The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions
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Amid COVID–19, India’s Modi and Australia’s Morrison plan virtual prime ministerial summit
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
May 07 2020
New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact — as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration.
In a first, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is planning to host a virtual bilateral “summit” meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. While the date for the meeting has not been announced, an Indian news report said that it will be soon. The Australian prime minister was initially scheduled to travel to India in January, but that had to be postponed due to the bushfires in Australia. The two leaders had been looking toward scheduling an in-person meeting in May, but that does not appear feasible under the current circumstances as much of the region is reeling under the stress of containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, there is excitement on both sides about the prospects of their meeting and New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact (as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration).
While recent Indo-Pacific developments, including China’s muscle flexing in the South China Sea, may likely be on the agenda, it will be interesting to see how India positions itself on such issues.
Australia is going through one of the worst phases in its contemporary relations with China. In an opinion piece in The Conversation, Tony Walker from La Trobe University wrote that Australia-China relations are “fractured,” calling it “the worst moment in Sino-Australian relations since Gough Whitlam normalised ties on his election in December 1972.” Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origins of the pandemic has not been well-received by China, to put it mildly. China, in response, unleashed its “wolf warrior” diplomats to lambast the Australian political leadership by threatening economic penalties. In a direct threat, China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned that Canberra asking for an independent probe “could spark a Chinese consumer boycott of students and tourists visiting Australia, as well as sales of popular agricultural exports like beef and wine.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang also commented: “At such a critical juncture [pandemic], it is highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation. We advise the Australian side to put aside ideological bias and political games, focus on the welfare of the Australian people and global public health security, follow the international community’s collective will for cooperation, and contribute to the global cooperation in fighting the virus, instead of doing things to the contrary.”
But Australia is not the only target of China’s economic coercion and trade threats, which have angered many countries. In fact, the Morrison government has found significant support for its call for an independent inquiry into the pandemic’s origins.
On the South China Sea as well, tension has been picking up and Australia is involved. The Chinese Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship was operating in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), around 325 kms away from the Malaysian coast starting around 20 April. Following this, in a show of support, Australian ships joined three US warships operating close to where the Chinese vessel was suspected to be undertaking oil exploration operations. The Australian Department of Defense in a statement said, “During the passage exercises, the ships honed interoperability between Australian and US navies, including replenishment-at-sea, aviation operations, maritime manoeuvres and communications drills.”
China’s survey ships were operating close to where Malaysia’s Petronas state oil company was already engaged in exploratory drilling. Harassment by China is not new. Even the recent events are a culmination of developments that have been going on since December, according to Asia Maritime Transparency International. Even amid the current stand-off, China claimed that Haiyang Dizhi 8 was only conducting its normal activities. Meanwhile, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has come out with grim warnings that while “international law guarantees the freedom of navigation, the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace, security and stability in the region.”
India has not responded to either China’s trespassing into the Malaysian EEZ or the Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel last month. Both incidents have increased concerns about China’s behaviour in the region.
The Modi-Morrison meeting agenda is not clear but the Indian government will likely be under some pressure to address at least some of these difficult issues. India will be expected to take a stand especially as it moves to take over as the Chairman of the WHO Executive Board. Australia will seek greater support from India to push for a clearer understanding of the role of the WHO in the early stages of the pandemic. India should take this opportunity to build a larger coalition of like-minded states such as the Quad-Plus grouping including New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to develop a coordinated actionable agenda to bring about better reforms and accountability within the WHO. More importantly, at a bilateral level, the Morrison government will expect a strong show of support for Australia in the face of China’s bullying behaviour.
The Modi-Morrison summit could also possibly cover the recent developments in the South China Sea. China’s continuing harassment of small and big neighbors alike, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia is reaching a peak and could call for concerted action among the key Southeast Asian players. As a key Indo-Pacific and Quad player, India could be expected to take a clear stand and gradually ready itself to play a more active operational role. The US-Australian joint patrols were impressive and important for the Southeast Asian countries which were at the receiving end of China’s harassment. As the Quad enhances its role, India may be asked to take part in activities like joint and coordinated patrols with others such as Australia.
Amid COVID–19, India’s Modi and Australia’s Morrison plan virtual prime ministerial summit | ORF
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
May 07 2020
New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact — as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration.
In a first, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is planning to host a virtual bilateral “summit” meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. While the date for the meeting has not been announced, an Indian news report said that it will be soon. The Australian prime minister was initially scheduled to travel to India in January, but that had to be postponed due to the bushfires in Australia. The two leaders had been looking toward scheduling an in-person meeting in May, but that does not appear feasible under the current circumstances as much of the region is reeling under the stress of containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, there is excitement on both sides about the prospects of their meeting and New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact (as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration).
While recent Indo-Pacific developments, including China’s muscle flexing in the South China Sea, may likely be on the agenda, it will be interesting to see how India positions itself on such issues.
The Morrison government has found significant support for its call for an independent inquiry into the pandemic’s origins.
Australia is going through one of the worst phases in its contemporary relations with China. In an opinion piece in The Conversation, Tony Walker from La Trobe University wrote that Australia-China relations are “fractured,” calling it “the worst moment in Sino-Australian relations since Gough Whitlam normalised ties on his election in December 1972.” Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origins of the pandemic has not been well-received by China, to put it mildly. China, in response, unleashed its “wolf warrior” diplomats to lambast the Australian political leadership by threatening economic penalties. In a direct threat, China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned that Canberra asking for an independent probe “could spark a Chinese consumer boycott of students and tourists visiting Australia, as well as sales of popular agricultural exports like beef and wine.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang also commented: “At such a critical juncture [pandemic], it is highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation. We advise the Australian side to put aside ideological bias and political games, focus on the welfare of the Australian people and global public health security, follow the international community’s collective will for cooperation, and contribute to the global cooperation in fighting the virus, instead of doing things to the contrary.”
But Australia is not the only target of China’s economic coercion and trade threats, which have angered many countries. In fact, the Morrison government has found significant support for its call for an independent inquiry into the pandemic’s origins.
India has not responded to either China’s trespassing into the Malaysian EEZ or the Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel last month. Both incidents have increased concerns about China’s behaviour in the region.
On the South China Sea as well, tension has been picking up and Australia is involved. The Chinese Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship was operating in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), around 325 kms away from the Malaysian coast starting around 20 April. Following this, in a show of support, Australian ships joined three US warships operating close to where the Chinese vessel was suspected to be undertaking oil exploration operations. The Australian Department of Defense in a statement said, “During the passage exercises, the ships honed interoperability between Australian and US navies, including replenishment-at-sea, aviation operations, maritime manoeuvres and communications drills.”
China’s survey ships were operating close to where Malaysia’s Petronas state oil company was already engaged in exploratory drilling. Harassment by China is not new. Even the recent events are a culmination of developments that have been going on since December, according to Asia Maritime Transparency International. Even amid the current stand-off, China claimed that Haiyang Dizhi 8 was only conducting its normal activities. Meanwhile, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has come out with grim warnings that while “international law guarantees the freedom of navigation, the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace, security and stability in the region.”
India has not responded to either China’s trespassing into the Malaysian EEZ or the Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel last month. Both incidents have increased concerns about China’s behaviour in the region.
The Modi-Morrison summit could also possibly cover the recent developments in the South China Sea. China’s continuing harassment of small and big neighbors alike, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia is reaching a peak and could call for concerted action among the key Southeast Asian players.
The Modi-Morrison meeting agenda is not clear but the Indian government will likely be under some pressure to address at least some of these difficult issues. India will be expected to take a stand especially as it moves to take over as the Chairman of the WHO Executive Board. Australia will seek greater support from India to push for a clearer understanding of the role of the WHO in the early stages of the pandemic. India should take this opportunity to build a larger coalition of like-minded states such as the Quad-Plus grouping including New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to develop a coordinated actionable agenda to bring about better reforms and accountability within the WHO. More importantly, at a bilateral level, the Morrison government will expect a strong show of support for Australia in the face of China’s bullying behaviour.
The Modi-Morrison summit could also possibly cover the recent developments in the South China Sea. China’s continuing harassment of small and big neighbors alike, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia is reaching a peak and could call for concerted action among the key Southeast Asian players. As a key Indo-Pacific and Quad player, India could be expected to take a clear stand and gradually ready itself to play a more active operational role. The US-Australian joint patrols were impressive and important for the Southeast Asian countries which were at the receiving end of China’s harassment. As the Quad enhances its role, India may be asked to take part in activities like joint and coordinated patrols with others such as Australia.
Amid COVID–19, India’s Modi and Australia’s Morrison plan virtual prime ministerial summit | ORF
Towards a quad-plus arrangement
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
May 07 2020
The Quad ships sailing through the Bay of Bengal. Source : Wiki.
It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.
Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers: NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.[1]
But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible ?
Indeed, whether this was even a “Quad-Plus” meeting is an open question. It appears that only the Indian government formally announced that this meeting was held, and true to fashion, New Delhi did not reference the Quad at all.
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a readout of the March 20 meeting only said that these countries had a telephonic conference to share best practices and collaborate in their efforts to contain the spread of the virus.[2] It will reportedly occur on a weekly basis, and covering a range of issues including cooperative vaccine development, addressing questions around stranded citizens, and minimising economic impacts.
However, a press report from a prominent Indian foreign affairs correspondent was more direct, stating that the meeting was also an “attempt to keep the Quad-plus countries within a certain sphere of influence and strategic direction.”[3]
The Quad-plus countries have held subsequent meetings, discussing not just battling the current pandemic situation but also sharing of technologies, and more importantly, ways to get the global economy back on track without significant setback.[4] They also appear to have agreed on the need to initially focus on the public health dimension of the crisis, and therefore will first target the development of vaccines, manufacture of equipment and calibrating treatment options.
Each of the “plus three” parties are an important partner the Quad countries. Vietnam is an important strategic partner for all four Quad members.[5] South Korea is also, despite the latter’s somewhat troubled relations occasionally with Japan and the US. Importantly, Seoul has managed COVID-19 successfully in comparison to other regional governments.
Perhaps the most surprising country in the list is New Zealand. Its inclusion is noteworthy because, despite being one of the Five Eyes nations, Wellington has generally been reluctant to be perceived as targeting China in any way. It did not initially endorse the Indo-Pacific concept, presumably because it may have strained ties with China. At the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, the New Zealand Defence Minister Ron Mark stuck to the old formulation of Asia-Pacific and resisted the term Indo-Pacific.[6] In October 2018, speaking at the MFAT@75 Conference in Wellington, Ben King, Deputy Secretary Americas and Asia Group at Ministry of Foreign and Trade Affairs (MFAT), defended and emphasised its preference for the term Asia-Pacific.[7] Given New Zealand’s heavy economic dependence on China, its positioning was probably understandable.[8]
However, New Zealand’s view has changed recently, with the country formally adopting the Indo-Pacific formulation in February 2020, presumably the result of Wellington’s growing security concerns about China.[9] New Zealand appears to have taken yet another step forward in joining the telephone diplomacy along with other key Indo-Pacific powers.
New Zealand’s path to the Quad mirrors the evolution in Indian thinking. Like New Zealand, India too had traditionally shied away from choosing between the United States and China. But China’s aggressive behaviour in attempting to deny India the strategic space it seeks in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in global platforms such as the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) has propelled New Delhi to shift increasingly towards partnerships with others in the Indo-Pacific.
Like others, India had been somewhat uncomfortable with the Quad because of the perception that it was a containment effort against China. But it appears now, in light of recent developments, to be fully invested.
All of this is a big advance for the Quad. Initially labelled the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), the Quad made a comeback in November 2017 when officials from the foreign ministries of India, Australia, Japan and the US met in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN and East Asia Summits to discuss areas of common interest in the regional and global context.[10] This was the first time that the officials from these countries met after the initial efforts to form the Quad fell apart a decade back.
According to the MEA’s press release, discussions focused on the “converging vision and values for promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly inter-connected region that they share with each other and with other partners.”[11]
Subsequent meetings amongst officials in 2018[12] and 2019[13] have concentrated on similar concerns. In a sign of further progress and political commitment, in 2019 Quad meetings were elevated to the foreign minister level.[14]
These institutional developments indicate that the concerns that gave rise to the formation of the original Quad in 2006-07, and its revival in 2017, not only remain relevant but have deepened.
The strategic consequences of China’s rise, its aggressive military posturing and the tendency to use threat of force have become more prominent in the Indo-Pacific. If the Quad’s progress has been somewhat hesitating, the reason is not hard to find: most countries in the region have significant economic exposure to China. This dependence constrained their capacity to participate in a mechanism which the Chinese government has expressly opposed.[15]
But as China’s behavior has become increasingly assertive, many governments' strategic calculus have begun to change. The very fact that there are more countries over the last year endorsing the Indo-Pacific concept is an indicator of things to come. ASEAN’s adoption of an Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in 2019, following previous reticence to explicitly use the Indo-Pacific formulation, is a telling example.[16]
The slow but steady institutionalisation of the Quad suggests that its future expansion is a real possibility.
Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls.[17] But such cooperation also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.
Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’smilitaryand political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis, making minilateral cooperation with like minded partners a better approach.
Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burden sharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.
Endnotes :
[1] “How America Is Leading the “Quad Plus” Group of Seven Countries in Fighting the Coronavirus”. The National
Interest, Jeff Smith, 30 March 2020.
[2]Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries (2020), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[3] “India joins hands with NZ, Vietnam, S Korea to combat pandemic”. The Times of India, Indrani Bagchi, 21 March 2020.
[4] “India, Quad-Plus countries discuss Covid-19 battle, economic resurgence”. The Times of India, Indrani Bagchi, 28
March 2020.
[5]"Special Strategic Partnership” between Aus-VN since mid-2018.
[6] “Indo-Pacific dominates at Shangri-La: Where does that leave New Zealand?”. Incline, David Capie, 7 June 2018.
[7]Remarks on the Indo-Pacific - Ben King, Deputy Secretary for Americas and Asia (2018), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade New Zealand.
[8]New Zealand Trade Dashboard (2019), Statistics New Zealand.
[9] “New Zealand Picks Up on the Indo-Pacific”. East-West Center, David Scott, 18 March 2020.
[10] India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (2017), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[11] ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (2019), Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
[12] India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations (2018), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[13]India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations (2018), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[14] Australia-India-Japan-United States ‘Quad’ Consultations (2019), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia.
[15] “Wary China on ‘Quad’ bloc watch after officials from US, Japan, India and Australia meet on ASEAN sidelines”.
South China Morning Post, Shi Jiangtao and Laura Zhou, 13 November 2017.
[16] ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (2019), Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
[17] “Xi Jinping calls on Trump to improve US-China relations amid Covid-19 crisis”. The Guardian, Lily Kuo, 27 March 2020.
www.orfonline.org
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
May 07 2020
The Quad ships sailing through the Bay of Bengal. Source : Wiki.
It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.
Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers: NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.[1]
But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible ?
Indeed, whether this was even a “Quad-Plus” meeting is an open question. It appears that only the Indian government formally announced that this meeting was held, and true to fashion, New Delhi did not reference the Quad at all.
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a readout of the March 20 meeting only said that these countries had a telephonic conference to share best practices and collaborate in their efforts to contain the spread of the virus.[2] It will reportedly occur on a weekly basis, and covering a range of issues including cooperative vaccine development, addressing questions around stranded citizens, and minimising economic impacts.
However, a press report from a prominent Indian foreign affairs correspondent was more direct, stating that the meeting was also an “attempt to keep the Quad-plus countries within a certain sphere of influence and strategic direction.”[3]
The Quad-plus countries have held subsequent meetings, discussing not just battling the current pandemic situation but also sharing of technologies, and more importantly, ways to get the global economy back on track without significant setback.[4] They also appear to have agreed on the need to initially focus on the public health dimension of the crisis, and therefore will first target the development of vaccines, manufacture of equipment and calibrating treatment options.
Each of the “plus three” parties are an important partner the Quad countries. Vietnam is an important strategic partner for all four Quad members.[5] South Korea is also, despite the latter’s somewhat troubled relations occasionally with Japan and the US. Importantly, Seoul has managed COVID-19 successfully in comparison to other regional governments.
Perhaps the most surprising country in the list is New Zealand. Its inclusion is noteworthy because, despite being one of the Five Eyes nations, Wellington has generally been reluctant to be perceived as targeting China in any way. It did not initially endorse the Indo-Pacific concept, presumably because it may have strained ties with China. At the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, the New Zealand Defence Minister Ron Mark stuck to the old formulation of Asia-Pacific and resisted the term Indo-Pacific.[6] In October 2018, speaking at the MFAT@75 Conference in Wellington, Ben King, Deputy Secretary Americas and Asia Group at Ministry of Foreign and Trade Affairs (MFAT), defended and emphasised its preference for the term Asia-Pacific.[7] Given New Zealand’s heavy economic dependence on China, its positioning was probably understandable.[8]
However, New Zealand’s view has changed recently, with the country formally adopting the Indo-Pacific formulation in February 2020, presumably the result of Wellington’s growing security concerns about China.[9] New Zealand appears to have taken yet another step forward in joining the telephone diplomacy along with other key Indo-Pacific powers.
New Zealand’s path to the Quad mirrors the evolution in Indian thinking. Like New Zealand, India too had traditionally shied away from choosing between the United States and China. But China’s aggressive behaviour in attempting to deny India the strategic space it seeks in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in global platforms such as the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) has propelled New Delhi to shift increasingly towards partnerships with others in the Indo-Pacific.
Like others, India had been somewhat uncomfortable with the Quad because of the perception that it was a containment effort against China. But it appears now, in light of recent developments, to be fully invested.
All of this is a big advance for the Quad. Initially labelled the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), the Quad made a comeback in November 2017 when officials from the foreign ministries of India, Australia, Japan and the US met in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN and East Asia Summits to discuss areas of common interest in the regional and global context.[10] This was the first time that the officials from these countries met after the initial efforts to form the Quad fell apart a decade back.
According to the MEA’s press release, discussions focused on the “converging vision and values for promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly inter-connected region that they share with each other and with other partners.”[11]
Subsequent meetings amongst officials in 2018[12] and 2019[13] have concentrated on similar concerns. In a sign of further progress and political commitment, in 2019 Quad meetings were elevated to the foreign minister level.[14]
These institutional developments indicate that the concerns that gave rise to the formation of the original Quad in 2006-07, and its revival in 2017, not only remain relevant but have deepened.
The strategic consequences of China’s rise, its aggressive military posturing and the tendency to use threat of force have become more prominent in the Indo-Pacific. If the Quad’s progress has been somewhat hesitating, the reason is not hard to find: most countries in the region have significant economic exposure to China. This dependence constrained their capacity to participate in a mechanism which the Chinese government has expressly opposed.[15]
But as China’s behavior has become increasingly assertive, many governments' strategic calculus have begun to change. The very fact that there are more countries over the last year endorsing the Indo-Pacific concept is an indicator of things to come. ASEAN’s adoption of an Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in 2019, following previous reticence to explicitly use the Indo-Pacific formulation, is a telling example.[16]
The slow but steady institutionalisation of the Quad suggests that its future expansion is a real possibility.
Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls.[17] But such cooperation also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.
Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’smilitaryand political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis, making minilateral cooperation with like minded partners a better approach.
Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burden sharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.
Endnotes :
[1] “How America Is Leading the “Quad Plus” Group of Seven Countries in Fighting the Coronavirus”. The National
Interest, Jeff Smith, 30 March 2020.
[2]Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call with counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries (2020), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[3] “India joins hands with NZ, Vietnam, S Korea to combat pandemic”. The Times of India, Indrani Bagchi, 21 March 2020.
[4] “India, Quad-Plus countries discuss Covid-19 battle, economic resurgence”. The Times of India, Indrani Bagchi, 28
March 2020.
[5]"Special Strategic Partnership” between Aus-VN since mid-2018.
[6] “Indo-Pacific dominates at Shangri-La: Where does that leave New Zealand?”. Incline, David Capie, 7 June 2018.
[7]Remarks on the Indo-Pacific - Ben King, Deputy Secretary for Americas and Asia (2018), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade New Zealand.
[8]New Zealand Trade Dashboard (2019), Statistics New Zealand.
[9] “New Zealand Picks Up on the Indo-Pacific”. East-West Center, David Scott, 18 March 2020.
[10] India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (2017), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[11] ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (2019), Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
[12] India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations (2018), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[13]India-Australia-Japan-US Consultations (2018), Ministry of External Affairs India.
[14] Australia-India-Japan-United States ‘Quad’ Consultations (2019), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia.
[15] “Wary China on ‘Quad’ bloc watch after officials from US, Japan, India and Australia meet on ASEAN sidelines”.
South China Morning Post, Shi Jiangtao and Laura Zhou, 13 November 2017.
[16] ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (2019), Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
[17] “Xi Jinping calls on Trump to improve US-China relations amid Covid-19 crisis”. The Guardian, Lily Kuo, 27 March 2020.
Towards a quad-plus arrangement | ORF
It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped
Ever since I've read some of his pronouncements before on Modi's foreign policy, I've lost some of my respect for SS Menon.
It seems as though he sees what Modi / Doval now joined by Jaishankar seem to be endeavouring / achieving as antithetical to his / MK Narayan's legacy . That explains why he seemed to be critical of their policy ever since the response to Uri or the aim to corner China w.r.t the Masood Azhar case in the UN or off late in Balakote.
This churlish attitude continues here. He seems to be conveying quite clearly that in order to maintain the pre Chinese virus world order in the post Chinese virus era, the world proceeds without antagonizing China by coming up with some Mandela style Truth & Reconciliation commission that only records facts, doesn't apportion blame or fix responsibility & certainly doesn't have the brief to hold the Chinese accountable for not only the deaths caused worldwide by the Chinese deliberately concealing information about the virus & it's effects at home but also the complete derailing of the global economy as well as the massive disruption in day to day life caused.
Does a person of his eminence & experience actually believe that the world will just sit by once this pandemic passes & let business resume as it was before? Has he not considered the US Chinese trade row which even before this pandemic was not so much about the trade imbalance as it was about cutting China to size for seeking to challenge US hegemony with a well charted plan to replace it all around the world, across global political, financial & other Institutions but also in hi tech areas now mostly the preserve of the US & it's allies in the EU apart from Japan & to a certain extent SK, Canada & Australia?
One would have expected a much more informed assessment given his pedigree & experience about the emerging world order post the Chinese virus apart from India's options & the US China dynamic given President Trump's & the US political leadership's disastrous handling of the aftermath of the wide spread infection in the US & it's impact on the economy which he's clearly now trying to pin onto the Chinese who're reacting equally belligerently.Does he actually think that Trump or anyone in his place would let go of such an opportunity to pull the rug beneath the feet of the Chinese?
Sadly, we've stumbled upon a half baked opinion piece with some brilliant observations in between most shocking observations. If one didn't know better, one could easily have mistaken this piece to be by someone veering towards being a Chinese apologist.
COVID-19 has been a spanner in the works of India-Australia relations and now India-Japan relations :
India, Japan Postpone Fighter Jet Exercise Despite Rising Activities of China in Indo-Pacific
sputniknews.com
India, Japan Postpone Fighter Jet Exercise Despite Rising Activities of China in Indo-Pacific
India, Japan Postpone Fighter Jet Exercise Despite Rising Activities of China in Indo-Pacific
New Delhi (Sputnik): Despite pandemic, China has been carrying out several maritime activities in South China Sea and Indian Ocean in past few weeks. Besides, China and India also engaged in massive border clashes across the Line of Actual...
sputniknews.com
Covid-19 shouldn’t stop Australia, India and Japan from developing stronger ties
Despite the Covid-19 crisis, geopolitical competition is not going into hibernation. With relations between the US and China taking a further adversarial turn, it is imperative that Australia find ways to continue strengthening and diversifying its strategic relationships.
How the pandemic will ultimately shape the regional order remains uncertain. Under any scenario, Australia’s partnerships across the Indo-Pacific will continue to be critical in navigating the region after the crisis passes. In this regard, Australia’s trilateral relationship with India and Japan is one asset that can be further developed and leveraged.
While significant attention has been paid to the rebirth of the ‘Quad’ dialogue among Washington, New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra, Australia’s trilateral arrangements with India and Japan have also matured in recent years. Amid concerns over the US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, the three other Quad partners have steadily reinforced their own collaboration. For example, the three countries now consistently convene at the foreign-secretary level.
Upgraded defence and diplomatic engagement has been a cornerstone of this trilateral. Between 2014 and 2018, the number of Australia–India defence exercises nearly quadrupled, and in 2019 Australia sent its largest ever deployment to India. Japan’s increasing defence activity with India and their upgraded ties led to an inaugural ‘2+2’ meeting of the two countries’ foreign and defence ministers in late 2019.
For Australia and Japan, both alliance partners with the US, deeper strategic ties with India are not a substitute for steadfast US engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, as India’s strategic clout grows, its contribution as a regional balancing power can be encouraged and complemented.
In February, Japan’s ambassador to Australia, Reiichiro Takahashi, spoke in Perth on the strategic underpinnings of this trilateral relationship:
Australia needs to find creative ways now to not only maintain these vital relationships, but strengthen them where possible. Given the extensive underpinnings of the Australia–Japan relationship, it’s Australia’s relationship with India that needs further developing.
There is no silver bullet for Australian officials pursuing deeper ties with India—strategic partnerships are developed over time through consistent engagement, dialogue and cooperation. Even in the constrained Covid-19 environment, there are a number of investments Australia can look to make.
On the defence side, concluding the mutual logistics support agreement with India remains a near-term opportunity. An anticipated outcome of Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s postponed January visit to India, the agreement will enable reciprocal access to military facilities and increase the two countries’ capacity to operate together. This could be concluded even without a prime ministerial visit and complement an India–Japan equivalent that’s also under negotiation.
Increasing the volume and complexity of Australia’s joint exercises with India will also offer benefits. The largest such initiative, AUSINDEX, featured anti-submarine exercises for the first time last year, alongside coordinated aerial patrols over the Bay of Bengal. The capacity to conduct joint exercises is likely to be limited in the near term, but ongoing defence engagement and planning of future operations remains vital. While Japan’s public support for Australian participation in the Malabar exercise involving India, Japan and the US is important—and Australian participation would be welcome—Malabar is but one of many joint exercises that can occur.
Diplomatically, maintaining senior-level dialogues is essential to turn shared interests into common action. This includes Australia’s ‘2+2’ with India and the formal trilateral dialogue, both currently held at the secretary level. Following the recent upgrade of the India–Japan 2+2, Australia could pursue a similar boost to its equivalent dialogue with India. Complementing Australia’s longstanding ministerial 2+2 with Japan, this would ensure all three countries were conducting such meetings at the ministerial level. These arrangements could underpin the upgrading of the trilateral dialogue itself to the ministerial level.
The maturing of the Australia–India–Japan trilateral relationship is testament to Australia’s strategic policy of helping to shape a regional order that is multipolar and balanced, and in which Australia has options. This has involved strengthening longstanding relationships like that with Japan, upgrading emerging ones like that with India, and building networked partnerships across the Indo-Pacific like the Australia–India–Japan trilateral.
The task remains unfinished, however, and Covid-19 further clouds Australia’s navigation of an uncertain regional outlook. While deepening Australia’s relationships is made more challenging amid the pandemic, a more precarious region makes those relationships all the more important.
www.aspistrategist.org.au
Despite the Covid-19 crisis, geopolitical competition is not going into hibernation. With relations between the US and China taking a further adversarial turn, it is imperative that Australia find ways to continue strengthening and diversifying its strategic relationships.
How the pandemic will ultimately shape the regional order remains uncertain. Under any scenario, Australia’s partnerships across the Indo-Pacific will continue to be critical in navigating the region after the crisis passes. In this regard, Australia’s trilateral relationship with India and Japan is one asset that can be further developed and leveraged.
While significant attention has been paid to the rebirth of the ‘Quad’ dialogue among Washington, New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra, Australia’s trilateral arrangements with India and Japan have also matured in recent years. Amid concerns over the US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, the three other Quad partners have steadily reinforced their own collaboration. For example, the three countries now consistently convene at the foreign-secretary level.
Upgraded defence and diplomatic engagement has been a cornerstone of this trilateral. Between 2014 and 2018, the number of Australia–India defence exercises nearly quadrupled, and in 2019 Australia sent its largest ever deployment to India. Japan’s increasing defence activity with India and their upgraded ties led to an inaugural ‘2+2’ meeting of the two countries’ foreign and defence ministers in late 2019.
For Australia and Japan, both alliance partners with the US, deeper strategic ties with India are not a substitute for steadfast US engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, as India’s strategic clout grows, its contribution as a regional balancing power can be encouraged and complemented.
In February, Japan’s ambassador to Australia, Reiichiro Takahashi, spoke in Perth on the strategic underpinnings of this trilateral relationship:
Since February, the health crisis and economic dislocation caused by Covid-19 has afflicted Australia, India and Japan. Nonetheless, the shared interests of the three countries have been reinforced in a region plunged into further uncertainty. These shared interests extend from managing the current crisis to preserving a rules-based regional order that’s at risk of unravelling.
Australia needs to find creative ways now to not only maintain these vital relationships, but strengthen them where possible. Given the extensive underpinnings of the Australia–Japan relationship, it’s Australia’s relationship with India that needs further developing.
There is no silver bullet for Australian officials pursuing deeper ties with India—strategic partnerships are developed over time through consistent engagement, dialogue and cooperation. Even in the constrained Covid-19 environment, there are a number of investments Australia can look to make.
On the defence side, concluding the mutual logistics support agreement with India remains a near-term opportunity. An anticipated outcome of Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s postponed January visit to India, the agreement will enable reciprocal access to military facilities and increase the two countries’ capacity to operate together. This could be concluded even without a prime ministerial visit and complement an India–Japan equivalent that’s also under negotiation.
Increasing the volume and complexity of Australia’s joint exercises with India will also offer benefits. The largest such initiative, AUSINDEX, featured anti-submarine exercises for the first time last year, alongside coordinated aerial patrols over the Bay of Bengal. The capacity to conduct joint exercises is likely to be limited in the near term, but ongoing defence engagement and planning of future operations remains vital. While Japan’s public support for Australian participation in the Malabar exercise involving India, Japan and the US is important—and Australian participation would be welcome—Malabar is but one of many joint exercises that can occur.
Diplomatically, maintaining senior-level dialogues is essential to turn shared interests into common action. This includes Australia’s ‘2+2’ with India and the formal trilateral dialogue, both currently held at the secretary level. Following the recent upgrade of the India–Japan 2+2, Australia could pursue a similar boost to its equivalent dialogue with India. Complementing Australia’s longstanding ministerial 2+2 with Japan, this would ensure all three countries were conducting such meetings at the ministerial level. These arrangements could underpin the upgrading of the trilateral dialogue itself to the ministerial level.
The maturing of the Australia–India–Japan trilateral relationship is testament to Australia’s strategic policy of helping to shape a regional order that is multipolar and balanced, and in which Australia has options. This has involved strengthening longstanding relationships like that with Japan, upgrading emerging ones like that with India, and building networked partnerships across the Indo-Pacific like the Australia–India–Japan trilateral.
The task remains unfinished, however, and Covid-19 further clouds Australia’s navigation of an uncertain regional outlook. While deepening Australia’s relationships is made more challenging amid the pandemic, a more precarious region makes those relationships all the more important.
Covid-19 shouldn’t stop Australia, India and Japan from developing stronger ties | The Strategist
Despite the Covid-19 crisis, geopolitical competition is not going into hibernation. With relations between the US and China taking a further adversarial turn, it is imperative that Australia find ways to continue strengthening and diversifying ...
And Australia wants India and Japan to protect them? And bring war inside Indian territory. This is India's strategy? I think brainy people should have some almonds and ghee. I am sure some Navy officer or some one from JIC has been vouching for this, because Australia might have promised job and citizen to his kids.
Why India should align with the US
By Yusuf T. Unjhawala
May 16 2020
Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal.
Capitol Hill, Washington DC. Pierre Blaché/Flickr
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi surprisingly attended the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) virtual summit recently, after previously skipping two summits signalling India’s move away from it having adopted the policy of multi-alignment. Non-alignment evokes nostalgia for many in India. As the Sino-US relations have reached tipping point, the debate over India’s alignment has only just begun.
Sino-US tensions have been building since the 2008 financial crisis, and has only sped up since 2013 when President Xi Jinping came to power and announced his vision to make China a superpower. ‘Decoupling’ between the US and China was not triggered by COVID-19. It started with US President Donald Trump labeling China a strategic competitor and imposing tariffs on Chinese goods and ordering American companies to leave China.
If the US-China rivalry leads to a situation where India has to make a choice of alignment or non-alignment, it has to be dictated by its interest and the nature of its relations with Washington DC and Beijing.
Views against China are bipartisan in the US. Even a change of guard after the elections later this year is not going to change US policy towards China. It will be difficult for Trump’s successor to overturn his decisions, from tariffs to any possible sanctions. If the US-China rivalry leads to a situation where India has to make a choice of alignment or non-alignment, it has to be dictated by its interest and the nature of its relations with Washington DC and Beijing.
An alignment with the US
It will be in India’s economic and strategic interests to align with the US and the Western world which will remain together despite the fissures under Trump. India needs investments, technology, a manufacturing ecosystem to employ millions of its young population and improve its living standards. It requires advanced weapons and technologies for its military. India is ambitious and wants to be a great power and the US and the Western world recognise this and are willing to partner India.
China’s handling of the coronavirus (COVID-19), and its complimenting boorish diplomacy has unmasked its intentions, leading to a global backlash. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said that the US is in talks with India to restructure global supply chains. The US is encouraging its companies to look at India as an alternative to China. This presents a big opportunity for India whose continental size, large market, young and skilled labour, and shared values with the West makes it an attractive destination. In fact, an alliance of democracies could crystallise with economic cooperation at its core.
Defence ties between the two have been cemented with increasing weapons sales and important defence agreements. There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation.
In many ways, India is already “aligned” with the US. Many adjectives are used to describe the “global strategic partnership” between the two countries — natural allies, indispensable allies, defining partnership of the 21st century and so on. Much has been written about the development of their relations over the last 15 years since the historic nuclear deal of 2008. Defence ties between the two have been cemented with increasing weapons sales and important defence agreements. There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation. The, US along with France, are India’s principle backers in the UN Security Council and also support its membership in it. The Quad of India, US, Japan and Australia is also slowly institutionalising the multilateral partnership that is committed to an open, secure, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in response to China’s expansionist policies.
On the other hand, India is a long term rival for China, which does not want India’s rise. Beijing wants to keep India boxed into South Asia, and tries to keep it off balance using Pakistan which it arms and supports. It has made inroads into the region using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It continues to block India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and continues to needle New Delhi in the UNSC over Kashmir. It occupies parts of Indian territory and also claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. China poses the biggest military threat for India, and the two month long Doklam standoff in 2017 followed by the two failed informal summits after that are a reminder.
Non-alignment is not an option
There will be opportunity and strategic costs for India’s economic development in alienating the US-led western world. India will not become a pawn in the great power rivalry as proponents of non-alignment fear. On the contrary, India will be a significant player in shaping the new world order.
The US prefers its partners to pay for and manage their own security, but collaborate in all possible ways — weapons sale, sharing civil and military technologies, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and logistics support.
India’s strategic autonomy will not be compromised and the alliances of the 21st century will not be the same as those of the 20th. The US prefers its partners to pay for and manage their own security, but collaborate in all possible ways — weapons sale, sharing civil and military technologies, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and logistics support. This suits India, which is averse to fighting someone else’s wars but wants to assume greater responsibilities.
Newly independent India was a poor and scarred country. Its policymakers thought it would be better to keep away from the great power rivalry. It co-founded and championed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to create a space for itself on the global stage. But it was driven by emotions to create solidarity with the newly independent nations rather than self interest which prevented India from using the great power rivalry to its advantage. With a policy of self sufficiency, it virtually closed the doors to the world.
But despite that, it leaned towards the Soviet Union as it needed security and development assistance. India had a choice to align either way, and could have gone with the US. That option does not exist between the US and China. It will be pragmatic to take advantage of the great power rivalry by suitably aligning with the power that New Delhi can derive maximum benefit from.
At $3 trillion, India is the world’s fifth largest economy and will become the third largest during this decade. It has a reasonably powerful military, and confidence about its place in the world.
India of 2020 is very different from seventy years ago. At $3 trillion, it is the world’s fifth largest economy and will become the third largest during this decade. It has a reasonably powerful military, and confidence about its place in the world. India enters partnerships as an equal and global agreements on critical issues such as climate change need India to play a large role. The results have been visible, for example in the founding of the International Solar Alliance. India is a also increasingly a first responder for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region, and considers itself to be a security provider.
A disruption in the waiting
At the Ramnath Goenka lecture last year, India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said that it is only through a series of disruptions that India was able to bring about decisive shifts in its favour. “The pursuit of an apparently consistent course despite changing circumstances often led us to lose the plot. This was the case with engaging China in the 1950s as part of a larger post-colonial front, even as political differences sharpened over a boundary dispute and a Tibet complication,” he said.
Much of India’s diplomacy in the last few years has been to counter China and its influence. India faces China as a competitor in Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Indo-US ties are complementary, and a formal alliance will help realise the full potential of these relations. India’s alliance with the US is not going to break down trade relations with China. Even during the Cold War, New Delhi had good trade ties with the US despite leaning towards the Soviet Union.
Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal. China will not be to India, what the Soviet Union was. In the post COVID-19 world, India will have to make a disruptive choice — of alignment.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).
www.orfonline.org
By Yusuf T. Unjhawala
May 16 2020
Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal.
Capitol Hill, Washington DC. Pierre Blaché/Flickr
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi surprisingly attended the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) virtual summit recently, after previously skipping two summits signalling India’s move away from it having adopted the policy of multi-alignment. Non-alignment evokes nostalgia for many in India. As the Sino-US relations have reached tipping point, the debate over India’s alignment has only just begun.
Sino-US tensions have been building since the 2008 financial crisis, and has only sped up since 2013 when President Xi Jinping came to power and announced his vision to make China a superpower. ‘Decoupling’ between the US and China was not triggered by COVID-19. It started with US President Donald Trump labeling China a strategic competitor and imposing tariffs on Chinese goods and ordering American companies to leave China.
If the US-China rivalry leads to a situation where India has to make a choice of alignment or non-alignment, it has to be dictated by its interest and the nature of its relations with Washington DC and Beijing.
Views against China are bipartisan in the US. Even a change of guard after the elections later this year is not going to change US policy towards China. It will be difficult for Trump’s successor to overturn his decisions, from tariffs to any possible sanctions. If the US-China rivalry leads to a situation where India has to make a choice of alignment or non-alignment, it has to be dictated by its interest and the nature of its relations with Washington DC and Beijing.
An alignment with the US
It will be in India’s economic and strategic interests to align with the US and the Western world which will remain together despite the fissures under Trump. India needs investments, technology, a manufacturing ecosystem to employ millions of its young population and improve its living standards. It requires advanced weapons and technologies for its military. India is ambitious and wants to be a great power and the US and the Western world recognise this and are willing to partner India.
China’s handling of the coronavirus (COVID-19), and its complimenting boorish diplomacy has unmasked its intentions, leading to a global backlash. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said that the US is in talks with India to restructure global supply chains. The US is encouraging its companies to look at India as an alternative to China. This presents a big opportunity for India whose continental size, large market, young and skilled labour, and shared values with the West makes it an attractive destination. In fact, an alliance of democracies could crystallise with economic cooperation at its core.
Defence ties between the two have been cemented with increasing weapons sales and important defence agreements. There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation.
In many ways, India is already “aligned” with the US. Many adjectives are used to describe the “global strategic partnership” between the two countries — natural allies, indispensable allies, defining partnership of the 21st century and so on. Much has been written about the development of their relations over the last 15 years since the historic nuclear deal of 2008. Defence ties between the two have been cemented with increasing weapons sales and important defence agreements. There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation. The, US along with France, are India’s principle backers in the UN Security Council and also support its membership in it. The Quad of India, US, Japan and Australia is also slowly institutionalising the multilateral partnership that is committed to an open, secure, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in response to China’s expansionist policies.
On the other hand, India is a long term rival for China, which does not want India’s rise. Beijing wants to keep India boxed into South Asia, and tries to keep it off balance using Pakistan which it arms and supports. It has made inroads into the region using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It continues to block India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and continues to needle New Delhi in the UNSC over Kashmir. It occupies parts of Indian territory and also claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. China poses the biggest military threat for India, and the two month long Doklam standoff in 2017 followed by the two failed informal summits after that are a reminder.
Non-alignment is not an option
There will be opportunity and strategic costs for India’s economic development in alienating the US-led western world. India will not become a pawn in the great power rivalry as proponents of non-alignment fear. On the contrary, India will be a significant player in shaping the new world order.
The US prefers its partners to pay for and manage their own security, but collaborate in all possible ways — weapons sale, sharing civil and military technologies, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and logistics support.
India’s strategic autonomy will not be compromised and the alliances of the 21st century will not be the same as those of the 20th. The US prefers its partners to pay for and manage their own security, but collaborate in all possible ways — weapons sale, sharing civil and military technologies, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and logistics support. This suits India, which is averse to fighting someone else’s wars but wants to assume greater responsibilities.
Newly independent India was a poor and scarred country. Its policymakers thought it would be better to keep away from the great power rivalry. It co-founded and championed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to create a space for itself on the global stage. But it was driven by emotions to create solidarity with the newly independent nations rather than self interest which prevented India from using the great power rivalry to its advantage. With a policy of self sufficiency, it virtually closed the doors to the world.
But despite that, it leaned towards the Soviet Union as it needed security and development assistance. India had a choice to align either way, and could have gone with the US. That option does not exist between the US and China. It will be pragmatic to take advantage of the great power rivalry by suitably aligning with the power that New Delhi can derive maximum benefit from.
At $3 trillion, India is the world’s fifth largest economy and will become the third largest during this decade. It has a reasonably powerful military, and confidence about its place in the world.
India of 2020 is very different from seventy years ago. At $3 trillion, it is the world’s fifth largest economy and will become the third largest during this decade. It has a reasonably powerful military, and confidence about its place in the world. India enters partnerships as an equal and global agreements on critical issues such as climate change need India to play a large role. The results have been visible, for example in the founding of the International Solar Alliance. India is a also increasingly a first responder for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region, and considers itself to be a security provider.
A disruption in the waiting
At the Ramnath Goenka lecture last year, India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said that it is only through a series of disruptions that India was able to bring about decisive shifts in its favour. “The pursuit of an apparently consistent course despite changing circumstances often led us to lose the plot. This was the case with engaging China in the 1950s as part of a larger post-colonial front, even as political differences sharpened over a boundary dispute and a Tibet complication,” he said.
Much of India’s diplomacy in the last few years has been to counter China and its influence. India faces China as a competitor in Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Indo-US ties are complementary, and a formal alliance will help realise the full potential of these relations. India’s alliance with the US is not going to break down trade relations with China. Even during the Cold War, New Delhi had good trade ties with the US despite leaning towards the Soviet Union.
Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal. China will not be to India, what the Soviet Union was. In the post COVID-19 world, India will have to make a disruptive choice — of alignment.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).
Why India should align with the US | ORF
China will not be to India what the Soviet Union was. In the post COVID-19 world, India will have to make a disruptive choice—of alignment.
Why India should align with the US
By Yusuf T. Unjhawala
May 16 2020
Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal.
View attachment 15908
Capitol Hill, Washington DC. Pierre Blaché/Flickr
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi surprisingly attended the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) virtual summit recently, after previously skipping two summits signalling India’s move away from it having adopted the policy of multi-alignment. Non-alignment evokes nostalgia for many in India. As the Sino-US relations have reached tipping point, the debate over India’s alignment has only just begun.
Sino-US tensions have been building since the 2008 financial crisis, and has only sped up since 2013 when President Xi Jinping came to power and announced his vision to make China a superpower. ‘Decoupling’ between the US and China was not triggered by COVID-19. It started with US President Donald Trump labeling China a strategic competitor and imposing tariffs on Chinese goods and ordering American companies to leave China.
If the US-China rivalry leads to a situation where India has to make a choice of alignment or non-alignment, it has to be dictated by its interest and the nature of its relations with Washington DC and Beijing.
Views against China are bipartisan in the US. Even a change of guard after the elections later this year is not going to change US policy towards China. It will be difficult for Trump’s successor to overturn his decisions, from tariffs to any possible sanctions. If the US-China rivalry leads to a situation where India has to make a choice of alignment or non-alignment, it has to be dictated by its interest and the nature of its relations with Washington DC and Beijing.
An alignment with the US
It will be in India’s economic and strategic interests to align with the US and the Western world which will remain together despite the fissures under Trump. India needs investments, technology, a manufacturing ecosystem to employ millions of its young population and improve its living standards. It requires advanced weapons and technologies for its military. India is ambitious and wants to be a great power and the US and the Western world recognise this and are willing to partner India.
China’s handling of the coronavirus (COVID-19), and its complimenting boorish diplomacy has unmasked its intentions, leading to a global backlash. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said that the US is in talks with India to restructure global supply chains. The US is encouraging its companies to look at India as an alternative to China. This presents a big opportunity for India whose continental size, large market, young and skilled labour, and shared values with the West makes it an attractive destination. In fact, an alliance of democracies could crystallise with economic cooperation at its core.
Defence ties between the two have been cemented with increasing weapons sales and important defence agreements. There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation.
In many ways, India is already “aligned” with the US. Many adjectives are used to describe the “global strategic partnership” between the two countries — natural allies, indispensable allies, defining partnership of the 21st century and so on. Much has been written about the development of their relations over the last 15 years since the historic nuclear deal of 2008. Defence ties between the two have been cemented with increasing weapons sales and important defence agreements. There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises and dialogues on economic and strategic cooperation. The, US along with France, are India’s principle backers in the UN Security Council and also support its membership in it. The Quad of India, US, Japan and Australia is also slowly institutionalising the multilateral partnership that is committed to an open, secure, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in response to China’s expansionist policies.
On the other hand, India is a long term rival for China, which does not want India’s rise. Beijing wants to keep India boxed into South Asia, and tries to keep it off balance using Pakistan which it arms and supports. It has made inroads into the region using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It continues to block India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and continues to needle New Delhi in the UNSC over Kashmir. It occupies parts of Indian territory and also claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. China poses the biggest military threat for India, and the two month long Doklam standoff in 2017 followed by the two failed informal summits after that are a reminder.
Non-alignment is not an option
There will be opportunity and strategic costs for India’s economic development in alienating the US-led western world. India will not become a pawn in the great power rivalry as proponents of non-alignment fear. On the contrary, India will be a significant player in shaping the new world order.
The US prefers its partners to pay for and manage their own security, but collaborate in all possible ways — weapons sale, sharing civil and military technologies, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and logistics support.
India’s strategic autonomy will not be compromised and the alliances of the 21st century will not be the same as those of the 20th. The US prefers its partners to pay for and manage their own security, but collaborate in all possible ways — weapons sale, sharing civil and military technologies, diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and logistics support. This suits India, which is averse to fighting someone else’s wars but wants to assume greater responsibilities.
Newly independent India was a poor and scarred country. Its policymakers thought it would be better to keep away from the great power rivalry. It co-founded and championed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to create a space for itself on the global stage. But it was driven by emotions to create solidarity with the newly independent nations rather than self interest which prevented India from using the great power rivalry to its advantage. With a policy of self sufficiency, it virtually closed the doors to the world.
But despite that, it leaned towards the Soviet Union as it needed security and development assistance. India had a choice to align either way, and could have gone with the US. That option does not exist between the US and China. It will be pragmatic to take advantage of the great power rivalry by suitably aligning with the power that New Delhi can derive maximum benefit from.
At $3 trillion, India is the world’s fifth largest economy and will become the third largest during this decade. It has a reasonably powerful military, and confidence about its place in the world.
India of 2020 is very different from seventy years ago. At $3 trillion, it is the world’s fifth largest economy and will become the third largest during this decade. It has a reasonably powerful military, and confidence about its place in the world. India enters partnerships as an equal and global agreements on critical issues such as climate change need India to play a large role. The results have been visible, for example in the founding of the International Solar Alliance. India is a also increasingly a first responder for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region, and considers itself to be a security provider.
A disruption in the waiting
At the Ramnath Goenka lecture last year, India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said that it is only through a series of disruptions that India was able to bring about decisive shifts in its favour. “The pursuit of an apparently consistent course despite changing circumstances often led us to lose the plot. This was the case with engaging China in the 1950s as part of a larger post-colonial front, even as political differences sharpened over a boundary dispute and a Tibet complication,” he said.
Much of India’s diplomacy in the last few years has been to counter China and its influence. India faces China as a competitor in Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Indo-US ties are complementary, and a formal alliance will help realise the full potential of these relations. India’s alliance with the US is not going to break down trade relations with China. Even during the Cold War, New Delhi had good trade ties with the US despite leaning towards the Soviet Union.
Non-alignment or being a swing state makes sense if the gains to be derived from either side are equal. China will not be to India, what the Soviet Union was. In the post COVID-19 world, India will have to make a disruptive choice — of alignment.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).
Why India should align with the US | ORF
China will not be to India what the Soviet Union was. In the post COVID-19 world, India will have to make a disruptive choice—of alignment.
He's already given the reason why we shouldn't become an American ally. We are a $3T economy and will be the third biggest by the end of the decade.
Getting into an allaince with the US means helping them out in toher places also. Totally does not help us at all.
We only see eye to eye when it comes to China, so we should keep going as we are. The US cannot be trusted. And India is too big to choose sides anyway.
This alliance gambit would have worked right after the Cold War, but not now. Too late.
Coronavirus: Scott Morrison identifies India as major trade partner
By Ben Packham
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT
Scott Morrison and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meet for a bilateral meeting during at the 2018 ASEAN Summit in Singapore.
Scott Morrison and his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, will cement new agreements to develop reliable supply chains in key strategic sectors, including medical goods, technology and critical minerals, amid heightened tensions with China.
The Prime Minister will use a June 4 virtual summit with Mr Modi to ramp up efforts to diversify Australia's export markets and find trusted suppliers of vital products and components.
The leaders will seal a new defence agreement allowing reciprocal access to bases and co-operation on military technology projects, while a new education partnership will be on the table to help overcome Australian university reliance on Chinese students.
Australian farmers could also benefit, with talks under way on expanding agricultural exports to India, including barley, as China throws up new trade barriers.
The online meeting follows the cancellation of the Prime Minister’s planned state visit to India in January due to the bushfires.
The talks now have greater significance as COVID-19 exacerbates the strategic contest between the US and China, and forces like-minded countries to seek out reliable partners.
Mr Morrison said last year, ahead of his planned visit, that India was “a natural partner for Australia”, referring to the countries’ “shared values” — a point of differentiation with China.
Former Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade secretary Peter Varghese, who wrote a landmark report on the bilateral relationship in 2018, said India would be even more important to Australia in the post-COVID world. “If one of the lessons from COVID is that countries need to spread their risk, then finding new markets or building up existing markets is a crucial part of that,” he said.
Mr Varghese said India, a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, Japan and the US, was a vital strategic partner to Australia in helping “constrain China’s ambitions to be the predominant power”.
“That shared objective between Australia and India of not wanting to see the region dominated by China is a key component of building up our geopolitical relationship,” he said.
Australian Strategic Policy Institute defence program director Michael Shoebridge said Australia’s handling of the coronavirus crisis would help elevate the bilateral partnership to the next level. “The way the government, the business community and society have managed the pandemic has raised our stocks in Delhi as a trusted, reliable partner,” Mr Shoebridge said.
The summit follows recent talks between Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the pandemic response and Australia’s call for an independent inquiry, which was overwhelmingly backed at the World Health Assembly on Tuesday.
Senator Payne has also spoken in recent days to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and counterparts in Brazil, Israel, Japan and South Korea, as democratic nations work together on a pandemic recovery plan.
Australia wants to support India to develop a domestic critical minerals processing industry, which would provide Western nations with an alternative to sourcing the materials from China.
India has strong expertise as a manufacturer of drugs and medical equipment, while Australia is a centre of biomedical research, opening the possibility for closer co-operation in the key sector.
It’s hoped a new research partnership will help Australia’s education sector to rebound after the pandemic, while also fostering closer co-operation on the development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning and quantum computing.
By working closely with India, Australia hopes to lessen its reliance on Chinese technology, and contribute to new standards that will prevent Beijing from setting the ground rules in key areas.
Mr Morrison and Mr Modi are due to finalise a defence logistics agreement to improve the interoperability of the countries’ navies and fast-track planning for joint exercises by pre-authorising arrangements for port visits, fuel costs, supplies and personnel clearances. The logistics deal is seen as a precursor to a formal invitation from India for Australia to join its Malabar naval exercises with the US and Japan.
NoCookies | The Australian
