A very insightful post here.
Sir.
For the bold, if I may, the attempt has been towards creating a situation that can be appropriately be exploited for further necessary action. However, the opposition has been tad uncooperative insofar these attempts are concerned.
Perhaps, I daresay, this tendency of theirs to not cooperate in any field is the root of our troubles.
One of our previous weakness, if we can call it that, has been that after every successful offensive we dig in and shift onto the defensive, awaiting their strike/riposte. That fundamentally hands over the initiative over to the enemy: They get to choose their timing and location of retaliation. That happened right after Balakot strikes: We just shifted onto the defensive without any prompting, ensuring that the enemy was perfectly free to plan own offensive without worrying about potential attack from our side.
That cannot be allowed to continue: It is imperative that we hold the initiative at all times, if necessary, mounting supporting offensives of own right after a major offensive, if nothing, then just to keep the pressure on and tie down forces/resources that could be used to support the offensive. A truely aggressive fighting force, like the Israeli AF would have mounted relentless provocations after the strike to tie down PAF air assets and Air HQ, putting them on the backfoot, worried about any further IsAF offensive, in effect establishing and dominating the battlespace.
Sir.
For the bold, if I may, the attempt has been towards creating a situation that can be appropriately be exploited for further necessary action. However, the opposition has been tad uncooperative insofar these attempts are concerned.
Perhaps, I daresay, this tendency of theirs to not cooperate in any field is the root of our troubles.