(La Tribune, jan. 25)
From the nothingness of the Franco-German strategic relationship to the necessary divorce
After the publication on 23 March 2021 of the tribune on France's German mistakes, the Vauban group*, which brings together some twenty active specialists in defence issues, looks back at the failure of German policy since 2017.
Three years after the signing of the Treaty of Aachen (22 January 2019), the conclusion is clear: the Franco-German relationship in defence and armaments is a bitter failure. It is true that between French misunderstandings and German treachery, the failure was predictable from the outset and even announced in these same columns since 2020. Now that the new coalition in power in Germany has adopted its government contract (24 November 2021) and that France is taking over the reins of the European presidency, it is necessary to go back to the primary causes of this failure to draw the conclusion that Germany is definitely not the right partner for France in defence.
France-Germany: from misunderstandings to treachery
The first French misunderstanding is to consider that Germany could, in the slightest, detach itself from the United States in favour of a Europe of defence: it is also German treachery to let people believe this.
In spite of the attempts that followed the Aachen Treaty, it must be noted that the magnet of the German strategic compass remains invariably American; with a little historical hindsight, France should not be surprised by this: Since 15 June 1963, the day when the Bundestag added, by the force of its vote (and American lobbying) the reference to the Atlantic Alliance in the Élysée Treaty through an interpretative preamble that totally distorted its spirit, it is known in Paris that the transatlantic relationship materialized by NATO is the cornerstone of German security policy.
A reading of the coalition contract of 24 November 2021 confirms this pro-NATO tropism: SPD, Greens and FDP have not had a word about "European strategic autonomy" - which is already a nice German slap on the French cheek - but full on NATO, "indispensable condition for the security" of Germany. The new masters in Berlin concede that Europe's defence can certainly progress, but on the sine qua non condition that any progress is made "while respecting interoperability and complementarity with NATO". The Chancellor's Office has authorised the study of the F-35 to replace the Tornado in its nuclear bomber version in order to allow the continuation of the nuclear mission carried out by the German Air Force.
Banned by the conservatives from the list of candidates due to French diplomatic and industrial pressure, the F-35 is thus reinstalled by the social democrats. It is true that it is the only modern aircraft certified to carry the future American B-61-12 gravity bomb, but how can one not see in its certain acquisition both a total allegiance to NATO and the United States and a betrayal of France and the SCAF project, whose budgets will obviously suffer from this acquisition of the worst enemy of the European military aeronautics industry?
The second mistake of Paris - and the second German treachery - is to believe that the politics of means will succeed in bridging the differences.
For reasons closer to sentiment than to realpolitik, Paris and Berlin continue their cooperation, but this cooperation concerns means (institutional, capability, industrial) and not common objectives, proof of a fundamental divorce. The Eurocorps is in itself the symbol of a relationship emptied of all meaning because it has no purpose. Jacques Bainville wrote with great insight that «too much has been made of sentiment in politics and in the relations between peoples. Hence so many disappointments. Sentiment is effective when interests coincide. From the day when interests separate, sentiment turns sour.»
Who can deny that there is currently French bitterness towards Germany and German bitterness towards France, especially (but not only) in defence matters and arms projects? When the vote on the famous preamble of 15 June 1963 was announced, General De Gaulle, a sceptical philosopher, spoke of treaties that, like roses, only last for a time and, turning his back on a Germany that was subservient to the United States, launched his "great policy of free hands" on his own. Macron, on the other hand, perseveres in spite of Germany's unfriendly actions: pressure on industry to pursue, whatever the cost, cooperation projects with Berlin, transfer of the production of Ariane 6's Vinci engines from Vernon to Germany, French support for Germany's demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council...
In Germany, treaties are signed, but care is taken not to engage in ways where its diplomatic and industrial interests would be threatened. At each crossroads, it is the American way that is chosen: Patriot yesterday, P-8 Poseidon today, F-35 tomorrow... without forgetting, in the face of France, to defend its industrial interests: the Budget Committee of the Bundestag thus says out loud what the Chancellery says down low and supports the lobbying of OHB, Rheinmetall, Diehl or Airbus to turn around joint industrial projects in space, land or aeronautics to its advantage. Basically, if the French ally wants to let itself be robbed, why not? And if it dares to resist German demands, which are perfectly unreasonable, especially on the SCAF and the MGCS? Blackmail on other issues (civil nuclear, arms exports) or recourse to the American solution will provide either the solution or the plan B that Berlin always has in mind.
France's third misunderstanding and Germany's third treachery: giving the impression that the bilateral relationship can change, this is the case, for example, with the new German coalition or the French presidency of Europe. Contrary to what Mr Clément Beaune, who must not read Goethe's language in the text, asserts, the coalition contract is a schizophrenic mixture of utopia and orthodoxy, totally unfavourable to French interests. Utopia of a world without nuclear weapons but orthodoxy in participating in NATO's nuclear debates; utopia of multilateralism but orthodoxy in defending its national interests in China, Russia, in foreign and commercial operations; utopia of an arms export law but orthodoxy in defending its European, NATO and...Israeli commercial pre-space.
France - Germany: two different strategic identities
The portrait of Germany drawn by the coalition contract is in every way opposed to that of a France for which peace is achieved through nuclear deterrence and diplomacy, sometimes through arms and arms exports... The coalition contract confirms to those who are willing to read it in its entirety that Germany's defence policy is clearly moving away from the French strategic identity as it has been materialised since November 1959.
On the diplomatic front, the contrast is striking: as a world power with a permanent seat on the Security Council and a vast overseas domain, France is turned towards the great horizons and great diplomacy; Germany, on the other hand, remains obsessed with Russia, riveted to its geography as a country at the centre of Europe that it loves within NATO, and has no plans for external military adventures apart from a few support and training missions. As a result of the mechanical effect of geography, which controls everything, the vision of Paris and Berlin diverges on strategic debates (from nuclear to Indo-Pacific), external operations and partnerships. The coalition agreement confirmed this great discrepancy: Paris is only one partner among others, perhaps mentioned first, but put on the same political level as Norway, the Netherlands or even the Balkans, without mentioning a common destiny or even the programmes undertaken since 2017...
On the ideological level, the coalition contract confirms that Germany remains fundamentally anti-nuclear (the continuation of NATO's nuclear mission under American tutelage is compensated by the desire for a Germany without nuclear weapons in the long term), neutralist (paradoxically accepting NATO's tutelage in order to avoid any geopolitical reflection) and pacifist (for the missions of its army to be even more strictly controlled in the future). The French strategic identity is the opposite of these three ideologies: protected by its deterrence, it remains an active military power. By promoting a diplomacy of values without the use of armed force or the export of armaments, Germany places itself in an ethic of conscience, the antithesis of a French strategic identity based on an ethic of responsibility.
On the military side, the government platform adopted on 24 November 2021 reinforces the German doctrine - first Atlanticist, then European - which makes it embrace outdated strategic concepts: turned towards the East, tracked, heavy. Too heavy for a French army that was more combat-oriented, reactive and imaginative and that was constantly preparing for all types of conflicts. The German Sitzkrieg corresponds to the French Blitzkrieg in a total inversion of military doctrines in the light of contemporary history. It is therefore not surprising that the debates on the specifications of future armament projects systematically turn sour: since the two countries do not pursue the same goals, how could they develop common equipment? The case of the Mk-III Tiger is obvious.
France - Germany: the bitter fruits of a Treaty
Three years after the Treaty of Aachen, it is clear what the latter brought to Berlin - Paris's support in winning a permanent seat with veto power on the UN Security Council and the French aerospace and ground industries on a silver platter - but it is hard to see what benefits it brought to France.
Since its entry into force, what have we witnessed except the sharp criticism (by a German Defence Minister) of a European strategic autonomy project carried by the French President (unprecedented in the bilateral relationship), the non-financing by Germany of the Tiger MK-III programme, even though it was a joint flagship programme, the end of the bilateral patrol aircraft project in favour of an American aircraft, the destabilisation of the battle tank project by the encouraged irruption of Rheinmetall, the transfer of the Ariane 6 upper stage re-ignition engines from Vernon to Ottobrun, which will weaken French control over projection technology?
The record of the recent past is edifying: what will the future hold? Will our deterrence be called into question tomorrow because of an anti-nuclear Germany? Will we see the de minimis intergovernmental agreement called into question tomorrow by virtue of the future German export law, which is of far greater political value to the partners in power in Berlin? Will all French technological capital, from land to aeronautics and space, be transferred from Paris to Berlin in a collaborative effort to prevent Germany from turning even more to American solutions?
Faced with such a balance sheet, the path of reason will impose next April the only possible and desirable outcome: the divorce of the Franco-German couple for lack of consent or by nullity of consent.
France-Germany: time to return to freedom
The French strategic identity is based on national pillars that cannot be supported or shared with the German strategic identity: deterrence, the implementation of which is politically and technically strictly national, the complete army model, built around national autonomy and the versatility of its capabilities, the almost complete range of arms industry, the export of which is the guarantee of its development and the support point of a national diplomacy and which cannot be slowed down by a foreign partner who bans it from the outset.
Deterrence, a complete, versatile and autonomous army model, and an exporting arms industry: none of this is German; none of this can be Franco-German; it must remain strictly national. After past, present and, alas, future mistakes, the conclusion will be obvious: France must regain its freedom of action because Germany is not the right partner for France in defence and armaments matters. It is getting bogged down. It is getting stuck in it. It gets lost in it. As the historian Jacques Bainville said, «systems based on arbitrary principles, conceived outside or even in opposition to reality and experience, produce nothing but nothingness».
Three years after the Treaty of Aachen and three months after the coalition agreement, after so many French misunderstandings and German treacheries leading to so many abandonments, how can we fail to see the nothingness of a Franco-German relationship that so powerfully denies France's deep strategic identity? Like Antigone in Anouilh's play, it is time to say: «I am here to tell you: “No!”».
*(Vauban group brings together some twenty specialists in defence issues.)
And:
From the nothingness of the Franco-German strategic relationship to the necessary divorce
After the publication on 23 March 2021 of the tribune on France's German mistakes, the Vauban group*, which brings together some twenty active specialists in defence issues, looks back at the failure of German policy since 2017.
Three years after the signing of the Treaty of Aachen (22 January 2019), the conclusion is clear: the Franco-German relationship in defence and armaments is a bitter failure. It is true that between French misunderstandings and German treachery, the failure was predictable from the outset and even announced in these same columns since 2020. Now that the new coalition in power in Germany has adopted its government contract (24 November 2021) and that France is taking over the reins of the European presidency, it is necessary to go back to the primary causes of this failure to draw the conclusion that Germany is definitely not the right partner for France in defence.
France-Germany: from misunderstandings to treachery
The first French misunderstanding is to consider that Germany could, in the slightest, detach itself from the United States in favour of a Europe of defence: it is also German treachery to let people believe this.
In spite of the attempts that followed the Aachen Treaty, it must be noted that the magnet of the German strategic compass remains invariably American; with a little historical hindsight, France should not be surprised by this: Since 15 June 1963, the day when the Bundestag added, by the force of its vote (and American lobbying) the reference to the Atlantic Alliance in the Élysée Treaty through an interpretative preamble that totally distorted its spirit, it is known in Paris that the transatlantic relationship materialized by NATO is the cornerstone of German security policy.
A reading of the coalition contract of 24 November 2021 confirms this pro-NATO tropism: SPD, Greens and FDP have not had a word about "European strategic autonomy" - which is already a nice German slap on the French cheek - but full on NATO, "indispensable condition for the security" of Germany. The new masters in Berlin concede that Europe's defence can certainly progress, but on the sine qua non condition that any progress is made "while respecting interoperability and complementarity with NATO". The Chancellor's Office has authorised the study of the F-35 to replace the Tornado in its nuclear bomber version in order to allow the continuation of the nuclear mission carried out by the German Air Force.
Banned by the conservatives from the list of candidates due to French diplomatic and industrial pressure, the F-35 is thus reinstalled by the social democrats. It is true that it is the only modern aircraft certified to carry the future American B-61-12 gravity bomb, but how can one not see in its certain acquisition both a total allegiance to NATO and the United States and a betrayal of France and the SCAF project, whose budgets will obviously suffer from this acquisition of the worst enemy of the European military aeronautics industry?
The second mistake of Paris - and the second German treachery - is to believe that the politics of means will succeed in bridging the differences.
For reasons closer to sentiment than to realpolitik, Paris and Berlin continue their cooperation, but this cooperation concerns means (institutional, capability, industrial) and not common objectives, proof of a fundamental divorce. The Eurocorps is in itself the symbol of a relationship emptied of all meaning because it has no purpose. Jacques Bainville wrote with great insight that «too much has been made of sentiment in politics and in the relations between peoples. Hence so many disappointments. Sentiment is effective when interests coincide. From the day when interests separate, sentiment turns sour.»
Who can deny that there is currently French bitterness towards Germany and German bitterness towards France, especially (but not only) in defence matters and arms projects? When the vote on the famous preamble of 15 June 1963 was announced, General De Gaulle, a sceptical philosopher, spoke of treaties that, like roses, only last for a time and, turning his back on a Germany that was subservient to the United States, launched his "great policy of free hands" on his own. Macron, on the other hand, perseveres in spite of Germany's unfriendly actions: pressure on industry to pursue, whatever the cost, cooperation projects with Berlin, transfer of the production of Ariane 6's Vinci engines from Vernon to Germany, French support for Germany's demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council...
In Germany, treaties are signed, but care is taken not to engage in ways where its diplomatic and industrial interests would be threatened. At each crossroads, it is the American way that is chosen: Patriot yesterday, P-8 Poseidon today, F-35 tomorrow... without forgetting, in the face of France, to defend its industrial interests: the Budget Committee of the Bundestag thus says out loud what the Chancellery says down low and supports the lobbying of OHB, Rheinmetall, Diehl or Airbus to turn around joint industrial projects in space, land or aeronautics to its advantage. Basically, if the French ally wants to let itself be robbed, why not? And if it dares to resist German demands, which are perfectly unreasonable, especially on the SCAF and the MGCS? Blackmail on other issues (civil nuclear, arms exports) or recourse to the American solution will provide either the solution or the plan B that Berlin always has in mind.
France's third misunderstanding and Germany's third treachery: giving the impression that the bilateral relationship can change, this is the case, for example, with the new German coalition or the French presidency of Europe. Contrary to what Mr Clément Beaune, who must not read Goethe's language in the text, asserts, the coalition contract is a schizophrenic mixture of utopia and orthodoxy, totally unfavourable to French interests. Utopia of a world without nuclear weapons but orthodoxy in participating in NATO's nuclear debates; utopia of multilateralism but orthodoxy in defending its national interests in China, Russia, in foreign and commercial operations; utopia of an arms export law but orthodoxy in defending its European, NATO and...Israeli commercial pre-space.
France - Germany: two different strategic identities
The portrait of Germany drawn by the coalition contract is in every way opposed to that of a France for which peace is achieved through nuclear deterrence and diplomacy, sometimes through arms and arms exports... The coalition contract confirms to those who are willing to read it in its entirety that Germany's defence policy is clearly moving away from the French strategic identity as it has been materialised since November 1959.
On the diplomatic front, the contrast is striking: as a world power with a permanent seat on the Security Council and a vast overseas domain, France is turned towards the great horizons and great diplomacy; Germany, on the other hand, remains obsessed with Russia, riveted to its geography as a country at the centre of Europe that it loves within NATO, and has no plans for external military adventures apart from a few support and training missions. As a result of the mechanical effect of geography, which controls everything, the vision of Paris and Berlin diverges on strategic debates (from nuclear to Indo-Pacific), external operations and partnerships. The coalition agreement confirmed this great discrepancy: Paris is only one partner among others, perhaps mentioned first, but put on the same political level as Norway, the Netherlands or even the Balkans, without mentioning a common destiny or even the programmes undertaken since 2017...
On the ideological level, the coalition contract confirms that Germany remains fundamentally anti-nuclear (the continuation of NATO's nuclear mission under American tutelage is compensated by the desire for a Germany without nuclear weapons in the long term), neutralist (paradoxically accepting NATO's tutelage in order to avoid any geopolitical reflection) and pacifist (for the missions of its army to be even more strictly controlled in the future). The French strategic identity is the opposite of these three ideologies: protected by its deterrence, it remains an active military power. By promoting a diplomacy of values without the use of armed force or the export of armaments, Germany places itself in an ethic of conscience, the antithesis of a French strategic identity based on an ethic of responsibility.
On the military side, the government platform adopted on 24 November 2021 reinforces the German doctrine - first Atlanticist, then European - which makes it embrace outdated strategic concepts: turned towards the East, tracked, heavy. Too heavy for a French army that was more combat-oriented, reactive and imaginative and that was constantly preparing for all types of conflicts. The German Sitzkrieg corresponds to the French Blitzkrieg in a total inversion of military doctrines in the light of contemporary history. It is therefore not surprising that the debates on the specifications of future armament projects systematically turn sour: since the two countries do not pursue the same goals, how could they develop common equipment? The case of the Mk-III Tiger is obvious.
France - Germany: the bitter fruits of a Treaty
Three years after the Treaty of Aachen, it is clear what the latter brought to Berlin - Paris's support in winning a permanent seat with veto power on the UN Security Council and the French aerospace and ground industries on a silver platter - but it is hard to see what benefits it brought to France.
Since its entry into force, what have we witnessed except the sharp criticism (by a German Defence Minister) of a European strategic autonomy project carried by the French President (unprecedented in the bilateral relationship), the non-financing by Germany of the Tiger MK-III programme, even though it was a joint flagship programme, the end of the bilateral patrol aircraft project in favour of an American aircraft, the destabilisation of the battle tank project by the encouraged irruption of Rheinmetall, the transfer of the Ariane 6 upper stage re-ignition engines from Vernon to Ottobrun, which will weaken French control over projection technology?
The record of the recent past is edifying: what will the future hold? Will our deterrence be called into question tomorrow because of an anti-nuclear Germany? Will we see the de minimis intergovernmental agreement called into question tomorrow by virtue of the future German export law, which is of far greater political value to the partners in power in Berlin? Will all French technological capital, from land to aeronautics and space, be transferred from Paris to Berlin in a collaborative effort to prevent Germany from turning even more to American solutions?
Faced with such a balance sheet, the path of reason will impose next April the only possible and desirable outcome: the divorce of the Franco-German couple for lack of consent or by nullity of consent.
France-Germany: time to return to freedom
The French strategic identity is based on national pillars that cannot be supported or shared with the German strategic identity: deterrence, the implementation of which is politically and technically strictly national, the complete army model, built around national autonomy and the versatility of its capabilities, the almost complete range of arms industry, the export of which is the guarantee of its development and the support point of a national diplomacy and which cannot be slowed down by a foreign partner who bans it from the outset.
Deterrence, a complete, versatile and autonomous army model, and an exporting arms industry: none of this is German; none of this can be Franco-German; it must remain strictly national. After past, present and, alas, future mistakes, the conclusion will be obvious: France must regain its freedom of action because Germany is not the right partner for France in defence and armaments matters. It is getting bogged down. It is getting stuck in it. It gets lost in it. As the historian Jacques Bainville said, «systems based on arbitrary principles, conceived outside or even in opposition to reality and experience, produce nothing but nothingness».
Three years after the Treaty of Aachen and three months after the coalition agreement, after so many French misunderstandings and German treacheries leading to so many abandonments, how can we fail to see the nothingness of a Franco-German relationship that so powerfully denies France's deep strategic identity? Like Antigone in Anouilh's play, it is time to say: «I am here to tell you: “No!”».
*(Vauban group brings together some twenty specialists in defence issues.)
And:
