Ukraine - Russia Conflict
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Eight 'capability coalitions' are rushing arms to Ukraine. Here's who will donate what. (EXPLAINER) - Breaking Defense
NATO has established eight different capability coalitions designed to get critical systems or ammo into Ukrainian hands quickly. Here's a deep dive into how they're all faring.
Fire at SalavatNeftekhim refinery as result of drone attack
Wow good air defence.
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Apache anti runaway missile are no more on duty for yearssss.@Picdelamirand-oil Does France still have any of those Apache missiles.
Apache (missile) - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Maybe some are stored, but in what condition now?
Penser la stratégie. Stratégie et « partage » nucléaire
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
Thinking strategy. Nuclear strategy and "sharing
All it took was a few words. Following a speech by French President Emmanuel Macron in Stockholm on 30 January 2024, a startling piece of information set the French networks and political world alight. "France has the responsibility to make its nuclear deterrent capability available to Europe," the head of the French armed forces was quoted as saying in front of his hosts. The shock was real and the reactions immediate. Except that - Traduttore, traditore - the quote in question was false.
The Élysée was quick to put out the fire by pointing out that the fundamentals of French doctrine had not changed and that the reference in this case was still the presidential speech given in February 2020 at the École de guerre in Paris. What exactly did that speech say about a possible European dimension to France's nuclear deterrent? It read as follows: "[...] I would like to see the development of a strategic dialogue with our European partners who are ready for it on the role of France's nuclear deterrent in our collective security. European partners who wish to commit to this approach will be able to take part in exercises by French deterrent forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to the development of a genuine strategic culture among Europeans.
If words have a meaning, it was a matter of exchanging views with European partners (those who would be "ready" and who would "wish" to do so, which is a lot), so that they could become more familiar with the role played by France's nuclear deterrent in the security and defence architecture of the European continent. In short, to better understand in order to better recognise. Over and above a reminder of the implications of the 1974 Ottawa Declaration, the French intention has long been the same: to suggest that the Union can and must eventually become an autonomous political and strategic player. From this point of view, French nuclear power is less a capability in itself than a capability parable. Far from nuclear sharing, the consolidation of a common strategic culture also highlights the need for conventional deterrence to back up nuclear deterrence. Paris seems to suggest that the urgent need for Europeans is not to further weaken the balance of the NPT, but to provide massive funding for the design, development and purchase of European defence equipment, produced nationally or in cooperation, rather than compulsively acquiring American or Israeli equipment.
Since the Élysée Palace has denied any revolution in this area, why has the debate continued unabated in France and Europe since the Stockholm incident? Because the strategic context of 2024 is nothing like that of 2020. Ukraine is forcing every European nation to revise its certainties about the future strategic balance on the continent. For some analysts, this context should lead Paris to make concrete changes, going much further than simply consolidating a common "deterrent culture". Their idea is to share the deterrent effect of French nuclear weapons, going so far as to station some of them on the territory of the EU members most directly exposed to the Russian strategic risk. And why not, argue the most iconoclastic, take the step of sharing the possible use of these weapons, by making it dependent on the agreement of the two partners concerned ('double key' concept), should deterrence fail? After all, they argue, NATO is a nuclear alliance, which has already set an example of nuclear sharing that Paris has so far rejected.
Two factors, one tactical-operational and the other political-strategic, seem to support their proposals. Firstly, on Saturday 17 February 2024, the exhausted Ukrainian army had to abandon Avdiivka, which had been conquered by the Russians. Secondly, and more structurally, the victory of a neo-isolationist candidate in the American presidential election of 2024 can no longer be ruled out. A shaken front, a weakened alliance: the Europeans least convinced by the CSDP, like the Poles, after years of treating the French concept of strategic autonomy with contempt, are suddenly discovering that they are 1o absolutely dependent on a power outside the European continent, which 2o is increasingly divided by serious cultural polarisations, and 3o whose foreign policy orientations can change radically every four years. Is this not a tempting opportunity for Paris to consolidate the 'European pillar' of collective continental defence, this time 'from above'?
The Swedish incident therefore has the merit of reopening the debate on the role of France's nuclear deterrent. The problem is that most of the proposals for nuclear "sharing" put forward on this occasion seem to overlook the paradoxes of what is known as "extended" deterrence. Of the three nuclear deterrents protecting the European continent, it is the American deterrent that most fully possesses the explicit dimension of a collective 'umbrella'. That is if we believe that Washington will risk New York to save Warsaw. Everything depends not on theory, but on scenarios and context. It would be wrong to think that the Russians are unaware of these contextual paradoxes: those who still insist that non-Western strategic players are "irrational" would do well to reread the epistolary exchange between Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev in 1962, in which the latter explained to the former what an ascent to atomic extremes really means. As early as 1957, Kissinger had already said everything about what this belief in "extended" deterrence implied in terms of the division between conventional, "tactical" and strategic nuclear deterrents. And also of the fundamental difference between the central deterrents and the subordinate nuclear players whose survival is at stake in the theatre itself: how can we imagine that the levels of reasoning, responsibility and risk-taking between them are the same?
Under these conditions, one might get the impression that the "innovators" are basically reviving discussions that have been out of date since the abortive birth of the multilateral force in the 1960s, in this case the very possibility of dividing planning and (more fundamentally) nuclear decision-making between several geographically distant players, without undermining the credibility of the associated nuclear deterrent. Because of the technical and temporal specificities of the deployment of atomic weapons, everything in this field depends on this dimension of supreme concentration of the decision. And we are not just talking here about cooperative devolution of implementation, but also about the planning aspect. The example of NATO's "nuclear sharing"? Even from a planning point of view, has it ever existed in the true sense of the word? Looking coldly at reality, has it ever gone beyond the simple level of "nuclear sheltering"? The existence of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which some would like France to join, does not prevent the final control of this complex whole ultimately resting solely on the American national decision, as is effectively demonstrated by a recent research article by Jeffrey H. Michaels, with a suggestive title ("No annihilation without representation") (1). This fascinating study looks at what we would now call the "first Cold War". Would what he describes of the conditions of (false) nuclear sharing at that time change in the context of the second Cold War that is beginning before our very eyes? It is doubtful.
The independent French atomic weapon existed because the French did not believe in a deterrent that was too broad, and because May 1940 had taught them the value of not being absolutely dependent on island allies who would not commit themselves until too late on the continent in the face of a massive land-based danger that did not threaten them directly. This does not mean that the French deterrent does not contribute to the general deterrence of the European continent. On the contrary, and this is precisely the essence of the Ottawa Declaration of 1974: it was the very independence of the French decision-making process that complicated the calculations of the adversary at the time (the USSR). And it still complicates them today (and not just for Russia). But this French nuclear deterrent is obliged, even more so than the American one - and all the more so because it is based on the principle of strict sufficiency - to take into account the difference between the sanctuary and what Poirier called the "parapet".
These complex debates should not divert the attention of European countries from the essential point: almost all of them have historically organised their defence by tying it to a power outside the continent. Talking about nuclear sharing under these conditions could well be a way of avoiding the central issue: if they do not organise themselves, starting by becoming credible from a conventional point of view, the only "sharing" they will show will be that of their common powerlessness.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
Thinking strategy. Nuclear strategy and "sharing
An RS-24 Yas (SS-27 Mod.2) launcher leaves its shelter. Russian action against NATO is potentially counter-dissuasive: it could mean escalation. But who would risk Riga or Vilnius for Washington?
All it took was a few words. Following a speech by French President Emmanuel Macron in Stockholm on 30 January 2024, a startling piece of information set the French networks and political world alight. "France has the responsibility to make its nuclear deterrent capability available to Europe," the head of the French armed forces was quoted as saying in front of his hosts. The shock was real and the reactions immediate. Except that - Traduttore, traditore - the quote in question was false.
The Élysée was quick to put out the fire by pointing out that the fundamentals of French doctrine had not changed and that the reference in this case was still the presidential speech given in February 2020 at the École de guerre in Paris. What exactly did that speech say about a possible European dimension to France's nuclear deterrent? It read as follows: "[...] I would like to see the development of a strategic dialogue with our European partners who are ready for it on the role of France's nuclear deterrent in our collective security. European partners who wish to commit to this approach will be able to take part in exercises by French deterrent forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to the development of a genuine strategic culture among Europeans.
If words have a meaning, it was a matter of exchanging views with European partners (those who would be "ready" and who would "wish" to do so, which is a lot), so that they could become more familiar with the role played by France's nuclear deterrent in the security and defence architecture of the European continent. In short, to better understand in order to better recognise. Over and above a reminder of the implications of the 1974 Ottawa Declaration, the French intention has long been the same: to suggest that the Union can and must eventually become an autonomous political and strategic player. From this point of view, French nuclear power is less a capability in itself than a capability parable. Far from nuclear sharing, the consolidation of a common strategic culture also highlights the need for conventional deterrence to back up nuclear deterrence. Paris seems to suggest that the urgent need for Europeans is not to further weaken the balance of the NPT, but to provide massive funding for the design, development and purchase of European defence equipment, produced nationally or in cooperation, rather than compulsively acquiring American or Israeli equipment.
Since the Élysée Palace has denied any revolution in this area, why has the debate continued unabated in France and Europe since the Stockholm incident? Because the strategic context of 2024 is nothing like that of 2020. Ukraine is forcing every European nation to revise its certainties about the future strategic balance on the continent. For some analysts, this context should lead Paris to make concrete changes, going much further than simply consolidating a common "deterrent culture". Their idea is to share the deterrent effect of French nuclear weapons, going so far as to station some of them on the territory of the EU members most directly exposed to the Russian strategic risk. And why not, argue the most iconoclastic, take the step of sharing the possible use of these weapons, by making it dependent on the agreement of the two partners concerned ('double key' concept), should deterrence fail? After all, they argue, NATO is a nuclear alliance, which has already set an example of nuclear sharing that Paris has so far rejected.
Two factors, one tactical-operational and the other political-strategic, seem to support their proposals. Firstly, on Saturday 17 February 2024, the exhausted Ukrainian army had to abandon Avdiivka, which had been conquered by the Russians. Secondly, and more structurally, the victory of a neo-isolationist candidate in the American presidential election of 2024 can no longer be ruled out. A shaken front, a weakened alliance: the Europeans least convinced by the CSDP, like the Poles, after years of treating the French concept of strategic autonomy with contempt, are suddenly discovering that they are 1o absolutely dependent on a power outside the European continent, which 2o is increasingly divided by serious cultural polarisations, and 3o whose foreign policy orientations can change radically every four years. Is this not a tempting opportunity for Paris to consolidate the 'European pillar' of collective continental defence, this time 'from above'?
The Swedish incident therefore has the merit of reopening the debate on the role of France's nuclear deterrent. The problem is that most of the proposals for nuclear "sharing" put forward on this occasion seem to overlook the paradoxes of what is known as "extended" deterrence. Of the three nuclear deterrents protecting the European continent, it is the American deterrent that most fully possesses the explicit dimension of a collective 'umbrella'. That is if we believe that Washington will risk New York to save Warsaw. Everything depends not on theory, but on scenarios and context. It would be wrong to think that the Russians are unaware of these contextual paradoxes: those who still insist that non-Western strategic players are "irrational" would do well to reread the epistolary exchange between Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev in 1962, in which the latter explained to the former what an ascent to atomic extremes really means. As early as 1957, Kissinger had already said everything about what this belief in "extended" deterrence implied in terms of the division between conventional, "tactical" and strategic nuclear deterrents. And also of the fundamental difference between the central deterrents and the subordinate nuclear players whose survival is at stake in the theatre itself: how can we imagine that the levels of reasoning, responsibility and risk-taking between them are the same?
Under these conditions, one might get the impression that the "innovators" are basically reviving discussions that have been out of date since the abortive birth of the multilateral force in the 1960s, in this case the very possibility of dividing planning and (more fundamentally) nuclear decision-making between several geographically distant players, without undermining the credibility of the associated nuclear deterrent. Because of the technical and temporal specificities of the deployment of atomic weapons, everything in this field depends on this dimension of supreme concentration of the decision. And we are not just talking here about cooperative devolution of implementation, but also about the planning aspect. The example of NATO's "nuclear sharing"? Even from a planning point of view, has it ever existed in the true sense of the word? Looking coldly at reality, has it ever gone beyond the simple level of "nuclear sheltering"? The existence of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which some would like France to join, does not prevent the final control of this complex whole ultimately resting solely on the American national decision, as is effectively demonstrated by a recent research article by Jeffrey H. Michaels, with a suggestive title ("No annihilation without representation") (1). This fascinating study looks at what we would now call the "first Cold War". Would what he describes of the conditions of (false) nuclear sharing at that time change in the context of the second Cold War that is beginning before our very eyes? It is doubtful.
The independent French atomic weapon existed because the French did not believe in a deterrent that was too broad, and because May 1940 had taught them the value of not being absolutely dependent on island allies who would not commit themselves until too late on the continent in the face of a massive land-based danger that did not threaten them directly. This does not mean that the French deterrent does not contribute to the general deterrence of the European continent. On the contrary, and this is precisely the essence of the Ottawa Declaration of 1974: it was the very independence of the French decision-making process that complicated the calculations of the adversary at the time (the USSR). And it still complicates them today (and not just for Russia). But this French nuclear deterrent is obliged, even more so than the American one - and all the more so because it is based on the principle of strict sufficiency - to take into account the difference between the sanctuary and what Poirier called the "parapet".
These complex debates should not divert the attention of European countries from the essential point: almost all of them have historically organised their defence by tying it to a power outside the continent. Talking about nuclear sharing under these conditions could well be a way of avoiding the central issue: if they do not organise themselves, starting by becoming credible from a conventional point of view, the only "sharing" they will show will be that of their common powerlessness.
The Ukrainian army published an episode of the battle with an attack near the village of Solovevo. The video shows a group of Russian military equipment going on the attack. As a result of the battle, some military equipment was disabled by Ukrainian FPV drones, but the T-90M Proryv tank was not damaged. The video shows the Russian T-90M Proryv tank equipped with additional protection; the tank withstood three hits from FPV drones. The final result of the battle is unknown to us, but the tank’s protection withstood all the blows. This is the first time in combat in Ukraine where a tank withstood an attack by three FPV drones.