"Russia entered the third year of its war in Ukraine more confident. While the Ukrainian counter-offensive had generally failed and Western arms deliveries to Ukraine were dwindling, Russia was beginning to reap the first rewards of its massive investment in arms production, giving it a greater capacity to regenerate equipment than the opposing side. At the end of the first half of 2024, however, the prospects appear to be less lopsided in favour of Ukraine, whose Western support seems to be picking up again.
For Russia, this means that the industrial effort will have to continue, although it is not certain that this will fully compensate for the loss of equipment in all segments. The question therefore arises as to the sustainability of this effort, against a backdrop of constant adaptation to Western sanctions and questions about the risks of an excessive concentration of the Russian economy on the needs of the army. The stocks of old equipment that Russian industry renovates and retrofits at reasonable prices, which have contributed to Russia's advantage over Ukraine, are not infinite. There is no obvious answer to the question of whether Russia will be able to produce sufficient quantities of new equipment.
On this subject, economists are perhaps the most "neutral" in their assessments and assume that Russia can maintain its current momentum over the next two years, perhaps three[28]. Russia's leaders probably had this timetable in mind when they opted in May 2024 for a new government organisation seeking to ensure that the money poured into the arms industry would be put to good use and to better articulate the economy's efforts in the service of defence".