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My concern is the area is flat farmlands.What if the next pak attack involves armour? Are we prepared? Defending such flat terrain with no cover is hard.
India - Pakistan Standoff 2019
- Thread starter nair
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My concern is the area is flat farmlands.What if the next pak attack involves armour? Are we prepared? Defending such flat terrain with no cover is hard.
It was always that way, my friend. The real wars were on SM & PDF.
Armour cannot appear all of a sudden
Armour is generally kept 30 km away
At least out of range of 155 mm guns
And if they still send Tanks, our Mechanised Formations are already prepared
By the way in Makwal sector , they did use Tanks but were still beaten back
Yesterday was a Carnage
Even Pakistani Twitter handles were panicking
Ghafoor was trying to calm all the cry babies
In fighter squadrons, when a mission comes, The CO knows who will meet the cut for the mission. But yet it is opened to all. Nay sayers exist even in Fighter squadrons. But Fighter Pilot's job is not to queston why, but to do or die. And they mount their aircraft like the Famous 600, in the valley of death.
We still don't know if Wg. Cdr Abhi actually suffered a com failure or he disreagrded the instructions. But what he did, shows the mindset of what Fighter Jockeys are all about including his capture and subsequent treatment and his handling of the situation. This also shows the mental calibre and ability to withstand harshest punishment while not having been subjected to it during training. We had seen the training video of Pak SSG to train them about interrogation. No such thing exists in India. Aircraft are Flown by officers and one of the most important criteria for making a fighter pilot is quick thinking and extremely sharp brain. many of you will be shocked to know that Fighter Pilots have average flying skills but what sets them apart is their reaction ability and extremely strong and agile mind.
We still don't know if Wg. Cdr Abhi actually suffered a com failure or he disreagrded the instructions. But what he did, shows the mindset of what Fighter Jockeys are all about including his capture and subsequent treatment and his handling of the situation. This also shows the mental calibre and ability to withstand harshest punishment while not having been subjected to it during training. We had seen the training video of Pak SSG to train them about interrogation. No such thing exists in India. Aircraft are Flown by officers and one of the most important criteria for making a fighter pilot is quick thinking and extremely sharp brain. many of you will be shocked to know that Fighter Pilots have average flying skills but what sets them apart is their reaction ability and extremely strong and agile mind.
Works both ways.
Makes for excellent field of fire with good observation.
I reiterate - it is an intelligence led operation so far.
Thats the way to play Dossier-Dossier. Tum mujhko dossier do aur main tum ko dossier dunga. prove karo.
PKS's interpretation of the dogfight on 27th Feb. He poses some pretty interesting questions.
@Falcon ; @vstol Jockey ; @Milspec ; @Austerlitz ; @randomradio .
@Falcon ; @vstol Jockey ; @Milspec ; @Austerlitz ; @randomradio .
- On BVR combat, the issue is not about BVRAAMs being out-ranged at all. Such excuses are raised only by those who are fascinated by XBox/Playstation games. Instead, it all about according perpetual respect/recognition to the absolute laws of thje physical sciences, especially the laws of physics & mathematics. Most folks don’t go into such finer details & hence they get ambushed by the lurking devil & the entire debate gets distorted, as is the case with AMRAAM versus R-77. The laws of physics dictate that a directly inbound target will offer a higher RCS & therefore will be detectable at a distance of 130km by the NO-11M ‘Bars’ PESA-MMR. But if the target is receding or flying away, then its RCS will get reduced & hence the same NO-11M radar will have a max detection range of only 90km. This is the phenomenon that totally dictates BVRAAM employment, & not the max range envelope of any BVRAAM. And that’s why BVRAAMs are best employed only when the target is inbound right ahead when the distance between the target & the BVRAAM-launching aircraft reduces steadily. Only then can can the BVRAAM be fired with the highest probability of a hit at a distance of 50km at best. This is known as ‘going hot’. But when the target is flying away, then the BVRAAM’s best chance of scoring a hit is at a distance of no more than 20km. This is known as ‘going cold’. The figures are available in posters uploaded by me here:
TRISHUL: Phazotron JSC's Airborne Radars
Western radar brochures don’t highlight such vital performance parameters, but Russian posters do as they are a more honest effort in marketing.
So, on February 27 morning, whenever the PAF F-16s starting closing the distance gap with the Su-30MKIs, the latter started receding & flying away from the orbiting F-16s, thereby preventing the APG-68 MMRs from achieving continuous target illumination lock-ons. Consequently, in desperation, the PAF resorted to firing some AMRAAMs when the APG-68 MMRs had achieved only target-tracking lock-ons for a brief moment, hoping that this will be good enough. But what this proved is only the inferior training standards of the PAF WRT BVR combat & lack of aircrew proficiency. If the IAF had deployed Akash-1s or Barak-8 MR-SAMs along the Pir Panjal range along a north-south axis, the PAF’s F-16s would not even have dared to mount loitering flight-paths or CAPs anywhere over PoK since such SAM networks serve as anti-access/area-denial weapons, while freeing the IAF’s MRCAs to fly CAPs further within the hinterland where their usage of BVRAAMs will not be restricted by any ROE.
Cont'd below...
Reply
Prasun K. SenguptaApril 4, 2019 at 12:50 AM
But those are not the real questions that ought to be asked. Instead, what should be asked are these:
1) Did the IAF seek permission for concurrently striking no more than 5 targets & no less than 3 in different geographical locations, but was instead authorised to strike at targets in only 1 geographical location?
2) Why did the Govt of India restrict the strike to only 1 geographical location & on whose advice?
3) Was this all finalised between February 16 & February 23?
4) How did a MiG-21 Bison lead flight without EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod get separated from the wingman carrying the EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod?
5) What caused radio signals saturation (not Pak jamming as is being peddled around) that led the MiG-21 Bison to not be able to receive the audio warning to ‘turn cold’?
6) Why was the aerial engagement being controlled by a GCI station located in northern Punjab & not by a J & K-based land-mobile ground exploitation centre capable of receiving the air situation picture from the IACCCS node located in Punjab & from AEW & CS platforms, & controlling the tactical air battle in the skies above Rajouri & Nowshera?
7) Would the ground-to-air comms traffic have been seamless & devoid of saturation had software-defined radios & tactical data-links been used by both the GCI & airborne IAF combat aircraft on that day?
8) Why did the IAF not go on the offensive & take down the PAF’s MRCAs loitering over PoK if indeed both the GoI & the IAF considered the PAF air-strike as an act of war since they had targetted Indian military installations?
9) Did such a display of reticent posture blunt the IAF’s conventional airpower deterrence policy on that day & did it accord more-than-necessary credibility to the PAF’s conventional deterrence capabilities & capacities?
10) Was this operational deficiency in the IAF’s warfighting capabilities/capacities responsible for ACM B S Dhanoa stating later that if the IAF had Rafales in-service, then the PAF would not have dared violate Indian airspace?
11) Does this therefore mean that there are serious shortcomings in the IAF’s deep-strike.offensive power projection capabilities/capacities that seriously diminish the IAF’s conventional deterrent value?
12) And if this is the case, what happens if between now & May 2019 there was to be a high-profile suicide terror-attack against a major military garrison/cantonment inside J & K?
PKS's interpretation of the dogfight on 27th Feb. He poses some pretty interesting questions.
@Falcon ; @vstol Jockey ; @Milspec ; @Austerlitz ; @randomradio .
- On BVR combat, the issue is not about BVRAAMs being out-ranged at all. Such excuses are raised only by those who are fascinated by XBox/Playstation games. Instead, it all about according perpetual respect/recognition to the absolute laws of thje physical sciences, especially the laws of physics & mathematics. Most folks don’t go into such finer details & hence they get ambushed by the lurking devil & the entire debate gets distorted, as is the case with AMRAAM versus R-77. The laws of physics dictate that a directly inbound target will offer a higher RCS & therefore will be detectable at a distance of 130km by the NO-11M ‘Bars’ PESA-MMR. But if the target is receding or flying away, then its RCS will get reduced & hence the same NO-11M radar will have a max detection range of only 90km. This is the phenomenon that totally dictates BVRAAM employment, & not the max range envelope of any BVRAAM. And that’s why BVRAAMs are best employed only when the target is inbound right ahead when the distance between the target & the BVRAAM-launching aircraft reduces steadily. Only then can can the BVRAAM be fired with the highest probability of a hit at a distance of 50km at best. This is known as ‘going hot’. But when the target is flying away, then the BVRAAM’s best chance of scoring a hit is at a distance of no more than 20km. This is known as ‘going cold’. The figures are available in posters uploaded by me here:
TRISHUL: Phazotron JSC's Airborne Radars
Western radar brochures don’t highlight such vital performance parameters, but Russian posters do as they are a more honest effort in marketing.
So, on February 27 morning, whenever the PAF F-16s starting closing the distance gap with the Su-30MKIs, the latter started receding & flying away from the orbiting F-16s, thereby preventing the APG-68 MMRs from achieving continuous target illumination lock-ons. Consequently, in desperation, the PAF resorted to firing some AMRAAMs when the APG-68 MMRs had achieved only target-tracking lock-ons for a brief moment, hoping that this will be good enough. But what this proved is only the inferior training standards of the PAF WRT BVR combat & lack of aircrew proficiency. If the IAF had deployed Akash-1s or Barak-8 MR-SAMs along the Pir Panjal range along a north-south axis, the PAF’s F-16s would not even have dared to mount loitering flight-paths or CAPs anywhere over PoK since such SAM networks serve as anti-access/area-denial weapons, while freeing the IAF’s MRCAs to fly CAPs further within the hinterland where their usage of BVRAAMs will not be restricted by any ROE.
Cont'd below...
Reply
Prasun K. SenguptaApril 4, 2019 at 12:50 AM
But those are not the real questions that ought to be asked. Instead, what should be asked are these:
1) Did the IAF seek permission for concurrently striking no more than 5 targets & no less than 3 in different geographical locations, but was instead authorised to strike at targets in only 1 geographical location?
2) Why did the Govt of India restrict the strike to only 1 geographical location & on whose advice?
3) Was this all finalised between February 16 & February 23?
4) How did a MiG-21 Bison lead flight without EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod get separated from the wingman carrying the EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod?
5) What caused radio signals saturation (not Pak jamming as is being peddled around) that led the MiG-21 Bison to not be able to receive the audio warning to ‘turn cold’?
6) Why was the aerial engagement being controlled by a GCI station located in northern Punjab & not by a J & K-based land-mobile ground exploitation centre capable of receiving the air situation picture from the IACCCS node located in Punjab & from AEW & CS platforms, & controlling the tactical air battle in the skies above Rajouri & Nowshera?
7) Would the ground-to-air comms traffic have been seamless & devoid of saturation had software-defined radios & tactical data-links been used by both the GCI & airborne IAF combat aircraft on that day?
8) Why did the IAF not go on the offensive & take down the PAF’s MRCAs loitering over PoK if indeed both the GoI & the IAF considered the PAF air-strike as an act of war since they had targetted Indian military installations?
9) Did such a display of reticent posture blunt the IAF’s conventional airpower deterrence policy on that day & did it accord more-than-necessary credibility to the PAF’s conventional deterrence capabilities & capacities?
10) Was this operational deficiency in the IAF’s warfighting capabilities/capacities responsible for ACM B S Dhanoa stating later that if the IAF had Rafales in-service, then the PAF would not have dared violate Indian airspace?
11) Does this therefore mean that there are serious shortcomings in the IAF’s deep-strike.offensive power projection capabilities/capacities that seriously diminish the IAF’s conventional deterrent value?
12) And if this is the case, what happens if between now & May 2019 there was to be a high-profile suicide terror-attack against a major military garrison/cantonment inside J & K?
It is a Really Good thing that a Small Skirmish has Created All these Points for
The IAF , to Think about and
Raised Questions to Find Answers thereof
1. Yes. And not only Balakote was struck.
2. See Point #1. Speculative.
3. No.
4. Ask the officer. He has enough service to not know his orientation and LC general direction.
5. Who says he did not get the warning? And what about his situational awareness? Did he not notice 'gap' with his wingman? Pertinent question: how did he leave his wingman exposed?
6. It was not. Load of nonsense.
7. Retard question.
8. Guess what? It was not. Refer to my original contention that they actually did not aim to hit anywhere.
9. No and yes.
10. Not correlated to it at all.
11. IAF is not going to go for 'deep strikes' We have enough resources in terms of Brahmos for that.
12. Suggest PA to oblige with something.
PKS's interpretation of the dogfight on 27th Feb. He poses some pretty interesting questions.
@Falcon ; @vstol Jockey ; @Milspec ; @Austerlitz ; @randomradio .
- On BVR combat, the issue is not about BVRAAMs being out-ranged at all. Such excuses are raised only by those who are fascinated by XBox/Playstation games. Instead, it all about according perpetual respect/recognition to the absolute laws of thje physical sciences, especially the laws of physics & mathematics. Most folks don’t go into such finer details & hence they get ambushed by the lurking devil & the entire debate gets distorted, as is the case with AMRAAM versus R-77. The laws of physics dictate that a directly inbound target will offer a higher RCS & therefore will be detectable at a distance of 130km by the NO-11M ‘Bars’ PESA-MMR. But if the target is receding or flying away, then its RCS will get reduced & hence the same NO-11M radar will have a max detection range of only 90km. This is the phenomenon that totally dictates BVRAAM employment, & not the max range envelope of any BVRAAM. And that’s why BVRAAMs are best employed only when the target is inbound right ahead when the distance between the target & the BVRAAM-launching aircraft reduces steadily. Only then can can the BVRAAM be fired with the highest probability of a hit at a distance of 50km at best. This is known as ‘going hot’. But when the target is flying away, then the BVRAAM’s best chance of scoring a hit is at a distance of no more than 20km. This is known as ‘going cold’. The figures are available in posters uploaded by me here:
TRISHUL: Phazotron JSC's Airborne Radars
Western radar brochures don’t highlight such vital performance parameters, but Russian posters do as they are a more honest effort in marketing.
So, on February 27 morning, whenever the PAF F-16s starting closing the distance gap with the Su-30MKIs, the latter started receding & flying away from the orbiting F-16s, thereby preventing the APG-68 MMRs from achieving continuous target illumination lock-ons. Consequently, in desperation, the PAF resorted to firing some AMRAAMs when the APG-68 MMRs had achieved only target-tracking lock-ons for a brief moment, hoping that this will be good enough. But what this proved is only the inferior training standards of the PAF WRT BVR combat & lack of aircrew proficiency. If the IAF had deployed Akash-1s or Barak-8 MR-SAMs along the Pir Panjal range along a north-south axis, the PAF’s F-16s would not even have dared to mount loitering flight-paths or CAPs anywhere over PoK since such SAM networks serve as anti-access/area-denial weapons, while freeing the IAF’s MRCAs to fly CAPs further within the hinterland where their usage of BVRAAMs will not be restricted by any ROE.
Cont'd below...
Reply
Prasun K. SenguptaApril 4, 2019 at 12:50 AM
But those are not the real questions that ought to be asked. Instead, what should be asked are these:
1) Did the IAF seek permission for concurrently striking no more than 5 targets & no less than 3 in different geographical locations, but was instead authorised to strike at targets in only 1 geographical location?
2) Why did the Govt of India restrict the strike to only 1 geographical location & on whose advice?
3) Was this all finalised between February 16 & February 23?
4) How did a MiG-21 Bison lead flight without EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod get separated from the wingman carrying the EL/L-8222 ASPJ pod?
5) What caused radio signals saturation (not Pak jamming as is being peddled around) that led the MiG-21 Bison to not be able to receive the audio warning to ‘turn cold’?
6) Why was the aerial engagement being controlled by a GCI station located in northern Punjab & not by a J & K-based land-mobile ground exploitation centre capable of receiving the air situation picture from the IACCCS node located in Punjab & from AEW & CS platforms, & controlling the tactical air battle in the skies above Rajouri & Nowshera?
7) Would the ground-to-air comms traffic have been seamless & devoid of saturation had software-defined radios & tactical data-links been used by both the GCI & airborne IAF combat aircraft on that day?
8) Why did the IAF not go on the offensive & take down the PAF’s MRCAs loitering over PoK if indeed both the GoI & the IAF considered the PAF air-strike as an act of war since they had targetted Indian military installations?
9) Did such a display of reticent posture blunt the IAF’s conventional airpower deterrence policy on that day & did it accord more-than-necessary credibility to the PAF’s conventional deterrence capabilities & capacities?
10) Was this operational deficiency in the IAF’s warfighting capabilities/capacities responsible for ACM B S Dhanoa stating later that if the IAF had Rafales in-service, then the PAF would not have dared violate Indian airspace?
11) Does this therefore mean that there are serious shortcomings in the IAF’s deep-strike.offensive power projection capabilities/capacities that seriously diminish the IAF’s conventional deterrent value?
12) And if this is the case, what happens if between now & May 2019 there was to be a high-profile suicide terror-attack against a major military garrison/cantonment inside J & K?
Can't say how accurate it is, but at least it's something.
This is exactly it. Why is nobody talking about the other 2 sites that were struck? Like, literally?
Thats the reason why I stopped searching sat images. I don't know where to look... Balakot was the place which PK was highlighting the most. Why will they highlight it if they were really hit hard there?
Just notice when it comes to current indian offensive in Dagger and around LoC, DGISPR shuts up like a clam.
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