General situation
Continued transformation of a Russian operation aimed at achieving a quick total victory, which has resulted in great dispersion and exhaustion of forces, into a sequential operation seeking to achieve one objective after another with the little manoeuvring capacity left, which is also declining.
Russian forces will take Mariupol and may then have the opportunity to reach at best one or two other geographical objectives - Kharkiv or Odessa, for political reasons, Dnipropetrovsk, in order to threaten the rear of the Ukrainian army in the Donbass (AUD) - or to obtain a withdrawal of the AUD by a general frontal pressure.
The most likely hypothesis is then a general rigidification of the fronts over the long term.
Specific situations
Sky: Russians still frequently use missiles and consume their stockpile. Publicity around the use of hypersonic missiles, without tactical interest compared to other less sophisticated models but for purely demonstrative purposes.
Question of strengthening the Ukrainian S300 air defence system, a key asset in the fight for the skies, especially around Kiev. Possibility of a roque manoeuvre (transfer of Slovak, Bulgarian or Greek batteries or complete systems to Ukraine in exchange for American Patriots). Perhaps a transfer of Turkish S400s in exchange for the possibility of acquiring F-35 fighters could also be considered. Perhaps the supply of Iron Dome anti-rocket batteries should be considered.
Belarus and Western Ukraine: the question of a Belarusian intervention in the conflict is still pending. Such an intervention would probably add more problems than advantages to the Russian side. Numerous sabotage of railways in Belarus (origin unknown) which severely hampers Russian logistics.
Russian manoeuvring capacity in Western Ukraine is for the moment limited to strikes and raids and possibly infiltration-harassment.
Kiev-Northeast zone: All Russian forces in the northern zone have switched to defensive mode and field fortifications are being put in place (appearance of minefields, engineering works). Effort on the protection of the axes and on the artillery. The battle of Kiev becomes a long-lasting artillery siege. The battle can be fought for the acquisition of artillery positions within a radius of 25 km from the centre of the capital.
While the Russian zone west of Kiev occupied by the 35th, 36th Armies and Airborne Troops (VDV) is coherent, the entire north-eastern zone (Chernihiv-Sumy-Brovary triangle) of the 41st, 2nd Guards Army (GA) and 1st Armoured Guards Army (ABG) is 'leopard-skinned' with interlocking antagonistic forces. How can this develop? Will Russian forces try to unify the area by successively reducing Ukrainian pockets? Will they evacuate the most difficult areas? Will they, for political reasons (to hold as much ground as possible in order to better negotiate) remain wherever they are at the risk of a costly little permanent war in the region?
Donbass zone: in the North, the Russians seem to have abandoned the idea of taking Kharkiv for the time being and have replaced the conquest of the city by an artillery siege. Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian armoured regiment south of Yzioum (120 km south-east of Kharkiv) with heavy losses. Involving two air assault brigades (but no helicopters), this is probably the most important Ukrainian attack of the war. Continued fighting around Severodonetsk, between Yzioum and Luhansk. The equivalent of 3 Ukrainian brigades (perhaps 5,000 men) are threatened with encirclement by the Russian 3rd Motorised Infantry Division (MD) and the 2nd NRL Corps.
In the south: the slow advance of the 19th MD in the west and 150th MD (plus Chechen brigade in the east) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in the north continued. The capture of Marioupol is probably a matter of days, two weeks at most.
South-West zone: the zone is the least densely occupied by Russian and Ukrainian forces. It is therefore the one where movements are the most important, before meeting urban resistance. The 7th Airborne Division's reconnaissance towards Voznesensk was pushed back towards Nova Odessa. Similarly a limited reconnaissance (one brigade) towards Kryuyi Rih was repulsed. The rather weak Russian 20th MD is having difficulty resisting Ukrainian forces in front of Mykolayev and appears to be on the retreat.
Black Sea Fleet Kalibr cruise missile strike(s) on 19 March on Ukrainian recruitment/training centre at Mykolayev, many dead.
Notes
While it is difficult to imagine a general mobilisation in Russia at the moment, Russia is imposing it in the DNR-LPR republics (4 million inhabitants in total). This could constitute the most important human resource for the Russian war effort, but at the price of many local reluctances.
The Wagner company is said to be a relay for the recruitment of fighters from Marshal Haftar's Libyan National Army to Ukraine.
Theory: civilian digitisation of the battlefield
The digitisation of the battlefield was the big military buzzword of the early 2000s. It was imagined as the setting up of expensive geolocation and data transmission systems between multiple military sensors and 'effectors' all knowing from common images where they are, where much of the enemy is and being able to collaborate with each other. No one was talking at the time about expanding this architecture along public-private/military-civilian lines, and combining our systems with those of the armed organisations we were facing that used civilian technologies.
Ukraine has done this (for the record, it is nations that make wars, not armies) by massively integrating civilian digitalisation, from simple fighters with smartphones to small territorial intelligence units with small low-cost drones. Combined with the mass of mobilised fighters (a fact that has been forgotten), this gives the Ukrainian army a considerable amount of real-time tactical information about itself and the enemy, and much more than the Russians, who do not currently benefit from such a contribution. This obviously gives a considerable advantage to the small mobile Ukrainian units over the heavy Russian columns. The vast majority of the fighting, even artillery ambushes, were thus initiated by the Ukrainians, which was an enormous advantage.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)