Ukraine - Russia Conflict
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LARGE-SCALE FIRE IN THE CITY / APOSTROF TV
Russia Spending an Estimated $900 Million a Day on Ukraine War
The figure doesn't take into consideration how much Russia may have lost financially because of the severe economic sanctions.
www.newsweek.com
Maybe he was being conscripted.I dont know what it is but I will still post them.
REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL telegram channel for Wagner
A few compiled realities of the last days - Snake Island.
Yes, yes, this is the same island where part of the Marines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine surrendered in the first days. And everything seemed to be going well, but in two months nothing has changed around the island we occupied. No separation has been created in the air defense, and the means of destruction of the enemy have not been suppressed. In just a few days, according to conservative estimates, the enemy destroyed the Mi-8 AMTSh (no, this is not a Ukrainian Armed Forces helicopter) with the crew and the special forces evacuation group (I hope those who were nearby are still alive), several with the Tor-M2 air defense system, two high-speed boats "Raptor", inflicted missile and bomb attacks on the places of deployment and destroyed the supply of weapons from the sea.
In fairness, our side destroyed one Su-27, Su-24 of the Ukrainian Air Force, as well as one to three Bayraktar TB-2 strike UAVs, but this is far from what we would like to see.
Now, according to some unconfirmed reports, the island is still abandoned. Probably, under a beautiful phrase - for uselessness.
Update on operations in Ukraine 8 May 2022
Current operations in Ukraine cover 900 km of frontline from Kharkiv to Mykolayev and rear areas accessible to infiltrating light units or air forces, encompassing the whole of Ukraine, the part of Russia close to the border, Belarus and the Black Sea up to Snake Island.
The economy of forces on the front
These 900 km are held by 27 Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades of three to five battalions, and National Guard/territorial brigades unevenly distributed in the line and in urban strongholds. These brigades were supported by a few defence zone artillery regiments or brigades.
On the other hand, the Russian divisions and brigades currently have 95 battle groups (BGs) out of a maximum of 140 (1 BG = 1 reinforced armoured battalion + 1 artillery battalion), plus the two army corps of the separatist republics, i.e. about 15 BGs. The combined Russian armies each have two brigades of artillery, missiles and howitzers, and various support elements including an engineer regiment and a spetsnaz brigade. The ensemble can also benefit from the 200 to 300 daily sorties of the Russian air force, for the benefit of units in contact or acting in the depth of the theatre of operations.
The forces are thus substantially balanced on the whole front. At the points of contact, the Ukrainian battalions were of a higher tactical range than the Russian battalions, but the Russian forces compensated for this inferiority with greater firepower, especially artillery. Both sides, especially on the Ukrainian side, enjoyed the defensive advantage of organised positions. It is difficult in these conditions to make progress and thus to achieve strategic effects.
The only way to achieve this is to have a ratio of forces of 2 to 1 in terms of the number of combat battalions in the sectors considered to be priorities. However, reserves are scarce. After recovering almost all the available BGs, the Russians used the units cleared from the Kiev region and then Mariupol, even if the fighting continues around Azovstal, to deploy them (in what condition?) in the main combat zone.
On the Ukrainian side, the reserves likely to be committed to the front are also quite limited - perhaps 5 brigades - also taking into account the wear and tear of the fighting in Kiev and the North-East and the need to maintain units there. The real Ukrainian operational reserve comes from Western, and mainly American, material aid and the massive training effort that is being made, which may make it possible, in addition to replenishing the units already committed, to form new battalions and perhaps brigades, for manoeuvre but probably not for several weeks.
The SKS zone
There was therefore hardly any other solution than to redistribute forces along the front line, concentrating them on the attack zones and admitting an inferiority in the sectors deemed secondary. No doubt pressed by the need to obtain quick results, it was the Russians who made the greatest redistributions by accepting a low density of forces in the Kherson and Kharkiv sectors, and to concentrate 48 BGs and a lot of support in the priority area from Yzium to Popasna around the three target cities of Sloviansk, Serverodonetsk and Kramatovsk against ten Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades, including the reinforcement of the 17th armoured brigade and probably the equivalent of 20 battalions of territorials and national guards.
Supported by large masses of artillery, the Russian forces are still pursuing their three converging attacks: around Severedonetsk, around Sloviansk from the north and finally more broadly around the whole pocket via Barvinkove in the west and the separatist republics in the south-east. This is the same plan that has been implemented since mid-March, but fuelled since the beginning of April by forces coming from the Kharkiv sector first and then from Kiev, with an increase in intensity since 18 April.
In the last three weeks, the large Russian force in the Yzium pocket (22 BG) has crossed the Donets River and advanced 10 km west against the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 81st Air Assault Brigade and south against the 3rd Armoured Brigade to the small town of Kurulta, 15 km from Sloviansk. Northeast of Sloviansk, Russian forces advanced against the 95th Air Assault Brigade to Lyman and Ozerne, about 15 km away. Between these two areas, a pocket was formed, which was held with increasing difficulty by the 57th motorised brigade.
The strike on 1 May on the headquarters of the 2nd Combined Army in Yzium and the threats to the rear have undoubtedly slowed down the Russian advance but it is continuing slowly. At this rate, the Russians could be in front of Sloviansk by the end of May. This pace could be accelerated if the 57th brigade, threatened by encirclement, withdrew to Sloviansk, but it could also be halted at any time by the wear and tear of the units involved (15 to 20 Russian combat vehicles lost per day compared to 5 to 10 Ukrainian ones), logistical insufficiency or an external event.
Progress was even slower around Severodonetsk where, after two months of fighting, the Russians could boast the capture of Rubizhne against the 79th air assault brigade on the northern outskirts of the town and, on 7 May, of Popasna, 20 km to the south, with, in particular, Wagner's fighters and the Russian 150th motorised division (withdrawn from Marioupol) against the 24th mechanised brigade.
The next objective from Popasna was probably Bakhmut, about ten kilometres away and about twenty kilometres from Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The capture of Bakhmut would put the whole Severodonetsk area at risk, but it would probably be impossible to achieve this without a parallel effort from Horlivka by the 1st and 2nd Corps (DNR and LNR) against the entrenched 30th Mechanised Brigade. It seems difficult to imagine anything decisive on the side for another month.
The Russians would therefore have to wait until the beginning of June at the earliest to consider the siege of the town of Severodonetsk, which was almost as difficult to take as Marioupol, and the investment of Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which was just as difficult as Marioupol.
Balanced sectors
By making an effort in the SKS area, the Russians have mechanically neglected the others. The border line of the two separatist republics is occupied by 20 BGs facing 4 solidly entrenched Ukrainian brigades. After the three major cities of the North, Propovsk, 40 km from Donetsk, is the fourth essential objective for the conquest of Donbass. At this stage it seems inaccessible.
The zone from Zaporojia to Donestk is more favourable to the Russian forces, which have 13 BGs against four Ukrainian brigades, including one territorial and one national guard. The Russian advance is noticeable in Orikhiv, 30km from Zaporozhia and Huliapole in the centre of the line, but this is an area where the Ukrainians can accept losing ground and it is again, unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, difficult to imagine a significant result before June.
The weak sectors
There are two sectors where the Russians are weak. On the Kherson side, beyond the Dnieper, the fighting is balanced, despite an advantage on the Ukrainian side. A great deal of activity in the west of the zone - unrest in Transnistria, missile strikes on Odessa, destruction of the Zatoka bridge at the mouth of the Dniester - is undoubtedly intended to maintain attention and therefore forces on this side. There would be enormous potential for Ukrainian success if they could cut off Russian forces from the Dnieper crossings.
It is on the Kharkiv side that the Ukrainians are focusing their efforts, and the fact that they are dedicating brigades to this area that could be committed to the Sloviansk sector is no doubt a sign of their confidence in the resilience of the SKS area. After advancing east of Kharkiv, Ukrainian forces are now moving north and north-east and have captured the town of Staryi Saltiv on the Donets River. The Russian border should be reached soon. In the immediate term, this removes the artillery threat to the city and in the short term, it may force the Russians to withdraw forces from the Yzium pocket to reinforce their rear.
Deep spaces
Intense Russian air activity in the deep with massive use of missiles, largely to hinder Western supplies.
Since 30 April, the Ukrainians have been carrying out a campaign of strikes on Snake/Bile Island, 35 km off the Ukrainian-Romanian border, which was transformed into an anti-aircraft and anti-ship base after the destruction of the cruiser Moskva. The island was attacked by TB-2 drones which destroyed several anti-aircraft defence systems, a landing craft and a Mi-8 helicopter. The neutralisation of the defences facilitated a raid by two Su-27 fighters on 7 May on the buildings in the centre of the island. The possibility of a Ukrainian takeover of the island and the establishment of an anti-access defence that would threaten even the Russian base in Sevastopol cannot be ruled out. Conversely, the lack of reaction from the Russian anti-aircraft defence, and in particular from the S-400 bases in Crimea, is once again surprising.
Current operations in Ukraine cover 900 km of frontline from Kharkiv to Mykolayev and rear areas accessible to infiltrating light units or air forces, encompassing the whole of Ukraine, the part of Russia close to the border, Belarus and the Black Sea up to Snake Island.
The economy of forces on the front
These 900 km are held by 27 Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades of three to five battalions, and National Guard/territorial brigades unevenly distributed in the line and in urban strongholds. These brigades were supported by a few defence zone artillery regiments or brigades.
On the other hand, the Russian divisions and brigades currently have 95 battle groups (BGs) out of a maximum of 140 (1 BG = 1 reinforced armoured battalion + 1 artillery battalion), plus the two army corps of the separatist republics, i.e. about 15 BGs. The combined Russian armies each have two brigades of artillery, missiles and howitzers, and various support elements including an engineer regiment and a spetsnaz brigade. The ensemble can also benefit from the 200 to 300 daily sorties of the Russian air force, for the benefit of units in contact or acting in the depth of the theatre of operations.
The forces are thus substantially balanced on the whole front. At the points of contact, the Ukrainian battalions were of a higher tactical range than the Russian battalions, but the Russian forces compensated for this inferiority with greater firepower, especially artillery. Both sides, especially on the Ukrainian side, enjoyed the defensive advantage of organised positions. It is difficult in these conditions to make progress and thus to achieve strategic effects.
The only way to achieve this is to have a ratio of forces of 2 to 1 in terms of the number of combat battalions in the sectors considered to be priorities. However, reserves are scarce. After recovering almost all the available BGs, the Russians used the units cleared from the Kiev region and then Mariupol, even if the fighting continues around Azovstal, to deploy them (in what condition?) in the main combat zone.
On the Ukrainian side, the reserves likely to be committed to the front are also quite limited - perhaps 5 brigades - also taking into account the wear and tear of the fighting in Kiev and the North-East and the need to maintain units there. The real Ukrainian operational reserve comes from Western, and mainly American, material aid and the massive training effort that is being made, which may make it possible, in addition to replenishing the units already committed, to form new battalions and perhaps brigades, for manoeuvre but probably not for several weeks.
The SKS zone
There was therefore hardly any other solution than to redistribute forces along the front line, concentrating them on the attack zones and admitting an inferiority in the sectors deemed secondary. No doubt pressed by the need to obtain quick results, it was the Russians who made the greatest redistributions by accepting a low density of forces in the Kherson and Kharkiv sectors, and to concentrate 48 BGs and a lot of support in the priority area from Yzium to Popasna around the three target cities of Sloviansk, Serverodonetsk and Kramatovsk against ten Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades, including the reinforcement of the 17th armoured brigade and probably the equivalent of 20 battalions of territorials and national guards.
Supported by large masses of artillery, the Russian forces are still pursuing their three converging attacks: around Severedonetsk, around Sloviansk from the north and finally more broadly around the whole pocket via Barvinkove in the west and the separatist republics in the south-east. This is the same plan that has been implemented since mid-March, but fuelled since the beginning of April by forces coming from the Kharkiv sector first and then from Kiev, with an increase in intensity since 18 April.
In the last three weeks, the large Russian force in the Yzium pocket (22 BG) has crossed the Donets River and advanced 10 km west against the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 81st Air Assault Brigade and south against the 3rd Armoured Brigade to the small town of Kurulta, 15 km from Sloviansk. Northeast of Sloviansk, Russian forces advanced against the 95th Air Assault Brigade to Lyman and Ozerne, about 15 km away. Between these two areas, a pocket was formed, which was held with increasing difficulty by the 57th motorised brigade.
The strike on 1 May on the headquarters of the 2nd Combined Army in Yzium and the threats to the rear have undoubtedly slowed down the Russian advance but it is continuing slowly. At this rate, the Russians could be in front of Sloviansk by the end of May. This pace could be accelerated if the 57th brigade, threatened by encirclement, withdrew to Sloviansk, but it could also be halted at any time by the wear and tear of the units involved (15 to 20 Russian combat vehicles lost per day compared to 5 to 10 Ukrainian ones), logistical insufficiency or an external event.
Progress was even slower around Severodonetsk where, after two months of fighting, the Russians could boast the capture of Rubizhne against the 79th air assault brigade on the northern outskirts of the town and, on 7 May, of Popasna, 20 km to the south, with, in particular, Wagner's fighters and the Russian 150th motorised division (withdrawn from Marioupol) against the 24th mechanised brigade.
The next objective from Popasna was probably Bakhmut, about ten kilometres away and about twenty kilometres from Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The capture of Bakhmut would put the whole Severodonetsk area at risk, but it would probably be impossible to achieve this without a parallel effort from Horlivka by the 1st and 2nd Corps (DNR and LNR) against the entrenched 30th Mechanised Brigade. It seems difficult to imagine anything decisive on the side for another month.
The Russians would therefore have to wait until the beginning of June at the earliest to consider the siege of the town of Severodonetsk, which was almost as difficult to take as Marioupol, and the investment of Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which was just as difficult as Marioupol.
Balanced sectors
By making an effort in the SKS area, the Russians have mechanically neglected the others. The border line of the two separatist republics is occupied by 20 BGs facing 4 solidly entrenched Ukrainian brigades. After the three major cities of the North, Propovsk, 40 km from Donetsk, is the fourth essential objective for the conquest of Donbass. At this stage it seems inaccessible.
The zone from Zaporojia to Donestk is more favourable to the Russian forces, which have 13 BGs against four Ukrainian brigades, including one territorial and one national guard. The Russian advance is noticeable in Orikhiv, 30km from Zaporozhia and Huliapole in the centre of the line, but this is an area where the Ukrainians can accept losing ground and it is again, unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, difficult to imagine a significant result before June.
The weak sectors
There are two sectors where the Russians are weak. On the Kherson side, beyond the Dnieper, the fighting is balanced, despite an advantage on the Ukrainian side. A great deal of activity in the west of the zone - unrest in Transnistria, missile strikes on Odessa, destruction of the Zatoka bridge at the mouth of the Dniester - is undoubtedly intended to maintain attention and therefore forces on this side. There would be enormous potential for Ukrainian success if they could cut off Russian forces from the Dnieper crossings.
It is on the Kharkiv side that the Ukrainians are focusing their efforts, and the fact that they are dedicating brigades to this area that could be committed to the Sloviansk sector is no doubt a sign of their confidence in the resilience of the SKS area. After advancing east of Kharkiv, Ukrainian forces are now moving north and north-east and have captured the town of Staryi Saltiv on the Donets River. The Russian border should be reached soon. In the immediate term, this removes the artillery threat to the city and in the short term, it may force the Russians to withdraw forces from the Yzium pocket to reinforce their rear.
Deep spaces
Intense Russian air activity in the deep with massive use of missiles, largely to hinder Western supplies.
Since 30 April, the Ukrainians have been carrying out a campaign of strikes on Snake/Bile Island, 35 km off the Ukrainian-Romanian border, which was transformed into an anti-aircraft and anti-ship base after the destruction of the cruiser Moskva. The island was attacked by TB-2 drones which destroyed several anti-aircraft defence systems, a landing craft and a Mi-8 helicopter. The neutralisation of the defences facilitated a raid by two Su-27 fighters on 7 May on the buildings in the centre of the island. The possibility of a Ukrainian takeover of the island and the establishment of an anti-access defence that would threaten even the Russian base in Sevastopol cannot be ruled out. Conversely, the lack of reaction from the Russian anti-aircraft defence, and in particular from the S-400 bases in Crimea, is once again surprising.
I suggested several pages back that this had become target practice island. I was kind of hoping the dummies in the Kremlin would keep sending resources there, like they are in Mariupol. So I'm a little disappointed with this news.
Press freedom anybody?
RT has been blocked in UK and most of Europe since the start of the war.
This is what I see when I try to tune in RT news.
RT has been blocked in UK and most of Europe since the start of the war.
This is what I see when I try to tune in RT news.
This ship is nearly written off and unfit to sail. It had a crane falling on it during refit. What trash people post here.