Only in your head.
Again, only in your head and Putin's head.
Now Moscow is on fire as well.
Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Again, only in your head and Putin's head.
Now Moscow is on fire as well.
Destroyed Ukrainian tank T-64BV in the Chernihiv region.
Positional battles in Kharkiv, explosions are thundering, there is a strong fire in one of the districts:
t.me
Intel Slava Z
🇷🇺🇺🇦⚡Positional battles in Kharkiv, explosions are thundering, there is a strong fire in one of the districts
t.me
Rubezhnoye came under the full control of Russian troops, - Kadyrov.
The flag of Russia was raised over the previously occupied city in the LPR:
t.me
The flag of Russia was raised over the previously occupied city in the LPR:
Intel Slava Z
🇷🇺🇺🇦⚡Rubezhnoye came under the full control of Russian troops, - Kadyrov. The flag of Russia was raised over the previously occupied city in the LPR.
t.me
Russia to invade FInland ?790 now. That isn't peanuts. How much does a tank cost? What about APCs and other vehicles, which are in the thousands. Fighter jets - 167. Many $bn being lost daily.
Servicing unpaid debts, same way any bank does it, asset seizure and liquidation. Dollar bonds can't be paid in rubles, the same issue cropped up with Greece many years back, when it wanted to leave the EU. It was told in no uncertain terms that debts in Euros must be paid in Euros, which meant it wouldn't have been able to inflate its way out of debt on its own currency anyway. If Russia had continued taking oil/gas payments in $s, it would have enough to service its debts, but forced payments in rubles as part of its ploy to artificially manipulate its currency. But the fact is, no online retailer is taking rubles at the official exchange rate because they simply aren't worth that in reality, it's more like 160 rubles to a $ online (or was like 20 days ago, probably more now), so Russia trying to pay $X with 80X rubles simply won't fly because no currency exchange or bank will change 83 rubles into $1, except Russian state banks. So basically Putin chose to sell Russia's oil and gas at half price to the EU to artificially stabilise the ruble for the purpose of conning the few saps in Asia it was still trading with.
You don't get my point, the debt figure is irrelevant if you can't pay your day-to-day costs. Russia is not the UK. Check out interest rates in Russia.
View attachment 23512Russia Interest Rate
The benchmark interest rate in Russia was last recorded at 18 percent. This page provides the latest reported value for - Russia Interest Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.tradingeconomics.com
Now the UK.
View attachment 23513United Kingdom Interest Rate
The benchmark interest rate in the United Kingdom was last recorded at 5 percent. This page provides - United Kingdom Interest Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.
When Russia borrows money it has to pay it back at the shown interest rates, same for the UK. The interest rate in the UK is ~1/25th of the interest rate in Russia, so 20% debt costs Russia the same as 500% debt costs the UK in servicing payments. 20% (approximate for 18% in 2020) of $1.7tr is $340bn, at 20% interest rate, that's $68bn/annum in interest payments. $68bn just to stop the debt from growing, never mind pay it down. For the UK 0.8% of ~$3tr is $24bn. Russia's debt is already almost 3 times as costly as UK debt even without the extra bills he's racking up daily and the actual inevitable shrinkage of Russian GDP.
A friend isn't someone who buys oil from you. I said 30 democracies who are friends and support Russia in Ukraine.
@Picdelamirand-oil, @Bon Plan, @Amarante, apparently all EU countries including France are vassal states, see quote above. @randomradio - I am utterly amazed that you think France's current relationship with the US is the same as Poland's relationship with Russia during the Cold War. Sometimes you really just need to stop talking and give your ar5e a chance.
And yet you can't say no to Russia, when it is doing stupid shit?
Well it did move some forces up there.
If he tries the same thing there I hope the forces in question know they'll be getting their heads kicked in from above instantly without any negotiation on the matter whatsoever.
They are already too busy in Ukrainia to to do. The russian armies level is more than doubtfull.
Hopefully for Vladimir Russia has the first or second nuclear stockpile of the world....
Point de situation des opérations en Ukraine 21 avril 2022
Update on operations in Ukraine 21 April 2022
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
The battle for Donbass
The great Russian offensive in the Donbass is first and foremost a fire offensive with a crushing of the Ukrainian positions in the seven combat zones, with about 2,400 various artillery pieces, and several hundred daily air sorties with strikes in all the depth of the theatre. We even note the presence of Kh35 anti-ship batteries used against targets on land.
This entire strike force, unprecedented since the Second World War, can launch between 1.5 and 2 kilotonnes of explosives every day on Ukrainian positions, which are the most entrenched in the world after the demilitarised zone in Korea. The aim is to neutralise as many Ukrainian forces as possible in the areas of Russian attacks, to fix them in the defensive zones and to hinder movements in depth.
The Russian attacks are concentrated in the Severodonetsk area (zone S) and its surroundings, particularly in the north. The Russian forces there can be estimated at 10-12 tactical groups (2 LNR regiments, 1 armoured regiment and 1 Russian mechanised brigade) probably under the command of the 2nd Army. They face three Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades, equivalent in combat units to 9 Russian BGs but with considerably less artillery, plus a territorial brigade and paramilitary units of the Ministry of the Interior.
The urban area of Severodonetsk (= ½ of Marioupol in area) and its entrenched surroundings have been holding out since 2 March. It is now largely under pressure. The Russian effort was focused on the northern edge of the area from Lyman, 15 km north-east of Sloviansk, to Rubizhne, which adjoined Severodonetsk to the north, with the hope of enveloping the town and cutting off this stronghold from the main objective of Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzkhivka-Konstantinovka (SKDK). The 2nd Corps (LNR) was still attacking in the Popasna area south of Severodonetsk to complete the envelopment. The progress of this first Russian clamp was slow but real.
The second clamp targeted the SKDK stronghold from Yzium (zone Y), where the main Russian force grouping was located (=22 BG, 1st Armoured Guards Army), and Horlivka to the south-east (zone Donetsk, D, 1st DNR Corps, 2nd LNR CA and elements of the 5th Russian Army = 15 BG). Russian progress on the M03 axis in the north against the 81st brigade was very slow and that on the southern axis held by two Ukrainian brigades almost non-existent. Even if the Russian forces were to succeed in breaking through and reaching the SKDK bastion, it would be necessary to secure the axes against Ukrainian harassment and to attack the equivalent of a reinforced Marioupol for the past 50 days. This seems difficult with the current capabilities and in any case, without hope of victory before 9 May.
The third clamp lies in complementary attacks from Yzium towards Barvinkova or from the Zaporijjia zone (zone Z, 58th Army, 10 BGs) towards the North from the Houliaipole region or from the city of Donetsk on the N15 axis. The objective of this attack in the south may be to reach the key point of Poprovske. The capture of Barvinkove and Poproske would represent a threat of general envelopment of the Donbass pocket, but again, assuming these captures are possible, the further Russian forces penetrate into Ukrainian territory, the more vulnerable they become. As for the even wider prospect of taking Zaporizhia and Dnipro (= 2 Mariupol each), not to mention Kharkiv (= 3 Mariupol), this seems inconceivable in the short term.
The peripheral battles
Three battles are taking place on the periphery of the Donbass battle. The fighting is still uncertain in the Kherson-Mykolaev region, where the Russian forces are trying to reduce the Ukrainian pressure by limited counter-attacks and especially the use of fire. The whole of the occupied southern zone is being monitored between the increase in Ukrainian guerrilla activity that is increasingly holding Russian forces and rumours of the proclamation of new separatist republics followed by general mobilisation.
In Mariupol, the last Ukrainian forces are still holding out in the Azov industrial complex. They even launched a counter-attack towards the port. Mariupol will fall, which will be a Russian tactical victory, but with such difficulty that it already appears to be a symbolic Ukrainian victory. If by some extraordinary chance the Azov complex forces were still holding on 9 May, it would spoil the celebration of the great victory of the Great Patriotic War (even if in fact the capture of Mariupol would still be declared). The Ukrainian resistance also sets 12 Russian BGs, apparently quite well tested, that cannot be engaged in the battle for Donbass. It also sets a very deterrent standard for the rest of the war, which may prove unwinnable for the Russians if every major town resists like Marioupol.
In the north-east, Ukrainian forces have taken the initiative in the Kharkiv region, both north of the city and especially in the east where the 92nd mechanised brigade and the 4th armoured brigade have reached the Chuhuiv-Malynivka area. From this crossroads the Ukrainians could threaten the main Russian logistical axis from Belgorod to Yzium via the towns of Velykyi Burluk and Kopiansk, which was defended by Russian forces returning from Kiev, but they would have to advance another 50 km. They could also continue southwest along the M03 axis towards the rear of the large Russian grouping at Yzium. This action is complemented by Special Forces raids on the Russian rear, including on Russian territory
Update on operations in Ukraine 21 April 2022
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
The battle for Donbass
The great Russian offensive in the Donbass is first and foremost a fire offensive with a crushing of the Ukrainian positions in the seven combat zones, with about 2,400 various artillery pieces, and several hundred daily air sorties with strikes in all the depth of the theatre. We even note the presence of Kh35 anti-ship batteries used against targets on land.
This entire strike force, unprecedented since the Second World War, can launch between 1.5 and 2 kilotonnes of explosives every day on Ukrainian positions, which are the most entrenched in the world after the demilitarised zone in Korea. The aim is to neutralise as many Ukrainian forces as possible in the areas of Russian attacks, to fix them in the defensive zones and to hinder movements in depth.
The Russian attacks are concentrated in the Severodonetsk area (zone S) and its surroundings, particularly in the north. The Russian forces there can be estimated at 10-12 tactical groups (2 LNR regiments, 1 armoured regiment and 1 Russian mechanised brigade) probably under the command of the 2nd Army. They face three Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades, equivalent in combat units to 9 Russian BGs but with considerably less artillery, plus a territorial brigade and paramilitary units of the Ministry of the Interior.
The urban area of Severodonetsk (= ½ of Marioupol in area) and its entrenched surroundings have been holding out since 2 March. It is now largely under pressure. The Russian effort was focused on the northern edge of the area from Lyman, 15 km north-east of Sloviansk, to Rubizhne, which adjoined Severodonetsk to the north, with the hope of enveloping the town and cutting off this stronghold from the main objective of Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzkhivka-Konstantinovka (SKDK). The 2nd Corps (LNR) was still attacking in the Popasna area south of Severodonetsk to complete the envelopment. The progress of this first Russian clamp was slow but real.
The second clamp targeted the SKDK stronghold from Yzium (zone Y), where the main Russian force grouping was located (=22 BG, 1st Armoured Guards Army), and Horlivka to the south-east (zone Donetsk, D, 1st DNR Corps, 2nd LNR CA and elements of the 5th Russian Army = 15 BG). Russian progress on the M03 axis in the north against the 81st brigade was very slow and that on the southern axis held by two Ukrainian brigades almost non-existent. Even if the Russian forces were to succeed in breaking through and reaching the SKDK bastion, it would be necessary to secure the axes against Ukrainian harassment and to attack the equivalent of a reinforced Marioupol for the past 50 days. This seems difficult with the current capabilities and in any case, without hope of victory before 9 May.
The third clamp lies in complementary attacks from Yzium towards Barvinkova or from the Zaporijjia zone (zone Z, 58th Army, 10 BGs) towards the North from the Houliaipole region or from the city of Donetsk on the N15 axis. The objective of this attack in the south may be to reach the key point of Poprovske. The capture of Barvinkove and Poproske would represent a threat of general envelopment of the Donbass pocket, but again, assuming these captures are possible, the further Russian forces penetrate into Ukrainian territory, the more vulnerable they become. As for the even wider prospect of taking Zaporizhia and Dnipro (= 2 Mariupol each), not to mention Kharkiv (= 3 Mariupol), this seems inconceivable in the short term.
The peripheral battles
Three battles are taking place on the periphery of the Donbass battle. The fighting is still uncertain in the Kherson-Mykolaev region, where the Russian forces are trying to reduce the Ukrainian pressure by limited counter-attacks and especially the use of fire. The whole of the occupied southern zone is being monitored between the increase in Ukrainian guerrilla activity that is increasingly holding Russian forces and rumours of the proclamation of new separatist republics followed by general mobilisation.
In Mariupol, the last Ukrainian forces are still holding out in the Azov industrial complex. They even launched a counter-attack towards the port. Mariupol will fall, which will be a Russian tactical victory, but with such difficulty that it already appears to be a symbolic Ukrainian victory. If by some extraordinary chance the Azov complex forces were still holding on 9 May, it would spoil the celebration of the great victory of the Great Patriotic War (even if in fact the capture of Mariupol would still be declared). The Ukrainian resistance also sets 12 Russian BGs, apparently quite well tested, that cannot be engaged in the battle for Donbass. It also sets a very deterrent standard for the rest of the war, which may prove unwinnable for the Russians if every major town resists like Marioupol.
In the north-east, Ukrainian forces have taken the initiative in the Kharkiv region, both north of the city and especially in the east where the 92nd mechanised brigade and the 4th armoured brigade have reached the Chuhuiv-Malynivka area. From this crossroads the Ukrainians could threaten the main Russian logistical axis from Belgorod to Yzium via the towns of Velykyi Burluk and Kopiansk, which was defended by Russian forces returning from Kiev, but they would have to advance another 50 km. They could also continue southwest along the M03 axis towards the rear of the large Russian grouping at Yzium. This action is complemented by Special Forces raids on the Russian rear, including on Russian territory
The crew of the Russian T-80BV tank demonstrated mastery of the tank in Ukraine. The tankers showed a steep 360-degree drift of the tank.
Biden announces heavy artillery, other weapons for Ukraine
President Joe Biden pledged an additional $1.3 billion Thursday for new weapons and economic assistance to help Ukraine in its strong but increasingly difficult battle against the Russian invasion, and he promised to seek much more from Congress to keep the guns, ammunition and cash flowing...
Putin is becoming increasingly engorged and physically uncomfortable? Why his hand is clutching the table?