Line of Actual Control (LAC) : India & Tibet Border Updates
- Thread starter Shashank
- Start date
https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/chinese-report-claims-to-have-detailed-knowledge-of-india-s-border-deployment-101614170747060.html
The Indian Army’s strategy on the border with China comprises protecting the eastern part, stabilising the middle and seizing the western section
In the report, Pan claims New Delhi has deployed 20% of its soldiers and kept another 30% of troops as reserves in “strategic areas” along the Sino-Indian boundary.
It said around 85,000 troops, 21 fighter aircraft (Su-MKI), 33 transport planes and 36 helicopters are deployed in the eastern region; the Sikkim section has some 64,000 troops, 30 fighter jets, 39 bombers, and 10 helicopters.
More than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in the western (Ladakh) and middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) sectors including from the elite Mountain Divisions and infantry divisions besides several battalions of paramilitary forces, dozens of fighter jets, and helicopters.
Overall, the Indian military has deployed 10 fighter squadrons along the border with about 320 combat aircraft of various types.
In addition, three A-50 early warning aircraft and eight P-8I patrol aircraft have been deployed, and even the P-8I has been dispatched to the Galwan Valley for reconnaissance to strengthen surveillance of border areas to make up for the lack of early warning capability of the Indian Air Force, the analysis said.
“The deployment of troops is a direct reflection of operational thinking. In terms of troop deployment, India emphasises ’offensive deployment’, and establishes the deployment policy of stabilising first-line troops, strengthening second-line reserves, expanding the depth of campaigns, and enhancing defensive flexibility, thus demonstrating its territorial ambitions,” he wrote.
“The Indian army believes that the eastern section is ‘the most vulnerable’ and the Sikkim section is ‘the most sensitive part of Indian’s defence’ as it overlooks the ’strategic’ Siliguri Corridor and where the ‘Chinese army can quickly cut of the Siliguri Corridor and isolate the provinces (states) in northeastern India’.”
“The first echelon is at the front of 10-20 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is mainly stationed by paramilitary forces; The second echelon is located 50-100 kilometers away from the actual control line and is held by brigade and battalion troops to form the main defence zone. The third echelons are located 100-300 kilometers away from the LAC line and are held by the main forces of the army, division and brigade to form an in-depth defense zone, equipped with strong air combat forces and ground air defense forces,” Pan says in the report
The Indian Army’s strategy on the border with China comprises protecting the eastern part, stabilising the middle and seizing the western section, the location of the recent and most serious military standoff in decades, according to a new report on a Chinese website that makes a rare public claim - having detailed knowledge of the Indian Army’s and the Air Force’s deployment across the Sino-Indian border.
In the report, Pan claims New Delhi has deployed 20% of its soldiers and kept another 30% of troops as reserves in “strategic areas” along the Sino-Indian boundary.
It said around 85,000 troops, 21 fighter aircraft (Su-MKI), 33 transport planes and 36 helicopters are deployed in the eastern region; the Sikkim section has some 64,000 troops, 30 fighter jets, 39 bombers, and 10 helicopters.
More than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in the western (Ladakh) and middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) sectors including from the elite Mountain Divisions and infantry divisions besides several battalions of paramilitary forces, dozens of fighter jets, and helicopters.
Overall, the Indian military has deployed 10 fighter squadrons along the border with about 320 combat aircraft of various types.
In addition, three A-50 early warning aircraft and eight P-8I patrol aircraft have been deployed, and even the P-8I has been dispatched to the Galwan Valley for reconnaissance to strengthen surveillance of border areas to make up for the lack of early warning capability of the Indian Air Force, the analysis said.
“The deployment of troops is a direct reflection of operational thinking. In terms of troop deployment, India emphasises ’offensive deployment’, and establishes the deployment policy of stabilising first-line troops, strengthening second-line reserves, expanding the depth of campaigns, and enhancing defensive flexibility, thus demonstrating its territorial ambitions,” he wrote.
“The Indian army believes that the eastern section is ‘the most vulnerable’ and the Sikkim section is ‘the most sensitive part of Indian’s defence’ as it overlooks the ’strategic’ Siliguri Corridor and where the ‘Chinese army can quickly cut of the Siliguri Corridor and isolate the provinces (states) in northeastern India’.”
“Therefore, its deployment focuses on the eastern section and Sikkim section, where 70 percent of the troops in the China-India border area are deployed,” Pan wrote.
The PLA expert said the India military has focused on its strength, mountain warfare, in deployment in mountainous regions. Among the eight infantry divisions, seven are mountain infantry divisions.
Of the 38 brigades, 30 are mountain brigades and mountain artillery brigades.
Mountain infantry divisions are equipped with helicopter units and artillery adapted to mountain operations in order to give full play to their specialties, Pan wrote.
“After 1962, the Indian army paid attention to learning from the experience and lessons of combat in high and cold mountains. For decades, it has been constantly tempered in actual combat in such areas, and flexibly mastered tactics, such as firepower warfare, air-ground integrated warfare, information warfare, logistics support and anti-support, etc. Their actual combat experience should not be underestimated,” Pan wrote.
The Chinese expert also said that most of the Indian army’s main battle equipment and ground troops are equipped with night vision supplies. “They are good at night attacks, carrying out air raids, ground infiltration, airborne operation on the enemy’s rear.”
The Indian Army’s strategy on the border with China comprises protecting the eastern part, stabilising the middle and seizing the western section
In the report, Pan claims New Delhi has deployed 20% of its soldiers and kept another 30% of troops as reserves in “strategic areas” along the Sino-Indian boundary.
It said around 85,000 troops, 21 fighter aircraft (Su-MKI), 33 transport planes and 36 helicopters are deployed in the eastern region; the Sikkim section has some 64,000 troops, 30 fighter jets, 39 bombers, and 10 helicopters.
More than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in the western (Ladakh) and middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) sectors including from the elite Mountain Divisions and infantry divisions besides several battalions of paramilitary forces, dozens of fighter jets, and helicopters.
Overall, the Indian military has deployed 10 fighter squadrons along the border with about 320 combat aircraft of various types.
In addition, three A-50 early warning aircraft and eight P-8I patrol aircraft have been deployed, and even the P-8I has been dispatched to the Galwan Valley for reconnaissance to strengthen surveillance of border areas to make up for the lack of early warning capability of the Indian Air Force, the analysis said.
“The deployment of troops is a direct reflection of operational thinking. In terms of troop deployment, India emphasises ’offensive deployment’, and establishes the deployment policy of stabilising first-line troops, strengthening second-line reserves, expanding the depth of campaigns, and enhancing defensive flexibility, thus demonstrating its territorial ambitions,” he wrote.
“The Indian army believes that the eastern section is ‘the most vulnerable’ and the Sikkim section is ‘the most sensitive part of Indian’s defence’ as it overlooks the ’strategic’ Siliguri Corridor and where the ‘Chinese army can quickly cut of the Siliguri Corridor and isolate the provinces (states) in northeastern India’.”
“The first echelon is at the front of 10-20 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is mainly stationed by paramilitary forces; The second echelon is located 50-100 kilometers away from the actual control line and is held by brigade and battalion troops to form the main defence zone. The third echelons are located 100-300 kilometers away from the LAC line and are held by the main forces of the army, division and brigade to form an in-depth defense zone, equipped with strong air combat forces and ground air defense forces,” Pan says in the report
The Indian Army’s strategy on the border with China comprises protecting the eastern part, stabilising the middle and seizing the western section, the location of the recent and most serious military standoff in decades, according to a new report on a Chinese website that makes a rare public claim - having detailed knowledge of the Indian Army’s and the Air Force’s deployment across the Sino-Indian border.
In the report, Pan claims New Delhi has deployed 20% of its soldiers and kept another 30% of troops as reserves in “strategic areas” along the Sino-Indian boundary.
It said around 85,000 troops, 21 fighter aircraft (Su-MKI), 33 transport planes and 36 helicopters are deployed in the eastern region; the Sikkim section has some 64,000 troops, 30 fighter jets, 39 bombers, and 10 helicopters.
More than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in the western (Ladakh) and middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) sectors including from the elite Mountain Divisions and infantry divisions besides several battalions of paramilitary forces, dozens of fighter jets, and helicopters.
Overall, the Indian military has deployed 10 fighter squadrons along the border with about 320 combat aircraft of various types.
In addition, three A-50 early warning aircraft and eight P-8I patrol aircraft have been deployed, and even the P-8I has been dispatched to the Galwan Valley for reconnaissance to strengthen surveillance of border areas to make up for the lack of early warning capability of the Indian Air Force, the analysis said.
“The deployment of troops is a direct reflection of operational thinking. In terms of troop deployment, India emphasises ’offensive deployment’, and establishes the deployment policy of stabilising first-line troops, strengthening second-line reserves, expanding the depth of campaigns, and enhancing defensive flexibility, thus demonstrating its territorial ambitions,” he wrote.
“The Indian army believes that the eastern section is ‘the most vulnerable’ and the Sikkim section is ‘the most sensitive part of Indian’s defence’ as it overlooks the ’strategic’ Siliguri Corridor and where the ‘Chinese army can quickly cut of the Siliguri Corridor and isolate the provinces (states) in northeastern India’.”
“Therefore, its deployment focuses on the eastern section and Sikkim section, where 70 percent of the troops in the China-India border area are deployed,” Pan wrote.
The PLA expert said the India military has focused on its strength, mountain warfare, in deployment in mountainous regions. Among the eight infantry divisions, seven are mountain infantry divisions.
Of the 38 brigades, 30 are mountain brigades and mountain artillery brigades.
Mountain infantry divisions are equipped with helicopter units and artillery adapted to mountain operations in order to give full play to their specialties, Pan wrote.
“After 1962, the Indian army paid attention to learning from the experience and lessons of combat in high and cold mountains. For decades, it has been constantly tempered in actual combat in such areas, and flexibly mastered tactics, such as firepower warfare, air-ground integrated warfare, information warfare, logistics support and anti-support, etc. Their actual combat experience should not be underestimated,” Pan wrote.
The Chinese expert also said that most of the Indian army’s main battle equipment and ground troops are equipped with night vision supplies. “They are good at night attacks, carrying out air raids, ground infiltration, airborne operation on the enemy’s rear.”
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They are making a case for an invasion..lolChinese report claims to have detailed knowledge of India’s border deployment
The analysis by expert Pan Xinmao, formerly from the PLA Academic of Military Science’s Operation Theory and Doctrine Research Department, was published on the website of the Outlook Weeklywww.hindustantimes.com
The Indian Army’s strategy on the border with China comprises protecting the eastern part, stabilising the middle and seizing the western section
In the report, Pan claims New Delhi has deployed 20% of its soldiers and kept another 30% of troops as reserves in “strategic areas” along the Sino-Indian boundary.
It said around 85,000 troops, 21 fighter aircraft (Su-MKI), 33 transport planes and 36 helicopters are deployed in the eastern region; the Sikkim section has some 64,000 troops, 30 fighter jets, 39 bombers, and 10 helicopters.
More than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in the western (Ladakh) and middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) sectors including from the elite Mountain Divisions and infantry divisions besides several battalions of paramilitary forces, dozens of fighter jets, and helicopters.
Overall, the Indian military has deployed 10 fighter squadrons along the border with about 320 combat aircraft of various types.
In addition, three A-50 early warning aircraft and eight P-8I patrol aircraft have been deployed, and even the P-8I has been dispatched to the Galwan Valley for reconnaissance to strengthen surveillance of border areas to make up for the lack of early warning capability of the Indian Air Force, the analysis said.
“The deployment of troops is a direct reflection of operational thinking. In terms of troop deployment, India emphasises ’offensive deployment’, and establishes the deployment policy of stabilising first-line troops, strengthening second-line reserves, expanding the depth of campaigns, and enhancing defensive flexibility, thus demonstrating its territorial ambitions,” he wrote.
“The Indian army believes that the eastern section is ‘the most vulnerable’ and the Sikkim section is ‘the most sensitive part of Indian’s defence’ as it overlooks the ’strategic’ Siliguri Corridor and where the ‘Chinese army can quickly cut of the Siliguri Corridor and isolate the provinces (states) in northeastern India’.”
“The first echelon is at the front of 10-20 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is mainly stationed by paramilitary forces; The second echelon is located 50-100 kilometers away from the actual control line and is held by brigade and battalion troops to form the main defence zone. The third echelons are located 100-300 kilometers away from the LAC line and are held by the main forces of the army, division and brigade to form an in-depth defense zone, equipped with strong air combat forces and ground air defense forces,” Pan says in the report
The Indian Army’s strategy on the border with China comprises protecting the eastern part, stabilising the middle and seizing the western section, the location of the recent and most serious military standoff in decades, according to a new report on a Chinese website that makes a rare public claim - having detailed knowledge of the Indian Army’s and the Air Force’s deployment across the Sino-Indian border.
In the report, Pan claims New Delhi has deployed 20% of its soldiers and kept another 30% of troops as reserves in “strategic areas” along the Sino-Indian boundary.
It said around 85,000 troops, 21 fighter aircraft (Su-MKI), 33 transport planes and 36 helicopters are deployed in the eastern region; the Sikkim section has some 64,000 troops, 30 fighter jets, 39 bombers, and 10 helicopters.
More than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in the western (Ladakh) and middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) sectors including from the elite Mountain Divisions and infantry divisions besides several battalions of paramilitary forces, dozens of fighter jets, and helicopters.
Overall, the Indian military has deployed 10 fighter squadrons along the border with about 320 combat aircraft of various types.
In addition, three A-50 early warning aircraft and eight P-8I patrol aircraft have been deployed, and even the P-8I has been dispatched to the Galwan Valley for reconnaissance to strengthen surveillance of border areas to make up for the lack of early warning capability of the Indian Air Force, the analysis said.
“The deployment of troops is a direct reflection of operational thinking. In terms of troop deployment, India emphasises ’offensive deployment’, and establishes the deployment policy of stabilising first-line troops, strengthening second-line reserves, expanding the depth of campaigns, and enhancing defensive flexibility, thus demonstrating its territorial ambitions,” he wrote.
“The Indian army believes that the eastern section is ‘the most vulnerable’ and the Sikkim section is ‘the most sensitive part of Indian’s defence’ as it overlooks the ’strategic’ Siliguri Corridor and where the ‘Chinese army can quickly cut of the Siliguri Corridor and isolate the provinces (states) in northeastern India’.”
“Therefore, its deployment focuses on the eastern section and Sikkim section, where 70 percent of the troops in the China-India border area are deployed,” Pan wrote.
The PLA expert said the India military has focused on its strength, mountain warfare, in deployment in mountainous regions. Among the eight infantry divisions, seven are mountain infantry divisions.
Of the 38 brigades, 30 are mountain brigades and mountain artillery brigades.
Mountain infantry divisions are equipped with helicopter units and artillery adapted to mountain operations in order to give full play to their specialties, Pan wrote.
“After 1962, the Indian army paid attention to learning from the experience and lessons of combat in high and cold mountains. For decades, it has been constantly tempered in actual combat in such areas, and flexibly mastered tactics, such as firepower warfare, air-ground integrated warfare, information warfare, logistics support and anti-support, etc. Their actual combat experience should not be underestimated,” Pan wrote.
The Chinese expert also said that most of the Indian army’s main battle equipment and ground troops are equipped with night vision supplies. “They are good at night attacks, carrying out air raids, ground infiltration, airborne operation on the enemy’s rear.”
Recent imagery from Rutog's Military Garrison (developing since late 2019) suggests sections of the disengaged #China PLA troops have been relocated here post the agreement with #India last week, this base however would serve future PLA activity for the #PangongTso area pic.twitter.com/l1hy30qitD
— Damien Symon (@detresfa_) February 22, 2021
As many actual strategists/strategic thinkers were saying from the very beginning, Pangong Tso is a diversion and Depseng Plains were the real target. China achieved what they came for, everything else on our side now is perception management through media and govt sponsored pithos aka think tanks, serving and ex BJP generals......oops....I mean to say Army Generals!!!
Its not over yet. China will junk any agreement without warning if an opening presents.
Their objectives for now are to keep India on the backfoot and also reduce the heat on their pets/our pests on the western side while making sure areas of their concern are made secure. They are on track to achieve all those.
India has met its short term objectives - to keep Kashmir in control, stand up to China and stop salami slicing in the short term.
The moment Chinese feel India's long term objectives clash with theirs, we will see them sneaking in again. 22-23 will be interesting for a lot of reasons.
It is and will always, thats quite obvious. We are hosting tibetans and are the only big power next to china other than russia who can play spoilsport. More or less India is seen as successor to british empire and all the shame that was heaped on them by british.
We have big mouths , that we make so much cacophony that main issue gets totally lost. By the time we discuss and make a decision we are already at a disadvantage. For our politicians only that matters is their power and as long as it is untouched, they will spin all sorts of cock & bull stories.
This is the second time after kargil we ended up in such a sticky situation , our intelligence gathering and response needs a thorough recheck.
Kailash Range will be vacated by IA only after Depsang is settlled and de-escalation takes place in that area.
Ya right , even IA occupying kailash range is perception management to win bengal election . Please keep ranting........ooops.....I mean giving such amazing strategic thinking !!
IA is vacating Kailash Range......because political masters wants emperor Xi to visit India during BRICS summit......now say.........oooooops
What Delhi must do to make sure it isn’t caught off-guard by China again
Relief at disengagement must be tempered by the fact that it is just the latest act in the ongoing drama being played out by China.
indianexpress.com
we will have another commission and a samosa meeting.What Delhi must do to make sure it isn’t caught off-guard by China again
Relief at disengagement must be tempered by the fact that it is just the latest act in the ongoing drama being played out by China.
China could well attempt another military adventure in its bid to humiliate this government and frustrate India’s rise, says Jayadeva, Ranade. So let us not be under any delusions https://t.co/kz11xN8Auy
— Vikram Sood (@Vikram_Sood) March 4, 2021
Lets have a poll to see when the forum members think Mickey Maos will be back
I think what comes across quite clearly is that this was a dry run. They've made their assessments & will return stronger. As to when would that be depends on how talks on the other sectors viz Ghogra, Hot Springs, Depsang etc progress.
Was it a dry run or a well crafted op with hidden motives?
Matches their style. Occupy all places, talk big talk hard, waste time before withdrawing from most places and just retaining your original objective.
That our Mountain infantry was better is not something that should be news to them. They knew coming in, that India would be forced to make a stand. We did that in Doklam, no reason we would not do that again especially now with the hyper media and easy access to satellite imagery.
Still they came in, kept the heat just high enough to avoid things boiling over.
My guess is they wanted a tense situation not an actual war. Their objectives - well its open to debate but I'd say they wanted some heat off Pakistan and wanted to make sure they reminded India that Aksai is a no go area.
Whenever India has acceded to China's demand (from Rajiv Gandhi's delinking of the border issue from normalization of ties to Vajpayee's Tibet-card surrender), Indian media has hailed it as a big breakthrough. The same is the story with India's recent Kailash Heights withdrawal.
— Brahma Chellaney (@Chellaney) March 5, 2021
Indian media learns little: Its hype on the 2017 Doklam deal provided China cover to capture Doklam. Its recent hype has obscured the fact that India no longer is demanding a return to status quo ante. Instead, India is seeking a return to peace and tranquility along the border.
— Brahma Chellaney (@Chellaney) March 5, 2021
@Jaymax
