Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
jetray, randomradio etc. They feel it was part of some elaborate scam to break up Yugoslavia, which was already broken up by that point anyway.
It looks very suspicious. The quick recognition of the new regime only 2 days after, the beginning of military training programs with them afterwards.
Republic of Afghanistan (1973–1978) - Wikipedia
If the US was the one doing these things, what would Indians say? North Korea immediately recognised the 4 extra annexed parts of Ukraine as Russian and is supplying Russia with arms for instance, how does that look?
Why would you suddenly recognise a new government who'd displaced a king of 40 years?
Mohammad Zahir Shah - Wikipedia
Islamic fundamentalism predates 1947, do some research, and it certainly predates the Soviet-Afghan War.An afghanistan story without pakistan , you sound so credible.
another example of "Wet streets cause rain"
Islamic fundamentalism - Wikipedia
It wasn't a natural heart attack, that's what police report says. Aside, there is investigation of few Russian people leaving the same hotel only 1 day after this alleged incident which has raised suspicion in Indian defence circles of Russian FSB active operations within India's geographical borders, they are alleged to be the killers of 2 ex-Russian officials including one found with unnatural trauma. An indicator of no respect for Indian constitution if found true which everybody knows will never be allowed to investigated by competitive agency. As things have unravelled in media, local police couldn't subdue the tensions among those Russians who went away from homeland after criticism of Russian administration, and living in India currently, hence some investigation is needed to misguide the allegations logically speaking to ease of their tensions.
Odisha DGP orders CID probe into 'unnatural' death of two Russian nationals - Times of India
Times of India brings the Latest & Top Breaking News on Politics and Current Affairs in India & around the World, Cricket, Sports, Business, Bollywood News and Entertainment, Science, Technology, Health & Fitness news & opinions from leading columnists.
m.timesofindia.com
There is a long list of Russian people allegedly doing suicide since the Russian war against Ukraine started in early this year. Current incident wasn't the last, more to come till someone is satisfied probably.It wasn't a natural heart attack, that's what police report says. Aside, there is investigation of few Russian people leaving the same hotel only 1 day after this alleged incident which has raised suspicion in Indian defence circles of Russian FSB active operations within India's geographical borders, they are alleged to be the killers of 2 ex-Russian officials including one found with unnatural trauma. An indicator of no respect for Indian constitution if found true which everybody knows will never be allowed to investigated by competitive agency. As things have unravelled in media, local police couldn't subdue the tensions among those Russians who went away from homeland after criticism of Russian administration, and living in India currently, hence some investigation is needed to misguide the allegations logically speaking to ease of their tensions.
Odisha DGP orders CID probe into 'unnatural' death of two Russian nationals - Times of India
Times of India brings the Latest & Top Breaking News on Politics and Current Affairs in India & around the World, Cricket, Sports, Business, Bollywood News and Entertainment, Science, Technology, Health & Fitness news & opinions from leading columnists.
Here is an old but relevant article on subject matter.
At least eight Russian businessmen have died in apparent suicide or accidents in just six months
At least eight Russian businessmen have died in apparent suicide or accidents in just six months
At least eight prominent Russian businessmen have reportedly died by suicide or in as yet unexplained accidents since late January, with six of them associated with Russia's two largest energy companies.
edition.cnn.com
Wealthy Russian entrepreneur falls out of hotel window in India
Antov was 65 years old. He was on vacation in India with three other Russians. One of them, Vladimir Bydanov, died two days earlier.
Pavel Antonov, richest deputy of 
Duma, died in India on 26th December. He fell out of a hotel's window where he celebrated his birthday. Antonov's companion Vladimir Bidenov was found dead in the same hotel four days prior to Antonov's death.
Aleksey Maslov, 69, ex chief of Russian Ground Forces, died in hospital on 25 December.
Aleksandr Buzakov, 67, died on 24 December. He headed "Admiralty Shipyards" for 10 years - they produced submarines that shot Kinzhals at Ukraine.
Vladimir Sungorkin, 68, died in Russian Far East on 14 September. He was editor in chief of a popular Russian propaganda media Komsomolskaya Pravda.
Vladislav Avayev, 51, was killed in Moscow. Police also found the bodies of his wife and daughter in the apartment. Avayev was the vice-president of Gazprombank, third largest bank in Russia by assets.
Aleksandr Tyulyakov, 61, was found dead in Leninskiy village (where Gazprom's top managers live) on 25 February. He was Deputy General Director of Gazprom's SRC for Corporate Security.
Leonid Shulman, 60, was found dead in Leninskiy village where Gazprom's top managers live, on 30 January. Shulman was head of Transport Service of Gazprom Invest.
Duma, died in India on 26th December. He fell out of a hotel's window where he celebrated his birthday. Antonov's companion Vladimir Bidenov was found dead in the same hotel four days prior to Antonov's death.Aleksey Maslov, 69, ex chief of Russian Ground Forces, died in hospital on 25 December.
Aleksandr Buzakov, 67, died on 24 December. He headed "Admiralty Shipyards" for 10 years - they produced submarines that shot Kinzhals at Ukraine.
Vladimir Sungorkin, 68, died in Russian Far East on 14 September. He was editor in chief of a popular Russian propaganda media Komsomolskaya Pravda.
Vladislav Avayev, 51, was killed in Moscow. Police also found the bodies of his wife and daughter in the apartment. Avayev was the vice-president of Gazprombank, third largest bank in Russia by assets.
Aleksandr Tyulyakov, 61, was found dead in Leninskiy village (where Gazprom's top managers live) on 25 February. He was Deputy General Director of Gazprom's SRC for Corporate Security.
Leonid Shulman, 60, was found dead in Leninskiy village where Gazprom's top managers live, on 30 January. Shulman was head of Transport Service of Gazprom Invest.
Les joueurs du néant - Point de situation du 27 décembre
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
The Void Players - Update 27 December
Strategy is often just a matter of solving one problem after another with a more or less clear idea of the peace you want to achieve in the distance. The prolongation of the war in Ukraine has seen both sides accumulate problems to solve with different resources. The winner will be the one who succeeds least badly.
Partial Stalinisation
After two and a half months of rapid advances in the provinces of Kharkiv and Kherson, the Ukrainian offensive has now come to a halt, due to the autumn weather with its rain and mud that hinders manoeuvres, and above all due to the new Russian strategy. On 11 September last year, we mentioned on this blog the idea that the Russians would never be able to avoid a crushing defeat without a radical change in posture. This radical change has taken place.
Let's skip the annexation of the conquered provinces after a surreal referendum. A magic trick only produces prestige, the final coup de théâtre, if the illusion was perfect beforehand. No one, except perhaps Vladimir Putin, thought that turning conquered land into Russian land would change the perceptions of the Russian population, which had suddenly become eager to defend the new motherland, or of enemies and their supporters, who would have been deterred from escalating by attacking it. The 'annexation' card fell through and things went back to the way they were. Kherson, was abandoned within days of being declared "Russian forever" and Russian artillery clearly does not hesitate to kill those who are normally fellow citizens.
No, the real change has been the Stalinisation of the Russian army. If the mobilisation of 300,000 reservists, and the immediate dispatch of 40,000 of them to the front line, was the most visible element, we should not forget the tightening of discipline with the return of the ban on taking prisoners as in the Great Patriotic War or the indefinite obligation to serve once deployed in Ukraine. The political commissars had already been there for several years, but the private company Wagner had recently reintroduced the second echelon barrage detachments (certain death if you retreat against possible death if you advance). It is not yet a general mobilisation, but nobody is fooled. The Rubicon is crossed.
The Russian military training is carried out directly in the combat units, but the units and their cadres are almost entirely in Ukraine, leaving behind conscripts playing cards and polishing the little equipment that remains. It would have been logical when the conquered Ukraine became Russian to send them back to their original units, but this was not the case and it is very surprising. Perhaps sending these very young men into combat was more delicate than sending 'old' reservists. This non-commitment, to this day, remains a mystery. Now, if we no longer had the means to train classes of 130-160,000 conscripts, we had even less for 300,000 reservists. Here again, perhaps it was believed that these former soldiers, in theory, did not need them.
Everything is done in the greatest disorder, and in war disorder is paid for with blood. It was with blood and heavy losses that the Surovikin line was held, but it was finally held and the test was rather successful politically. The "partial Stalinisation" provoked a great external or internal exodus, many incidents, complaints about the conditions of employment but no revolt. Why stop there now that the lives of the soldiers no longer count at all? The sacrifice of the first batch of mobilised soldiers saved the situation, the arrival of the second - the 150,000 men still in training in Belarus and Russia - will either freeze the situation for good or take the initiative again. And if that is not enough, it will always be possible to send several hundred thousand more. The pot of chest cards is still full, although there is undoubtedly a 'critical discontent' card that could emerge at any moment, a card that could become explosive if laid against a backdrop of defeats and economic difficulties.
But men are not everything. The Russian army is still 'artillery-centric', and all the more so because the constant mediocrity of the battalions' tactical range must be compensated for by more shells. In June, the Omega Point was mentioned, the moment when it was no longer possible to attack on a large scale due to a lack of shells, with consumption (and destruction) largely exceeding production. A new problem: we seem to be approaching this omega point. Daily firing rates have already been cut by a factor of three since the summer, while we see videos of soldiers demanding shells and images of large empty depots in Russia. It is true that Ukraine is experiencing the same difficulties and, as was also expected, is also approaching the omega point. This has also helped to limit Ukrainian manoeuvres, which would have been in a much better position if they had been able to maintain their summer firing rates. On both sides, people are looking for 'shell' cards everywhere. Whoever finds them will have a major advantage over his opponent. It is not certain that they will succeed, which would have a great influence on the outcome of the war.
Blood and guns
The most surprising thing in this context is that the Russians maintain a very aggressive attitude by multiplying attacks, necessarily small, along the Donbass as if the objective of complete conquest announced on 25 March had not been abandoned. The Russians have clearly not yet admitted that they are systematically trying to achieve objectives that are too big for their hand and that they are exhausting their army every time. The Battle of Kiev in February-March (the so-called 'decoy') broke their ground force for the first time. The documented Russian material and therefore probably also human losses of this first month of the war represent at least a quarter of the total to date. It was the extreme erosion of the four armies engaged around Kiev that forced their rapid withdrawal. The next three months of the battle for Donbass exhausted the Russian army again and made it vulnerable again. No longer able to attack on a large scale, or even defend everything with reduced forces, the Russians were forced to stall in Kharkiv province, partly to defend the Kherson bridgehead. They ended up blowing up in Kharkiv and in the end had to abandon the bridgehead as well.
Now they have just saved the situation and yet they are attacking under difficult conditions along fortified areas and with no hope of dislocating the enemy, but only of clearing the city of Donetsk or seizing Bakhmut, to the glory of Yevgeny Prigozhin. In a way, the Russians are creating problems for themselves by wearing themselves out in impossible attacks.
By attacking all over the place, the Russians are wearing themselves out, but they probably also hope to do the same with the Ukrainians who accept this fight. Perhaps it is a question of the latter refusing to give ground at all costs, which is not necessarily a good idea. Perhaps they are choosing to fight in order to bleed the Russian army dry again, so that they can then attack on a large scale. Simply trying to kill as many of the enemy as possible is the zero level of tactics, unless the losses inflicted are high enough to prevent the enemy from making progress through experience. Given the current poor soldier manufacturing structure of the Russian side, and certainly inferior to that of the Ukrainians, this may be a good and bloody card to play.
Creating problems for the enemy
It's not enough to solve your own problems, you have to create them in the enemy's home country according to the cards you hold in your hand. Since October, the Russians have been squandering their arsenal of long-range missiles to ravage the Ukrainian power grid, hoping to hamper the Ukrainian war effort, increase the cost of Western support and affect the morale of the population by plunging them into darkness and cold. This is a typical example of a weak card played by default, because there are not many others in hand and without much faith in its success. Again, this missile campaign is approaching its omega point, probably in two or three months, and here again we are looking for 'drone and missile' cards, especially on the Iranian side, to be able to continue.
But this action also has the effect of provoking a reinforcement of Ukrainian air defence through the Western delivery of medium and long-range systems. This reinforcement is slow, as these systems are rare, but inexorable. The introduction of a Patriot Pac-2 battery will effectively protect a large part of the country against missiles. Two batteries protected almost the entire country. The risk for the Russians is that the sky will be completely closed off in the depths, but also increasingly on the front line. Combined with Russian air defence neutralisation capabilities, and the delivery of attack aircraft such as the A-10 Thunderbolts that the Americans had refused, this could change the situation on the front line and compensate for the weakening of the artillery.
Another relatively simple card to play was the Belarusian diversion. The entry of Belarus into the war was the big issue of the conflict. President Lukashenko is putting the brakes on this entry into the war, which he knows would inevitably provoke unrest in his country and perhaps his downfall. However, it is still possible to maintain a threat towards Kiev in order to at least fix Ukrainian forces in the north. The headquarters of the 2nd Combined Army has been deployed to Belarus with several thousand men, the heavy equipment of a few battalions and a few Iskander missile launchers and S-400 batteries, possibly for NATO. In reality, the Belarusian card is weak. The Belarusian army is very weak and serves mainly as a stockpile of equipment and ammunition for the Russians. As for the thousands of Russian soldiers, they are mostly mobilised using the Belarusian training structure. In the worst case, a new Russian or Russian-Belarusian offensive, necessarily limited by the terrain around the Dnieper, would probably have even less chance of success than the one of 24 February.
On the Ukrainian side, the card of drone strikes in depth on Russian territory is being played and in particular twice on the Engels bomber base on the Volga. Several TU-95s were damaged, which is far from negligible, but the effects of this mini-campaign are even more symbolic than material. If the Ukrainians manage to mass-produce these new projectiles (improved TU-141 drones or missiles made in Ukraine), they could have a strategic influence. But beware, these bombings may in turn feed the victim discourse of the Russian government and the population may feel really threatened. One should always be wary of the side effects of one's actions.
We are currently in a weak time, weak at the strategic level because at the tactical level things are still as violent as ever. However, there are still cards to be drawn in the pot and problems to be created until neither side can solve them or the pot is empty on both sides. At the moment, the bets are more against Putin, with the unknown of how he will react and who will be around him when he can no longer solve the problems.
You've got to admit, it's impressive how they're being anti-semitic, invading and annexing a neighbour, committing genocide and claiming to be fighting Nazis at the same time.
