Russian military personnel spoke about the use of the Scorpion-M wheeled platform in Ukraine. Typically, the Scorpion-M robotic platform is used for transport purposes, but in this case, the wheeled drone was loaded with explosives and sent to a Ukrainian army stronghold. The route of movement of the robotic platform is adjusted from the FPV drone.
Ukraine - Russia Conflict
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Foreign minister says Moldova has right to expel more Russian diplomats
The foreign minister of ex-Soviet Moldova was quoted as saying on Friday that his government reserved the right to order further expulsions of Russian diplomats if Moscow engaged in new activities harmful to the country's interests. Moldova's relations with Russia have deteriorated as President...
@randomradio, @Rajput Lion, @RASALGHUL, @Parthu
This is basically an admission that Russia is kidnapping your people.
Modi to seek early discharge of Indians from Russian army in Moscow talks
NEW DELHI (Reuters) -The early discharge sought by India of its nationals who were "misled" into serving in the Russian army is expected to be discussed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Moscow next week, his foreign secretary said on Friday. Several cases of Indians who were lured...
Russian use of equipment and ammunition
Russian military doctrine, inherited from the Soviet era, often emphasises mass and volume of fire to overwhelm the enemy. This means intensive use of artillery, rockets and air strikes to prepare the ground before troops advance. Russia has vast stocks of armaments and munitions accumulated since the Cold War. Although these stocks may vary in quality, they provide a basis for sustained offensives.
Russian forces often use massive bombardments to destroy Ukrainian defences, at the cost of heavy material destruction and civilian casualties. These bombardments are visible in areas such as Marioupol and Severodonetsk. Artillery plays a central role in Russian operations, providing constant support to ground units, often from a safe distance, and engaging targets over long distances.
Russian offensives are characterised by high ammunition consumption, reflected in reports of massive use of artillery and missile projectiles. Russian ammunition stocks are being consumed at a high rate, leading to reports of shortages and the need to replenish stocks with increasingly older ammunition.
Ukrainian Materiel and Ammunition Utilisation
In contrast to Russia, Ukrainian doctrine relies more on precise strikes and targeted use of resources, maximising effectiveness while minimising casualties. Western military support, including sophisticated weapons such as HIMARS, Javelins and drones, is used for precise strikes against targets of high strategic value, rather than for massive barrages.
Ukrainian forces often employ guerrilla tactics, striking weak points in Russian lines, using their knowledge of the terrain and moving quickly to avoid retaliatory strikes. Ukraine has innovated in the use of drones for reconnaissance missions and targeted strikes, compensating for the lack of heavy artillery with precision strikes.
Due to resource constraints and dependence on Western supplies, Ukraine is using its munitions in a more measured and strategic way. The emphasis is on optimising each shot to maximise impact while minimising consumption. Guidance systems and guided munitions play a key role in this approach.
Russia focuses on quantity and raw power, while Ukraine focuses on efficiency and precision.
Advantages for Russia: The ability to maintain a continuous barrage of fire can disrupt opposing lines and create opportunities to advance, but Russian strategy depends on the ability to maintain a robust logistics chain to continuously supply the vast quantities of ammunition required.
Advantages for Ukraine: Precise use of resources minimises losses and maximises impact on critical targets, while preserving ammunition for future needs, but Ukraine depends on the constant flow of Western supplies and its ability to adapt equipment quickly.
Russia's high consumption of ammunition could become unsustainable in the long term if it cannot maintain its stocks or produce new ammunition quickly.
Use of Soviet Stockpiles
Russia has a considerable legacy of military equipment from the Soviet era, accumulated during the Cold War. These stocks include a wide range of equipment, from tanks and armoured vehicles to artillery and air defence systems. Much of this equipment has been refurbished for use in the current conflict. This includes the refurbishment of tanks such as the T-62 and T-72, as well as other old armoured vehicles.
The war in Ukraine has led to a rapid consumption of these stocks. Intense fighting, massive use of artillery and casualties have led to rapid deterioration of equipment. A large proportion of these stocks, even after refurbishment, are technologically obsolete by modern standards. This includes vulnerabilities to modern attacks and inferior performance compared with more recent weapons supplied to Ukraine by Western allies.
Russia's industrial capacity
The Russian defence industry has shown an ability to adjust its production lines to meet the needs of the conflict. This includes the production of new ammunition, armoured vehicles and weapons systems. However, despite these efforts, modern production in Russia is hampered by a number of factors:
Ukraine's industrial capacity to produce large-scale military equipment remains limited compared to Russia, largely due to war damage to industrial infrastructure and dependence on imports for components. However, thanks to Western support, Ukraine has been able to modernise and diversify its arsenal with recent, sophisticated equipment and has shown flexibility in integrating different Western weapons systems, improving its combat capabilities without requiring heavy investment in local production.
With continued high consumption, Russia risks exhausting its stocks inherited from the Soviet era. This could force increased reliance on newly produced equipment, which is often more expensive and takes longer to manufacture. Russia has been able to compensate for this consumption through sustained industrial renovation of Soviet stocks, but it faces major challenges in terms of sanctions, obsolescence and limited production capacity. Ukraine, despite more modest local industrial capacities, compensates for this with robust Western support and flexibility in adopting modern technologies.
In the long term, if Russia's Soviet stocks run out and sanctions continue to restrict its production capacity, this could weaken its position on the ground.
Ukraine's strategy
It could be in Ukraine's strategic interest to first stabilise the front lines to push Russia to exhaust its stocks of equipment inherited from the Soviet era, before launching more aggressive offensives.
By maintaining the front lines, Ukraine could force Russia to continue its military operations, making massive use of its Soviet equipment and munitions, thereby accelerating the exhaustion of these stocks. Russia would be forced to maintain extensive and costly supply lines, increasing logistical complexity and resource consumption.
Ukraine could use this period to fortify its positions, improve its defences and prepare logistical infrastructures to support future offensives. Stabilisation would also allow Ukraine to focus on rebuilding and stabilising the liberated areas, improving morale and national resilience. But an indefinite extension of stabilisation could lead to a frozen conflict, where frontlines become fixed and hopes of recapture diminish. This could reduce international support and domestic motivation and Russia could adapt its strategies to save resources or develop new capabilities, which could reduce the attrition effect of the Ukrainian strategy.
Once Ukraine judges that Russia has significantly depleted its stocks of Soviet equipment and that its production capacity is weakened, this would be an opportune moment to launch offensives, but Ukraine must ensure that it has sufficiently strengthened its own capabilities, with modern equipment, robust logistics and effective strategic preparation.
Adopting a frontline stabilisation strategy to deplete Russia's Soviet stockpile before launching active recapture offensives has considerable strategic advantages for Ukraine. However, this strategy must be carefully managed to avoid the pitfalls of a frozen conflict or prolonged mutual attrition. The key to success lies in carefully preparing and synchronising the transition to active offensives, while ensuring robust international support and continued pressure on Russia.
This approach offers a balance between defence and offensive preparation, exploiting the opponent's weak points while consolidating its own strengths for long-term gains.
Russian military doctrine, inherited from the Soviet era, often emphasises mass and volume of fire to overwhelm the enemy. This means intensive use of artillery, rockets and air strikes to prepare the ground before troops advance. Russia has vast stocks of armaments and munitions accumulated since the Cold War. Although these stocks may vary in quality, they provide a basis for sustained offensives.
Russian forces often use massive bombardments to destroy Ukrainian defences, at the cost of heavy material destruction and civilian casualties. These bombardments are visible in areas such as Marioupol and Severodonetsk. Artillery plays a central role in Russian operations, providing constant support to ground units, often from a safe distance, and engaging targets over long distances.
Russian offensives are characterised by high ammunition consumption, reflected in reports of massive use of artillery and missile projectiles. Russian ammunition stocks are being consumed at a high rate, leading to reports of shortages and the need to replenish stocks with increasingly older ammunition.
Ukrainian Materiel and Ammunition Utilisation
In contrast to Russia, Ukrainian doctrine relies more on precise strikes and targeted use of resources, maximising effectiveness while minimising casualties. Western military support, including sophisticated weapons such as HIMARS, Javelins and drones, is used for precise strikes against targets of high strategic value, rather than for massive barrages.
Ukrainian forces often employ guerrilla tactics, striking weak points in Russian lines, using their knowledge of the terrain and moving quickly to avoid retaliatory strikes. Ukraine has innovated in the use of drones for reconnaissance missions and targeted strikes, compensating for the lack of heavy artillery with precision strikes.
Due to resource constraints and dependence on Western supplies, Ukraine is using its munitions in a more measured and strategic way. The emphasis is on optimising each shot to maximise impact while minimising consumption. Guidance systems and guided munitions play a key role in this approach.
Russia focuses on quantity and raw power, while Ukraine focuses on efficiency and precision.
Advantages for Russia: The ability to maintain a continuous barrage of fire can disrupt opposing lines and create opportunities to advance, but Russian strategy depends on the ability to maintain a robust logistics chain to continuously supply the vast quantities of ammunition required.
Advantages for Ukraine: Precise use of resources minimises losses and maximises impact on critical targets, while preserving ammunition for future needs, but Ukraine depends on the constant flow of Western supplies and its ability to adapt equipment quickly.
Russia's high consumption of ammunition could become unsustainable in the long term if it cannot maintain its stocks or produce new ammunition quickly.
Use of Soviet Stockpiles
Russia has a considerable legacy of military equipment from the Soviet era, accumulated during the Cold War. These stocks include a wide range of equipment, from tanks and armoured vehicles to artillery and air defence systems. Much of this equipment has been refurbished for use in the current conflict. This includes the refurbishment of tanks such as the T-62 and T-72, as well as other old armoured vehicles.
The war in Ukraine has led to a rapid consumption of these stocks. Intense fighting, massive use of artillery and casualties have led to rapid deterioration of equipment. A large proportion of these stocks, even after refurbishment, are technologically obsolete by modern standards. This includes vulnerabilities to modern attacks and inferior performance compared with more recent weapons supplied to Ukraine by Western allies.
Russia's industrial capacity
The Russian defence industry has shown an ability to adjust its production lines to meet the needs of the conflict. This includes the production of new ammunition, armoured vehicles and weapons systems. However, despite these efforts, modern production in Russia is hampered by a number of factors:
- Sanctions have restricted Russia's access to key components, including microprocessors and other critical technologies.
- Russian industrial capacity is being tested by the need to produce large quantities while ensuring quality. Dependence on old technologies limits the efficiency of this production.
- Russia has continued to develop new weapons systems, such as the T-14 Armata tank, but production remains limited and deployment at the front is marginal.
- Efforts to integrate new technologies into existing equipment face logistical and technical challenges, notably the lack of modern components due to sanctions.
Ukraine's industrial capacity to produce large-scale military equipment remains limited compared to Russia, largely due to war damage to industrial infrastructure and dependence on imports for components. However, thanks to Western support, Ukraine has been able to modernise and diversify its arsenal with recent, sophisticated equipment and has shown flexibility in integrating different Western weapons systems, improving its combat capabilities without requiring heavy investment in local production.
With continued high consumption, Russia risks exhausting its stocks inherited from the Soviet era. This could force increased reliance on newly produced equipment, which is often more expensive and takes longer to manufacture. Russia has been able to compensate for this consumption through sustained industrial renovation of Soviet stocks, but it faces major challenges in terms of sanctions, obsolescence and limited production capacity. Ukraine, despite more modest local industrial capacities, compensates for this with robust Western support and flexibility in adopting modern technologies.
In the long term, if Russia's Soviet stocks run out and sanctions continue to restrict its production capacity, this could weaken its position on the ground.
Ukraine's strategy
It could be in Ukraine's strategic interest to first stabilise the front lines to push Russia to exhaust its stocks of equipment inherited from the Soviet era, before launching more aggressive offensives.
By maintaining the front lines, Ukraine could force Russia to continue its military operations, making massive use of its Soviet equipment and munitions, thereby accelerating the exhaustion of these stocks. Russia would be forced to maintain extensive and costly supply lines, increasing logistical complexity and resource consumption.
Ukraine could use this period to fortify its positions, improve its defences and prepare logistical infrastructures to support future offensives. Stabilisation would also allow Ukraine to focus on rebuilding and stabilising the liberated areas, improving morale and national resilience. But an indefinite extension of stabilisation could lead to a frozen conflict, where frontlines become fixed and hopes of recapture diminish. This could reduce international support and domestic motivation and Russia could adapt its strategies to save resources or develop new capabilities, which could reduce the attrition effect of the Ukrainian strategy.
Once Ukraine judges that Russia has significantly depleted its stocks of Soviet equipment and that its production capacity is weakened, this would be an opportune moment to launch offensives, but Ukraine must ensure that it has sufficiently strengthened its own capabilities, with modern equipment, robust logistics and effective strategic preparation.
Adopting a frontline stabilisation strategy to deplete Russia's Soviet stockpile before launching active recapture offensives has considerable strategic advantages for Ukraine. However, this strategy must be carefully managed to avoid the pitfalls of a frozen conflict or prolonged mutual attrition. The key to success lies in carefully preparing and synchronising the transition to active offensives, while ensuring robust international support and continued pressure on Russia.
This approach offers a balance between defence and offensive preparation, exploiting the opponent's weak points while consolidating its own strengths for long-term gains.
These are just the confirmed deaths:
kyivindependent.com
Leaked documents suggest more Russians killed in Ukraine than previously thought
Between 462,000 and 728,000 Russian soldiers were killed, injured, or captured by mid-June, The Economist reported on July 5, citing leaked documents from the U.S. Defense Department.
