If the situation calls for it, we can order all 4 that you've stated. Like if a war happens over the next few years.
MMRCA 2.0 - Updates and Discussions
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If the situation calls for it, we can order all 4 that you've stated. Like if a war happens over the next few years.
A very real 5th point is 36 more Rafales and 114 more via tender.
If the situation can be salvaged a bit now, why wait for the d day?
Don't think fuselage has been widened AFAIK. Just because the wings have been canted slighlty outwards it has bigger wing-span over MK1A. Addition of wing-tip CCM pylons(as they are clipped further over MK1's) also help increase the hard-point count. Don't think too much can be changed now except Canard positioning post ONERA test.
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The Falcon line can (and does) exist independently of MRFA. Like I said, it's a different value proposition that isn't connected to Rafale. Falcon can be produced here because it makes sense to produce it here. We have the 3rd highest number of billionaires in the world after US & China.
They would want private jets regardless of what happens in MRFA. And producing locally makes Falcon more competitive for that market. One has nothing to do with the other.
IAF needs CCAs and CATS will be compatible across the whole air force unlike foreign offers which may only work for one type of fighter, you won't be able to use Western CCAs with MKIs and vice versa. Foreign offer would only be considered if CATS fails.
Then we'd remain an import air force for perpetuity. That isn't how you create redundancy.
CATS is being pursued by HAL/NewSpace. If you want an alternative, get ADE to pursue one as well. Like how NewSpace and CSIR-NAL are pursuing competing HAPS drone programs.
Sounds optimistic, but great if it turns up that quickly. We can get the +36 buy to go through that much quicker.
Why spend so much on modifying an obsolete foreign platform to make it somewhat less obsolete when we could spend that money on our own platform tailor-made for our requirements?
The Mk-2 is capable of displacing offers like F-16V/Gripen E completely, while being able to do a lot of the jobs that could otherwise only be done by likes of Rafale or MKI. That's why Mk-2 could kill the SEF tender while Mk-1/1A couldn't.
So in IAF & ADA's eyes, the Mk2 fights in a higher weight class than the Mk-1/1A. It's as simple as that.
And it says "Medium Weight Fighter" before that. You just see what you want to see don't you?
Why would they call the project a Medium weight fighter unless it is one?
The LCA name reinforces the idea that this is a program that everyone is already invested into, thus making opposition to it difficult to justify. That's why they continue with it. But it's clear they didn't just start calling it an MWF for no reason.
That's like replacing an F-16 with an F-22. Sure the Raptor can do everything F16 can & more. Does that mean it's a F16 replacement?
What we did with MKI was a temporary measure brought on by drastic situations.
If you don't care whether ACT works to hide Rafale or ends up making the Rafale look even bigger on enemy radar, then sure it's the same.
Cuz the latter is what happens if ACT misses its mark...which it will, if it tries to spoof large AESAs.
No, that's how older radars (slotted arrays, MSAs) used to track multiple objects. AESAs don't do that cuz they don't need to. They use narrow, individual beams to track each designated target. Otherwise you are negating the LPI advantage that AESA affords you.
Each of those beams can have different properties in terms of frequency, amplitude or phase. And there'll be variance in those properties for every pulse, or even within the same pulse. The pattern of the variance is not predictable by conventional computing unless someone leaked the algorithm to your intel agencies.
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This is why a proper AESA-FCR is a nightmare to deal with. This is why everybody is dead-set on the necessity of shaping & internal weapons for future aircraft. Deflection is the only reliable way to maintain stealth in a world filled with AESAs. Even absorption through RAM/RAS will get less effective over time as IRSTs get more advanced. And then you're going to have airborne long-wavelength radars (like what Su-57 already implements, but only for IFF) which require your shaping to develop even further, with fewer & fewer discontinuities & structural aberrations (fins & tailplanes being omitted on a lot of future designs).
Back when France was experimenting with ACT (on FTBs like the one below), AESAs were extremely rare outside the West. Airborne AESA-FCRs were non-existent outside the West. So there was quite some room for Rafale to play with ACT. As far as Russia is concerned, ACT still has room to play cuz Moscow seems to be struggling to roll out AESAs like China can.
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Against China, I'd say ACT is already pretty ineffective in frontline duties. By the 2030s, it'll be useless.
If France was offering a SCAF airframe, even with no next-gen engine & avionics, that would still be worth it to indigenize. As a back-up to AMCA if nothing else. But investing into the Rafale platform at this point makes no sense. It'd be wasted money.
The question is why not use ACT to hide the drone instead of making it a flying wing with IWBs, which hinders aerodynamics & payload?
They aren't.
Dassault is simply pursuing OEM self-interest, they're well within their rights to do that.
IAF is investing into AMCA & IUSAV. And they even broke off AMCA into Mk-1 & Mk-2, cuz they're even willing to take the jet to FOC with a 4th gen engine if it means getting the airframe in hand sooner. Cuz it's the airframe they want - it's the airframe that gives AMCA even a semblance of survivability in the future battlefield against China.
IAF isn't even pressing GOI for follow-on Rafales even though we're approaching the decade mark since the first deal and the tenders aren't getting anywhere. For comparison, the MKI ToT deal was signed a mere <4 years after the first off-the-shelf buy. That showed that IAF was ready to be invested into the platform.
But for Rafale, the timeline is saying something else.
A time when according to you, ACT will be more effective than it is now and shaping will be less effective than it is now.
Like I said, they aren't allowed to say they don't unless the order is given. What the leadership believes internally, we don't know.
All we can see is their actions. AMCA funds have been greenlit, Mk-1A is ordered, follow-on Mk-1A is also close to order, Mk-2 is going ahead, just waiting on the engine. IUSAV is funded & in testing (SWiFT).
But for over 8 years, there's not a peep about additional Rafales.
And any question as to why there's not a peep has been deflected by saying "we want it through the tender". So the MRFA is like a carrot tied to the stick that's perpetually in front no matter how much the donkey walks. And it's very useful for IAF in that role.
Because as long as the MRFA carrot is present, nobody can question either IAF or MoD if at all Rafale capabilities (or the attached strings) didn't turn out the way they expected. After this many years, you have to consider the possibility that this may indeed be the case.
If we follow the MKI pattern of procurement, the deal for Rafale through the 114-jet RFI (issued in 2018) should have gone through by 2020 as we came out of the election cycle, but there was COVID so I'll give you a 1 or 2 year moratorium, so by 2022. But here we are entering 2025 and procurement hasn't moved an inch. Still no AoN, so officially MRFA didn't even start yet.
If you ask me, something happened in 2022 that changed IAF's entire internal calculus as to what kind of platform they actually need. The emergence of J-20B that year might well be one of the factors. F-35 showing up at AeroIndia the following year might've been another.
But until AMCA Mk-1 prototype emerges (should happen by 2027-28), IAF will continue to need the MRFA carrot to deflect unnecessary criticism. Unfortunately, it also means a +36 off the shelf buy becomes hard to justify due to the corner they've painted themselves into.
The review might just give them the relief they need so they can go through with the buy. After that, MRFA can be slowly put to rest as focus shifts to AMCA and Tejas Mk2 begins production.
They were very limited back then. The vast majority of systems they were up against were still pre-AESA. Even today that's still the case with Russia so the French may have thought they can ride this out. Against China we can't.
Chinese even have AESA low-level mobile gapfiller radars these days. So even flying low is not a guarantee that you won't be seen.
Meh, answered above.
I've addressed pretty much all your points. The anwers have already been repeated more than once, so there's no point in flogging that dead horse. You have no idea about tech, and refuse to do any research to support your points as well.
Anyway, the overall the topic has now shifted from will MRFA happen or not happen to will we buy or not buy 36 Rafales as stopgap before MRFA happens, 'cause now MRFA is practically guaranteed at this point. So continuing on is meaningless.
The IAF has revealed their plan ages ago (MKI, LCA, MRFA and AMCA) and it seems the govt will go through with it. So that's the end of what I have to say about that.
LCA Mk2 is the same as Mk1's airframe with some new refinements. It's like a Su-27M to Su-37 transition, which became the MKI. The refinements will continue until the final serial production model is made after the first prototype starts flying. When they say changes are going to be made, it will all be very minor, centered around incremental gains in performance.
So they have added 2 plugs, that's not going to change. They have made the airframe higher, 'cause there was enough space behind the cockpit, less drag and more internal space, so that was a good idea. And the wing has been strengthened for additional hardpoints with more payload. What's more special about the Mk2 wing is it has wingtip stations, hence the additional space for an extra pylon.
The original canard-less MK2 also came with a nose plug for IRST.
The N-LCA Mk2 came with even more changes.
The first one changed to TEDBF and the second one was abandoned. But both were based on the same airframe. So this is nothing new.
F-16 B10, B30 and B60 are all modernizations too. Mirage 2000 did not go through this. Rafale initially was supposed to go through it via something called Rafale NG, but did not happen. Dassault is talking about a Super Rafale if SCAF fails. Gripen A/C to Gripen NG is the same; both have the same airframe.
The Flanker family has undergone a lot of such modernizations. The same as the Eagle. The F-22 was also similarly ambitious.
It's all the same airframe design.
JF-17 is a modernized Mig-21 airframe. The Chinese created their own modernization of the Mig-21 called J-7, with some more modifications with the help of Grumman it became Super 7. And once Grumman left, it was renamed to FC-1 in China and JF-17 in Pakistan. So can you imagine it was born out of the Mig-21?
Just like Mk1 to Mk2, it's quite literally the same fuselage. The difference is the JF-17 have abandoned plugs and just used the standard 3 pieces with longer dimensions due to the massive timeline between the mid-80s and 2001. So you can see why LCA has so much more respect in comparison.
So among all these programs, the LCA Mk1 to LCA Mk2 transition is significantly less ambitious than what others have done, like widening fuselage in some programs, which is why our development time is also very short and is considered low risk. ADA and GoI have taken their own sweet time to begin, but that's a different issue.
War means less development funds and more money for weapons. But we are fighting a war within India, and that requires money towards development. So we are gonna stick to our peacetime plan. We are not expecting a major fight anyway.
Anyway, I did present you our squadron buildup plan, we have no immediate need for new aircraft outside of the plan. The only holdup is if the Americans are being nefarious about the LCA program as a whole.
The whole argument is arising because there's no movement on mmrca right. If it would atleast been moving, we wouldn't have been discussing this.
Window for MRFA closed in 2020 -22. If we go in for an additional 36 nos that's 2/3 rd of the order fulfilled. ORCA is not even a paper plane. MKIs we needed at least another 50 more including the 12 we're going in for especially if we're re opening the production line.
Other than the Su-57 perhaps we've really run out of realistic options as far as imports go . So we'd might as well stick to familiar territory namely indigenous products.
S400 is a meme. The Americans don't care. And especially after Ukraine the Yanks won't have any Issue selling us the f-35. We will though have to comply with a lot of their requirements. That I think we can do considering we have decent lobby in the U.S now.
The possibilities with the f-35 are endless. We would be able to have both the meteor integrated as well as integrate Israeli tech and EW.
I am not contending against definition of modernization / Upgradation etc..
But against simple 2 plugs.
Fuselage widening also happening 300 mm.
Every parameter is changing.
read somewhere, someone in HAL said difference between Mk1 and Mk1A itself huge.
That's based on our limited information. But internal mechanics within the govt indicate MMRCA 2.0 has been going on for quite sometime.
MKI MLU, LCA Mk2, MRFA and AMCA were decided on in 2022. And the IAF has been pushing for an AoN since then. And their timeframe reflects the development timelines of both Rafale F5 and Typhoon Tranche 5, both expected in 2030. A 2022-23 MRFA start date would mean a 2030-31 delivery for the IAF.
As civvies, we have known the start date since the late 2010s (2022+) but didn't know the end date (2030+). So now that its come out of the woodwork, it's easier to speculate. 8 years from now is 2033. By then Mk1A would have finished, we would have 1 or 2 squadrons of Mk2 and perhaps even Ghatak. MKI MLU and MRFA deliveries would have begun and AMCA would be on the cusp of IOC delivery.
So the plan has been established for years. The problem is while the IAF has been saying this for years, people have been more interested in what the domestic lobby has been wanting. For example, 72 more MKIs; never been mentioned by IAF, it's just HAL's wishlist, and people have decided to make it their own. But in the end, it's just a wishlist. The same as ORCA. HAL's public lobby is so powerful, they push out things as though they are in demand or are necessary; more MKIs, ORCA instead of MRFA, CATS and so on. Jaguar Max is dead, but that was also part of their PR push for quite sometime, although it had little to do with the IAF. But nothing the IAF needs.
If people stopped listening to advertisements and instead listened to the end user, things wouldn't be complicated. But people end up sticking to what they like to hear, hence the confusion.
It gets a lot worse when biases step into the picture.
The S-400 was just an excuse. The US now plans to allow Turkey to deploy both S-400 and buy F-35s. It was all just politics concerning Syria and perhaps Libya.
The fuselage wasn't widened, only the spine was more bulged. I've already pointed it out. That's what the 300mm is referring to. F-16 B50 to 50+ also came with the same modification. The change was so small they did not even bother giving it a new number.
And when they say Mk1 to Mk1A is huge, it's just internal estate changes apart from some refinement. The fuselage itself is the same, so are the wings and fins.
And words are tricky. When HAL says Mk1 to Mk1A changes are huge, it's still not as huge as F-16 B10 to B30. That would be massive. F-22 to FB-22 would be gigantic. So words like that are meaningless when it's the specifics that matter.
So in comparison, Mk1 to Mk1A is a tiny change, nothing more than what's done during an MLU. Since it's for a new build, airframe refinements and better machining are possible right from scratch. That's why they practically jumped to production from day 1 while testing avionics on Mk1 prototypes. Even the final configuration was tested on an LSP-8, so not even the serial standard, IOC-3+.
Greece will have transferred its S-300 to Ukraine long before the first of its F-35s arrive in country. You can be sure the US will do the same with Turkey before signing-off on a F-35 deal. Won't be surprised if the system lands up on an EW range in the US.
Multistatic radars are an important element in the development of detection and air warfare technologies.
Multistatic radars
Multistatic radars use several transmitters and receivers in different positions to detect targets. This enables them to bypass certain limitations of traditional radars by taking advantage of several observation angles.
This architecture is particularly effective against stealth aircraft, because even if an aircraft minimises its radar signature in the direction of a specific transmitter (as in the case of shape stealth), it is harder to do so simultaneously for several receivers in different locations.
Shape Stealth detection
Shape stealth is designed to deflect radar waves away from the transmitter. However, multistatic radars can pick up signals reflected in other directions, making this technique less effective.
Active Cancellation on the Rafale
Active cancellation is an advanced technology used by the Rafale, which consists of transmitting signals to cancel detectable radar echoes. This approach is more adaptable to different radar configurations, including multistatic radars.
Unlike form stealth, active cancellation can be adjusted in real time to counter different types of detection, offering greater operational flexibility.
Connected combat
In a connected combat environment, fighter aircraft, UAVs and ground surveillance systems share data in real time, improving target detection and tracking. Multistatic radars fit perfectly into this framework, creating a dense detection network that can track stealth aircraft with increased precision.
Conclusion
The rise of multistatic radars marks an important limit to form stealth, while technologies such as the Rafale's active cancellation remain relevant in this evolving environment. This argument highlights the need for an integrated and flexible technological approach to maintain air superiority in the face of these new threats.
Detection systems are becoming multispectral, using a combination of radar, infrared and other sensors to identify stealth targets.
Formal stealth focuses on reducing the radar signature through the physical design of the aircraft, minimising the surfaces that reflect radar waves back to the transmitter.
This method, although effective in certain scenarios, is limited in the face of increasingly advanced radar systems and multispectral detection techniques.
Electronic stealth is evolving rapidly and can manipulate electronic signals to jam, mask or fool enemy radars.
It offers greater flexibility because it can be continually updated and improved to counter new threats, unlike form stealth which is more rigid once the aircraft has been designed.
The Rafale, although less stealthy in terms of form than the F-35, relies on superior survivability thanks to a combination of :
This means that electronic stealth and active countermeasures will become increasingly crucial, as they can adapt in real time to these emerging threats, unlike form stealth.
Conclusion
Electronic stealth appears to be the future of air survival, outperforming form stealth in an increasingly sophisticated environment. Your observations underline the importance of not focusing solely on the physical aspects of stealth, but of considering an integrated approach to maximising the overall survivability of combat aircraft.
Formal stealth focuses on reducing the radar signature through the physical design of the aircraft, minimising the surfaces that reflect radar waves back to the transmitter.
This method, although effective in certain scenarios, is limited in the face of increasingly advanced radar systems and multispectral detection techniques.
Electronic stealth is evolving rapidly and can manipulate electronic signals to jam, mask or fool enemy radars.
It offers greater flexibility because it can be continually updated and improved to counter new threats, unlike form stealth which is more rigid once the aircraft has been designed.
The Rafale, although less stealthy in terms of form than the F-35, relies on superior survivability thanks to a combination of :
- Superior agility.
- Advanced electronic warfare.
- Optimised deployment tactics.
This means that electronic stealth and active countermeasures will become increasingly crucial, as they can adapt in real time to these emerging threats, unlike form stealth.
Conclusion
Electronic stealth appears to be the future of air survival, outperforming form stealth in an increasingly sophisticated environment. Your observations underline the importance of not focusing solely on the physical aspects of stealth, but of considering an integrated approach to maximising the overall survivability of combat aircraft.
Here's a key concept in the evolution of modern military doctrines: man-machine interoperability in increasingly connected and automated combat environments.
Manned vectors as conductors
Manned fighter aircraft will become primarily command and control platforms, coordinating the operations of a swarm of drones.
These drones could be divided into two main types:
Crew protection
Protecting the lives of crews will become a key priority. This means designing manned vectors that can:
Survivability redefined
Survivability will no longer be just a question of armour or stealth, but of mobility, connectivity and responsiveness to threats.
Manned platforms will need to be capable of rapid relocation, jamming and evasion, while providing remote command of their drones.
Cyber robustness and the resilience of communications networks will be fundamental to avoid any interruption in the chain of command.
New Operational Doctrine
In this configuration, missions will be executed by swarms of UAVs, with manned vectors playing the role of strategic analysts and decision-makers.
The doctrine would emphasise network-centric warfare, where each unit contributes to a dynamic combat ecosystem, with manned delivery systems at the apex of this structure.
This model aims to maximise operational effectiveness while minimising risks to human crews, relying on the autonomous capabilities of UAVs and the resilience of communications systems.
Manned vectors as conductors
Manned fighter aircraft will become primarily command and control platforms, coordinating the operations of a swarm of drones.
These drones could be divided into two main types:
- Effectors: tasked with offensive missions (strikes, interference, etc.).
- Sensors: dedicated to intelligence gathering (surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare).
Crew protection
Protecting the lives of crews will become a key priority. This means designing manned vectors that can:
- Avoid high-threat areas thanks to improved situational awareness, provided by sensor drones and data networks.
- Maintain a safe distance while remaining close enough to direct drones effectively.
Survivability redefined
Survivability will no longer be just a question of armour or stealth, but of mobility, connectivity and responsiveness to threats.
Manned platforms will need to be capable of rapid relocation, jamming and evasion, while providing remote command of their drones.
Cyber robustness and the resilience of communications networks will be fundamental to avoid any interruption in the chain of command.
New Operational Doctrine
In this configuration, missions will be executed by swarms of UAVs, with manned vectors playing the role of strategic analysts and decision-makers.
The doctrine would emphasise network-centric warfare, where each unit contributes to a dynamic combat ecosystem, with manned delivery systems at the apex of this structure.
This model aims to maximise operational effectiveness while minimising risks to human crews, relying on the autonomous capabilities of UAVs and the resilience of communications systems.
MRFA is all empty talk unless Air Headquarters receives AoN from DAC. They have not been able to make it happen in the last 5 years, and even if it moves forward, the contract won't happen in the next 5 years.
Dreamers keep dreaming.
Greek SAM is long due for replacement. And for now the Turks are claiming they will be able to operate both. I guess time will tell.
Russia is apparently happy to sell S-400 to the US for testing. The versions are different for each country. The hardware itself is nothing special.