Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
You could, but I never claimed any Western politician was brave.
At the current rate that would take several centuries. Meanwhile Russian bankruptcy will take only half a decade.
@Picdelamirand-oil, @Bon Plan - Your chief has come under the focus of Russian state comedy show.
"Insignificant, pathetic, little Satanist." Apparently.
"Insignificant, pathetic, little Satanist." Apparently.
Yeah, wonderful, six months after Russia razed every single building in the city and killed over a hundred thousand people, they have started to rebuild a few Potemkin apartments for a propaganda campaign. Woop-dee-doo.
Are you even aware that the people of Mariupol could have lived normally all along, without needing to recover and rebuild, if the fascist hordes of your favorite lunatic hadn't come to destroy, pillage, and torture?
Accurate if by "mob" you man the Kremlin mafia. They're the ones who decided to genocide the Ukrainians, claiming they have no right to exist; they're the ones who decided to start a stupid pointless wars; and they're the one who think victory would provoke the downfall of the West.
You really should stop with the DARVO tactics. They won't work, everyone sane can see through them.
Missiles, menaces et mensonges - Point de situation du 24 octobre 2022
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Missiles, threats and lies - Update 24 October 2022
Let's start with some news from the sky.
Flying machines and petty strategy
The most visible development in the situation is the transformation of the Russian air campaign of theatre strikes (theatre also in the sense of stage) from ad hoc to systematic. Since 10 October, it has no longer been a question of striking fixed targets irregularly in depth, but rather of producing a mass effect with the use of several dozen ballistic or cruise missiles, accompanied by even larger numbers of target drones. In this avatar of Warden's circles theory, these 400 million euros of daily projectiles are officially used to strike the infrastructure of the Ukrainian 'life system' and more particularly its energy network.
In this respect, this campaign, carried out solely with inanimate projectiles, is reminiscent of the "V" weapons for "revenge" launched by Nazi Germany on England and then on the liberated countries in the West from June 1944. As at the time, dozens of projectiles were launched on cities every day, without it being known whether this was a real strategy of paralysis, retaliation after a series of humiliations or an act of simple communication for the use of the regime's hawks, its own population or its troops, whom it was trying to reassure. First of all, it is strange to claim to want to liberate a population from a neo-Nazi yoke by directly or indirectly hitting the lives of this population. Above all, it is important to remember the vanity of such an approach.
If the objective is to obtain the capitulation of peoples or their revolt against leaders incapable of protecting them, i.e. the same strategy as terrorist organisations, it is as inhuman as it is stupid. If entire peoples can break down and force their leaders to ask for mercy, the phenomenon is quite rare and seems to be limited to the Russian and German examples at the end of the First World War after years of privation, suffering and above all the spectacle of disasters on the front. It should be noted that in these two cases, it was certainly not because German and Russian civilians received projectiles from the sky - rare at the time - that they rebelled, but because the sacrifices made were no longer accompanied by any hope that they would serve any purpose. People may only rebel against their government when there is no hope of military victory.
This is far from the case on both sides in the current war in Ukraine, and when there is still hope of victory, it is mainly the aggressors in the sky who are blamed, a context conducive to escalation. There is no reason why those you strike in retaliation should react differently than you do, but you do it anyway. The Ukrainians are also hitting Russian-held cities and even Belgorod in Russia. This is very punctual for the moment, but it could also become a systematic campaign to satisfy a desire for revenge. This would be a big mistake for the Russian government, which is desperate to mobilise its population psychologically before actually doing so.
Air campaigns on infrastructure may have more value in hindering war production, especially by hitting certain key areas. This was the case over Germany in the Second World War. But there has to be something important to destroy. When you ravage countries as poorly industrialised as North Korea or North Vietnam, when their military supplies come from an untouchable foreign country, it does not serve much purpose other than to slow down the enemy's manoeuvre a little. But you also have to deploy a lot of resources. Russian missiles do indeed do a lot of damage, but they are few in number each time and their stockpile is not unlimited. At least 2,000 of them have already been used, with a total value of around ten billion euros, and they produce very few. The fact that the Russians have been reduced to also using old anti-ship missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in this role already indicates a fear of squandering this valuable strike force.
The supply of ballistic missiles by Iran or North Korea could perhaps change the situation by making it possible to extend the V campaign. As these weapons are of low precision, this campaign would therefore drift more and more towards a purely anti-city campaign, in the manner of the "area bombing" dear to the British general "Bomber" Harris. Failing that, only the deep involvement of the Russian air force could allow the campaign to continue with greater efficiency and scale, but undoubtedly at the cost of intolerable losses in such a dense anti-aircraft environment. This is a far cry from the fleets of thousands of aircraft of the Second World War; an air force of a few hundred aircraft vulnerable to modern anti-aircraft defence can be destroyed in a matter of weeks.
In the meantime, the use of the Shahed-131 or especially 136 projectile drones, renamed Geran (Geranium) 2 to make them look Russian, has the advantage of being cheap and therefore numerous. But with an explosive charge of a few tens of kilos of explosive, they must be considered as large-calibre shells similar to those launched by the thousands every day on the front line, but with a very long range. They would undoubtedly be very useful for hitting fixed targets in the depths of the battlefield, but the Russians prefer to use them to hit cities where they produce mostly stress, which brings us back to the question of the primary objective of this campaign. In the end, the only military interest in using these drones against cities is to force the Ukrainians to devote significant material resources, such as machine guns, to tracking down these low-cost V1s.
Towards a Stalingrad on the Dnieper?
On the front line, the most critical zone at the moment is on the side of Kherson where, despite an unprecedented informational blackout, several signs, such as the withdrawal of part of the town's population but also of Russian soldiers, seem to indicate a new active phase after two weeks of preparation.
Seven Ukrainian melee brigades are currently concentrated with an artillery brigade around the northern half of the Russian pocket against only four in the southern part between Kherson and Mykolayev. With the two territorial brigades in reserve at Mykolayev, one-fifth of Ukrainian melee units - about 40,000 men - are now concentrated in this sector, compared with 12 disparate Russian brigades/regiments of about 20,000 men at the height of the deployment, perhaps fewer now, under the command of the 49th Army.
The support forces, air and especially artillery, had to be roughly equivalent on both sides to harass the enemy's position and its rear, and occasionally to support a Ukrainian attack or to block it. The Ukrainian method is very classic in such a context of open-air entrenched camp and consists of battalion attacks on small spaces in order to 'dent' the front and form small pockets forcing the Russians to withdraw to a new line. This was the method used by the Russians in the Donbass. There is now talk of a new dent with a second advance along the river, this time towards Mylove, 30 km north of the Nova Kakhovka crossing point, combined with a side attack from Davidyv Brid. If these successes are confirmed, the Russians will have no choice but to withdraw again.
At this stage, if we exclude the possibility for the Russians, due to lack of means, to counter-attack and take back the lost ground, there are only two possible options for them. The first is to retreat foot by foot towards the river, risking a sudden collapse or entrapment if the Ukrainians continue to advance rapidly along the river and/or if they advance again directly towards Kherson. The second is a rapid withdrawal behind the protection of the river, similar to the withdrawal of the armies around Kiev at the end of March. There remains the question of the city of Kherson itself, which it is difficult to imagine the Russians abandoning without a fight. We must therefore expect a great battle, a Stalingrad on the Dnieper, which could begin in the next few days, weeks or perhaps never if the city is evacuated.
The Ukrainian forces will then find themselves in front of the Dnieper and it is unlikely that they will be able to go beyond it, at least for the time being, as this crossing will have to be an amphibious operation given the width of the river. In fact, the Dnieper already marks the demarcation line between the two camps over several hundred kilometres. It is more likely that the Ukrainians will move most of their brigades to another part of the front.
The front of mutual accusations
The battle for the Kherson pocket is accompanied by a new mutual threat to a major civilian infrastructure on the contact line, in this case the large Kakhovka dam. As in the case of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, no one has an interest in the catastrophe, but everyone has an interest in presenting the other as wanting to cause it.
The destruction of the dam and the release of the 18 billion tons of water retained would cause a gigantic and devastating flood downstream. It should be remembered that a civil structure of this importance, 30 metres high and a few metres wide and 3 km long, cannot be destroyed with a few artillery shells, but with tons of well-placed explosives. In other words, destruction by the Ukrainians would require a series of highly visible air strikes, in which case it would be difficult for them to blame the Russians. Conversely, if there is only one large explosion, the culprit is bound to be Russia, which is the only one able to place the charge, but which would still blame the Ukrainians for the misdeed. In reality, it is hard to see what would be the point of devastating what for each of us is our own territory. If it is a question of blocking the troops of the other side, the Dnieper already constitutes a major obstacle without it being necessary to add to it.
The main interest of this accusation, like that of the envisaged use by the Ukrainians of a "dirty bomb" (i.e. a heavy ammunition associated with radioactive elements in order to irradiate a whole region) is communication. It is a matter of describing the other as an awful person ready to commit the worst ignominy, including on his own territory and his own people. This allows to divert attention, to legitimise the war a little more and to provide arguments to all the foreign sympathisers, who will use the same language. At worst, it can constitute an a priori justification for an escalation which in this case would be preventive. At worst, it can herald a real operation for which the responsibility would be attributed to the adversary, an exercise as cynical as it is delicate, since the obligatory indignation provoked by such acts can backfire. It is true that, as after the Katyn massacre in March 1940 when the weapon of mass destruction (4,500 dead) was called Vassili Blokhine, the attribution of the misdeed to someone else, the stubborn denial of the obvious and the unconditional support of the militants can allow a saving doubt to be maintained for a very long time.
Donetsk, Luhansk and X
The other active area is the Donbass, with a multitude of small battles from company size to battalions all along the front line. The Ukrainians have the initiative in these attacks on the border of Luhansk province and the Russians, in fact mainly Wagner and the LNR/DNR brigades, along the border of Donetsk. The Russians still seem to be stubbornly trying to take over Donetsk province completely, or at least to clear the capital city. They are making slow progress around the small town of Avdiivka, a few kilometres from Donetsk, just as they (Wagner) have been making progress around Bakhmut since July before retreating again. Apart from a very unlikely collapse of the Ukrainian front, which would be of little use given the current lack of Russian reserves for exploitation, it would take at least two years at this rate to conquer the Donbass. Without reserves, and therefore without the numerical superiority of good quality combat units, this type of "Somme, 1916" strategy does not bring much.
In Luhansk province, where their second effort after Kherson lay, the Ukrainians assembled 13 melee brigades from the Russian border to the forest area of the Donets River. On the other side, the Russians had put together a patchwork of battle groups from nine different divisions (they had fourteen) that were trying to form a solid line. It is very difficult to assess the capacity of resistance of this heterogeneous group, which receives the influx of mobilized soldiers, as much a source of problems as a reinforcement. Since the Ukrainians had superior resources in the area, we were in a preparation phase, with offensive reconnaissance along the line, particularly in the north where the density of forces was still low and where each side tried to outflank the other.
This phase of preparation is longer than anticipated but it can nevertheless be considered that the Ukrainians will resume larger-scale attacks either towards Kreminna, an area that is nevertheless difficult to take, or more likely towards Svatove, either directly or from the north. With Svatove in their hands, Starobilsk, the key point of the whole north-west, would become accessible and the whole Kreminna - Rubijné - Severodonetsk - Lyssychansk urban complex would be accessible from the north.
But one can also imagine that the Ukrainians decide to completely shift their effort to the area between the Dnieper and Vouhledar (DV line) to the south-west of the city of Donetsk, an area that has been rather quiet until now. This is the Battle X mentioned a month ago.
The Ukrainians have about 60 melee brigades. We can identify 42 of them along the front line. Where are the others? Some are protecting Kharkiv and north of Kiev while the Russians are making gesticulations along the Russian border and in Belarus to secure as many as possible. Others are at rest. However, there are probably enough left to complete the six already present on the DV line.
The Ukrainian armoured brigades (BBs) were still to be looked at, as they were their shock forces in the slightly open spaces. The 3rd and 4th BBs are in the Donbass, the 17th that was there has disappeared from the radar, as well as the 5th BB, an intact reserve formation equipped with T-72M1 tanks supplied by Poland and Dutch YPR-765 infantry fighting vehicles. As for the 1st BB, the most powerful of all, it was located behind the DV line. There were also two artillery brigades in the sector, an unusually high density. Opposite, after the 58th Russian army, weakened by numerous withdrawals, there were also the small 36th and 5th armies in reserve between the Enerhodar nuclear power station and the Crimea, unless one or more of them had been recalled to the north.
A major operation requires a staff to plan and conduct it. The Southern Zone staff is conducting the battle of Kherson and the Northern Zone staff is conducting the battle of the Donbass. It is not obvious that the latter has the capacity to manage a new offensive. In this case, it is conceivable to call upon another staff, the one in the western zone for example, which has been inactive for months. We must also consider all the logistics necessary for a third offensive. It is not obvious that the Ukrainians have all these resources, and it will perhaps be necessary to wait for the end of one of the two current offensives, but if they do have them, it would be in their interest to attack between Orikhiv, Houliaïpole and Vouhledar, with priority given to the first two points, as these are the points that offer the most possibilities. The capture of Tokmak would already be a great success, that of Melitopol would mark the end of the Russian presence in the provinces of Kherson and Zaporajjia and almost the return to the lines of 24 February, the first strategic threshold.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Missiles, threats and lies - Update 24 October 2022
Let's start with some news from the sky.
Flying machines and petty strategy
The most visible development in the situation is the transformation of the Russian air campaign of theatre strikes (theatre also in the sense of stage) from ad hoc to systematic. Since 10 October, it has no longer been a question of striking fixed targets irregularly in depth, but rather of producing a mass effect with the use of several dozen ballistic or cruise missiles, accompanied by even larger numbers of target drones. In this avatar of Warden's circles theory, these 400 million euros of daily projectiles are officially used to strike the infrastructure of the Ukrainian 'life system' and more particularly its energy network.
In this respect, this campaign, carried out solely with inanimate projectiles, is reminiscent of the "V" weapons for "revenge" launched by Nazi Germany on England and then on the liberated countries in the West from June 1944. As at the time, dozens of projectiles were launched on cities every day, without it being known whether this was a real strategy of paralysis, retaliation after a series of humiliations or an act of simple communication for the use of the regime's hawks, its own population or its troops, whom it was trying to reassure. First of all, it is strange to claim to want to liberate a population from a neo-Nazi yoke by directly or indirectly hitting the lives of this population. Above all, it is important to remember the vanity of such an approach.
If the objective is to obtain the capitulation of peoples or their revolt against leaders incapable of protecting them, i.e. the same strategy as terrorist organisations, it is as inhuman as it is stupid. If entire peoples can break down and force their leaders to ask for mercy, the phenomenon is quite rare and seems to be limited to the Russian and German examples at the end of the First World War after years of privation, suffering and above all the spectacle of disasters on the front. It should be noted that in these two cases, it was certainly not because German and Russian civilians received projectiles from the sky - rare at the time - that they rebelled, but because the sacrifices made were no longer accompanied by any hope that they would serve any purpose. People may only rebel against their government when there is no hope of military victory.
This is far from the case on both sides in the current war in Ukraine, and when there is still hope of victory, it is mainly the aggressors in the sky who are blamed, a context conducive to escalation. There is no reason why those you strike in retaliation should react differently than you do, but you do it anyway. The Ukrainians are also hitting Russian-held cities and even Belgorod in Russia. This is very punctual for the moment, but it could also become a systematic campaign to satisfy a desire for revenge. This would be a big mistake for the Russian government, which is desperate to mobilise its population psychologically before actually doing so.
Air campaigns on infrastructure may have more value in hindering war production, especially by hitting certain key areas. This was the case over Germany in the Second World War. But there has to be something important to destroy. When you ravage countries as poorly industrialised as North Korea or North Vietnam, when their military supplies come from an untouchable foreign country, it does not serve much purpose other than to slow down the enemy's manoeuvre a little. But you also have to deploy a lot of resources. Russian missiles do indeed do a lot of damage, but they are few in number each time and their stockpile is not unlimited. At least 2,000 of them have already been used, with a total value of around ten billion euros, and they produce very few. The fact that the Russians have been reduced to also using old anti-ship missiles or anti-aircraft missiles in this role already indicates a fear of squandering this valuable strike force.
The supply of ballistic missiles by Iran or North Korea could perhaps change the situation by making it possible to extend the V campaign. As these weapons are of low precision, this campaign would therefore drift more and more towards a purely anti-city campaign, in the manner of the "area bombing" dear to the British general "Bomber" Harris. Failing that, only the deep involvement of the Russian air force could allow the campaign to continue with greater efficiency and scale, but undoubtedly at the cost of intolerable losses in such a dense anti-aircraft environment. This is a far cry from the fleets of thousands of aircraft of the Second World War; an air force of a few hundred aircraft vulnerable to modern anti-aircraft defence can be destroyed in a matter of weeks.
In the meantime, the use of the Shahed-131 or especially 136 projectile drones, renamed Geran (Geranium) 2 to make them look Russian, has the advantage of being cheap and therefore numerous. But with an explosive charge of a few tens of kilos of explosive, they must be considered as large-calibre shells similar to those launched by the thousands every day on the front line, but with a very long range. They would undoubtedly be very useful for hitting fixed targets in the depths of the battlefield, but the Russians prefer to use them to hit cities where they produce mostly stress, which brings us back to the question of the primary objective of this campaign. In the end, the only military interest in using these drones against cities is to force the Ukrainians to devote significant material resources, such as machine guns, to tracking down these low-cost V1s.
Towards a Stalingrad on the Dnieper?
On the front line, the most critical zone at the moment is on the side of Kherson where, despite an unprecedented informational blackout, several signs, such as the withdrawal of part of the town's population but also of Russian soldiers, seem to indicate a new active phase after two weeks of preparation.
Seven Ukrainian melee brigades are currently concentrated with an artillery brigade around the northern half of the Russian pocket against only four in the southern part between Kherson and Mykolayev. With the two territorial brigades in reserve at Mykolayev, one-fifth of Ukrainian melee units - about 40,000 men - are now concentrated in this sector, compared with 12 disparate Russian brigades/regiments of about 20,000 men at the height of the deployment, perhaps fewer now, under the command of the 49th Army.
The support forces, air and especially artillery, had to be roughly equivalent on both sides to harass the enemy's position and its rear, and occasionally to support a Ukrainian attack or to block it. The Ukrainian method is very classic in such a context of open-air entrenched camp and consists of battalion attacks on small spaces in order to 'dent' the front and form small pockets forcing the Russians to withdraw to a new line. This was the method used by the Russians in the Donbass. There is now talk of a new dent with a second advance along the river, this time towards Mylove, 30 km north of the Nova Kakhovka crossing point, combined with a side attack from Davidyv Brid. If these successes are confirmed, the Russians will have no choice but to withdraw again.
At this stage, if we exclude the possibility for the Russians, due to lack of means, to counter-attack and take back the lost ground, there are only two possible options for them. The first is to retreat foot by foot towards the river, risking a sudden collapse or entrapment if the Ukrainians continue to advance rapidly along the river and/or if they advance again directly towards Kherson. The second is a rapid withdrawal behind the protection of the river, similar to the withdrawal of the armies around Kiev at the end of March. There remains the question of the city of Kherson itself, which it is difficult to imagine the Russians abandoning without a fight. We must therefore expect a great battle, a Stalingrad on the Dnieper, which could begin in the next few days, weeks or perhaps never if the city is evacuated.
The Ukrainian forces will then find themselves in front of the Dnieper and it is unlikely that they will be able to go beyond it, at least for the time being, as this crossing will have to be an amphibious operation given the width of the river. In fact, the Dnieper already marks the demarcation line between the two camps over several hundred kilometres. It is more likely that the Ukrainians will move most of their brigades to another part of the front.
The front of mutual accusations
The battle for the Kherson pocket is accompanied by a new mutual threat to a major civilian infrastructure on the contact line, in this case the large Kakhovka dam. As in the case of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, no one has an interest in the catastrophe, but everyone has an interest in presenting the other as wanting to cause it.
The destruction of the dam and the release of the 18 billion tons of water retained would cause a gigantic and devastating flood downstream. It should be remembered that a civil structure of this importance, 30 metres high and a few metres wide and 3 km long, cannot be destroyed with a few artillery shells, but with tons of well-placed explosives. In other words, destruction by the Ukrainians would require a series of highly visible air strikes, in which case it would be difficult for them to blame the Russians. Conversely, if there is only one large explosion, the culprit is bound to be Russia, which is the only one able to place the charge, but which would still blame the Ukrainians for the misdeed. In reality, it is hard to see what would be the point of devastating what for each of us is our own territory. If it is a question of blocking the troops of the other side, the Dnieper already constitutes a major obstacle without it being necessary to add to it.
The main interest of this accusation, like that of the envisaged use by the Ukrainians of a "dirty bomb" (i.e. a heavy ammunition associated with radioactive elements in order to irradiate a whole region) is communication. It is a matter of describing the other as an awful person ready to commit the worst ignominy, including on his own territory and his own people. This allows to divert attention, to legitimise the war a little more and to provide arguments to all the foreign sympathisers, who will use the same language. At worst, it can constitute an a priori justification for an escalation which in this case would be preventive. At worst, it can herald a real operation for which the responsibility would be attributed to the adversary, an exercise as cynical as it is delicate, since the obligatory indignation provoked by such acts can backfire. It is true that, as after the Katyn massacre in March 1940 when the weapon of mass destruction (4,500 dead) was called Vassili Blokhine, the attribution of the misdeed to someone else, the stubborn denial of the obvious and the unconditional support of the militants can allow a saving doubt to be maintained for a very long time.
Donetsk, Luhansk and X
The other active area is the Donbass, with a multitude of small battles from company size to battalions all along the front line. The Ukrainians have the initiative in these attacks on the border of Luhansk province and the Russians, in fact mainly Wagner and the LNR/DNR brigades, along the border of Donetsk. The Russians still seem to be stubbornly trying to take over Donetsk province completely, or at least to clear the capital city. They are making slow progress around the small town of Avdiivka, a few kilometres from Donetsk, just as they (Wagner) have been making progress around Bakhmut since July before retreating again. Apart from a very unlikely collapse of the Ukrainian front, which would be of little use given the current lack of Russian reserves for exploitation, it would take at least two years at this rate to conquer the Donbass. Without reserves, and therefore without the numerical superiority of good quality combat units, this type of "Somme, 1916" strategy does not bring much.
In Luhansk province, where their second effort after Kherson lay, the Ukrainians assembled 13 melee brigades from the Russian border to the forest area of the Donets River. On the other side, the Russians had put together a patchwork of battle groups from nine different divisions (they had fourteen) that were trying to form a solid line. It is very difficult to assess the capacity of resistance of this heterogeneous group, which receives the influx of mobilized soldiers, as much a source of problems as a reinforcement. Since the Ukrainians had superior resources in the area, we were in a preparation phase, with offensive reconnaissance along the line, particularly in the north where the density of forces was still low and where each side tried to outflank the other.
This phase of preparation is longer than anticipated but it can nevertheless be considered that the Ukrainians will resume larger-scale attacks either towards Kreminna, an area that is nevertheless difficult to take, or more likely towards Svatove, either directly or from the north. With Svatove in their hands, Starobilsk, the key point of the whole north-west, would become accessible and the whole Kreminna - Rubijné - Severodonetsk - Lyssychansk urban complex would be accessible from the north.
But one can also imagine that the Ukrainians decide to completely shift their effort to the area between the Dnieper and Vouhledar (DV line) to the south-west of the city of Donetsk, an area that has been rather quiet until now. This is the Battle X mentioned a month ago.
The Ukrainians have about 60 melee brigades. We can identify 42 of them along the front line. Where are the others? Some are protecting Kharkiv and north of Kiev while the Russians are making gesticulations along the Russian border and in Belarus to secure as many as possible. Others are at rest. However, there are probably enough left to complete the six already present on the DV line.
The Ukrainian armoured brigades (BBs) were still to be looked at, as they were their shock forces in the slightly open spaces. The 3rd and 4th BBs are in the Donbass, the 17th that was there has disappeared from the radar, as well as the 5th BB, an intact reserve formation equipped with T-72M1 tanks supplied by Poland and Dutch YPR-765 infantry fighting vehicles. As for the 1st BB, the most powerful of all, it was located behind the DV line. There were also two artillery brigades in the sector, an unusually high density. Opposite, after the 58th Russian army, weakened by numerous withdrawals, there were also the small 36th and 5th armies in reserve between the Enerhodar nuclear power station and the Crimea, unless one or more of them had been recalled to the north.
A major operation requires a staff to plan and conduct it. The Southern Zone staff is conducting the battle of Kherson and the Northern Zone staff is conducting the battle of the Donbass. It is not obvious that the latter has the capacity to manage a new offensive. In this case, it is conceivable to call upon another staff, the one in the western zone for example, which has been inactive for months. We must also consider all the logistics necessary for a third offensive. It is not obvious that the Ukrainians have all these resources, and it will perhaps be necessary to wait for the end of one of the two current offensives, but if they do have them, it would be in their interest to attack between Orikhiv, Houliaïpole and Vouhledar, with priority given to the first two points, as these are the points that offer the most possibilities. The capture of Tokmak would already be a great success, that of Melitopol would mark the end of the Russian presence in the provinces of Kherson and Zaporajjia and almost the return to the lines of 24 February, the first strategic threshold.
Look at this official statement from whiny little babies ruling the worst country in the world.
Fun fact, Russia: the military of a hostile country is always a legitimate target; by definition these attacks on your BS fleet boats cannot be terrorist attacks. What is a terrorist attack, however, is when you use these boats to send missiles at civilian targets with no military relevance. Which is the only thing you're using them for.
In French we have a quote to mock this kind of mindset:
"Cet animal est très méchant, quand on l'attaque il se défend."
How mean of the Ukrainians to fight back when attacked!
Hey, let's go back to 2015:
For reference, Putin ordered Litvinenko murdered because he had revealed that Putin is a pedophile.
But more interestingly, in 2015 there was this interview of Russian agent and war criminal Igor "Strelkov" Girkin where he shamelessly admitted the Crimea referendum was a sham, that they had to round out people and force them to vote:
Fun fact, Russia: the military of a hostile country is always a legitimate target; by definition these attacks on your BS fleet boats cannot be terrorist attacks. What is a terrorist attack, however, is when you use these boats to send missiles at civilian targets with no military relevance. Which is the only thing you're using them for.
In French we have a quote to mock this kind of mindset:
"Cet animal est très méchant, quand on l'attaque il se défend."
How mean of the Ukrainians to fight back when attacked!
Hey, let's go back to 2015:
For reference, Putin ordered Litvinenko murdered because he had revealed that Putin is a pedophile.
Alexander Litvinenko Was Killed ‘for Calling Putin a Pedophile’
Russia’s president ‘probably approved’ the radioactive assassination of ex-spy Alexander Litvinenko in London, a British inquiry has found.
www.thedailybeast.com
But more interestingly, in 2015 there was this interview of Russian agent and war criminal Igor "Strelkov" Girkin where he shamelessly admitted the Crimea referendum was a sham, that they had to round out people and force them to vote:
They lie, admit lying, and then randomradio and jetray still believe them anyway.
Russia can, Putin's ego can't. Once again, nobody has invaded Russia.
In the Bakhmut direction, at night, soldiers of one of the units of the SSO wounded four Russian occupiers with a drop from a UAV. The next day, our soldiers completed their work and destroyed the enemy with a shot from an ATGM.
Good job.
Good job.
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According to Rybar:
In the next few days, a Su-24M bomber will fly to Poland from the airfield of the 7th tactical aviation brigade of the Ukrainian Air Force in Starokonstantinov (Khmelnitsky region).
Western experts intend to determine the possibility of integrating the Storm Shadow (British version) or SCALP (French) cruise missile into the Su-24M weapon system.
In the next few days, a Su-24M bomber will fly to Poland from the airfield of the 7th tactical aviation brigade of the Ukrainian Air Force in Starokonstantinov (Khmelnitsky region).
Western experts intend to determine the possibility of integrating the Storm Shadow (British version) or SCALP (French) cruise missile into the Su-24M weapon system.
This is again a response to the grain blockade, not to mention attacks on electricity and water treatment infrastructure.According to Rybar:
In the next few days, a Su-24M bomber will fly to Poland from the airfield of the 7th tactical aviation brigade of the Ukrainian Air Force in Starokonstantinov (Khmelnitsky region).
Western experts intend to determine the possibility of integrating the Storm Shadow (British version) or SCALP (French) cruise missile into the Su-24M weapon system.
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ISTANBUL
The UN, Türkiye and Ukraine have agreed on a movement plan for 16 vessels that are in Turkish waters after Russia withdrew from the Black Sea grain deal.
In a statement, the Istanbul-based Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) which oversees shipments said the three delegations also agreed to inspect 40 outbound vessels on Monday.
The JCC added that the Russian side was informed of the development.
According to the statement, currently, there are 97 loaded vessels and 15 inbound vessels registered for JCC inspection around Istanbul and an additional 89 that have applied to join the initiative.
Earlier, Türkiye’s National Defense Ministry said National Defense Minister Hulusi Akar continues to negotiate and coordinate with his interlocutors for the resumption of Black Sea grain exports.
On Saturday, Russia announced that it had suspended its participation in the deal to export Ukrainian grain following attacks on its Black Sea Fleet.
Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on July 22 in Istanbul to resume grain exports from three Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which were paused after the Russia-Ukraine war began in February.
www.aa.com.tr
The UN, Türkiye and Ukraine have agreed on a movement plan for 16 vessels that are in Turkish waters after Russia withdrew from the Black Sea grain deal.
In a statement, the Istanbul-based Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) which oversees shipments said the three delegations also agreed to inspect 40 outbound vessels on Monday.
The JCC added that the Russian side was informed of the development.
According to the statement, currently, there are 97 loaded vessels and 15 inbound vessels registered for JCC inspection around Istanbul and an additional 89 that have applied to join the initiative.
Earlier, Türkiye’s National Defense Ministry said National Defense Minister Hulusi Akar continues to negotiate and coordinate with his interlocutors for the resumption of Black Sea grain exports.
On Saturday, Russia announced that it had suspended its participation in the deal to export Ukrainian grain following attacks on its Black Sea Fleet.
Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on July 22 in Istanbul to resume grain exports from three Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which were paused after the Russia-Ukraine war began in February.
Türkiye, Ukraine, UN agree to move 16 vessels under Black Sea grain deal
Russia on Saturday suspended its participation in landmark agreement that allowed vital grain exports from Ukraine - Anadolu Ajansı
www.aa.com.tr
So as you know, things are dreadful for the mobiks (mobilized Russian soldiers). But do you think they are better for the contractniks (professional Russian soldiers)? No! Of course not. Why do you think they're most of their time looting random stuff (when they're not accomplishing their military duty, namely, raping and torturing civilians)? Simple: they're not paid. So they steal everything, including their fellow soldiers' equipment, and resell it. Second army of the world!
Meanwhile, Russian propaganda center accidentally found someone with a brain. I bet he's gonna go base jumping from a window very soon!
Meanwhile, Russian propaganda center accidentally found someone with a brain. I bet he's gonna go base jumping from a window very soon!
Justice, sometimes it is so poetic.
www.iranintl.com
Gunmen Kill IRGC Colonel, Basij Militant In Southeastern City Of Zahedan
Unknown gunmen shot dead two officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) in Zahedan, the provincial capital of the largely Sunni Muslim southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan.
www.iranintl.com