So, besides the Prune posts I've cited that show the hidden cracks in the russian economy, there's this interesting paper by Vladimir Milov, a former government official of russia at the turn of the century before poo-tin started sending the country on the road to become Greater North Korea.
What's interesting is that, for example, it shows how the growth figures are spread out across sectors, and we can see how russia is actually in recession except for the military industry and, to a much lesser extent, construction (with a Chinese-style bubble going on, in fact, as construction is growing but so is the amount of unsold buildings).
So for example: russian GDP growth figure for 2023 was 3.6%. But industry growth was actually just 3.5%, less than GDP growth. However, industry growth in the defense-related sectors was between 25% and 33%.
So say your defense industry has a growth of 30%, but your total industry (including defense, but also the others) has an average growth of only 3.5%. Are you good enough at math to extrapolate what it means that the non-defense industries are lowering the growth value by an order of magnitude?
The other thing is to keep in mind how that military industry growth is funded. It's by russia's financial reserves. Let me quote a paragraph here:
While in early 2022 the liquidity portion of the NWF was sufficient to finance the military budget that existed back then for 30 months, its financing capacity is down to only 5,5 months now.
So... In 2022, russia's piggy bank could fund 30 months of defense spending. 24 months later, they can only fund six more months. Now that's logical because 30 - 24 = 6. However, it's not the whole picture, because a month of defense spending in 2022 is less than a month of defense spending in 2024, as the russian defense budget has massively increased and will keep increasing.
So russia cannot fund its war and needs to empty its national wealth fund. It's desperate for cash, and is repeating the Soviet Union's mistakes in doing so:
But the evident consequence of increased taxation will be the shrinking of capital investments - in the same way as it happened in the late 1980s, when the Soviet government was reluctant to cut budget spending, instead preferring to derive extra revenues from mineral exports, causing major underinvestment and output collapse, as described in detail in Yegor Gaidar’s book “Collapse of an Empire”.
Anyone remembers what happened to the Soviet Union just after "the late 1980s"?
Unlike the late USSR, modern-day Russia doesn’t have the ability to significantly increase borrowing to sustain its economy. China and other countries of the Global South are clearly not interested in bailing Russia out – major loans to Russia are not even under discussion, and China has its own difficulties with cooling domestic economy.
But the kremlinbots on twitter and youtube comments keep insisting that "80% of the world supports russia", how comes then that the "Global South" isn't helping? Not even with the "unlimited friendship" of China?
Oh well, at least they have North Korea to bail them out: