Ukraine - Russia Conflict
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Sometimes it's the only sensible conversation I can find.seriously you need to stop talking to yourself.
Russian expert Pavel Baev: "Putin's days are numbered
For the Russian-Norwegian analyst at the prestigious Oslo Peace Research Institute, the erosion of the Kremlin master's power has reached a point of no return.
Last week, Russian-Norwegian professor Pavel Baev celebrated the 30th anniversary of his move to Norway, where he works at the prestigious Oslo Peace Research Institute. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1979 (in economics and political geography) and began his career in the Soviet Union in the Ministry of Defence. Considered by his research peers as one of the best connoisseurs of the transformations within the Russian army, Baev extends his field of expertise to other areas such as Sino-Russian relations, Russian policy in the Arctic or the Caucasus. He is an associate researcher at the Russia/NIS Centre of the French Institute of International Relations and has just published a fascinating article entitled "Russia's War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy" which is available free of charge on the French think tank's website.
According to Pavel Baev, the rigidity of the chain of command is, along with corruption within the military institution, the main reason for Putin's failure in Ukraine.
Interview.
The Express: To what extent is Vladimir Putin correctly informed about the situation on the ground in Ukraine?
Pavel Baev: In rigid and autocratic political systems such as Putin's, subordinates tend to announce only good news to their boss, who doesn't want to upset his superior, who in turn doesn't want to upset the guy above him. As a result, bad news travels slowly. But the urgency of the war requires efficient reporting. From the start of the war in February, Vladimir Putin did not have all the information that would have allowed him to avoid miscalculations even before the launch of his "special operation".
In the course of the war - where, by nature, as in all wars, the situation is constantly changing - he is alternately well and poorly informed.
When Russian troops evacuated the Kiev region in March-April, he must have had the right information about the situation on the ground, otherwise he would not have given the green light for the withdrawal of his troops.
In contrast, in July, at the height of the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast and after the capture of Lyssychansk in Luhansk Oblast, his generals did not give him a full picture of the situation. For example, they did not explain to him that they could not continue their advance because of the lack of human resources.
If they had done so at that moment, then Putin might have made a different decision. He could, for example, have announced the full annexation of the Luhansk oblast as early as July, which would have been welcomed in Russia. He could also have announced a partial mobilisation of part of the army, for example by limiting it to Russians who had served in the army for the previous five years, which would also have been well received.
With these 100,000 additional soldiers, he could have continued his offensive. Thus he would have 'surfed' on a military victory, a limited mobilisation and an annexation that would have seemed sensible. But he missed this window of opportunity.
Ill-informed about the balance of power on the ground, he waited until mid-September to announce a "partial mobilisation". Poorly "sold" to Russian opinion and very badly organised, it turned into a huge failure. This shows that Putin is not properly informed.
Can the war of attrition he has embarked on succeed?
No, because this kind of war of attrition requires a capacity for endurance that neither the Russian economy nor the military-industrial complex has. Despite this, Putin has embarked on an arm wrestling match with the entire West. He will not be able to continue indefinitely to suffer tactical military defeats such as those looming in Kherson (south) and in the Donbass (east) where the Ukrainian army is advancing step by step.
It should be noted that we are witnessing a double trend: on the one hand, the equipment of the Russian army is increasingly rustic, on the other hand the armament of the Ukrainian army is increasingly modern.
Is the Russian population aware of just how bad its army is?
Until the September mobilisation, Russians thought that military affairs were going on as normal. But the sudden mobilisation in September was a shock whose ripples are felt every day because families receive daily information about the unpreparedness of the recruitment centres and the poor conditions of the mobilised. The effect of this bad news is cumulative. "The elite is beginning to understand that Putin is becoming a burden.
Let's not forget, either, that the number of people who have fled the country is three times higher than that of those mobilised. This, by the way, will have an impact on the economy. Forecasts predicted a recession of 4 to 5% this year, which seemed "manageable". In reality, we should expect a recession at least twice as big, which will affect people.
All these factors lead Russians to believe that things are going in the wrong direction, that defeat is on the horizon and that there is no way out.
Is there a public opinion in Russia?
There may not be a public opinion, but the September mobilisation has created discontent. However, we should not expect popular demonstrations. But mutinies are possible among the newly mobilised units. And here we are talking about armed people. Also, the elite itself is beginning to realise that within its system, Putin is no longer an asset but a burden.
Just as Xi Jinping is at the heart of Chinese power, Vladimir Putin is at the heart of the Russian problem. His popularity is declining and, at various levels, his system is eroding. You don't need a crystal ball to understand this. Many black swans are circling over Russia. And even if it is impossible to know which one will change the course of things, the potential is there for the system to break down.
How do you explain that, unlike the Iranian diaspora, Russians abroad are not protesting against the regime?
The first wave of exiles, that of February-March, which numbered about 300,000 people, is scattered in Europe and is beginning to organise itself. Digital media are beginning to appear on the Web. The second wave, which fled the September mobilisation and which is at least twice as numerous, needs a little time to get back on its feet and understand what is happening to it.
Are Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin, who have a strong online presence, taking advantage of the army's disorganisation to gain power?
Their presence on Twitter, TikTok or Instagram does not mean that they have access to Putin. In reality, they are kept at a distance from the Kremlin. But it is clear that they want to position themselves for the future. But it is important to understand that Kadyrov has no personal interests in Ukraine and that he is simply mobilising his army in anticipation of the problems that he already sees looming on the horizon: after the Russian defeat, he knows that the Caucasus will enter a phase of instability.
As for Prigozhin, he doesn't have the intrinsic strength of Kadyrov, who at least has a loyal and devoted army. Prigozhin, on the other hand, leads a group of mercenaries who, by nature, have no loyalty to him and are therefore likely to sell themselves to the highest bidder.
Is Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu still in Putin's favour?
The rumours of his being placed on the cabinet are just that - rumours. Putin is not in a position to remove Shugu, who is very loyal to him. Who would he replace him with? Putin has no general who can do better and give him a victory on a plate. In my opinion, Shugu is here to stay, and so is Chief of Staff Valeri Guerasimov.
All eyes are now on General Sergei Surovikin. Promoted to commander of the Russian army in Ukraine in September, he becomes the new central figure. Which also means that if the Kremlin needs to blow a fuse at some point, he is the perfect person to do the job.
How does the Russian elite deal with the distance between its cherished modernised notion of a 'great Russian power' and the reality on the ground?
It is a difficult mental task. Watching the defeat unfold before their eyes is like swallowing a bitter potion. A year ago, it was accepted, even beyond the borders, that Russia was a great power. The Russian elite believed that the army would be able to deploy its know-how in many fields. Suddenly, the truth is that it is in ruins.
The Russian retreat also concerns the energy field and the country's place in the world. Vladimir Putin cherished the idea that Moscow had the capacity to connect to what in geopolitics is called the "Global South". But at the UN General Assembly in September, only five countries (North Korea, Belarus, Nicaragua, Syria, Russia) supported Moscow's annexation of the four Ukrainian regions. 143 countries voted against and 35 abstained.
This is a slap in the face for Putin, who no longer has the capacity to subvert the world order. Even China, supposedly his very dear ally, did not support Russia. Beijing is certainly willing to transform the international system to increase its influence, but not by breaking everything. It will take Putin a long time to absorb this resounding failure, as he is not someone who digests bad news easily.
As for the Russian elite, their awareness of the deterioration of Russia's place in the world will probably only come after the end of Putin, which in my opinion is not far off...
The end of Putin is not far off, you say...
This may be wishful thinking as it is obviously impossible to predict the future but, yes, I think his days are numbered. It is becoming increasingly clear to everyone in Russia that this war is Putin's war; that the current defeat is Putin's defeat; and that no solution will be possible without Putin's departure.
How will this happen?
I don't know, because every coup is different. Only one thing is known: successful coups happen suddenly, as if from heaven. One day we will wake up with the words "Breaking News" on our screens. And that day is not far off.
What might the post-Putin era look like?
It will be a process. Initially, the new leadership will be collective. It will resume, step by step, the dialogue with the West and make compromises on the Ukrainian issue. It will be a period of great instability with settling of scores, musical chairs, evictions, resistance and scapegoating.
There will also be tremors in Russia's "near abroad". In Belarus, the fall of the Lukashenko regime should follow Putin's departure. In the Caucasus, the Chechen Ramzan Kadyrov will be destabilised. And he knows it. That is why he is strengthening his army today. In Moscow, there will be no radical break with the past, for example with a civil war.
Too many people need to stabilise Russia in order to avoid total catastrophe. The members of the collective that will succeed Putin will also have to manage their own interests: they will want to recover their assets currently frozen in the West because of the individual sanctions against them.
Could ex-oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, exiled in London, or the opponent Alexei Navalny, now in prison, play a role?
Maybe, one day... In the very distant future... But no, this hypothesis is unlikely. However, Navalny's release could, at some point, allow Putin's successors to indicate to the West that they are open to dialogue and ready to make certain reforms. But that is as far as it will go.
Sometimes presented as a possible successor, could Nikolai Patrushev (former FSB boss, very close to Putin) be part of the group of people you are talking about?
No. Patrushev's power comes from his proximity to Putin. Apart from that, he doesn't control anything. What's more, he's quite old. He is 71 years old. Among the people in power, however, there are well-known figures, such as the current Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu or Prime Minister Mikhail Michustin. And others. Don't expect any surprises or outsiders. The cast will be made up of familiar figures, linked to Putin.
For the Russian-Norwegian analyst at the prestigious Oslo Peace Research Institute, the erosion of the Kremlin master's power has reached a point of no return.
Last week, Russian-Norwegian professor Pavel Baev celebrated the 30th anniversary of his move to Norway, where he works at the prestigious Oslo Peace Research Institute. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1979 (in economics and political geography) and began his career in the Soviet Union in the Ministry of Defence. Considered by his research peers as one of the best connoisseurs of the transformations within the Russian army, Baev extends his field of expertise to other areas such as Sino-Russian relations, Russian policy in the Arctic or the Caucasus. He is an associate researcher at the Russia/NIS Centre of the French Institute of International Relations and has just published a fascinating article entitled "Russia's War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy" which is available free of charge on the French think tank's website.
According to Pavel Baev, the rigidity of the chain of command is, along with corruption within the military institution, the main reason for Putin's failure in Ukraine.
Interview.
The Express: To what extent is Vladimir Putin correctly informed about the situation on the ground in Ukraine?
Pavel Baev: In rigid and autocratic political systems such as Putin's, subordinates tend to announce only good news to their boss, who doesn't want to upset his superior, who in turn doesn't want to upset the guy above him. As a result, bad news travels slowly. But the urgency of the war requires efficient reporting. From the start of the war in February, Vladimir Putin did not have all the information that would have allowed him to avoid miscalculations even before the launch of his "special operation".
In the course of the war - where, by nature, as in all wars, the situation is constantly changing - he is alternately well and poorly informed.
When Russian troops evacuated the Kiev region in March-April, he must have had the right information about the situation on the ground, otherwise he would not have given the green light for the withdrawal of his troops.
In contrast, in July, at the height of the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast and after the capture of Lyssychansk in Luhansk Oblast, his generals did not give him a full picture of the situation. For example, they did not explain to him that they could not continue their advance because of the lack of human resources.
If they had done so at that moment, then Putin might have made a different decision. He could, for example, have announced the full annexation of the Luhansk oblast as early as July, which would have been welcomed in Russia. He could also have announced a partial mobilisation of part of the army, for example by limiting it to Russians who had served in the army for the previous five years, which would also have been well received.
With these 100,000 additional soldiers, he could have continued his offensive. Thus he would have 'surfed' on a military victory, a limited mobilisation and an annexation that would have seemed sensible. But he missed this window of opportunity.
Ill-informed about the balance of power on the ground, he waited until mid-September to announce a "partial mobilisation". Poorly "sold" to Russian opinion and very badly organised, it turned into a huge failure. This shows that Putin is not properly informed.
Can the war of attrition he has embarked on succeed?
No, because this kind of war of attrition requires a capacity for endurance that neither the Russian economy nor the military-industrial complex has. Despite this, Putin has embarked on an arm wrestling match with the entire West. He will not be able to continue indefinitely to suffer tactical military defeats such as those looming in Kherson (south) and in the Donbass (east) where the Ukrainian army is advancing step by step.
It should be noted that we are witnessing a double trend: on the one hand, the equipment of the Russian army is increasingly rustic, on the other hand the armament of the Ukrainian army is increasingly modern.
Is the Russian population aware of just how bad its army is?
Until the September mobilisation, Russians thought that military affairs were going on as normal. But the sudden mobilisation in September was a shock whose ripples are felt every day because families receive daily information about the unpreparedness of the recruitment centres and the poor conditions of the mobilised. The effect of this bad news is cumulative. "The elite is beginning to understand that Putin is becoming a burden.
Let's not forget, either, that the number of people who have fled the country is three times higher than that of those mobilised. This, by the way, will have an impact on the economy. Forecasts predicted a recession of 4 to 5% this year, which seemed "manageable". In reality, we should expect a recession at least twice as big, which will affect people.
All these factors lead Russians to believe that things are going in the wrong direction, that defeat is on the horizon and that there is no way out.
Is there a public opinion in Russia?
There may not be a public opinion, but the September mobilisation has created discontent. However, we should not expect popular demonstrations. But mutinies are possible among the newly mobilised units. And here we are talking about armed people. Also, the elite itself is beginning to realise that within its system, Putin is no longer an asset but a burden.
Just as Xi Jinping is at the heart of Chinese power, Vladimir Putin is at the heart of the Russian problem. His popularity is declining and, at various levels, his system is eroding. You don't need a crystal ball to understand this. Many black swans are circling over Russia. And even if it is impossible to know which one will change the course of things, the potential is there for the system to break down.
How do you explain that, unlike the Iranian diaspora, Russians abroad are not protesting against the regime?
The first wave of exiles, that of February-March, which numbered about 300,000 people, is scattered in Europe and is beginning to organise itself. Digital media are beginning to appear on the Web. The second wave, which fled the September mobilisation and which is at least twice as numerous, needs a little time to get back on its feet and understand what is happening to it.
Are Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin, who have a strong online presence, taking advantage of the army's disorganisation to gain power?
Their presence on Twitter, TikTok or Instagram does not mean that they have access to Putin. In reality, they are kept at a distance from the Kremlin. But it is clear that they want to position themselves for the future. But it is important to understand that Kadyrov has no personal interests in Ukraine and that he is simply mobilising his army in anticipation of the problems that he already sees looming on the horizon: after the Russian defeat, he knows that the Caucasus will enter a phase of instability.
As for Prigozhin, he doesn't have the intrinsic strength of Kadyrov, who at least has a loyal and devoted army. Prigozhin, on the other hand, leads a group of mercenaries who, by nature, have no loyalty to him and are therefore likely to sell themselves to the highest bidder.
Is Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu still in Putin's favour?
The rumours of his being placed on the cabinet are just that - rumours. Putin is not in a position to remove Shugu, who is very loyal to him. Who would he replace him with? Putin has no general who can do better and give him a victory on a plate. In my opinion, Shugu is here to stay, and so is Chief of Staff Valeri Guerasimov.
All eyes are now on General Sergei Surovikin. Promoted to commander of the Russian army in Ukraine in September, he becomes the new central figure. Which also means that if the Kremlin needs to blow a fuse at some point, he is the perfect person to do the job.
How does the Russian elite deal with the distance between its cherished modernised notion of a 'great Russian power' and the reality on the ground?
It is a difficult mental task. Watching the defeat unfold before their eyes is like swallowing a bitter potion. A year ago, it was accepted, even beyond the borders, that Russia was a great power. The Russian elite believed that the army would be able to deploy its know-how in many fields. Suddenly, the truth is that it is in ruins.
The Russian retreat also concerns the energy field and the country's place in the world. Vladimir Putin cherished the idea that Moscow had the capacity to connect to what in geopolitics is called the "Global South". But at the UN General Assembly in September, only five countries (North Korea, Belarus, Nicaragua, Syria, Russia) supported Moscow's annexation of the four Ukrainian regions. 143 countries voted against and 35 abstained.
This is a slap in the face for Putin, who no longer has the capacity to subvert the world order. Even China, supposedly his very dear ally, did not support Russia. Beijing is certainly willing to transform the international system to increase its influence, but not by breaking everything. It will take Putin a long time to absorb this resounding failure, as he is not someone who digests bad news easily.
As for the Russian elite, their awareness of the deterioration of Russia's place in the world will probably only come after the end of Putin, which in my opinion is not far off...
The end of Putin is not far off, you say...
This may be wishful thinking as it is obviously impossible to predict the future but, yes, I think his days are numbered. It is becoming increasingly clear to everyone in Russia that this war is Putin's war; that the current defeat is Putin's defeat; and that no solution will be possible without Putin's departure.
How will this happen?
I don't know, because every coup is different. Only one thing is known: successful coups happen suddenly, as if from heaven. One day we will wake up with the words "Breaking News" on our screens. And that day is not far off.
What might the post-Putin era look like?
It will be a process. Initially, the new leadership will be collective. It will resume, step by step, the dialogue with the West and make compromises on the Ukrainian issue. It will be a period of great instability with settling of scores, musical chairs, evictions, resistance and scapegoating.
There will also be tremors in Russia's "near abroad". In Belarus, the fall of the Lukashenko regime should follow Putin's departure. In the Caucasus, the Chechen Ramzan Kadyrov will be destabilised. And he knows it. That is why he is strengthening his army today. In Moscow, there will be no radical break with the past, for example with a civil war.
Too many people need to stabilise Russia in order to avoid total catastrophe. The members of the collective that will succeed Putin will also have to manage their own interests: they will want to recover their assets currently frozen in the West because of the individual sanctions against them.
Could ex-oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, exiled in London, or the opponent Alexei Navalny, now in prison, play a role?
Maybe, one day... In the very distant future... But no, this hypothesis is unlikely. However, Navalny's release could, at some point, allow Putin's successors to indicate to the West that they are open to dialogue and ready to make certain reforms. But that is as far as it will go.
Sometimes presented as a possible successor, could Nikolai Patrushev (former FSB boss, very close to Putin) be part of the group of people you are talking about?
No. Patrushev's power comes from his proximity to Putin. Apart from that, he doesn't control anything. What's more, he's quite old. He is 71 years old. Among the people in power, however, there are well-known figures, such as the current Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu or Prime Minister Mikhail Michustin. And others. Don't expect any surprises or outsiders. The cast will be made up of familiar figures, linked to Putin.