Like I said back in those days all three of youz were militarily equal-ish in tech that is not the case anymore chicom military is significantly on the next level compared to India.
Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Moscow Officials Urge Putin to GTFO: ‘Everything Went Wrong’
GettyMore and more Russian officials are urging Vladimir Putin to get the hell out of the Kremlin as Moscow suffered another series of humiliating defeats in Ukraine this weekend.Just one day after several municipal deputies in Putin’s hometown of St. Petersburg called on the State Duma to try...
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You use mostly foreign weapons though, built under license or otherwise.
Well this war is beyond stupid now. Not only is Russia's war unjust, any fool can see that it's impossible for them to succeed at any level now, it's just a case of how many people Putin wants to throw under a bus to protect him from having to admit his folly.
The difference in morale is just staggering. Ukranians fought tooth and nail for each cities/settlements, where Russians are abandoning them without any fight. Unlike the Kherson counter offensive, Ukraine is not taking unsustainable casualities in Kharkiv offensive.
Without more infantry ( which requires conscription), Russian defeat is going to be inevitable. With these counter offensive, strategic initiative is now with Ukrainians.
Without more infantry ( which requires conscription), Russian defeat is going to be inevitable. With these counter offensive, strategic initiative is now with Ukrainians.
Ukranians are long way from Luhansk. They are still in kharkiv oblast
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1918 in Ukraine?
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
One should always be interested in battles with surprising results, as they often indicate new trends.
Breakthrough
A review of the situation at the beginning of this week would have listed the names of villages that both sides had attacked. It was explained that the Russians had continued to attack around the city of Donetsk, then towards Bakhmut and Seversk to the east of Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, often advancing in a millimetre-fine fashion. The Ukrainians continued to advance slowly to the north and a little to the south of the Russian bridgehead at Kherson, while continuing to carry out important interdiction strikes on the rear.
And then the surprise came from the north. On 6 September, after a few weeks' preparation, Ukrainian forces launched an attack with a group of five manoeuvre brigades in the Zmiv-Andriivak area south-west of Kharkiv, combined with two peripheral groups, one south of Balakliya with a brigade reinforced by a tank battalion and another north of Chkalovske with two territorial brigades. With at least one artillery brigade, three special forces groups and several independent battalions, this was at least as large a force as the one engaged around the Kherson bridgehead.
The attack completely surprised the rather small Russian forces of the 144th motorised division reinforced with disparate independent units. The small town (25,000 inhabitants) of Balakliya was taken very quickly. The breakthrough was exploited immediately.
The main grouping split into two. The first went north-west towards Shevchenkove, which was taken on the 9th. From there, a mechanised brigade continued northwards and joined the two territorial brigades, while two brigades preceded by special forces in light vehicles drove towards Kupiansk, the Russian rear base of the whole region. Meanwhile, two other brigades advanced due west towards the Oskil River with the intention of encircling the key area of Yzium.
At this stage, the Ukrainians had obtained for the first time in this war, apart from the siege of Mariupol, a dislocation of their position. It was no longer a question of pushing back an enemy force, but of penetrating its heart to its command structure and rendering the force incapable of a coherent fight. In concrete terms, this translates into an unusual proportion of prisoners, perhaps more than a thousand, and the capture of numerous items of equipment, including sensitive equipment (electronic warfare, transmission vehicles, radars) that will supply Ukrainian depots and interest Western services. The Russian forces were pushed around and only really tried to slow down the Ukrainian advance by the air force.
On 10 September, what was left of the 18th Russian division was driven out of Kupiansk during the day. One of the two Ukrainian brigades kept the position and the possibility of crossing the Oskil river while the second joined the push north towards Velykyi Burluk and then the Russian border. To the south, the huge Russian force at Yzium, at least fifteen battle groups from four independent divisions and brigades, was hurriedly withdrawn to the east, beyond the forest area of the Donets River. Yzium was taken. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks also took place around the Kramatorsk pocket, as far north as Lyman, north of Sloviansk, and possibly even on the outskirts of Lysysyshansk, which the Russians had taken in July. The airport north-east of Donetsk may itself be under threat.
Russian forces are now trying to re-establish a front line with forces withdrawn from Yzium, reinforcements from the large rear base area of Belgorod and especially from the south. It is not yet clear when and how they will succeed in doing so.
When we witness such a surprise, a triumph for some, a disaster for others, it is because there is a combination of very good things on one side and incompetence on the other. On the one hand, the Ukrainians were able to organise two very different offensives simultaneously, in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, including a total of at least 15 manoeuvre brigades, whereas the Russians have not been able to mount attacks on a scale larger than one brigade or regiment since July.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the meeting of five armoured-mechanised brigades near the front in Zmiv went unnoticed by the Russians, despite their intelligence assets, from observation satellites to deep reconnaissance teams and spies, to listening devices or drones, or even planes or helicopters, because the Russians still have air superiority at least near the front. It is true that many of these assets have been reduced by the fighting, but there has undoubtedly been a serious failure in the tactical assessment of the situation within the Russian chain of command.
Perhaps the Russian high command, whose heads were gathered at the same time in the Far East with a number of assets to parade at the Zapad exercise, misjudged the value of its army in Ukraine. It was understood that, without fully admitting it, he had given up on the complete conquest of the Donbass by limiting attacks in the region in favour of defending the south. He was probably also unaware of how weak his army had become in the north. There are people in the chain who made mistakes and/or lied.
Curves
The idea of an army as a mass of skills, which grows or shrinks according to the combination of resources provided and learning capacity, has been mentioned several times. It is now clear that the Russian skill pool has been shrinking since the beginning of the war.
The war of movement failed to achieve strategic objectives, and in this it was a failure, but there were tactical successes on the part of well-organised armies, such as the 58th in the south. The shift to a positional campaign at the turn of March and April, with much simpler modes of action, already showed a decline in skill after the initial losses. This campaign did achieve some success, 1,000 km2 conquered in three months, compared to the 2,000 taken by the Ukrainians in three days, but again at the cost of heavy losses. The best troops, constantly in demand, suffered greatly and were replaced by battalions of recruits of very low value or by expedients such as Wagner's mercenaries or battalions of mobilised soldiers from the separatist republics, ill-equipped and unmotivated to fight in Kherson or Kharkiv.
The 'operational pause' of July, which still lasts, was a symptom of this weakening that resembles the reaching of the Omega deck, which describes the moment when an army no longer has the resources to organise large-scale offensives. Disorganised, insufficiently reinforced in number and even more so in quality, Russian divisions and brigades saw the tactical range of manoeuvre units become even more heterogeneous and diminish on average.
At the same time, the evolution of the Ukrainian army went in the other direction. For a time, there was some doubt about this, especially in June when pressure and losses were high in the Donbass, but the long-term trend, in combination with Western aid and the mobilisation - and therefore also the military training - of the Ukrainian nation's forces, was towards an increase in the number and tactical range of combat and support units.
It remained to be seen when the curves would cross to the Ukrainians' advantage. Overestimating the Russians once again and underestimating the Ukrainians, it was imagined that this would happen in the autumn or even in 2023, with new large-scale offensive operations or even the return of the war of movement. This has obviously happened now.
1918 ?
Since April, the shape of the war has often been compared to that of the First World War, moving from a phase of movement to a phase of trenches, often forgetting that it ended in 1918 with a new war of movement, admittedly of a different style than that of 1914. Perhaps 1918 can be seen as having now begun in Ukraine. This 1918 campaign of movement was carried out in two ways: by a few large-scale German offensives from spring to summer and then by a series of multiple small Allied offensives from summer to autumn, until the German collapse.
Currently, the Ukrainians are doing both. The attack on the Kherson bridgehead actually resembles a siege, where through the precision of their modern artillery but also a small renewed attacking air force, combined with multiple small attacks, the Ukrainians are trying to pressure the isolation and withdrawal of the 20,000 Russian troops beyond the Dnieper. It was a bit like the reduction of the German pocket of Soissons in July 1918. If they succeeded, it would again be a major blow, both materially and psychologically, to the Russian forces. In the north, Ukrainian forces succeeded in breaking through and dislocating for the first time in their young history. This is similar to the creation of the Soissons pocket, when on 27 May 1918 the Germans attacked the area as a diversion from the main operations in Flanders and broke through a poorly defended French front to the Marne.
It was now up to the Ukrainians to exploit their success to the full and then to maintain these territorial gains despite the logistical difficulties that this might entail. If they succeed, and if they continue to benefit from the advantage of the number and tactical quality of their combat units, combined with greater flexibility of command and good support, their possibilities are very great. Like the Allies in 1918, they would be able to move brigades and supports from one point of the front to another faster than the Russians and to multiply important attacks. One can imagine what a breakthrough similar to that of Balakliya could do on the hitherto rather calm front south of Zaporozhie, with an operation towards Melitopol, the Enerhodar nuclear power station or even Marioupol, which would be a very strong symbol. It would also endanger both Crimea and the Kherson area.
Let us not neglect the psychological aspect of things. You need a good reason and the hope that it will serve a purpose to take mortal risks in combat. It is obviously less difficult when one believes that it will contribute to victory rather than serve no purpose. But without risk-taking, there are rarely victories.
The next few days will be decisive in determining whether we are really in a 1918 to the advantage of the Ukrainians or whether this is just a happy circumstance and an anomaly before returning to the rigidity of the fronts. If a new phase has indeed been reached, it is hard to see how the Russians can cope without a radical change in their army. The problem is that this radical change is a Pandora's box.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
One should always be interested in battles with surprising results, as they often indicate new trends.
Breakthrough
A review of the situation at the beginning of this week would have listed the names of villages that both sides had attacked. It was explained that the Russians had continued to attack around the city of Donetsk, then towards Bakhmut and Seversk to the east of Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, often advancing in a millimetre-fine fashion. The Ukrainians continued to advance slowly to the north and a little to the south of the Russian bridgehead at Kherson, while continuing to carry out important interdiction strikes on the rear.
And then the surprise came from the north. On 6 September, after a few weeks' preparation, Ukrainian forces launched an attack with a group of five manoeuvre brigades in the Zmiv-Andriivak area south-west of Kharkiv, combined with two peripheral groups, one south of Balakliya with a brigade reinforced by a tank battalion and another north of Chkalovske with two territorial brigades. With at least one artillery brigade, three special forces groups and several independent battalions, this was at least as large a force as the one engaged around the Kherson bridgehead.
The attack completely surprised the rather small Russian forces of the 144th motorised division reinforced with disparate independent units. The small town (25,000 inhabitants) of Balakliya was taken very quickly. The breakthrough was exploited immediately.
The main grouping split into two. The first went north-west towards Shevchenkove, which was taken on the 9th. From there, a mechanised brigade continued northwards and joined the two territorial brigades, while two brigades preceded by special forces in light vehicles drove towards Kupiansk, the Russian rear base of the whole region. Meanwhile, two other brigades advanced due west towards the Oskil River with the intention of encircling the key area of Yzium.
At this stage, the Ukrainians had obtained for the first time in this war, apart from the siege of Mariupol, a dislocation of their position. It was no longer a question of pushing back an enemy force, but of penetrating its heart to its command structure and rendering the force incapable of a coherent fight. In concrete terms, this translates into an unusual proportion of prisoners, perhaps more than a thousand, and the capture of numerous items of equipment, including sensitive equipment (electronic warfare, transmission vehicles, radars) that will supply Ukrainian depots and interest Western services. The Russian forces were pushed around and only really tried to slow down the Ukrainian advance by the air force.
On 10 September, what was left of the 18th Russian division was driven out of Kupiansk during the day. One of the two Ukrainian brigades kept the position and the possibility of crossing the Oskil river while the second joined the push north towards Velykyi Burluk and then the Russian border. To the south, the huge Russian force at Yzium, at least fifteen battle groups from four independent divisions and brigades, was hurriedly withdrawn to the east, beyond the forest area of the Donets River. Yzium was taken. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks also took place around the Kramatorsk pocket, as far north as Lyman, north of Sloviansk, and possibly even on the outskirts of Lysysyshansk, which the Russians had taken in July. The airport north-east of Donetsk may itself be under threat.
Russian forces are now trying to re-establish a front line with forces withdrawn from Yzium, reinforcements from the large rear base area of Belgorod and especially from the south. It is not yet clear when and how they will succeed in doing so.
When we witness such a surprise, a triumph for some, a disaster for others, it is because there is a combination of very good things on one side and incompetence on the other. On the one hand, the Ukrainians were able to organise two very different offensives simultaneously, in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, including a total of at least 15 manoeuvre brigades, whereas the Russians have not been able to mount attacks on a scale larger than one brigade or regiment since July.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the meeting of five armoured-mechanised brigades near the front in Zmiv went unnoticed by the Russians, despite their intelligence assets, from observation satellites to deep reconnaissance teams and spies, to listening devices or drones, or even planes or helicopters, because the Russians still have air superiority at least near the front. It is true that many of these assets have been reduced by the fighting, but there has undoubtedly been a serious failure in the tactical assessment of the situation within the Russian chain of command.
Perhaps the Russian high command, whose heads were gathered at the same time in the Far East with a number of assets to parade at the Zapad exercise, misjudged the value of its army in Ukraine. It was understood that, without fully admitting it, he had given up on the complete conquest of the Donbass by limiting attacks in the region in favour of defending the south. He was probably also unaware of how weak his army had become in the north. There are people in the chain who made mistakes and/or lied.
Curves
The idea of an army as a mass of skills, which grows or shrinks according to the combination of resources provided and learning capacity, has been mentioned several times. It is now clear that the Russian skill pool has been shrinking since the beginning of the war.
The war of movement failed to achieve strategic objectives, and in this it was a failure, but there were tactical successes on the part of well-organised armies, such as the 58th in the south. The shift to a positional campaign at the turn of March and April, with much simpler modes of action, already showed a decline in skill after the initial losses. This campaign did achieve some success, 1,000 km2 conquered in three months, compared to the 2,000 taken by the Ukrainians in three days, but again at the cost of heavy losses. The best troops, constantly in demand, suffered greatly and were replaced by battalions of recruits of very low value or by expedients such as Wagner's mercenaries or battalions of mobilised soldiers from the separatist republics, ill-equipped and unmotivated to fight in Kherson or Kharkiv.
The 'operational pause' of July, which still lasts, was a symptom of this weakening that resembles the reaching of the Omega deck, which describes the moment when an army no longer has the resources to organise large-scale offensives. Disorganised, insufficiently reinforced in number and even more so in quality, Russian divisions and brigades saw the tactical range of manoeuvre units become even more heterogeneous and diminish on average.
At the same time, the evolution of the Ukrainian army went in the other direction. For a time, there was some doubt about this, especially in June when pressure and losses were high in the Donbass, but the long-term trend, in combination with Western aid and the mobilisation - and therefore also the military training - of the Ukrainian nation's forces, was towards an increase in the number and tactical range of combat and support units.
It remained to be seen when the curves would cross to the Ukrainians' advantage. Overestimating the Russians once again and underestimating the Ukrainians, it was imagined that this would happen in the autumn or even in 2023, with new large-scale offensive operations or even the return of the war of movement. This has obviously happened now.
1918 ?
Since April, the shape of the war has often been compared to that of the First World War, moving from a phase of movement to a phase of trenches, often forgetting that it ended in 1918 with a new war of movement, admittedly of a different style than that of 1914. Perhaps 1918 can be seen as having now begun in Ukraine. This 1918 campaign of movement was carried out in two ways: by a few large-scale German offensives from spring to summer and then by a series of multiple small Allied offensives from summer to autumn, until the German collapse.
Currently, the Ukrainians are doing both. The attack on the Kherson bridgehead actually resembles a siege, where through the precision of their modern artillery but also a small renewed attacking air force, combined with multiple small attacks, the Ukrainians are trying to pressure the isolation and withdrawal of the 20,000 Russian troops beyond the Dnieper. It was a bit like the reduction of the German pocket of Soissons in July 1918. If they succeeded, it would again be a major blow, both materially and psychologically, to the Russian forces. In the north, Ukrainian forces succeeded in breaking through and dislocating for the first time in their young history. This is similar to the creation of the Soissons pocket, when on 27 May 1918 the Germans attacked the area as a diversion from the main operations in Flanders and broke through a poorly defended French front to the Marne.
It was now up to the Ukrainians to exploit their success to the full and then to maintain these territorial gains despite the logistical difficulties that this might entail. If they succeed, and if they continue to benefit from the advantage of the number and tactical quality of their combat units, combined with greater flexibility of command and good support, their possibilities are very great. Like the Allies in 1918, they would be able to move brigades and supports from one point of the front to another faster than the Russians and to multiply important attacks. One can imagine what a breakthrough similar to that of Balakliya could do on the hitherto rather calm front south of Zaporozhie, with an operation towards Melitopol, the Enerhodar nuclear power station or even Marioupol, which would be a very strong symbol. It would also endanger both Crimea and the Kherson area.
Let us not neglect the psychological aspect of things. You need a good reason and the hope that it will serve a purpose to take mortal risks in combat. It is obviously less difficult when one believes that it will contribute to victory rather than serve no purpose. But without risk-taking, there are rarely victories.
The next few days will be decisive in determining whether we are really in a 1918 to the advantage of the Ukrainians or whether this is just a happy circumstance and an anomaly before returning to the rigidity of the fronts. If a new phase has indeed been reached, it is hard to see how the Russians can cope without a radical change in their army. The problem is that this radical change is a Pandora's box.
An Su-34 has crashed in North Crimea, that's 2 lost in 2 days.
t.me
Baza
В Крыму упал российский военный самолет. По предварительной информации, пилоты успели катапультироваться. Авиакатастрофа произошла на границе Разнодельненского и Красноперекопского района. Очевидцы сообщили «Базе», что около 6 часов утра в поле упал военный самолёт. Предположительно это мог...
t.me