Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Man 'hurls a burning Molotov cocktail at the Kremlin walls'
Video shows the man, who has not been identified, gesticulating angrily at the red walls of the Kremlin as he looks up at a burning section of the brickwork.
Guess it's the start of the Russian Revolution 2.0. The neo Lenin - Navalny is busy scratching around in a cell for the next 9 yrs . Incidentally rumours are he has partial Irish ancestry . Russian commentators are using this alleged fact to justify why he returned to Russia after surviving that near fatal poisoning attack.Man 'hurls a burning Molotov cocktail at the Kremlin walls'
Video shows the man, who has not been identified, gesticulating angrily at the red walls of the Kremlin as he looks up at a burning section of the brickwork.www.dailymail.co.uk
Russia FM to visit India
economictimes.indiatimes.com
Russian Foreign Minister to visit India close on heels of Wang Yi's trip
Lavrov who has made few trips abroad since Russia invaded Ukraine or what they describe as special military operations in Ukraine on February 24 could travel to India in near future, ET has learnt.
16% is actually very small compared to EU dependencies and they're moving to reduce by 67% at end of 2022 and remove altogether by 2030. Germany got 34% of its crude from Russia, 35% of its gas and 53% of its coal for instance in 2021.
10 years vs 0 years is. Putin has made himself the number one threat, almost like he was looking for attention. With this following COVID, he may well have already planned something with China.
Yes, you would criticise, you've criticised for far less on this very forum in posts I have read.
With war next door, Finland, Sweden train with NATO
In a muddy car park in Norway's Far North, Finnish troops show off their military might, lining up rocket launchers, artillery and snowmobiles as they prepare to train alongside their NATO brothers-in-arms.
www.france24.com
This Sweden we're talking about, well known for their neutrality.
I'm sure Putin soiled his underpants when he heard the news. Now this is no ordinary nation we're talking about but Sweden the undisputed super power of all Europe & perhaps the world. Btw what's the break up in energy sources they import from Russia ? Do remember they'd have to shell out the moolah in roubles not kroners .With war next door, Finland, Sweden train with NATO
In a muddy car park in Norway's Far North, Finnish troops show off their military might, lining up rocket launchers, artillery and snowmobiles as they prepare to train alongside their NATO brothers-in-arms.
This Sweden we're talking about, well known for their neutrality.
Good Golly Paddy ! That's amazing .
I hope the Brits honour a fellow thief with an OBE - Other Bugger's Efforts.
Russian Commander of 13th Tank Regiment Dies by Suicide Due to Faulty Tanks in Reserve? Engines Stolen, Claims Ukraine
Western officials released the name of seven Russian generals who they claimed have been killed or sacked since the war began.
www.ibtimes.sg
Ok. It's official. A US made MANPAD brought down a Russian TBM. To know the extent of the Irishification of the western world pls check the comments below the video on YT .
Update on operations in Ukraine 27 March D+31
General situation
The Russian General Rudskoi, deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, gave an update on the situation after a month of fighting, explaining that the first phase of the war was a success with the destruction of a large part of the Ukrainian army and that the Russian army and its DNR/LPR allies would concentrate on the complete conquest of the two provinces of Donbass. He thus formalised what had been observed for at least a week. In reality, in the short term this does not change anything.
Specific situations
Sky
According to the figures given by General Rudskoi, the Ukrainian army has lost ¾ of its aircraft, 35 TB2 drones out of 36, more than 80% of its anti-aircraft means (S300-Buk M1). After the discovery that the Ukrainians had as many TB2 drones (and a priori more than at the beginning of the war), this is a hollow admission that the Ukrainian air force is still active and probably still has a fleet of drones.
One should not confuse the campaign of conquest with the campaign of strikes. While the campaign of conquest is officially (and for the time being) concentrated on the Donbass. The strike campaign continues throughout the territory. We should therefore not be surprised by strikes of opportunity (oil depot) in Lviv, in the west of the country and close to Poland, probably also in connection with the visit of Joe Biden in the latter country.
The Russians are said to have used more than 1,000 ballistic/cruise missiles, i.e. about 2/3 of the stockpile.
West
General Rudskoy's statement may also formalise that there will be no Russian-Belarusian operation in Western Ukraine. The Belarusian military potential is estimated to be around 5 low tactical level task forces anyway. Nothing that could fundamentally change the situation on the ground, at great political and economic cost to Belarus.
Kiev and the Northeast
The announced reorientation does not change the situation in the North. Russian forces are still in a defensive/transcending posture and are being reconstituted. Several brigades of the 35th and 36th A in the west of Kiev have each formed a marching task force with their last fighting forces, several units with more than 50% losses have been sent to the Bryansk region (Russia) to reconstitute. Russian attacks are rather limited to the Chernihiv area. Perhaps a rectification of the Russian front line can be imagined, seeking to ensure a strong presence in the vicinity of Kiev with the conquest of Chernihiv and the E95 axis to Brovary by the 41stA and 2nd AG, but otherwise abandoning the difficult to hold areas, especially the H07 axis from Soumy to Kiev.
Ukrainian forces continued their pressure west of Kiev on the Ivankiv (NW-key axis to Belarus)-Dymer (NE-near the Dnieper)-Irpin-Myla (SE) and Kalymiv (SW) quadrilateral with the plan to smother the 35th and 36th A. The destruction of these two Russian armies and the remaining VDVs would be a major victory. However, it is unlikely at this time.
South: unchanged. Russian forces are under pressure and rather defensive. General Rezantsev, commander of the 49th Army was killed in the Kherson area. This is the 7th Russian general killed (plus 3 colonels commanding regiments/brigades killed and one suicide) in a month in Ukraine. This confirms Ukrainian activity in the Kherson area and the presence of the 49th A staff from the Caucasus.
Donbass
Mariupol is almost cut in two by the Russian advance. It is not clear that the Ukrainian resistance will stop. If the capture of the city is inevitable, a major question is in what state the 150th Motorised Infantry Division, including a Chechen grouping, and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade will be after the fighting. It is not clear that these important units can be reused in the short term to restart the offensive in the rest of the Donbass.
In the battle of the 'Donbass salient', it seems that the Russians have abandoned the idea of encircling the Ukrainian army by controlling the E105 axis between Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. They do not hold Kharkiv and probably could not control this 250 km axis. While they are probably not giving up on a push from the south, from Zaporizhjia to Dnipropetrovsk, they are for the moment simply trying to push the Ukrainian forces back beyond the limits of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
The Ukrainians resisted with a braking manoeuvre based on urban bastions. The cost in casualties and time to capture each kilometre is very high for the Russians and allies. The 1st DNR Corps has exhausted itself in taking Volnovakha (20,000 inhabitants, and destroyed town) between Donetsk and Marioupol and is stumbling in front of Mariinka, Kurakhove, Avdiivka and Vouhledar near the town of Donetsk. The same is true in the north of the salient with resistance in Yzium and Severodonetsk (a solid stronghold of 100,000 inhabitants) and conversely a Ukrainian attack towards Horlivka, north of Donetsk. Even if Severodonetsk fell into the hands of the 8th A and the 2nd LNR Corps, the Sloviansk-Kramatrosk-Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka-Toretsk line constituted a real urban front 70 km long and 450,000 inhabitants, very difficult to take.
The announcement for once of a clear objective - the conquest of the Donbass - perhaps means that it is considered attainable. It is possible, but it will still be difficult, especially if Ukrainian forces can be reinforced in the region.
Notes
In politics, when you triumph you brag about it. When you send the second-in-command of the ECS to announce a success and a major change of direction, it is not necessarily perceived internally as a great success.
General Rudskoi also announced the destruction of a large third of the Ukrainian artillery and two-thirds of the armoured fighting vehicles, a balance sheet that is undoubtedly highly exaggerated. The losses documented by Oryx only indicate 227 vehicles of this type lost, a significant figure and necessarily lower than the reality, but it is undoubtedly far from the 2/3 announced. It should be remembered that a third of the Russian combat vehicles lost were in fact captured by the Ukrainians, i.e. at least 300 vehicles, most of which could be reused by the Ukrainians.
When we look at the figures for the destruction of vehicles over the week by the Oryx site, we see that in 8 days the Russians have lost 170 vehicles of this type for 38 Ukrainians. The daily losses in armoured fighting vehicles tend to decrease on both sides, especially on the Ukrainian side. The losses in artillery pieces, on the other hand, also tend to increase on both sides (30 Russian pieces in eight days for 100 before, 14 Ukrainian for 29 before), which also reflects the growing importance of this weapon in more static fighting and probably also more counter-battery fire.
In the same way that ongoing replacements tend to diminish the human capital of the Russian army. The same seems to be true for the equipment replaced by old equipment recovered from stocks.
Leaving in the English way is leaving without saying so; leaving in the Russian way is saying very loudly that you are leaving while you are staying. The Russians have announced their withdrawal from Syria on several occasions, even though it was only a question of relieving the forces. The Russians have announced that they are concentrating on the Donbass, but they are not giving up anything for the moment.
General situation
The Russian General Rudskoi, deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, gave an update on the situation after a month of fighting, explaining that the first phase of the war was a success with the destruction of a large part of the Ukrainian army and that the Russian army and its DNR/LPR allies would concentrate on the complete conquest of the two provinces of Donbass. He thus formalised what had been observed for at least a week. In reality, in the short term this does not change anything.
Specific situations
Sky
According to the figures given by General Rudskoi, the Ukrainian army has lost ¾ of its aircraft, 35 TB2 drones out of 36, more than 80% of its anti-aircraft means (S300-Buk M1). After the discovery that the Ukrainians had as many TB2 drones (and a priori more than at the beginning of the war), this is a hollow admission that the Ukrainian air force is still active and probably still has a fleet of drones.
One should not confuse the campaign of conquest with the campaign of strikes. While the campaign of conquest is officially (and for the time being) concentrated on the Donbass. The strike campaign continues throughout the territory. We should therefore not be surprised by strikes of opportunity (oil depot) in Lviv, in the west of the country and close to Poland, probably also in connection with the visit of Joe Biden in the latter country.
The Russians are said to have used more than 1,000 ballistic/cruise missiles, i.e. about 2/3 of the stockpile.
West
General Rudskoy's statement may also formalise that there will be no Russian-Belarusian operation in Western Ukraine. The Belarusian military potential is estimated to be around 5 low tactical level task forces anyway. Nothing that could fundamentally change the situation on the ground, at great political and economic cost to Belarus.
Kiev and the Northeast
The announced reorientation does not change the situation in the North. Russian forces are still in a defensive/transcending posture and are being reconstituted. Several brigades of the 35th and 36th A in the west of Kiev have each formed a marching task force with their last fighting forces, several units with more than 50% losses have been sent to the Bryansk region (Russia) to reconstitute. Russian attacks are rather limited to the Chernihiv area. Perhaps a rectification of the Russian front line can be imagined, seeking to ensure a strong presence in the vicinity of Kiev with the conquest of Chernihiv and the E95 axis to Brovary by the 41stA and 2nd AG, but otherwise abandoning the difficult to hold areas, especially the H07 axis from Soumy to Kiev.
Ukrainian forces continued their pressure west of Kiev on the Ivankiv (NW-key axis to Belarus)-Dymer (NE-near the Dnieper)-Irpin-Myla (SE) and Kalymiv (SW) quadrilateral with the plan to smother the 35th and 36th A. The destruction of these two Russian armies and the remaining VDVs would be a major victory. However, it is unlikely at this time.
South: unchanged. Russian forces are under pressure and rather defensive. General Rezantsev, commander of the 49th Army was killed in the Kherson area. This is the 7th Russian general killed (plus 3 colonels commanding regiments/brigades killed and one suicide) in a month in Ukraine. This confirms Ukrainian activity in the Kherson area and the presence of the 49th A staff from the Caucasus.
Donbass
Mariupol is almost cut in two by the Russian advance. It is not clear that the Ukrainian resistance will stop. If the capture of the city is inevitable, a major question is in what state the 150th Motorised Infantry Division, including a Chechen grouping, and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade will be after the fighting. It is not clear that these important units can be reused in the short term to restart the offensive in the rest of the Donbass.
In the battle of the 'Donbass salient', it seems that the Russians have abandoned the idea of encircling the Ukrainian army by controlling the E105 axis between Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. They do not hold Kharkiv and probably could not control this 250 km axis. While they are probably not giving up on a push from the south, from Zaporizhjia to Dnipropetrovsk, they are for the moment simply trying to push the Ukrainian forces back beyond the limits of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
The Ukrainians resisted with a braking manoeuvre based on urban bastions. The cost in casualties and time to capture each kilometre is very high for the Russians and allies. The 1st DNR Corps has exhausted itself in taking Volnovakha (20,000 inhabitants, and destroyed town) between Donetsk and Marioupol and is stumbling in front of Mariinka, Kurakhove, Avdiivka and Vouhledar near the town of Donetsk. The same is true in the north of the salient with resistance in Yzium and Severodonetsk (a solid stronghold of 100,000 inhabitants) and conversely a Ukrainian attack towards Horlivka, north of Donetsk. Even if Severodonetsk fell into the hands of the 8th A and the 2nd LNR Corps, the Sloviansk-Kramatrosk-Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka-Toretsk line constituted a real urban front 70 km long and 450,000 inhabitants, very difficult to take.
The announcement for once of a clear objective - the conquest of the Donbass - perhaps means that it is considered attainable. It is possible, but it will still be difficult, especially if Ukrainian forces can be reinforced in the region.
Notes
In politics, when you triumph you brag about it. When you send the second-in-command of the ECS to announce a success and a major change of direction, it is not necessarily perceived internally as a great success.
General Rudskoi also announced the destruction of a large third of the Ukrainian artillery and two-thirds of the armoured fighting vehicles, a balance sheet that is undoubtedly highly exaggerated. The losses documented by Oryx only indicate 227 vehicles of this type lost, a significant figure and necessarily lower than the reality, but it is undoubtedly far from the 2/3 announced. It should be remembered that a third of the Russian combat vehicles lost were in fact captured by the Ukrainians, i.e. at least 300 vehicles, most of which could be reused by the Ukrainians.
When we look at the figures for the destruction of vehicles over the week by the Oryx site, we see that in 8 days the Russians have lost 170 vehicles of this type for 38 Ukrainians. The daily losses in armoured fighting vehicles tend to decrease on both sides, especially on the Ukrainian side. The losses in artillery pieces, on the other hand, also tend to increase on both sides (30 Russian pieces in eight days for 100 before, 14 Ukrainian for 29 before), which also reflects the growing importance of this weapon in more static fighting and probably also more counter-battery fire.
In the same way that ongoing replacements tend to diminish the human capital of the Russian army. The same seems to be true for the equipment replaced by old equipment recovered from stocks.
Leaving in the English way is leaving without saying so; leaving in the Russian way is saying very loudly that you are leaving while you are staying. The Russians have announced their withdrawal from Syria on several occasions, even though it was only a question of relieving the forces. The Russians have announced that they are concentrating on the Donbass, but they are not giving up anything for the moment.