The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions
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Making ‘Quad Plus’ a Reality
On January 6, 2022, Japan and Australia signed a “landmark” defense treaty, the Reciprocal Access Agreement, to elevate their bilateral defense cooperation in the face of China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific region. The joint statement explicitly mentioned the growing collaboration among the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) nations –Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – to “drive forward coordinated responses to the most pressing challenges” in the region. The “informal grouping” – sometime known as the Quad 2.0 – was revived in 2017 after a 10-year gap, and has since redoubled efforts to consolidate security partnerships and regional cooperation between members. The recently-concluded Australia-Japan treaty aims to inject further momentum to the Quad 2.0, which held its first-in-person leaders’ summit in September 2021, albeit under the shadow of the AUKUS (Australia-U.K.-U.S.) defense pact announcement. Notably, Tokyo is set to host the second Quad summit in 2022.In this context, the concept of the “Quad Plus,” which has been in circulation for quite some time but remained abstract so far, becomes increasingly important in the current geopolitical scene, where post-AUKUS tensions are running high even among allies. How can the Quad Plus move beyond an abstract idea and consolidate as a regular political grouping?
In 2020, the Quad Plus framework found its first footing outside the parameters of roundtable conferences (where the idea has been in motion since 2013). On March 20, representatives from South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand were included in the weekly Quad meeting. In May, the intent for the Plus format was strengthened when the United States hosted a meeting of Quad nations, which also included Brazil, Israel, and South Korea, to discuss a global response to COVID-19.
The importance of multi-sectoral cooperation and convergence in the larger interest of the global community among like-minded countries is the need of this fragile post-COVID era. This is nowhere more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific, where the Quad intends to write “shared futures” through “new collaboration opportunities.”
The Quad Plus can represent one such critical opportunity. Moving forward, the Plus format can be framed as a “conjectural alliance” that abides by universalism, rule of law, democratic ideals, and free and open maritime domains. Overall, the idea of Quad Plus refers to a minilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific that draws from the Quad to include other crucial emerging economies. At the same time, it offers a multipolar lens through which we can view, analyze, and assess the strategic multilateral growth of the nations involved.
Hence, it is not necessary to view the Quad Plus as an extension of the Quad. While the former has largely focused on creating a cooperative framework to tackle shared international challenges, like the pandemic-induced economic and public health concerns, the Quad has remained a more strategic dialogue that has looked at maritime, technological, infrastructural, and health challenges through the lens of security. Concurrently, the need to view the Plus framework in isolation is equally incorrect, especially with the release of the “Spirit of the Quad” joint statement, which highlighted the Quad’s own growing focus on avenues like global health, vaccination, infrastructure, critical technologies, and climate.
Rather, the Quad Plus must be viewed as link between the four founding nations and emerging global powers (via new joint initiatives or programs) that are relevant to regional prosperity, peace, and stability. Such a connect could perhaps first emerge on a rotational basis through bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral cooperation. The Quad’s outreach should not be limited to regional states (like Vietnam or South Korea) either, but also include like-minded partners in other regions such as the European Union and the U.K., which are stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific. The EU, for example, is a natural candidate owing to its close partnerships with India, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly after the release of its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the 300 billion-euro global connectivity strategy, Golden Gateway. So is the U.K., which has recently unveiled its Global Britain program that contains its own vision for the Indo-Pacific.
Expanding the Quad’s Horizons
The format will potentially expand the Quad’s horizons in terms of pluralism and inclusivity by inviting new and emerging powers to the fold. Such states can collaborate with the Quad’s new and niche initiatives (including its new working groups on climate and critical and emerging technology) to support, strengthen, and enhance value-driven, sustainable shared interests globally, as well as reiterate the support for ASEAN centrality. Moreover, Quad Plus partners can be included via newly-instituted projects like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI, comprising Japan, Australia, and India), which seeks to reduce dependence on China and build resilient supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region.
Further, the implementation of national initiatives by Quad partners has enhanced the sphere of influence they wield, both individually and as a grouping, in the Indo-Pacific. By way of the Quad Plus narrative, an expanded outreach of ventures like Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), the U.S.-led Group of Seven (G-7) venture Build Back Better World (B3W), India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), Australia’s Pacific Step-Up, and the multilateral SCRI can, and must, be promoted. Quad Plus countries like Vietnam, New Zealand, Brazil, Israel, and South Korea can become crucial partners within such national initiatives.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the AUKUS announcement, which has caused a rift in Transatlantic ties, re-energizing Europe’s growing demands for strategic autonomy, the Quad Plus emerges as an expansion – not necessarily an extension – of the Quad. It will allow the creation of a “continental connect” and “corridor of communication,” revealing independent and direct links to Asian economies for the EU, beyond a U.S.-led entry.
Beyond Anti-China Rhetoric: Gains From Quad Plus
The Quad is a not a formal military alliance, even as it holds military/maritime drills like MALABAR among like-minded partners. However, in recent years, as the global geopolitical situation has worsened, the ongoing China-U.S. trade war has reignited the debate on the “Thucydides Trap.” At the same time, the post-COVID order has emphasized the “Kindleberger Trap” that posits China as a weak power in terms of providing public goods. Therefore, the Quad’s resurgence amid an increasingly volatile world and a militarist – though “weak” – China has given it a “new focus” to enhance “economic and environmental resilience,” as well as bolster “security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”
The Quad has been particularly critical in escalating the bilateral and trilateral security cooperation between member states. Although the
Against this scenario, the Quad Plus can emerge as an intermediary or pacifier with its intent to go beyond the China trope: While accepting realistic national security threats, a Quad Plus system allows participating nations to create a strategic alignment that might indicate a growing, or temporary, embrace of a U.S.-led order in the Indo-Pacific region while still not becoming part of a set “alliance framework.” Here, it is important to remember that countries like South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam were largely included in the format because of their success in handling the COVID-19 pandemic within their borders.
However, should the Quad Plus format gain new impetus and new objectives, these states will likely not be willing to openly participate in or espouse any format that appears to be China-centric (or rather, anti-China), while they share elaborate economic ties with Beijing. Even though economic and trade ties with China are witnessing more scrutiny in the post-COVID-19 order, with nations aiming to create more resilient and sustainable supply chains, China’s vise-like hold on the world economy is unlikely to be upended. Nonetheless, there are ways to reduce the global reliance on China – as the SCRI highlighted through its efforts to explore possibilities for diversification via collaborations of like-minded countries and public-private partnership programs. Additionally, the Quad Plus could also consider making room for China, which is still a dominant economic force, in its dialogue mechanism so as to promote China-U.S. bonhomie in the interest of safeguarding regional prosperity and stability.
Ultimately, the Quad Plus format is now its nascent stages; however uncertain, its future holds immense potential. In a post-COVID-19 world, where the pre-existing economic and political vulnerabilities have exacerbated and created havoc, this kind of alternative framework could not only help facilitate the provision of global public goods, but also reconfigure the global governance systems – and therein lies the essential capital of a Quad Plus grouping.
Making ‘Quad Plus’ a Reality
Japan’s hosting of the Quad summit this year is the perfect opportunity to bring other partners on board. But how?
thediplomat.com
Toward a Quadrilateral Intelligence Sharing Network?
The primary aim of intelligence is to know the intentions and capabilities of adversaries to ensure a state’s security. However due to the sensitive and resource-intensive nature of intelligence collection, it can also function as a confidence-building measure between states. Given the growing prominence of the Indo-Pacific region in the United States’ national security priorities, is the time ripe for the U.S. to formalize an intelligence-sharing network with Quad partners Australia, Japan, and India?A Patchwork of Quadrilateral Intelligence Capabilities
The United States provides gradations of intelligence sharing with its allies and partners, the deepest ties being to Britain, Australia, and Canada built on the UKUSA treaty — the foundation of the Five Eyes network — for cooperation in signals intelligence (SIGINT). In addition to its SIGINT agreement, in 2008 the U.S. and Australia signed an agreement for “intensified co-operation and intelligence sharing in the field of GEOINT – geospatial intelligence,” where the U.S. provided support for Australia to obtain an imagery satellite through which Australia could gather information that it would share with the U.S. and its allies.
While not a member of Five Eyes, Japan as a U.S. treaty partner has established bilateral defense intelligence sharing. Beyond this, Japan signed the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement in 2012, which “lays the foundation for information sharing and information cooperation between Japan and Australia, and is expected to further strengthen Japan-Australia security cooperation.” In 2020 Japan expanded its state secrets law to broaden the scope of its defense intelligence sharing beyond the U.S. to include Australia, India, Britain, and France, to promote broader cooperation as well as joint developments of defense equipment.
India has also made efforts to ramp up its intelligence sharing capabilities with other Quad states, despite lacking an alliance with any of them. It signed General Security of Military Information Agreements (GSOMIA) with the United States and Japan, but of particular importance was the 2020 signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) between India and the United States. Going beyond other agreements that enabled military logistics and secure communications, BECA strengthens India’s ability to collect, process and produce GEOINT data, further enabling interoperability among Quad states.
Toward a Quadrilateral GEOINT network?
Clearly the Quad states have made inroads in formalizing intelligence sharing through GEOINT, but perhaps this isn’t surprising given the critical role it has played since the Quad’s inception. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) harnessed its collection and analysis assets to provide timely information to responders. NGA assessments also provided the framework for the U.S. response to Japan’s 2011 triple disaster. With its ability to greatly enhance humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, GEOINT likely provided Quad states the means — during a crisis — to build trust. As U.S. intelligence expert Mark Lowenthal notes in his book, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” “exchanging useful intelligence is a good way for nations to build confidence in one another.”
Of course, states must prioritize safeguarding the integrity of their intelligence sources and methods, but under appropriate circumstances intelligence sharing can advance common objectives, particularly in a rapidly changing security environment where retaining primacy in collecting, processing, and analyzing information is a Sisyphean task, even for the U.S.
Despite the progress, two main challenges remain for the Quad’s intelligence sharing. The first has to do with incongruent national intelligence systems, or rather “dissimilar information platforms and national classification of intelligence products.” While the former issue is somewhat nullified in the Quad’s GEOINT developments since U.S. technology (satellites) is primarily relied upon, the latter concern is one that needs continuous effort. However, these issues of interoperability are likely to be overcome in the medium term with focused efforts to address their shortcomings.
The larger challenge to formalizing a Quad intelligence-network is China. China’s perception of the Quad as a counterbalance to its position as a leader in the Indo-Pacific is one that the Quad states take seriously. They have refrained from openly naming China as a common threat and rationale for their collaboration; however, their alignment on preserving a “free and open Indo-Pacific” underscores their concerns about deterring coercive behavior, particularly in the maritime domain. This will likely prevent public acknowledgement of any formal Quad mechanisms with national security implications, but it shouldn’t slow the integration of Quad GEOINT capabilities.
While SIGINT can be viewed as particularly intrusive by target states, the growth of commercial GEOINT has democratized access to imagery. Indeed, satellite imagery can support intelligence gathering like tracking troop and fleet movements, of key concern to India and Japan, who watch China’s movements closely. But GEOINT provides users with information critical to non-traditional defense missions as well, those related to climate change, IUU fishing, mass migration, HA/DR, and pandemic mitigation, a growing set of threats on the horizon that will also affect China.
Toward a Quadrilateral Intelligence Sharing Network?
Is the time ripe for the U.S. to formalize an intelligence-sharing network with Quad partners Australia, Japan, and India?
thediplomat.com
Japan and allies look to hold 'Quad' foreign minister talks in February
Japan, the United States, Australia and India — the grouping known as ‘the Quad’ — are considering holding talks involving their foreign ministers in mid-February in Australia, diplomatic sources said Wednesday.The gathering of the ministers, if realized, would be their first in-person meeting since October 2020, taking place ahead of a summit of the Quad nations’ leaders that Japan plans to host in spring with the aim of further showcasing the four Indo-Pacific democracies’ deepening ties amid China’s rising clout in the region.
Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar are expected to attend the talks. The meeting could be switched to a virtual format depending on the COVID-19 situation, the sources said.
Among likely agenda items for the meeting are members’ cooperation in such fields as security and the economy toward realizing a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” and concerns over Beijing’s military assertiveness in the East and South China seas, according to the sources.
The ministers are also expected to confirm progress in their cooperation, agreed on at the previous Quad summit in Washington in September, in infrastructure building in the Indo-Pacific region, utilization of outer space and bolstering of the semiconductor supply chain, the sources said.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed to hold the next Quad summit in Japan in spring during their bilateral virtual meeting on Friday.
The four nations plan to hold their leaders meeting every year.
Japan and allies look to hold 'Quad' foreign minister talks in February
Among likely agenda items for the meeting are members' cooperation in such fields as security and the economy toward realizing a 'free and open Indo-Pacific.'
France belongs in the Quad
The announcement last year of a security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to procure nuclear submarines sent shockwaves across the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS promises to transform America’s force posture in the region and build the foundations of an integrated strategy to respond to China’s rise as a military power.
Yet from the outset AUKUS faced major criticism, not so much from China as from America’s oldest ally, France. Paris accused Washington of a ‘stab in the back’ after Australia ‘blindsided’ France with the unceremonious termination of a $60 billion contract with the French shipbuilder Naval Group to develop a fleet of diesel–electric submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. Since it was agreed in 2016, France had hailed the contract as a pillar of Paris’s defence engagement and enduring security commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Today, that robust strategic posture is in tatters.
The loss of the contract and France’s overall exclusion from AUKUS demonstrated Europe’s increasingly marginal role in Asian security affairs. This is despite attempts by France and Germany to support freedom-of-navigation operations in defiance of China’s actions in the South China Sea. Were these manoeuvres not enough to convince Washington that the European Union offered a robust commitment to Asia?
A careful study of France’s strategic interests reveals that the republic could never become the fully integrated military ally the US desires in the Indo-Pacific. Historically, modern France was torn between continental and maritime security responsibilities. Despite its attempts to form an overseas empire to rival Britain (which failed), France’s core security interests remained in Europe—and particularly after two world wars with the perennial threat of Germany. That experience taught France that it can’t rely on the UK, let alone the US, to maintain its security. The seas acted as a natural barrier for the Anglo-Saxon states not available to the Gallic French.
In the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle defined France’s uniquely autonomous relationship with the NATO alliance. According to the ‘Gaullist’ foreign policy, France withdrew from the joint military command structure of NATO and pursued its own nuclear deterrent independently from the UK and the US. That effectively allowed France to remain a core partner of NATO without committing any forces to the defence of the continent in the event it decided not to contest a determined Soviet breakthrough into West Germany. And in the event of Germany’s—or Britain’s—re-emergence as a significant security threat, France maintained its independent nuclear deterrent.
A strong Anglo-Saxon alliance with Britain and Australia is now emerging as part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Frankly, that is precisely what the US requires to tackle the challenge posed by China at sea. The UK and Australia are both bound to the US by history, by military alliances and through the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partnership, which also includes Canada and New Zealand. AUKUS therefore has the potential to become an integrated defence partnership in a manner impossible for the sovereigntist French or the larger European Union.
Certainly, France doesn’t lack significant interests in the region. It maintains French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and the relatively large island of New Caledonia—home to France’s largest military station in the region—a status threatened by a contested independence referendum. It also has a series of dependencies in the Indian Ocean, most notably Mayotte and Reunion. There are some 1.6 million French citizens residing across the Indo-Pacific protected by a complement of 7,000 forces and 12 naval vessels permanently stationed in theatre. It has a larger presence in the region than the UK, which only maintains 1,000 Gurkhas in theatre in Brunei Darussalam.
What, then, is the appropriate level of Franco-American security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? Given France’s historical autonomous security policy, the US can’t integrate its military forces to the same level as the Five Eyes nations, which are bound by agreements to promote seamless interoperability among their armed forces. What the US needs is an institution to include France as an emerging security partner to deter China, but one that respects strategic autonomy. Of course, it already has such a mechanism in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan and Australia.
The idea of a ‘Quad-plus’ arrangement isn’t new, and it has been specifically floated to include a more robust French presence in the region. But considering that France is itself an Indo-Pacific power—barring a series of independence referendums across all its possessions—there seems to be no real obstacle to fully integrating this discontented ally into the Quad. Paris has recognised the potential of the Quad nations for some time. There’s already a France–India–Australia trilateral on maritime safety and a Japan–Australia–France trilateral on South Pacific affairs. This relationship is buttressed by profitable defence contracts, including a US$9.4 billion contract to sell Rafale fighter jets to India, now mired in corruption allegations.
The real obstacle is Franco-Australian relations. While the damage to Franco-American relations has subsided, the damage to Franco-Australian relations may persist for years to come—unless Canberra and Paris agree to mend their differences, an outcome both countries need. Even if offered, Paris may choose not to join the multilateral format of the Quad in defiance of Australia’s role. That would render both a Quad-plus and any existing trilateral forums defunct. But without a larger institutional framework, a Franco-Indian declaration to ‘act jointly’ in the region and France’s revitalised ties with Japan will only remain diplomatic posturing in response to AUKUS.
The solution is, as always, diplomacy. It will require the US to engage directly with the two allied nations to restore strong ties in support of its larger, shared strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. That vision is clear: whereas the AUKUS nations are part of a singular, interoperable alliance command, the Quad-plus is a coalition that agrees to work jointly with the US to deter the shared challenge of China, but that ultimately retain varying levels of strategic autonomy.
While ‘the Quintuplet’ may not be the most attractive name for such an organisation, it is effectively what the US should form in order to reconcile and find an appropriate level of strategic cooperation with France. The Quad offers France everything it desires—a relevant military role tempered by its Gaullist autonomist traditions. That may not make up for a lost contract, but it will institutionalise security cooperation with France in a manner most conducive to the defence of the Indo-Pacific.
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Nevertheless, in an increasingly complex multipolar world order, an insulated and restricted alliance has its limitations; a more inclusive forum within AUKUS’ minilateral setting can therefore be imperative to overcome obstacles and have a greater impact. What would an augmented AUKUS encompass? Does inclusivity necessarily imply a formal expansion, or, can the pact allow for a more abstract “Plus” network among “like-minded” Indo-Pacific partners without resorting to an expanded partnership? And what would be the scope of a potential Plus framework? Europe, as well as Indo-Pacific powers like India, Japan and South Korea can be prospective “AUKUS Plus” partners and engage in issues-based collaborations with AUKUS, such as cooperating on common issues like supply chains.
AUKUS Plus Europe: Seeds of Collaboration Amid Fallout?
The secrecy that underlaid the formation of AUKUS and the unilateral cancellation of the $90 billion Franco-Australian submarine deal severely affected the transatlantic relationship. To make matters worse, the AUKUS announcement overshadowed the launch of the European Union’s “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” the bloc’s autonomous attempt to enhance its Indo-Pacific footprint. This unfortunate timing, which caught the EU unaware, was an embarrassing moment for Europe. It not only caused a rift between long-standing partners but also strengthened calls for greater strategic autonomy within the EU.
Yet, despite the cracks in transatlantic ties that AUKUS exposed, the United States and Europe share a long history and shared values, perceptions, and challenges; it is therefore unlikely that the rift will be permanent. Already, the secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has said that the pact was not “directed against NATO or Europe,” and that NATO would continue to work closely with its Indo-Pacific partners, namely New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea on cyber and maritime security, among other issues. Biden has also made efforts to reach out to Europe, especially France, to smooth ties and attempt to find new common ground to sustain transatlantic ties. In the future, cooperation between AUKUS and NATO – the bedrock for European security – cannot be ruled out, particularly as Europe faces “new challenges” from Russia and China.
AUKUS Plus Japan, India, and South Korea: Allaying Regional Security Concerns?
AUKUS’ first core initiative looks to assist Australia in building nuclear-powered submarines to bolster “interoperability, commonality, and mutual benefit” without compromising nuclear non-proliferation, security, and safety commitments. Naturally, its nuclear focus has been controversial, triggering concerns in allies and rivals alike over the possibility that AUKUS will spur an arms race and lax non-proliferation standards in the Indo-Pacific.
For example, North Korea and China condemned the deal as one that would “upset the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region,” “severely [damage] regional peace… and [intensify] the arms race.” New Zealand, an Anglosphere country and Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partner of the AUKUS states, announced that it would uphold its long-standing ban on nuclear submarines entering its waters (in line with its nuclear-free policy) and deny (still hypothetical) Australian nuclear subs entry. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members like Indonesia and Malaysia, too, have expressed similar reservations. Even U.S. treaty ally Japan, while welcoming AUKUS as a “strengthening engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” has refrained from mentioning the nuclear submarine focus – indicating that it remains uncomfortable with the nuclear aspect and its potential implications. Here, engaging with regional powers through a ‘Plus’ framework can help ally regional security concerns and make AUKUS a more accepted framework in the region.
Japan
Japan, particularly, shares a security treaty with the United States and close security ties with Australia and the U.K.; it would hence be a natural addition to an AUKUS Plus forum. Japan’s ambassador to Australia, Yamagami Shingo, has already hinted that Tokyo would be willing to participate in AUKUS initiatives on AI and cybersecurity – a sentiment reiterated by former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who remains an influential entity in the ruling party.
The use of nuclear propulsion technology is a highly controversial topic in Japan, largely owing to its history with nuclear weapons and a constitutional commitment to pacifism. Hence, any cooperation between Japan and AUKUS will likely not involve the nuclear element, but rather come as ad hoc cooperation on shared issues (like critical technology development) that help strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance in face of shared challenges, particularly in the maritime domain. This could, for instance, include collaboration in efforts to patrol the East and South China Seas. As a step in this direction, Japan and Australia recently inked a landmark defense agreement that builds on the AUKUS deal.
India
Another major Asian power, India has neither officially welcomed nor criticized, the deal. Instead, New Delhi has maintained a wary distance while emphatically delinking the Quad – which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – from AUKUS. However, from the view point of New Delhi, AUKUS has had a direct bearing on India’s regional engagement by compromising the recently-launched France-Australia-India trilateral. Nevertheless, more from a geopolitical calculus, considering China’s recent military tactics in Ladakh, AUKUS’ focus on Chinese expansionist tendencies comes in India’s favor; it could serve to ease pressure on New Delhi and help restore strategic balance in the region.
Even so, given that AUKUS stands as an anti-China military alliance, and India’s uneasiness with treaty ties that may compromise its strategic autonomy, engagement between the two may be complicated. Nevertheless, India can build on its already strong existing ties with AUKUS states and collaborate on broader defense-related areas such as cyber and quantum technologies and AI. India and Australia are set to enhance their joint capacities and interoperability after upgrading their strategic partnership in 2020. Since the AUKUS launch, India and the United Kingdom have already taken steps to enhance interoperability, with a focus on the digital realm. Despite India’s current delinking, the potential inclusion of Japan and India into a plus network will certainly bolster the Quad-AUKUS synergy.
South Korea
While South Korea, another major U.S. ally and NATO partner, has not released any official statement on AUKUS, President Moon Jae-in highlighted the pact as a contributor to regional stability and supported Australia’s decision to acquire submarines. Seoul has long sought, but not been allowed to develop, nuclear-powered submarines because of its nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement) with the United States that limits applications to “peaceful uses.”
In May 2021, however, the two allies agreed to terminate the Revised Missile Guidelines, which had limited Seoul’s missile development capacity. South Korea and Australia also expanded their cooperation through a recently-inked $717 million defense contract. Post AUKUS, South Korea will look forward to, if not expect, increased defense cooperation and expanded access to nuclear technology. On the other hand, should AUKUS (and the United States particularly) continue to exclude Seoul and refuse transfer of nuclear tech, South Korea may be pushed to partner with France in developing nuclear-powered submarines.
ASEAN and Others
Undoubtedly, a large part of the disgruntlement among Asian states (especially allies) is due to the exclusive nature of the military alliance, which has the veneer of yet another imperial attempt by Anglosphere powers to decide Asia’s future without any consultations with or regard for regional states. If AUKUS intends to achieve its aim of sustaining “peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region,” Asian powers need to be consulted in the development of advanced capabilities. The absence of an Asian voice in an Indo-Pacific security alliance does not bode well for the “like-minded cooperation” that the United States seeks in order to rebuild its diminishing status in the region. Apart from dialogues with Japan, India, and South Korea, AUKUS will also need to focus on ASEAN and its member states, especially Indonesia, which is a direct neighbor of Australia and therefore directly impacted by Canberra’s expanding capabilities and the possibility of an arms race right in its backyard. Apart from consultations with ASEAN, AUKUS can also reinforce cooperation with other minilateral ventures in the Indo-Pacific (like the Quad), on shared goals.
Greater Impact in the Indo-Pacific?
The launch of AUKUS has been largely mired in skepticism, and as such, its expansion is not an obviously viable option. Not that the trio would easily open their exclusive club to other states: The U.S. has rebuffed any inclination to involve other countries, including Japan and India, in the AUKUS alliance. However, because of legitimate regional security concerns (and distrust of outside powers) among the nations in the region, the AUKUS mechanism needs to be reconfigured – perhaps by extension and not expansion.
Much like the still-evolving Quad Plus format, AUKUS could fulfill the needs of the Indo-Pacific region by building a broader cohesive grouping of key regional actors like India, Japan, and South Korea through forums, dialogues, and bilateral or multilateral sharing of information. These Plus partnerships could supplement AUKUS’ military focus and commitment to emergency action on pressing matters like China’s imminent takeover of Taiwan, its maritime expansion in the South China Sea, and its intimidation tactics in Hong Kong.
Further, “AUKUS Plus” can draw from the already exclusive Fives Eyes arrangement – another Anglosphere framework – which has long coordinated closely with Japan (often referred to as the Sixth Eye) and South Korea. Such ad hoc cooperation can also be developed with France, Canada, and New Zealand.
As potential for a Russia-China-North Korea alliance grows, the need for AUKUS to expand its outreach and collaboration to promote interoperability becomes crucial. A Russia-China-North Korea alliance had previously been proposed as a response to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral; now, it could emerge as a counter to AUKUS. Against such a scenario, the pact needs to allow for synergy with existing global value-driven frameworks like Global Gateway, Build Back Better World (B3W), and existing organizations like ASEAN and NATO. Thus, even as formal inclusion of other states does not seem a possibility, coordinating and envisioning a subsidiary Plus format would allow for not only flexibility in collaboration but also greater acceptance and impact in the Indo-Pacific.
The announcement last year of a security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to procure nuclear submarines sent shockwaves across the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS promises to transform America’s force posture in the region and build the foundations of an integrated strategy to respond to China’s rise as a military power.
Yet from the outset AUKUS faced major criticism, not so much from China as from America’s oldest ally, France. Paris accused Washington of a ‘stab in the back’ after Australia ‘blindsided’ France with the unceremonious termination of a $60 billion contract with the French shipbuilder Naval Group to develop a fleet of diesel–electric submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. Since it was agreed in 2016, France had hailed the contract as a pillar of Paris’s defence engagement and enduring security commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Today, that robust strategic posture is in tatters.
The loss of the contract and France’s overall exclusion from AUKUS demonstrated Europe’s increasingly marginal role in Asian security affairs. This is despite attempts by France and Germany to support freedom-of-navigation operations in defiance of China’s actions in the South China Sea. Were these manoeuvres not enough to convince Washington that the European Union offered a robust commitment to Asia?
A careful study of France’s strategic interests reveals that the republic could never become the fully integrated military ally the US desires in the Indo-Pacific. Historically, modern France was torn between continental and maritime security responsibilities. Despite its attempts to form an overseas empire to rival Britain (which failed), France’s core security interests remained in Europe—and particularly after two world wars with the perennial threat of Germany. That experience taught France that it can’t rely on the UK, let alone the US, to maintain its security. The seas acted as a natural barrier for the Anglo-Saxon states not available to the Gallic French.
In the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle defined France’s uniquely autonomous relationship with the NATO alliance. According to the ‘Gaullist’ foreign policy, France withdrew from the joint military command structure of NATO and pursued its own nuclear deterrent independently from the UK and the US. That effectively allowed France to remain a core partner of NATO without committing any forces to the defence of the continent in the event it decided not to contest a determined Soviet breakthrough into West Germany. And in the event of Germany’s—or Britain’s—re-emergence as a significant security threat, France maintained its independent nuclear deterrent.
A strong Anglo-Saxon alliance with Britain and Australia is now emerging as part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Frankly, that is precisely what the US requires to tackle the challenge posed by China at sea. The UK and Australia are both bound to the US by history, by military alliances and through the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partnership, which also includes Canada and New Zealand. AUKUS therefore has the potential to become an integrated defence partnership in a manner impossible for the sovereigntist French or the larger European Union.
Certainly, France doesn’t lack significant interests in the region. It maintains French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and the relatively large island of New Caledonia—home to France’s largest military station in the region—a status threatened by a contested independence referendum. It also has a series of dependencies in the Indian Ocean, most notably Mayotte and Reunion. There are some 1.6 million French citizens residing across the Indo-Pacific protected by a complement of 7,000 forces and 12 naval vessels permanently stationed in theatre. It has a larger presence in the region than the UK, which only maintains 1,000 Gurkhas in theatre in Brunei Darussalam.
What, then, is the appropriate level of Franco-American security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? Given France’s historical autonomous security policy, the US can’t integrate its military forces to the same level as the Five Eyes nations, which are bound by agreements to promote seamless interoperability among their armed forces. What the US needs is an institution to include France as an emerging security partner to deter China, but one that respects strategic autonomy. Of course, it already has such a mechanism in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan and Australia.
The idea of a ‘Quad-plus’ arrangement isn’t new, and it has been specifically floated to include a more robust French presence in the region. But considering that France is itself an Indo-Pacific power—barring a series of independence referendums across all its possessions—there seems to be no real obstacle to fully integrating this discontented ally into the Quad. Paris has recognised the potential of the Quad nations for some time. There’s already a France–India–Australia trilateral on maritime safety and a Japan–Australia–France trilateral on South Pacific affairs. This relationship is buttressed by profitable defence contracts, including a US$9.4 billion contract to sell Rafale fighter jets to India, now mired in corruption allegations.
The real obstacle is Franco-Australian relations. While the damage to Franco-American relations has subsided, the damage to Franco-Australian relations may persist for years to come—unless Canberra and Paris agree to mend their differences, an outcome both countries need. Even if offered, Paris may choose not to join the multilateral format of the Quad in defiance of Australia’s role. That would render both a Quad-plus and any existing trilateral forums defunct. But without a larger institutional framework, a Franco-Indian declaration to ‘act jointly’ in the region and France’s revitalised ties with Japan will only remain diplomatic posturing in response to AUKUS.
The solution is, as always, diplomacy. It will require the US to engage directly with the two allied nations to restore strong ties in support of its larger, shared strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. That vision is clear: whereas the AUKUS nations are part of a singular, interoperable alliance command, the Quad-plus is a coalition that agrees to work jointly with the US to deter the shared challenge of China, but that ultimately retain varying levels of strategic autonomy.
While ‘the Quintuplet’ may not be the most attractive name for such an organisation, it is effectively what the US should form in order to reconcile and find an appropriate level of strategic cooperation with France. The Quad offers France everything it desires—a relevant military role tempered by its Gaullist autonomist traditions. That may not make up for a lost contract, but it will institutionalise security cooperation with France in a manner most conducive to the defence of the Indo-Pacific.
France belongs in the Quad | The Strategist
The announcement last year of a security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to procure nuclear submarines sent shockwaves across the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS promises to transform America’s force posture in the ...
Is ‘AUKUS Plus’ a Viable Option?
The emergence of AUKUS – an “enhanced trilateral security partnership” involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States launched in September 2021 – has strengthened the already growing momentum toward minilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, in order to “meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.” The pact has wide-ranging goals: promoting deeper information and technology sharing; integrating security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains; and enhancing the three nations’ joint capabilities and interoperability. Although exclusive to the three Anglo partners, the grouping can offer immense value to the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.Nevertheless, in an increasingly complex multipolar world order, an insulated and restricted alliance has its limitations; a more inclusive forum within AUKUS’ minilateral setting can therefore be imperative to overcome obstacles and have a greater impact. What would an augmented AUKUS encompass? Does inclusivity necessarily imply a formal expansion, or, can the pact allow for a more abstract “Plus” network among “like-minded” Indo-Pacific partners without resorting to an expanded partnership? And what would be the scope of a potential Plus framework? Europe, as well as Indo-Pacific powers like India, Japan and South Korea can be prospective “AUKUS Plus” partners and engage in issues-based collaborations with AUKUS, such as cooperating on common issues like supply chains.
AUKUS Plus Europe: Seeds of Collaboration Amid Fallout?
The secrecy that underlaid the formation of AUKUS and the unilateral cancellation of the $90 billion Franco-Australian submarine deal severely affected the transatlantic relationship. To make matters worse, the AUKUS announcement overshadowed the launch of the European Union’s “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” the bloc’s autonomous attempt to enhance its Indo-Pacific footprint. This unfortunate timing, which caught the EU unaware, was an embarrassing moment for Europe. It not only caused a rift between long-standing partners but also strengthened calls for greater strategic autonomy within the EU.
Yet, despite the cracks in transatlantic ties that AUKUS exposed, the United States and Europe share a long history and shared values, perceptions, and challenges; it is therefore unlikely that the rift will be permanent. Already, the secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has said that the pact was not “directed against NATO or Europe,” and that NATO would continue to work closely with its Indo-Pacific partners, namely New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea on cyber and maritime security, among other issues. Biden has also made efforts to reach out to Europe, especially France, to smooth ties and attempt to find new common ground to sustain transatlantic ties. In the future, cooperation between AUKUS and NATO – the bedrock for European security – cannot be ruled out, particularly as Europe faces “new challenges” from Russia and China.
AUKUS Plus Japan, India, and South Korea: Allaying Regional Security Concerns?
AUKUS’ first core initiative looks to assist Australia in building nuclear-powered submarines to bolster “interoperability, commonality, and mutual benefit” without compromising nuclear non-proliferation, security, and safety commitments. Naturally, its nuclear focus has been controversial, triggering concerns in allies and rivals alike over the possibility that AUKUS will spur an arms race and lax non-proliferation standards in the Indo-Pacific.
For example, North Korea and China condemned the deal as one that would “upset the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region,” “severely [damage] regional peace… and [intensify] the arms race.” New Zealand, an Anglosphere country and Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partner of the AUKUS states, announced that it would uphold its long-standing ban on nuclear submarines entering its waters (in line with its nuclear-free policy) and deny (still hypothetical) Australian nuclear subs entry. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members like Indonesia and Malaysia, too, have expressed similar reservations. Even U.S. treaty ally Japan, while welcoming AUKUS as a “strengthening engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” has refrained from mentioning the nuclear submarine focus – indicating that it remains uncomfortable with the nuclear aspect and its potential implications. Here, engaging with regional powers through a ‘Plus’ framework can help ally regional security concerns and make AUKUS a more accepted framework in the region.
Japan
Japan, particularly, shares a security treaty with the United States and close security ties with Australia and the U.K.; it would hence be a natural addition to an AUKUS Plus forum. Japan’s ambassador to Australia, Yamagami Shingo, has already hinted that Tokyo would be willing to participate in AUKUS initiatives on AI and cybersecurity – a sentiment reiterated by former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who remains an influential entity in the ruling party.
The use of nuclear propulsion technology is a highly controversial topic in Japan, largely owing to its history with nuclear weapons and a constitutional commitment to pacifism. Hence, any cooperation between Japan and AUKUS will likely not involve the nuclear element, but rather come as ad hoc cooperation on shared issues (like critical technology development) that help strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance in face of shared challenges, particularly in the maritime domain. This could, for instance, include collaboration in efforts to patrol the East and South China Seas. As a step in this direction, Japan and Australia recently inked a landmark defense agreement that builds on the AUKUS deal.
India
Another major Asian power, India has neither officially welcomed nor criticized, the deal. Instead, New Delhi has maintained a wary distance while emphatically delinking the Quad – which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – from AUKUS. However, from the view point of New Delhi, AUKUS has had a direct bearing on India’s regional engagement by compromising the recently-launched France-Australia-India trilateral. Nevertheless, more from a geopolitical calculus, considering China’s recent military tactics in Ladakh, AUKUS’ focus on Chinese expansionist tendencies comes in India’s favor; it could serve to ease pressure on New Delhi and help restore strategic balance in the region.
Even so, given that AUKUS stands as an anti-China military alliance, and India’s uneasiness with treaty ties that may compromise its strategic autonomy, engagement between the two may be complicated. Nevertheless, India can build on its already strong existing ties with AUKUS states and collaborate on broader defense-related areas such as cyber and quantum technologies and AI. India and Australia are set to enhance their joint capacities and interoperability after upgrading their strategic partnership in 2020. Since the AUKUS launch, India and the United Kingdom have already taken steps to enhance interoperability, with a focus on the digital realm. Despite India’s current delinking, the potential inclusion of Japan and India into a plus network will certainly bolster the Quad-AUKUS synergy.
South Korea
While South Korea, another major U.S. ally and NATO partner, has not released any official statement on AUKUS, President Moon Jae-in highlighted the pact as a contributor to regional stability and supported Australia’s decision to acquire submarines. Seoul has long sought, but not been allowed to develop, nuclear-powered submarines because of its nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement) with the United States that limits applications to “peaceful uses.”
In May 2021, however, the two allies agreed to terminate the Revised Missile Guidelines, which had limited Seoul’s missile development capacity. South Korea and Australia also expanded their cooperation through a recently-inked $717 million defense contract. Post AUKUS, South Korea will look forward to, if not expect, increased defense cooperation and expanded access to nuclear technology. On the other hand, should AUKUS (and the United States particularly) continue to exclude Seoul and refuse transfer of nuclear tech, South Korea may be pushed to partner with France in developing nuclear-powered submarines.
ASEAN and Others
Undoubtedly, a large part of the disgruntlement among Asian states (especially allies) is due to the exclusive nature of the military alliance, which has the veneer of yet another imperial attempt by Anglosphere powers to decide Asia’s future without any consultations with or regard for regional states. If AUKUS intends to achieve its aim of sustaining “peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region,” Asian powers need to be consulted in the development of advanced capabilities. The absence of an Asian voice in an Indo-Pacific security alliance does not bode well for the “like-minded cooperation” that the United States seeks in order to rebuild its diminishing status in the region. Apart from dialogues with Japan, India, and South Korea, AUKUS will also need to focus on ASEAN and its member states, especially Indonesia, which is a direct neighbor of Australia and therefore directly impacted by Canberra’s expanding capabilities and the possibility of an arms race right in its backyard. Apart from consultations with ASEAN, AUKUS can also reinforce cooperation with other minilateral ventures in the Indo-Pacific (like the Quad), on shared goals.
Greater Impact in the Indo-Pacific?
The launch of AUKUS has been largely mired in skepticism, and as such, its expansion is not an obviously viable option. Not that the trio would easily open their exclusive club to other states: The U.S. has rebuffed any inclination to involve other countries, including Japan and India, in the AUKUS alliance. However, because of legitimate regional security concerns (and distrust of outside powers) among the nations in the region, the AUKUS mechanism needs to be reconfigured – perhaps by extension and not expansion.
Much like the still-evolving Quad Plus format, AUKUS could fulfill the needs of the Indo-Pacific region by building a broader cohesive grouping of key regional actors like India, Japan, and South Korea through forums, dialogues, and bilateral or multilateral sharing of information. These Plus partnerships could supplement AUKUS’ military focus and commitment to emergency action on pressing matters like China’s imminent takeover of Taiwan, its maritime expansion in the South China Sea, and its intimidation tactics in Hong Kong.
Further, “AUKUS Plus” can draw from the already exclusive Fives Eyes arrangement – another Anglosphere framework – which has long coordinated closely with Japan (often referred to as the Sixth Eye) and South Korea. Such ad hoc cooperation can also be developed with France, Canada, and New Zealand.
As potential for a Russia-China-North Korea alliance grows, the need for AUKUS to expand its outreach and collaboration to promote interoperability becomes crucial. A Russia-China-North Korea alliance had previously been proposed as a response to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral; now, it could emerge as a counter to AUKUS. Against such a scenario, the pact needs to allow for synergy with existing global value-driven frameworks like Global Gateway, Build Back Better World (B3W), and existing organizations like ASEAN and NATO. Thus, even as formal inclusion of other states does not seem a possibility, coordinating and envisioning a subsidiary Plus format would allow for not only flexibility in collaboration but also greater acceptance and impact in the Indo-Pacific.
Is ‘AUKUS Plus’ a Viable Option?
The absence of an Asian voice in an Indo-Pacific security alliance does not bode well. How can AUKUS include other states?
thediplomat.com
Committee launch inquiry on Indo-Pacific
The Defence Committee inquiry focuses on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to the UK, exploring the UK’s political, diplomatic, economic and operational interests in the region. The Committee will discuss the UK’s relationship with the region, including the benefits of closer defence co-operation with ASEAN nations and our current defence engagements with key regional allies.The inquiry examines AUKUS, its impact on the UK’s engagement in the region, as well as the defence supply chain and UK resilience. The Committee will review progress on the goals set out by the Defence Command Paper and Integrated Review.
The Committee is asking for written submissions by Friday 4 March 2022.
Chair's comment
Chair of the Defence Committee, Tobias Ellwood MP, said:“The Government has touted the ‘tilt to the Indo-Pacific’ as key to its vision of ‘Global Britain’. Numerous Government papers, including the Defence Command Paper and the Integrated Review, have reinforced our commitment to strengthening engagement in the region.
“Strategy papers are all well and good, but the Government must start consistently delivering on its vision. Our inquiry will examine whether the UK Government is making good on its promises to forge a new era for the UK.
“The Indo-Pacific region is of huge strategic importance for the UK. As the world becomes an increasingly unpredictable and volatile place, strong relationships in the region will help us weather the years ahead.”
The Committee welcomes evidence on the following:
- Why is the Indo-Pacific important to the UK? What are its political, diplomatic, economic and operational interests in the region?
- What progress has been made on the goals for UK Defence as part of the Indo-Pacific Tilt as set out in the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper?
- What impact has the Carrier Strike Group deployment had in the region?
- Are the goals set out (for UK Defence as part of the Indo-Pacific Tilt) in the Defence Command Paper appropriate and achievable?
- Should the UK Government have additional goals or aspirations for UK Defence in the region, such as taking part in the Quad?
- Who are the UK’s key regional allies and how effective are UK Defence’s current engagements attempts and future engagement plans both in terms of operational and non-operational areas (such as science and technology)?
- What is the benefit of closer defence co-operation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and how can this best be achieved?
- Does the UK need bases in the region?
- What challenges are there for UK Defence in its Indo-Pacific tilt, both in terms of achieving its goals and operating in the region?
- How could the UK develop alliances with partners in the region, for example through the Quad partnership?
- What progress has there been following the announcement of AUKUS?
- What impact has the AUKUS agreement had on the UK’s engagement in the region and with wider allies and partners?
- What does AUKUS mean for UK defence industry and for UK supply chain resilience?
- How could the success (or failure) of AUKUS best be measured?
- How will the UK manage or balance resourcing, in particular deployment of personnel and capabilities, the tilt to the region alongside NATO and other commitments?
Time for the Quad to Expand Into Subnational Partnerships
With two key meetings of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as the Quad, slated for the first half of 2022, participating leaders have an opportunity to further bolster ties between their countries at all levels of government while finding creative and holistic ways to manage national security risks. One item leaders should consider adding to the agenda is how to facilitate better coordination on international engagement between national and subnational officials throughout the four participating countries.The Quad, a strategic dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, is an ideal forum for such discussion. With Rahm Emanuel, the former mayor of the United States’ third most populous city, recently assuming his post as U.S. ambassador to Japan and Eric Garcetti, the current mayor of the United States’ second most populous city, nominated to serve as the ambassador to India, there is an opportunity for this important group of major Indo-Pacific democracies to utilize subnational diplomacy to better address shared security and economic challenges.
The first in-person Leaders’ Summit of the Quad took place in September 2021. The leaders discussed a range of initiatives aiming to address a number of major challenges, including “ending the COVID-19 pandemic, including by increasing production and access to safe and effective vaccines; promoting high-standards infrastructure; combatting the climate crisis; partnering on emerging technologies, space, and cybersecurity; and cultivating next-generation talent in all of [the] countries.” Cities and states have been on the frontlines of many of these issues and deeper collaboration among Quad countries across the local, national, and international levels can promote more effective responses.
It is clear cities are already engaging in international issues. A report released in October 2020 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the University of Melbourne’s Connected Cities Lab in which representatives from 47 global cities were surveyed found that 86 percent of respondents indicated their city maintained an official international office.
Yet there are also risks associated with subnational diplomacy. The same survey indicated that less than half of the staff engaged in international engagement received any relevant training for their international activities. And those who did receive training indicated it was generally informal or self-guided.
This is concerning given the stakes of subnational diplomacy, particularly in the face of competition with China. Chinese officials and entities have been active in their engagement with subnational officials. And despite increased scrutiny of ties at all levels, Chinese officials continued that subnational engagement in the United States in the first year of the Biden administration.
As competition continues between China and members of the Quad, it will be critical to find ways to creatively engage in ways that mitigate risk. A 2018 Hoover Institution report on Chinese influence and U.S. interests examined ties between Chinese entities and U.S. subnational governments, “highlighting their potential for mutually-beneficial engagement as well as the potential risks that arise from insufficient due diligence.”
One way this risk can be mitigated, particularly given the lack of formal training that often takes place with city staff handling international engagement, is through deeper coordination between national and subnational governments. Some leaders within the Quad have recognized this need. For example, legislation was introduced in the United States Congress that would create an Office of Subnational Diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State.
Two upcoming meetings of the Quad present an opportunity for these four countries to prioritize national and subnational government cooperation on international issues. The foreign ministers of Quad nations are slated to meet in Australia in February followed by a summit with the leaders of the countries in Japan in the spring. By engaging in dialogue about subnational diplomacy, the Quad can position local governments to engage prudently and effectively on the international stage while bolstering the initiatives of the national governments through this deeper collaboration.
Time for the Quad to Expand Into Subnational Partnerships
Engagement between local governments can help the grouping better address shared security and economic challenges.
thediplomat.com
Where do you get this delusion from? India is in the Quad as are the JP US and AU. How is AUKUS a threat to India?
ASPI is quite worried about the fallout from the whole AUKUS thing:
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As the Defence Department’s deputy secretary for strategy between 2009 and 2012, I asked US counterparts on three occasions about the likelihood they would share submarine nuclear-propulsion technology. The answer was the same each time: ...
Basically what they write is amusing, but largely irrelevant. Nobody will pay attention to them.
I made two separate points that are independent from each other.
France won't join QUAD because it's a US-led alliance. They won't let France in even if the French want to join.
AUKUS is a major threat to India, both in terms of boosting the military power of an alliance that India is not part of, and also creating a new precedent in terms of transfer of a destabilising technology like the SSN to countries that cannot get them on their own. With the former, if India doesn't toe the American line, then there's an alliance being established that can counter our stand already. Just 'cause we are thinking alike today doesn't mean we will be the same when India becomes big in the future. As far as the US is concerned, India is the next China. Normally the Australian Navy shouldn't be able to challenge the IN, but SSNs can change that equation quite a bit even if India gets big. The latter means a country like Pak, with no hope of getting SSN tech on their own for the next 50 years can now just import it from China within 10. So even if AUKUS doesn't become our enemy tomorrow, it's still setting the precedent that allows other potential rivals and enemies getting this tech and destabilising our neighbourhood.
Pak like India, is a nuke state. Leaving that aside. Making their own or importing chinese nuke subs can be done. It is lawful to have nuke propulsion in civil and military vessels. Aukus has nothing to do with it. The rest is a bit too paranoid for me.
Pak is as much of a N power as Australia would be in 2 decades with SSNs sailing under the Australian flag.
In theory China could supply those SSNs to PN ( remember Germany & those NATO states which fly with US made N gravity bombs stored in their countries under so called US supervision ) but would always risk sanctions by the west namely the US.
With the precedent now set , there's no way the US can invoke the clauses of NPT to sanction China were it to supply such SSNs to the PN or any other P-5 nation to a non P-5 nation .
To conclude , irrespective of how Australia sees itself , the rest of the world including India sees it as a vassal to US & will be dictated to by the Anglo US combine. There's nothing in the past 6-7 decades in Australian actions or policies to suggest otherwise. Unlike blissfully unaware you , We in India know the implications of this .