Ukraine - Russia Conflict

Picdelamirand-oil said:
The battle of Severodonesk seen by Michel Goya:
To put everything in perspective, read again what Michel Goya has been saying for the last 3 months.
We are talking about a territory with 4 large cities of 100,000 inhabitants that the Russians have only conquered at 25% despite considerable efforts over the last 12 weeks. The Russians have some clear advantages, but they haven't even tackled the biggest piece yet (Sloviansk-Kramatorsk).

27 March: Even if Severodonetsk fell to the 8th A and the 2nd LNR Corps, the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka-Toretsk line was a real urban front, 70 km long and with 450,000 inhabitants, very difficult to take. The announcement for once of a clear objective - the conquest of the Donbass - perhaps means that it is considered attainable. It is possible, but it will still be difficult, especially if Ukrainian forces can be reinforced in the region.

5 April: The battle of Donbass is now arguably the decisive battle of the war. It is unlikely that the Russian side will consider a ceasefire before the end of April and see the outcome of the battle. If the two Donbass provinces, including Mariupol, are conquered, the Russians will be able to declare themselves victorious by 9 May, even if this will undoubtedly be a much smaller victory than envisaged. If not, i.e. if they find it impossible to take the Donbass, perhaps they will consider a 'tactical ceasefire' to freeze the situation while rebuilding their forces for a subsequent large-scale offensive.

7 April: In the east, the Russian intention is clearly to seize the Severdonetsk salient as quickly as possible and, above all, in the west to push from Yzium towards Bervinkove, a small town of 8,000 inhabitants 30 km west of Sloviansk held by the 85th brigade. For the time being, the aim is not to capture the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban stronghold but to bypass it.

10 April: A form of combat based on massive in-depth fire followed by concentrated attacks by ad hoc divisions, which were revealed as they wore out, was thus taking shape. (...) With the remaining forces, there is hardly any other possibility than to attempt a Yzium-Donetsk or Yzium-Zaporajjia junction (...) In the end, it is hard to see how the Russian battle groups, even with the superiority of supporting fire, could exceed in tactical range on the points of contact the Ukrainian battalions in the Donbass, worn out, but in a solid defensive posture, undoubtedly with better morale, and possibly reinforced. And even if the Russians do manage to be superior, it is not clear how they could create enough victorious points of contact to prevail in this spring offensive.

21 April: The major Russian offensive in the Donbass is primarily a fire offensive with a crushing of Ukrainian positions in all seven combat zones, with about 2,400 various artillery pieces, and several hundred daily air sorties with strikes in the entire depth of the theatre. (...) The aim is to neutralise as much as possible the Ukrainian forces in the Russian attack zones, to fix them in the defensive zones and to hinder movements in the depth.

28 April: Winning the battle of Donbass is equivalent to taking a rectangle 100 km long and 70 km deep, the size of a French department, in which there are three major cities. (...) All other things being equal, it would take the Russian forces between two and three months at the current rate to take this rectangle.

8 May: Supported by large masses of artillery, the Russian forces are still pursuing their three converging attacks (...). It is the same plan that has been implemented since mid-March, but fuelled since the beginning of April by forces coming first from the Kharkiv sector and then from Kiev, with an increase in intensity since 18 April. (...) The Russians will therefore have to wait at best until the beginning of June to envisage the siege of the town of Severodonetsk, which is almost as difficult to take as Marioupol, and the investment, which is probably incomplete, of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk area, which is as difficult as Marioupol.

15 May: The possibility of a large "pincer" encircling Donetsk oblast is no longer credible at present. (...) In summary, the Russian offensive is increasingly focused on the conquest of Sloviansk and Severdonetsk-Lysychansk, with limited attacks and many strikes along the rest of the Donbass arc and a defensive posture in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. The Russians are advancing very slowly, at the cost of significant losses, and when you lose a lot of men and equipment to gain little ground, the battle of manoeuvre tends to become a battle of attrition. (...) The dislocation of the Ukrainian forces north of Sloviansk is unlikely, at best the Russians will see them retreat to the city. The Russians may therefore be on the northern outskirts of Sloviansk at the end of this month or early June, with exhausted forces. Their prospects are more favourable for Severodonetsk where they are already on the outskirts of the city. They can hope at best to have the city surrounded by the end of the month. They will then have to fight inside the urban bastions

21 May: The battle of the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered is the "major effect" of "Operation Donbass". Once the conquest of these four towns is secured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a road junction in the centre-west of Donetsk oblast, population 65,000 - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission is accomplished, at least in this phase of the war. The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. (...) The capture of the town, a high point, made it possible to observe and therefore strike with artillery all Ukrainian movements, particularly between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. (...) The progression towards the north, a threat to the security of the town, was also a priority. ) The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main LS supply route in the Soledar region, or even Bakhmut.

Prospects: One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the Donbass battle, and in reality already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from an operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take. (...) Assuming that the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk has been achieved, it will then be necessary to take these two localities, which have been preparing for a siege for the past two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, with a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment of the two cities that is even more difficult than Lysysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?

19 June: The material balance of forces, especially in terms of firepower, will be to the advantage of the Russian forces for the next three months. It is even likely that this advantage will be even greater from mid-July to mid-August. It remains to be seen whether this material advantage of the summer can be combined with an assault infantry still sufficient in volume to obtain decisive results. Everything depends on the intelligence of the Ukrainian defence in the Donbass and in the immediate Severodonetsk-Lysychansk pocket. If the Ukrainian army is surrounded in this pocket, the Russians will undoubtedly achieve their major effect. If it manages to hold out for two months there, or if it manages to withdraw in good order and without great material loss to a solid Sloviansk - Kramatorsk - Druzhkivka - Kostiantynivka line, it may succeed in preventing the Russians from achieving their strategic objective.
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Once Severo-Lysy is taken, a lot of troops currently stuck across the river sitting uselessly will free up.
 
Slovenia has provided Ukraine with M-80A infantry fighting vehicles. An echelon with 35 Yugoslav-made infantry fighting vehicles has already arrived in Ukraine. Even the newest production BMP M-80A is already over 30 years old, the vehicles have been removed from storage, as they were developed in the sixties and finished in the nineties. The Yugoslav BMP M-80A is a reworked copy of the Soviet BMP 1. The armored vehicle is armed with a 20-mm Hispano-Suiza HS.804 automatic cannon and there are problems with this, the cannon requires 20x110 mm shells, Ukraine and Russia do not have them. A 7.62 mm machine gun is paired with a cannon. The infantry fighting vehicle is equipped with ATGM 9M14 "Baby" developed in 1960.


The Ukrainian military has published the first video footage of the use of American M-142 Himars multiple launch rocket systems. The information is inaccurate, since it is impossible to establish the location from where the fire is being fired. The presented video frames show the launches of M-30A1 missiles, with a range of hitting targets up to 70 kilometers. Presumably, two M142 Himars MLRS, captured on video, were deployed in the south of Ukraine, in the Odessa region, while two more launchers are located in the central part of Ukraine.


The Russian Ministry of Defense showed the combat work of the crews of heavy flamethrower systems TOS-1A Solntsepek. After completing the combat mission, the crews of the TOS-1A "Solntsepyok" in the shortest possible time carry out a change of combat positions and promptly reload the installations. There are 24 thermobaric projectiles in the installation package. They are capable of covering an area of up to 40 thousand square meters, while destroying lightly armored vehicles and fortifications. after a 200-kilogram projectile hits the target, the thermobaric mixture dissipates in the air and explodes under enormous pressure, creating a temperature of 3000 degrees. TOS-1A "Sun" is a 2001 modification of the TOS-1 "Pinocchio" system developed back in 1980.


The base of the Kraken battalion, a Ukrainian territorial defense unit created from semi-criminal elements, was destroyed in Kharkiv by Russian artillery strikes.

 
Picdelamirand-oil said:
This is not what my informants say.
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I don't know who your informants are, but officially the Ukrainians have revealed that their casualties are 1000 a day in Donbas alone, and they also officially give the Russians the same number. Funny that... "Official" numbers... But what about actual numbers...

How bad do you think things really are if the Ukrainians are basically saying their casualties in Donbas alone are as much as Russian casualties across the entire front, while at the same time practically begging for more weapons supplies from NATO?

You will also notice that the Western media is slowly turning against Zelesnky. They are basically slowly preparing the public for bad news.

Do note casualties don't cover the number of Ukrainian PoWs taken. At least 2000-3000 are expected to surrender in the Hirske-Zolote region alone. Another 8000-12000 will get encircled by next week. The bridge at the oil refinery was destroyed, so the troops at Lysychansk have lost one of their main roads, cutting off access to the oil refinery from Lysychansk. And the second road towards Siversk has come under artillery fire control from two sides. Nobody in the West is talking about the massive amount of desertions and insubordinations too. Can't fight without food, fuel, weapons and fire support after all.
 
BMD said:
The Germans also had many more resources and men than the Russians have at their disposal in Ukraine. And the allies lost twice as many men as the axis powers to win.
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That's basically what I'm saying. The Germans were out-resourced by the Allies, they never had a chance to win even when playing by the rules they set. Ukraine doesn't have the resources to fight. Russia has the same advantages the Allies had.

Plus the Russians seem to be creating the conditions necessary to mobilise for war. A victory in Severo-Lysy area, which would mean the 'liberation' of the Luhansk Oblast, followed by a domestic PR explosion by showing off territories captured, parading PoWs etc, will push the country's morale up. So the objective seems to be to break the will of the Ukrainians.
 
(eurasiaprospective, jun.23)
Igor Strelkov, the Russian nationalist's bitterness about the war in Ukraine

The former military leader of the Donbass separatists has become an outspoken critic of the military operation in Ukraine. Igor Strelkov is now one of the most violent critics of Russian military strategy. Known for his ultranationalist positions, he actively comments on the course of the war on social networks and spares neither Vladimir Putin nor his Defence Minister.

"The special military operation is a total failure," says Igor Strelkov, arms folded in front of the camera, against a backdrop of the flag of Novorossia, the territory encompassing the south and east of Ukraine that the nostalgics of the Russian empire dream of conquering. Since the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, the FSB reserve colonel, with a thin moustache and short-cropped greying hair, has been very active on social networks to say what he thinks of the war Russia is waging in its neighbouring country: "In Ukraine, they're simply laughing at us. Not you and me, but they are laughing at all those people who think so well, who have such wonderful strategic concepts and tactical solutions," he quips.

Since he was sidelined in August 2014, when he had to leave his short-lived fiefdom of Sloviansk in the Donbass, the former "defence minister" of the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People's Republic" has been bitter, gnawing at his teeth and not hesitating to criticise the course of the war in Ukraine. "He represents a part of the Russian political spectrum, namely the far-right nationalists, who are not expected to criticise Vladimir Putin's position," says Florent Parmentier, a lecturer at Sciences Po and associate researcher at the Centre for Geopolitics at HEC. "But since the fall of Mariupol, we have heard from him both a criticism of the deplorable mastery of the art of war and the mistakes made by the Russian army at the beginning of this conflict. He is also extremely critical, as a military trainee and participant in the 2014 conflict, of Vladimir Putin's interference in military decision-making.


Criticism that remains acceptable to the Russian authorities
A fan of historical re-enactments, a monarchist, an ultra-nationalist, and labelled a "terrorist" by the Ukrainian authorities and media, Igor Guirkine, alias Strelkov, a name derived from the word "shooter", describes himself as an opponent. However, his criticism, although virulent, remains acceptable to the Russian authorities. "He really criticises the actions of the Russian army and he says quite clearly that he does not think well of the current president, but he also says that he must not be removed because otherwise there will be a revolution," notes Natalia Yudina, a specialist in Russian nationalism at the Sova centre for racism analysis in Moscow. "What I think is most important is that, since the beginning of the military operation, he has always said he supports it. He only allows himself to criticise the government for its lack of strategy and its unpreparedness, but overall, he remains in line with the general party line", the expert underlines.

Igor Strelkov, 51, took part in many conflicts after the break-up of the USSR: Transnistria in 1992, Bosnia, the two Chechen wars, before finding his moment of glory in the Donbass, as a leader of separatist fighters, financed by the orthodox nationalist oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. He even boasts that he was behind the outbreak of the Donbass war in April 2014. But his setbacks in the military field and the destruction of flight MH17 by a missile fired from separatist territory finally pushed him towards the exit in August 2014. Since then, the Russian authorities have lost interest in him and he has disappeared from national television channels. "It seems to me that they are not ready to hand him over to the Hague tribunal, but at the same time they have no intention of using his services for their military operation. He is no longer of any use to them, in fact," says Natalia Yudina, who points out that the man has repeatedly announced his readiness to go to the field of military operations, "but for the time being he continues to travel by metro, he stays at home and occupies his time commenting on the special operation.

Igor Strelkov heads his movement "Novorossia" and is involved in humanitarian aid and the supply of ammunition and uniforms to the military in the Ukrainian separatist republics. Currently on trial in a Dutch court, along with three other suspects, all of whom are absent, for the murder of the passengers of flight MH17 shot down on July 2014 over eastern Ukraine, Igor Strelkov denies the charges. Dutch prosecutors, who have asked for life imprisonment, believe the four men played a central role in the delivery from Russia of a BUK anti-aircraft battery, probably intended to hit a Ukrainian warplane. The verdict could be handed down in November. (DeepL)

Igor Strelkov, l’amertume du nationaliste russe face à la guerre en Ukraine (PARMENTIER – RFI)
 
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randomradio said:
That's basically what I'm saying. The Germans were out-resourced by the Allies, they never had a chance to win even when playing by the rules they set. Ukraine doesn't have the resources to fight. Russia has the same advantages the Allies had.

Plus the Russians seem to be creating the conditions necessary to mobilise for war. A victory in Severo-Lysy area, which would mean the 'liberation' of the Luhansk Oblast, followed by a domestic PR explosion by showing off territories captured, parading PoWs etc, will push the country's morale up. So the objective seems to be to break the will of the Ukrainians.
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They don't though because there's a limited amount of forces Russia can deploy ultimately, for Ukraine they have the draft, so there is no upper limit. Russia will lose more troops as the aggressor and will be ground down and spread thin.

They are torching enlistment offices. There is very little support in Russia, the soldiers they are sending are amongst the world's dumbest, because no smart person would volunteer or believe any of Russia's propaganda.
 
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