Can the future Rafale F5 standard evolve into a Super Rafale?
A few days ago, the first F4.1 standard Rafale was delivered to the Centre d'Expertise Aérienne Militaire, or CEAM, at Mont-de-Marsan Air Base 118. This new standard will provide the Rafale with much needed new capabilities, such as the helmet-mounted sight, new air-to-air and air-to-ground modes of its engagement system, extended data fusion and a fully upgraded SPECTRA self-protection system. In addition, the aircraft will be able to operate new munitions such as the MICA NG short- and medium-range air-to-air missile, which promises to be the best in its class, as was the MICA in the early 2000s; the new 1000 kg A2SM heavy precision and propelled bomb capable of eliminating the most hardened bunkers, as well as the new Talios designation pod. All Rafale F3Rs currently in service with the French air force and navy, as well as probably exported aircraft, will be upgraded to this standard in the coming years. As for the new aircraft to be delivered from 2025 onwards, they will be delivered to the F4.2 standard, which offers the same functionalities, but which prepares the arrival of a major evolution of the Rafale to come, the F5 standard.
The previous standards enabled the evolution of the first F1s of the French Navy, limited to air-to-air missions, and the F2s of the French Air Force, dedicated to air-to-ground missions, towards the F3 standard, then the F3R omni-purpose, and then the F4.1, which enables the Rafale to approach the famous 5th generation thanks to its enhanced data processing capabilities. On the other hand, the F5 standard, and before it the F4.2 which paved the way for it, represented a major evolution of the aircraft both in the technological and capability fields, forcing the Rafale to evolve physically to accommodate the new systems and equipment. As a first consequence, Rafales prior to the F4.2 version will not be able to fully evolve towards this standard, and it is likely that a double evolution branch will emerge from the F4 standard. Above all, the F5 will have capabilities that will allow it to approach not the 5th generation of fighter aircraft such as the F-35 or Su-57, but the 6th generation SCAF or NGAD.
Indeed, the Rafale F5 will have capabilities that break with previous standards, such as the implementation of the new ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missile that will replace the ASMPA-Re, the new cruise and anti-ship missiles resulting from the Franco-British FMAN and FMC programmes, as well as, most likely, a new anti-radar munition, as the F5 must be able to penetrate and evolve over non-permissive environments that are strongly defended by the anti-aircraft means that will exist in 2035 and beyond. Above all, the Rafale F5 will have to operate and control combat UAVs such as the Remote Carrier being developed within the framework of the SCAF programme, which will enable it to considerably extend its detection and engagement capabilities, as these UAVs are specifically designed to carry detectors (radar, electro-optical systems, electronic listening systems, etc.) or effectors (missiles, bombs, jamming or electronic warfare systems, etc.).
It is precisely this last capability that will allow the Rafale F5 to claim to be the 6th generation of fighter aircraft, or at least as coming close to it. Because of the immense technological and capability progress characterising this standard, its development will undoubtedly be longer than the previous ones, since the aircraft will not enter service before 2035, and most probably the most expensive, even if part of the developments will be shared with the SCAF programme. However, the F5 will not, strictly speaking, constitute a new aircraft, even though it will break with one of the most attractive characteristics of the Rafale for both French and foreign armies, namely its upgradability. In this context, would it not be appropriate to develop not a new standard, but a genuine new aircraft derived from the Rafale F4, as the Gripen E/F was with respect to the Gripen C/D, the F/A-18E Super Hornet with respect to the F/A-18C/D Hornet, or the Super Etendard with respect to the Etendard IV?
To answer this question, it is necessary to define, first of all, what a Super Rafale could be, particularly in relation to the Rafale F5, which, in a way, could already claim this qualification. Indeed, there is no question of a possible new aircraft not offering at least the same capabilities as the F5.
On the other hand, because of a significantly redesigned aircraft, it would be possible to provide it with certain characteristics lacking in the F5, such as increased stealth, in particular through the use of an ammunition bay and a shape and materials better adapted to this need, but also better performance, whether it be speed to guarantee Supercruise even with drag (canisters, ammunition), flight autonomy thanks to larger (compliant? ), or carrying capacities, in particular to use the Remote Carrier, which is itself armed. To meet these needs while retaining the advantages of its predecessor, the Super Rafale should be larger and heavier than the Rafale, but also have more powerful propulsion.
However, in order to reduce development costs, the Super Rafale will be able to rely on the technological pillars of the Rafale, such as the M88 turbojet engine, since Safran has repeatedly stated that it is possible to bring this engine up to 8.5 or even 9 tonnes of thrust per unit; the RBE2 AESA antenna radar, which offers excellent performance and scalability, the new SPECTRA self-protection system for the Rafale F4, as well as the Rafale's numerous munitions (Meteor missile, MICA NG, SCALP-EG/AM39 Exocet and their FMC/FMAN replacements, A2SM propelled bombs, etc.) .). In other words, the Super Rafale would be, in this model, a sort of logical outcome of the Rafale F5 principle, in order to bring the airframe, the on-board systems and the sensors and effectors into complete adequacy with the reality of future missions, while optimising its evolutionary and commercial potential.
The Super Rafale would, in a way, completely reset the aircraft's evolutionary potential, since the airframe and on-board systems would be redesigned precisely to meet future evolutionary needs foreseeable in 2025, and which could not be foreseen in 1990 when the Rafale was designed. For example, the locations where critical on-board systems, such as the radar, are housed could be resized and optimised to anticipate the arrival of larger, more mobile systems or systems requiring increased power generation or cooling capacity. Similarly, a Super Rafale's networks could also be sized to carry the volumes of data or electrical power needed to power these new systems, while the turbojet engines and APU (auxiliary power unit allowing onboard systems to operate with engines off, but also to start up autonomously) will have to provide the additional electrical power required. Put another way, a Super Rafale would by definition offer a much greater potential for scalability and adaptability than a Rafale F5, even if partially redesigned for this purpose.
In fact, the Super Rafale would represent an important opportunity for the French DTIB to continue exporting the aircraft beyond 2030, whereas the Rafale F5 will probably have difficulty convincing because it is too closely related to an aircraft that is over 35 years old, while other modern models, such as the South Korean KF21 Boramae from 2025, and the British Tempest from 2035, will offer much more modern capabilities, not to mention the probable arrival of Russian (Su-57e, Su-75? ) or Chinese (FC-31/J-35) 5th generation aircraft on the international market. Moreover, by building on the Rafale's excellent reputation in terms of performance and reliability, while offering renewed capabilities putting the Super Rafale halfway between the 5th and 6th generations, the new French fighter would position itself on a market in strong demand but lacking in adapted and reliable offers, in particular for the Western sphere.
In this respect, and beyond a renewed export potential for at least two decades, the Super Rafale could be a perfect support for international cooperation, so as to reduce its budgetary weight, perhaps even significantly below the planned weight of the F5 standard. In Europe, Greece and Belgium have already indicated that they are ready to commit themselves industrially and financially to the development of a new-generation aircraft, which would undoubtedly be the Super Rafale. Sweden, for its part, could see this as an excellent opportunity to co-develop its Flygvapnet 2030 programme which aims to design the successor to the Gripen E/F. Beyond the old continent, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, both Rafale operators, are facing important trade-offs for the replacement of their respective F-16 fleets, while both are aiming to develop their own DITBs. This is also the case of Saudi Arabia for the replacement of its Tornado and part of its F-15, Riad having already opened some doors in Paris on this subject, while trying, without much success, to get on board the FCAS programme gathering Great Britain, Italy and Japan.
It is important to note, however, that a Super Rafale programme would in no way threaten the SCAF programme that brings together France, Germany and Spain, quite the contrary. Indeed, SCAF aims to develop an aircraft fully designed ab initio for the 6th generation, and which should fly until 2100 according to its designers.
The Super Rafale, on the other hand, aims to provide a transitional platform between the current Rafale and the SCAF, with a more limited life span between 2035 and 2065/2070. Moreover, SCAF will be heavier, more complex and probably more expensive than Super Rafale, precisely because of its increased ambitions. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that the current target timetable for SCAF, i.e. entry into service by 2040, is clearly optimistic, to say the least. If the European programme were to slip, because of its technological ambitions but also because of the inevitable political difficulties and industrial disputes that have already slowed down its development, the Super Rafale would enable the French armed forces, but also the industrialists, to remain successful on the operational and commercial scene. Finally, if SCAF were to fail, which cannot be ruled out, the Super Rafale programme would give France the necessary time to serenely develop another programme, alone or with new partners.
In this respect, the Super Rafale programme could even help to reduce tensions within the SCAF programme. Indeed, beyond the issues of divergent deadlines linked to the arrival of the F-35 in Germany (and probably in Spain), the Super Rafale programme would make it possible to preserve French industrial skills threatened by industrial sharing within the SCAF programme, notably in the field of onboard systems, munitions and drones, simulation and the cloud. On the other hand, it would simplify SCAF, for example by removing from the programme the airborne capability demanded only by France, and which is frequently put forward by Berlin as an example of the much-dreaded "Germany pays for France". Paradoxically, if the French navy were to equip itself with Super Rafales rather than NGFs, it would also very probably be possible to reduce the dimensions of the future New Generation Aircraft Carrier or NGC, but also of its catapults, which would lead to a significant reduction in design and construction costs, to the point that it might even be possible, on the basis of a 50. This would significantly reduce both design and construction costs, to the extent that it might even be possible, on the basis of a 50,000-tonne ship designed to operate Super Rafales, to build two ships for the price of a single 75,000-tonne heavy PANG designed for NGFs.
It should also be noted that a heavier Super Rafale, but affiliated to the Rafale, would allow the French air force and navy to develop a specific version of the aircraft dedicated to suppressing enemy anti-aircraft defences, as was the case for Boeing's EA-18G Growler based on the F/A-18F Super Hornet. Indeed, an aircraft of this type is necessarily two-seater, to meet the workload in the cockpit, and must have increased electrical production and data transfer capabilities compared to a traditional fighter. However, it is precisely this same specification that applies to the development of the Super Rafale, which, instead of powerful jammers and anti-radiation missiles, will have to implement Remote Carriers, which also imply an increased workload, probably requiring a two-man crew, and increased energy and communication capacities. In other words, the Super Rafale would constitute, by its design, a platform of choice for the development of a SEAD version of the aircraft, while the Growler production will end in 2025, and no other aircraft of this type is being prepared in the West.
As we can see, the question of developing a Super Rafale in place of the Rafale F5 really arises, as the opportunities outweigh the risks, and the strengths neutralise the weaknesses of such a programme. What's more, it is relatively easy to remove the doubt as to whether the aircraft will indeed have the expected international appeal, since it would be sufficient to raise the subject of cooperation on this programme with the Greek, Emilian or Saudi authorities, and to evaluate their responses to determine the viability of the programme. It is rare that a major programme such as this can be subject to such an indisputable and trivial Go-No Go arbitration.
