an Indo-Pacific strategy in response to the evolving strategic environment I outlined. Its six pillars are to:
- Strengthen our alliance with the US, which is central to our approach to the Indo-Pacific.
- Seek a workable relationship with China, noting Beijing’s greater capacity to share responsibility for supporting regional and global security.
- Work with the Indo-Pacific’s major democracies, bilaterally and in small groupings. Central among these is of course India, as well as the US, Japan, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea.
- Support ASEAN centrality and unity, including through a plan to ensure we are a leading security, economic and development partner for Southeast Asia.
- Support regional trade, investment and infrastructure building so they are inclusive and based on market principles. We know from long experience that open, outward-looking regional economies strongly connected to global markets are vital to maximising economic growth and helping to guard against protectionism and strategic rivalry.
- And the sixth pillar is to boost defence engagement to enhance the capacity of our regional partners to manage security challenges.
What does that mean in practice ?
Unsurprisingly we have a strong focus on the Pacific. We want to ensure it is secure strategically, stable economically and sovereign politically. A core theme has been responsiveness to Pacific requirements. That’s why we sharpened our focus on climate change and disaster resilience, and we expanded the Pacific Labour Scheme to allow more Pacific Islanders to work in Australia.
We also created a 2 billion dollar infrastructure financing facility for the Pacific, and are providing the majority funding for undersea telecommunications cables to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Of interest to a defence audience, we’ve been supporting Fiji to redevelop its Black Rock facility into a regional hub for police and peacekeeping training and pre-deployment preparation.
And we’ve been supporting the Papua New Guinea defence force to upgrade its Lombrum naval base. Of course the outbreak of COVID means that some forms of our engagement will have to be paused, or conducted in new and innovative ways. But there will never be a future in which Australia is not heavily invested in the Pacific.
Part 6
Of course Southeast Asia is core to our concept of the Indo-Pacific, much as it is for India. Among other initiatives, we established a 121 million dollar Southeast Asia economic governance and infrastructure initiative designed to help unlock the region’s next phase of growth.
We expanded cooperation with Southeast Asia on maritime issues, including on maritime law, maritime domain awareness and strengthening civil maritime organisations. All of which was designed to strengthen a rules-based maritime order.
We also have great ambition for the India-Australia relationship to strengthen the security and stability of the Indian Ocean region. India is the natural major power in the region, and Australia looks to it as a strategic partner with complementary interests.
We both have significant Indian Ocean coastlines, strategic island territories, highly capable military reach and valuable trade routes across the Indian Ocean. We contribute to the South Asian Regional Infrastructure Connectivity initiative, designed to support high quality infrastructure investments with particular focus on South Asia’s energy and transport sectors.
Our 2018 India Economic Strategy set an ambition to have India become a top three trading partner for Australia by 2035. We support India’s leadership in institutions like the Indian Ocean Rim Association as it helps to shape it into a genuinely norm-building entity.
Our defence relationship with India is at a historic peak. Defence activities between the two countries quadrupled from 2014 to around forty last year. You may have heard our bilateral naval exercise AUSINDEX was the largest ever Australian defence deployment to India. It was also our most complex to date, involving submarine-on-submarine serials, and coordinated P-8 maritime patrol aircraft missions over the Bay of Bengal.
Part 7
So we’re exceptionally well placed to build on our partnership in a post-COVID world. But where to from here ?
Both countries’ attention is rightly placed on protecting their populations against the pandemic. And we’ll continue to look at ways we can help each other in that effort. But I’ll focus here on defence cooperation.
I note we’re very close to finalising a defence science and technology sharing arrangement.
We’ll be looking at that to see if there are ways we might leverage this new framework of scientific cooperation to support each other’s responses to COVID-19. I’ve no doubt science cooperation will have renewed significance in Australia’s relationship with India, not just in the defence sphere.
We will soon conclude a mutual logistics support arrangement, which will significantly boost our ability to exercise and operate together.
Looking further out, we mustn’t rest on our laurels when it comes to military exercises. I mentioned the complexity of our most recent iteration of AUSINDEX. That complexity – that level of closeness – should be the norm, not the exception. We anticipate many opportunities to cooperate.
Particularly noting that our militaries have many common platforms. Not least the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft, and India’s soon-to-be-acquired MH-60 Romeo helicopters.
Likewise, we shouldn’t limit ourselves to exercises. We share an ocean, and have a significant interest in keeping it safe, secure and open. And we also share a responsibility to protect it. There are many ways we can reinforce each other’s efforts in doing so.
We can make defence facilities available to each other to expand our militaries’ respective operational reach.
And we should remain heavily engaged with our Southeast Asian partners. Southeast Asia is the region feeling the heat of increasing great power competition, and challenges to norms and institutions. Cooperation between India and Australia in Southeast Asia is a natural fit. We bring decades of experience collaborating closely with regional partners across the full spectrum of issues. Our largest embassy in the world is in Jakarta – not in Beijing, not in London, and not in Washington.
India’s traditionally non-aligned stance, and its deep cultural and religious links to the region, make it a natural partner for Southeast Asian countries. India represents a major power without some of the baggage that others can bring.
As a starting point, we should build on last year’s successful trilateral Maritime Security Workshop with Indonesia to identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean.
Part 8
As I mentioned at the outset, we need leaders capable of thinking creatively more than ever. We can’t afford to limit ourselves to comfortable or conventional habits. Or simply wait for crises to blow over before going back to normal. I’m not a defence expert. For that I – as those in government – will defer to you, leaders in your respective services, to think and develop ways we can best contribute to a secure, open and stable Indo-Pacific.
But we are at an historic inflection point. India may be one of the most successful developing countries in managing COVID. Australia is on track to emerge from the crisis relatively strongly. Now is our opportunity to shape the post-COVID world together.
I know that Air Marshal Choudhury and the NDC Directing Staff will set Course 60 up for a year of stimulating strategic discussions, and I look forward to interacting with the course at other occasions during the year.
Thank you, and I invite your questions and observations.
High Commissioner-Designate Mr Barry O'Farrell's speech to the National Defence College
COVID-19: Australia Cancels Premier Multilateral Air Combat Training Exercise
By Dinakar Peri
NEW DELHI , April 26, 2020 19:30 IST
Photo : Youtube screengrab from Indian Air Force Sukhoi Su-30MKI Exercise Pitch Black 2018 . Pitch Black 2020 - an opportunity for IAF to interact with forces from across the globe
Australia has informed India that their premier multilateral air combat training exercise Pitch Black 2020 scheduled from July 27 to August 14 has been cancelled due to the COVID-19 situation, defence sources said.
This was conveyed by Air Marshal Meg Hupfeld, Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), in a letter to Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria, in mid-April.
“The RAAF Chief informed of his decision to cancel the exercise this year due to the current and anticipated impacts of the worldwide pandemic of COVID-19,” a defence source told The Hindu. He also noted that while the IAF was not participating with aircraft, Ex Pitch Black 2020 would have provided an opportunity for engagement between our personnel, the source said.
The exercise is also an opportunity to interact with forces from across the globe, a second defence source said. The next edition of Pitch Black is scheduled in 2022.
In the last edition of Pitch Black in 2018, the IAF for the first time deployed fighter aircraft which it had said would “provide a unique opportunity for exchange of knowledge and experience with these nations in a dynamic warfare environment”. The contingent consisted of 145 personnel, four Su-30MKI fighters, one C-130 and one C-17 transport aircraft which went to Australia via Indonesia and during the transit had constructive engagements with Indonesian and Malaysian Air Forces as well.
The defence and strategic engagement with Australia has steadily gone up in recent years especially on the bilateral front with naval cooperation at the forefront. The bilateral naval exercise AUSINDEX early last year saw participation of the largest Australian contingent ever to India with over 1,000 personnel.
The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) has been long pending and is expected to be concluded soon as well as a broader maritime cooperation agreement including the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) to elevate the existing strategic partnership.
Last week, Australian High Commissioner-designate Barry O’Farrell made a pitch for trilateral cooperation among India, Australia and Indonesia to “identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean”.
The defence cooperation between India and Australia is underpinned on the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation 2006, the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 2009 and the bilateral Framework for Security Cooperation 2014.
COVID-19: Australia cancels premier multilateral air combat training exercise
By Dinakar Peri
NEW DELHI , April 26, 2020 19:30 IST
Photo : Youtube screengrab from Indian Air Force Sukhoi Su-30MKI Exercise Pitch Black 2018 . Pitch Black 2020 - an opportunity for IAF to interact with forces from across the globe
Australia has informed India that their premier multilateral air combat training exercise Pitch Black 2020 scheduled from July 27 to August 14 has been cancelled due to the COVID-19 situation, defence sources said.
This was conveyed by Air Marshal Meg Hupfeld, Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), in a letter to Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria, in mid-April.
“The RAAF Chief informed of his decision to cancel the exercise this year due to the current and anticipated impacts of the worldwide pandemic of COVID-19,” a defence source told The Hindu. He also noted that while the IAF was not participating with aircraft, Ex Pitch Black 2020 would have provided an opportunity for engagement between our personnel, the source said.
The exercise is also an opportunity to interact with forces from across the globe, a second defence source said. The next edition of Pitch Black is scheduled in 2022.
In the last edition of Pitch Black in 2018, the IAF for the first time deployed fighter aircraft which it had said would “provide a unique opportunity for exchange of knowledge and experience with these nations in a dynamic warfare environment”. The contingent consisted of 145 personnel, four Su-30MKI fighters, one C-130 and one C-17 transport aircraft which went to Australia via Indonesia and during the transit had constructive engagements with Indonesian and Malaysian Air Forces as well.
The defence and strategic engagement with Australia has steadily gone up in recent years especially on the bilateral front with naval cooperation at the forefront. The bilateral naval exercise AUSINDEX early last year saw participation of the largest Australian contingent ever to India with over 1,000 personnel.
The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) has been long pending and is expected to be concluded soon as well as a broader maritime cooperation agreement including the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) to elevate the existing strategic partnership.
Last week, Australian High Commissioner-designate Barry O’Farrell made a pitch for trilateral cooperation among India, Australia and Indonesia to “identify new ways that our three countries can collaborate to be the best possible custodians of the Indian Ocean”.
The defence cooperation between India and Australia is underpinned on the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation 2006, the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 2009 and the bilateral Framework for Security Cooperation 2014.
COVID-19: Australia cancels premier multilateral air combat training exercise
The rise of the Indo-Pacific
What do these news events from the past week have in common? Two US warships sailed by the Spratly and Paracel island chains in the South China Sea. Australia announced that it would support Taiwan’s return to the World Health Organisation (WHO). In Delhi, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi hosted a ministerial meeting on how to lure manufacturing firms from China to India.
The link is summed up in a recently published book, Indo-Pacific Empire. It came out in early March, so was written before the Covid-19 pandemic struck. But it is impressively prescient.
In it Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, highlights an emerging formation on the geopolitical map: the Indo-Pacific, a growing web of alliances centred on the “Quad” of India, Japan, Australia and the US, but also taking in a crescent of maritime states in eastern, south-eastern and southern Asia. Looser and more multipolar than other such formations, it is unified by the quest to balance, dilute and absorb Chinese power. “The Indo-Pacific is both a region and an idea: a metaphor for collective action, self-help combined with mutual help,” writes Medcalf. Two months on from its publication, virtually all of the trends that his book draws together have advanced.
Scepticism towards China is mounting. In an escalating war of words, Australia has called for an investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 outbreak. Japan’s economic rescue package included almost 250bn yen (some $2.2bn) to support Japanese firms in moving production out of China. India has tightened investment restrictions in a move clearly aimed at shielding domestic firms from Chinese takeovers; Modi’s meeting illustrating the country's new willingness to style itself as a rival manufacturing hub.
Among ordinary citizens the shift is more overt. Tanvi Madan of the Brookings Institute reports that “anti-China sentiment has gone mainstream” in India, in everything from prime-time news to social media memes. In countries threatened by China’s ambitions in the South China Sea patience is also waning: “What’s new is the outrage south-east Asian states feel over seeing this business-as-usual intimidation at a time when they’re struggling with a pandemic that is at least partly Beijing’s fault,” Greg Poling of the CSIS think tank tells Associated Press.
Meanwhile, the latest Pew survey shows a record 66 per cent of Americans have an “unfavourable" view of China – a shift not lost on Donald Trump and Joe Biden, who are now competing to out-hawk each other ahead of November’s presidential election.
Current events also reinforce Medcalf’s thesis in the way this intensifying wariness about China is pushing different parts of the Indo-Pacific closer together. Australia’s new hawkishness is expressed in its vocal support, echoed by Japan, for Taiwan’s return to the WHO at the World Health Assembly in two weeks. Taipei’s deft response to the outbreak has strengthened its standing more widely, including in India and the Philippines. Chinese naval provocations have had a similar effect, prompting US shows of commitment to its allies around the South China Sea, as well as shows of intra-regional solidarity between them (notably, the Philippines protested when the Chinese coastguard sank a Vietnamese fishing boat on 2 April).
Meanwhile the “Quad”, long considered a fairly peripheral forum, has not only held multiple ministerial meetings to discuss the pandemic in recent weeks, but also expanded to a “Quad Plus” including South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand. Its “slow but steady institutionalisation”, writes Rajeswari Rajagopalan in a new report for the Perth USAsia Centre, “suggests that its future expansion is a real possibility.”
It is too early to make firm predictions about the geopolitical fallout of the pandemic. But it is clear that Medcalf is on to something. So watch alignments at the upcoming World Health Assembly, watch the tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula (where Kim Jong-un has apparently reappeared after an unexplained absence), watch Indo-Pacific bilateral partnerships such as the Indian-Japanese one. Watch the US presidential campaign; Biden has not yet unveiled his foreign-policy prospectus but it is likely to include hawkishness on China and a commitment to repairing the US’s international alliances. And do not be surprised if, under a Biden presidency, those two threads combine to make the Indo-Pacific the central idea in US foreign policy.
www.newstatesman.com
What do these news events from the past week have in common? Two US warships sailed by the Spratly and Paracel island chains in the South China Sea. Australia announced that it would support Taiwan’s return to the World Health Organisation (WHO). In Delhi, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi hosted a ministerial meeting on how to lure manufacturing firms from China to India.
The link is summed up in a recently published book, Indo-Pacific Empire. It came out in early March, so was written before the Covid-19 pandemic struck. But it is impressively prescient.
In it Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, highlights an emerging formation on the geopolitical map: the Indo-Pacific, a growing web of alliances centred on the “Quad” of India, Japan, Australia and the US, but also taking in a crescent of maritime states in eastern, south-eastern and southern Asia. Looser and more multipolar than other such formations, it is unified by the quest to balance, dilute and absorb Chinese power. “The Indo-Pacific is both a region and an idea: a metaphor for collective action, self-help combined with mutual help,” writes Medcalf. Two months on from its publication, virtually all of the trends that his book draws together have advanced.
Scepticism towards China is mounting. In an escalating war of words, Australia has called for an investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 outbreak. Japan’s economic rescue package included almost 250bn yen (some $2.2bn) to support Japanese firms in moving production out of China. India has tightened investment restrictions in a move clearly aimed at shielding domestic firms from Chinese takeovers; Modi’s meeting illustrating the country's new willingness to style itself as a rival manufacturing hub.
Among ordinary citizens the shift is more overt. Tanvi Madan of the Brookings Institute reports that “anti-China sentiment has gone mainstream” in India, in everything from prime-time news to social media memes. In countries threatened by China’s ambitions in the South China Sea patience is also waning: “What’s new is the outrage south-east Asian states feel over seeing this business-as-usual intimidation at a time when they’re struggling with a pandemic that is at least partly Beijing’s fault,” Greg Poling of the CSIS think tank tells Associated Press.
Meanwhile, the latest Pew survey shows a record 66 per cent of Americans have an “unfavourable" view of China – a shift not lost on Donald Trump and Joe Biden, who are now competing to out-hawk each other ahead of November’s presidential election.
Current events also reinforce Medcalf’s thesis in the way this intensifying wariness about China is pushing different parts of the Indo-Pacific closer together. Australia’s new hawkishness is expressed in its vocal support, echoed by Japan, for Taiwan’s return to the WHO at the World Health Assembly in two weeks. Taipei’s deft response to the outbreak has strengthened its standing more widely, including in India and the Philippines. Chinese naval provocations have had a similar effect, prompting US shows of commitment to its allies around the South China Sea, as well as shows of intra-regional solidarity between them (notably, the Philippines protested when the Chinese coastguard sank a Vietnamese fishing boat on 2 April).
Meanwhile the “Quad”, long considered a fairly peripheral forum, has not only held multiple ministerial meetings to discuss the pandemic in recent weeks, but also expanded to a “Quad Plus” including South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand. Its “slow but steady institutionalisation”, writes Rajeswari Rajagopalan in a new report for the Perth USAsia Centre, “suggests that its future expansion is a real possibility.”
It is too early to make firm predictions about the geopolitical fallout of the pandemic. But it is clear that Medcalf is on to something. So watch alignments at the upcoming World Health Assembly, watch the tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula (where Kim Jong-un has apparently reappeared after an unexplained absence), watch Indo-Pacific bilateral partnerships such as the Indian-Japanese one. Watch the US presidential campaign; Biden has not yet unveiled his foreign-policy prospectus but it is likely to include hawkishness on China and a commitment to repairing the US’s international alliances. And do not be surprised if, under a Biden presidency, those two threads combine to make the Indo-Pacific the central idea in US foreign policy.
The rise of the Indo-Pacific
How coronavirus is accelerating the emergence of a new geopolitical formation.
www.newstatesman.com