Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Nobody should use nuclear weapons, but if they found out that the Russians were gearing up for a nuclear strike, a decision might be taken to strike first, which is why Russian sabre rattling is so dangerous.
Dear God, this man must think that reality only exists when he says it does.
Russia has already overplayed their nuclear deterrent. They're really just supposed to deter direct attack against your country, using them to deter the use of military force against you when you're outside your country invading a democracy is already overplaying your hand. Trying to force an illegal annexation using nukes is beyond the pale and there are obvious reasons why nobody is going to allow that.
Les nus et les mots - La guerre, point de situation.
Nudes and words - The war, point of situation.
First some news from the front. After the capture of Lyman and the new blow to the Russian forces, the Ukrainian forces of the Eastern Command continue to advance in the 25-30 km strip between the Oskil and Krasna rivers, both running north-south. On October 2, the Ukrainian brigade crossed the Oskil at Kupiansk and advanced rapidly east and southeast toward Svatove. In conjunction with the push from the south, particularly from Lyman on the three axes between the two rivers, this new breakthrough forced the Russian forces to withdraw from the Borova position on the Oskil before being surrounded. Russian units are trying to re-establish themselves along the Krasna, hoping to make a strong defensive line from the urban chain along it. It is not clear that they will succeed, as Ukrainian units are trying to advance faster than the defense is organized. They have apparently already gained a foothold in the small towns of Chervonopopivka and Pishchane on the P66 highway that connects Svatove to Kreminna, 30 km east of Lyman. The town of Kreminna (population 20,000 before the war) is held by the forces of the Russian 20th Army, which retreated from the Lyman pocket.
Despite the wear and tear of the units engaged over the past month and the logistical elongation, which we note is also fed by the numerous captures from the enemy, the Ukrainian forces have a vested interest in maintaining pressure through maneuver on the Russian forces that are struggling to recover. The Ukrainian effort will probably be focused on taking Kreminna and especially Rubizhne (56,000 inhabitants), which had already been the subject of intense fighting from March to May. The capture of Rubizhne would open the door, on the one hand, to the reconquest of Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, which could be approached from the north, and, on the other hand, to the seizure 60 km to the north-east of the small town of Starobilsk, a communications hub for the whole of northern Luhansk province. The Ukrainian forces will then be in the heart of the provinces annexed by Russia and warned that they would be defended by all means.
After weeks of pressure, Ukrainian forces of the Southern Command have in turn made a very significant advance into the northern part of the Russian bridgehead of Kherson along the Dnieper River. The Russians acknowledged the Ukrainian capture of Zolota Balka, as always at the cost of "terrible losses" that would make it a Pyrrhic victory. But the Ukrainians continued further south on the T0403 road and even reached Dudchany, which represents the first real breakthrough in this strongly defended area. Having reached the same parallel as the small bridgehead at Davydiv Brid to the west of the device, the Ukrainians seem to have forced the Russian forces in the northern sector to withdraw. They now threaten the central sector and possibly even the Dnieper crossing at Nova Kakhovka. For the rest, the southern area of the bridgehead is hardly moving, with the Ukrainians perhaps practicing the balance of forces from one point of the front to the other, which would be rational, while the interdiction and harassment artillery campaign continues to isolate the Russians.
In short, with their numbers and tactical superiority, the Ukrainians advanced almost everywhere they attacked, maintaining the initiative in the face of a Russian command whose functioning is not well understood. There is clearly a gap in the speed of decision making, according to John Boyd's famous OODA (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) loop, but already perfectly described by Marc Bloch in L'étrange défaite. Things seem to be going too fast for the Russians, whose centralization up to the highest level is apparent, or at least their concern not to upset this highest level. An insistent rumor claims that Lyman's forces were not withdrawn on September 30 so as not to spoil the "annexation party", which had serious and often fatal consequences for many Russian soldiers. But one does not understand either the obstinacy to multiply the attacks against Bakhmut like a fly against a window. If the capture of this city had an interest in July by opening a passage towards Kramatorsk, it has no more any except perhaps that to offer a victory.
In the meantime, the Russians are concentrating on this objective a few forces that are still fighting, which would probably be more useful elsewhere. The holding of the Kherson bridgehead at all costs cannot be explained militarily either. While the Russian forces are globally inferior in number and are in difficulty in many sectors, the choice to place one-sixth of the total forces (some say an even greater proportion) and among the best in a small bridgehead likely to be isolated is extremely dangerous. The position is paradoxically strong but also fragile, as it could explode under pressure. It would be a disaster, perhaps decisive for the fate of the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine, all to keep the city of Kherson and the possibility of attacking Odessa one day.
The situation could only improve for the Russians by a profound transformation of their military tool. This did not come from a general movement from below in the manner of the French army before the battle of the Marne from August to September 1914 or from above by the energy of a general de Lattre arriving in Indochina. The first possibility is not in the Russian military DNA, the second is not possible since one does not want to see an imperator and potential rival emerge. The transformation therefore came from Vladimir Putin, who reluctantly decided to mobilize the nation's resources in the war effort and thus to bring this war into the whole society.
Let's recall this anomaly which wanted a major war, of high intensity to use the current term, that is to say a conflict essential in its stakes - in this case the life or death of nations - and important in the extent of the means deployed and the violence deployed, to be engaged without even declaring it and without proceeding to a mobilization of the nation. Vladimir Putin's Russia has become like the empires described by Ibn Khaldun. A general population pacified in the sense of demilitarized and passive if not to work and provide wealth to an asabiya from the "force structures", the Siloviki, and an army recruited from peripheral Russia, geographically and socially.
This model of society, otherwise sufficiently corrupted not to ensure its proper functioning, failed to defeat an equally corrupt Ukrainian society, but which mobilized as a whole and received help from Western democracies. Ukraine has succeeded in creating a patriotic mass movement where the Russian authorities refused to do so.
To fight, that is to say to kill and eventually to be killed, is not at all natural. To take these risks, one needs three ingredients: good reasons to do so, confidence in one's ability to do so, and a sense of purpose. Despite the losses, Ukraine has managed, after several months of mobilization, training and victories, to bring these ingredients together in several hundred thousand men and women. In the face of this, the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine no longer has much chance, limited only in its capacity to replace the enormous losses, with motivation often linked above all to the "esprit de corps" of regiments and brigades in increasing decomposition and now accumulating rather than failing.
Vladimir Putin has therefore tried to ward off fate by raising a first Pandora's box, the appeal to the nation, while threatening to raise a second, the use of nuclear weapons. This is the primary reason for the rush to annex the conquered territories, a long-standing project but one that was envisaged from a position of strength and not on the back foot. The extension of the Russian border and land is thus hoped to give a good reason to fight to all those who will now be sent there authoritatively. Accompanied by an offer of discussion on the mode "what is mine is mine, the rest is negotiable", and by terrible threats, it is also supposed to give good reasons for the Ukrainians not to fight anymore and especially for the Westerners not to help anymore. This annexation had no chance of being recognized by anyone, and especially not by the Ukrainians, but the main thing was that it was recognized by the Russians and that Western sympathizers seized upon it in the name of peace and fear to push the Ukraine to accept defeat.
So this is how we hope to reverse the situation with a "mass uprising" which we are rightly suspicious of, given the massive and once again unprecedented flight that it provokes. No matter. Nobody dared to plan the organization of a mobilization behind the Tsar's back, since he had said that it would never take place. So here we are, in the most complete bardak, hundreds of thousands of men sent in bulk to the sorting centers by the regional governors in order to respect the requested numbers, as when Stalin gave quotas of deportees. When they arrived at the sorting center, those who could really serve or who could not afford to pay an exemption were seen. Those who cannot get through will then discover that the equipment depots are largely empty, due to lack of organization or lack of anticipation except for the increase in the bank account of some. Thus, we are still looking for, among others, hundreds of thousands of winter outfits that have probably been paid for, but never manufactured.
Another Stalinist touch can be found in the law on tougher sanctions for draft dodgers and now even for prisoners, who have just been told that they will go to Russian prisons as soon as they are released by the Ukrainians, which is added to a more modern element such as the "stop-loss" which transforms the fixed-term contracts of soldiers who volunteered to serve for a while in Ukraine into permanent contracts that cannot be denounced.
There is not much in it, except the duty to defend the "extended Fatherland" which gives good reasons to fight, and even less confidence in one's abilities, which are weak, one's means, which are non-existent, and one's friends, who are unknown. As for victories, they are not likely to come with bulk soldiers facing a Ukrainian army that has become the best in Europe with Western help (several recent examples show that this is not enough in itself) and its internal energy. If the 200,000 mobilized troops announced by Minister Shugu are sent immediately and in small packages directly to the combat units on the front line, and the units are not numerous enough to be much elsewhere, they will not strengthen them but on the contrary will plummet them. Fragile and unskilled rookies are dead weight there, figuratively at first before they really are, and much more often than others.
However, no revolt or mutiny is to be expected in the immediate future. In Russia, at best, one revolts first on one's knees by going to see the Tsar so that he corrects the errors of the boyars, or one takes refuge in an extreme passivity. It takes a lot of accumulated suffering to see a Potemkin battleship, the hungry women workers in Petrograd in February 1917, or the mothers who ask where their sons are sent to the furnace of the horrible wars in Afghanistan or Chechnya. Often, however, suffering alone is not enough; it must also be accompanied by disaster. Moreover, these angers only lead to shocks and not to direct seizures of power. These upheavals end up replacing the failing regime with another, more liberal one, as in February 1917 or 1991, or a harder one, like the Bolsheviks taking power in November 1917 or Putin succeeding Yeltsin at the turn of the year 2000.
So we risk seeing more disaster and horror in Ukraine before we get our hands on the second Pandora's box, the one that is only opened as a last resort. Every month, a Russian leader reminds us that it exists, and another one reminds us the next day that we will only put our hand on it in case of an existential threat to Russia. This is a dangerous game that was played almost every four or five years during the Cold War and that has been forgotten since 1989, except in the Indian subcontinent. No one has ever dared to play it to the end. No one wanted to attach his name to the first use of nuclear weapons after they had become taboo after their sole use in Japan. So far, Russia has played by the rules of the game: nuclear weapons are used to frighten and care is taken to avoid military aggression that would escalate and increase the likelihood of reciprocal use. In the context of a confrontation, everything else is possible, including sabotage of gas pipelines, but we do not fight each other with weapons in hand, at least on a large scale.
Two things have changed, however, since September 30. The first is the most worrying part of Vladimir Putin's surreal speech on 30 September, in which he recalled the example of the American atomic strikes on Japan, but not to emphasize that this marked the end of a taboo, but on the contrary to explain that this constituted a precedent that could justify all the others. This is a subtle change of tone from an ultimately very orthodox discourse. The second, more obvious and probably too much so, is the displacement of the Russian border, which allows one to declare that anything is possible as long as it concerns the Fatherland. It is as if France had invaded Belgium, annexed Wallonia under the pretext that French is spoken there, and declared that the use of nuclear weapons to defend this new France would not be excluded.
These two elements and the effect of many of the various statements, from Medvedev to Kadyrov, make the matter more serious if not more likely. There is still a long way to go before the nuclear card is the only one to be played. The partial mobilization, which will undoubtedly be followed by others, must be seen as a drawing of new cards, and there are still many hopes on the Russian side of getting the decadent West to weaken aid to Ukraine. There are also strong doubts about the credibility of a terrible punishment for crossing a border that is not even known.
The red line has been made clearer. It is also hard to see at what stage of what is ultimately a nibbling of the new motherland one will start using a nuclear weapon, no matter how powerful it is, since what counts is the label "nuclear". Will the Russians accept to become a pariah state for the whole international community, including China, because Melitopol has been reconquered by the Ukrainians? Will they accept devastating conventional strikes on Russian forces, the Sevastopol base, the Kerch bridge or others, because it is inconceivable to accept the banalization of nuclear use? One cannot eternally multiply strategic errors.
In 1983, the British general John Kackett described the third world war in a book of the same name. To break the deadlock in their attack on the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviets destroyed the city of Birmingham with a nuclear strike. Minsk was destroyed immediately in response. The fear of the apocalypse shook the Soviet Union enough to cause its breakup and collapse. On top of that the revolt began in Ukraine.
Nudes and words - The war, point of situation.
First some news from the front. After the capture of Lyman and the new blow to the Russian forces, the Ukrainian forces of the Eastern Command continue to advance in the 25-30 km strip between the Oskil and Krasna rivers, both running north-south. On October 2, the Ukrainian brigade crossed the Oskil at Kupiansk and advanced rapidly east and southeast toward Svatove. In conjunction with the push from the south, particularly from Lyman on the three axes between the two rivers, this new breakthrough forced the Russian forces to withdraw from the Borova position on the Oskil before being surrounded. Russian units are trying to re-establish themselves along the Krasna, hoping to make a strong defensive line from the urban chain along it. It is not clear that they will succeed, as Ukrainian units are trying to advance faster than the defense is organized. They have apparently already gained a foothold in the small towns of Chervonopopivka and Pishchane on the P66 highway that connects Svatove to Kreminna, 30 km east of Lyman. The town of Kreminna (population 20,000 before the war) is held by the forces of the Russian 20th Army, which retreated from the Lyman pocket.
Despite the wear and tear of the units engaged over the past month and the logistical elongation, which we note is also fed by the numerous captures from the enemy, the Ukrainian forces have a vested interest in maintaining pressure through maneuver on the Russian forces that are struggling to recover. The Ukrainian effort will probably be focused on taking Kreminna and especially Rubizhne (56,000 inhabitants), which had already been the subject of intense fighting from March to May. The capture of Rubizhne would open the door, on the one hand, to the reconquest of Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, which could be approached from the north, and, on the other hand, to the seizure 60 km to the north-east of the small town of Starobilsk, a communications hub for the whole of northern Luhansk province. The Ukrainian forces will then be in the heart of the provinces annexed by Russia and warned that they would be defended by all means.
After weeks of pressure, Ukrainian forces of the Southern Command have in turn made a very significant advance into the northern part of the Russian bridgehead of Kherson along the Dnieper River. The Russians acknowledged the Ukrainian capture of Zolota Balka, as always at the cost of "terrible losses" that would make it a Pyrrhic victory. But the Ukrainians continued further south on the T0403 road and even reached Dudchany, which represents the first real breakthrough in this strongly defended area. Having reached the same parallel as the small bridgehead at Davydiv Brid to the west of the device, the Ukrainians seem to have forced the Russian forces in the northern sector to withdraw. They now threaten the central sector and possibly even the Dnieper crossing at Nova Kakhovka. For the rest, the southern area of the bridgehead is hardly moving, with the Ukrainians perhaps practicing the balance of forces from one point of the front to the other, which would be rational, while the interdiction and harassment artillery campaign continues to isolate the Russians.
In short, with their numbers and tactical superiority, the Ukrainians advanced almost everywhere they attacked, maintaining the initiative in the face of a Russian command whose functioning is not well understood. There is clearly a gap in the speed of decision making, according to John Boyd's famous OODA (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) loop, but already perfectly described by Marc Bloch in L'étrange défaite. Things seem to be going too fast for the Russians, whose centralization up to the highest level is apparent, or at least their concern not to upset this highest level. An insistent rumor claims that Lyman's forces were not withdrawn on September 30 so as not to spoil the "annexation party", which had serious and often fatal consequences for many Russian soldiers. But one does not understand either the obstinacy to multiply the attacks against Bakhmut like a fly against a window. If the capture of this city had an interest in July by opening a passage towards Kramatorsk, it has no more any except perhaps that to offer a victory.
In the meantime, the Russians are concentrating on this objective a few forces that are still fighting, which would probably be more useful elsewhere. The holding of the Kherson bridgehead at all costs cannot be explained militarily either. While the Russian forces are globally inferior in number and are in difficulty in many sectors, the choice to place one-sixth of the total forces (some say an even greater proportion) and among the best in a small bridgehead likely to be isolated is extremely dangerous. The position is paradoxically strong but also fragile, as it could explode under pressure. It would be a disaster, perhaps decisive for the fate of the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine, all to keep the city of Kherson and the possibility of attacking Odessa one day.
The situation could only improve for the Russians by a profound transformation of their military tool. This did not come from a general movement from below in the manner of the French army before the battle of the Marne from August to September 1914 or from above by the energy of a general de Lattre arriving in Indochina. The first possibility is not in the Russian military DNA, the second is not possible since one does not want to see an imperator and potential rival emerge. The transformation therefore came from Vladimir Putin, who reluctantly decided to mobilize the nation's resources in the war effort and thus to bring this war into the whole society.
Let's recall this anomaly which wanted a major war, of high intensity to use the current term, that is to say a conflict essential in its stakes - in this case the life or death of nations - and important in the extent of the means deployed and the violence deployed, to be engaged without even declaring it and without proceeding to a mobilization of the nation. Vladimir Putin's Russia has become like the empires described by Ibn Khaldun. A general population pacified in the sense of demilitarized and passive if not to work and provide wealth to an asabiya from the "force structures", the Siloviki, and an army recruited from peripheral Russia, geographically and socially.
This model of society, otherwise sufficiently corrupted not to ensure its proper functioning, failed to defeat an equally corrupt Ukrainian society, but which mobilized as a whole and received help from Western democracies. Ukraine has succeeded in creating a patriotic mass movement where the Russian authorities refused to do so.
To fight, that is to say to kill and eventually to be killed, is not at all natural. To take these risks, one needs three ingredients: good reasons to do so, confidence in one's ability to do so, and a sense of purpose. Despite the losses, Ukraine has managed, after several months of mobilization, training and victories, to bring these ingredients together in several hundred thousand men and women. In the face of this, the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine no longer has much chance, limited only in its capacity to replace the enormous losses, with motivation often linked above all to the "esprit de corps" of regiments and brigades in increasing decomposition and now accumulating rather than failing.
Vladimir Putin has therefore tried to ward off fate by raising a first Pandora's box, the appeal to the nation, while threatening to raise a second, the use of nuclear weapons. This is the primary reason for the rush to annex the conquered territories, a long-standing project but one that was envisaged from a position of strength and not on the back foot. The extension of the Russian border and land is thus hoped to give a good reason to fight to all those who will now be sent there authoritatively. Accompanied by an offer of discussion on the mode "what is mine is mine, the rest is negotiable", and by terrible threats, it is also supposed to give good reasons for the Ukrainians not to fight anymore and especially for the Westerners not to help anymore. This annexation had no chance of being recognized by anyone, and especially not by the Ukrainians, but the main thing was that it was recognized by the Russians and that Western sympathizers seized upon it in the name of peace and fear to push the Ukraine to accept defeat.
So this is how we hope to reverse the situation with a "mass uprising" which we are rightly suspicious of, given the massive and once again unprecedented flight that it provokes. No matter. Nobody dared to plan the organization of a mobilization behind the Tsar's back, since he had said that it would never take place. So here we are, in the most complete bardak, hundreds of thousands of men sent in bulk to the sorting centers by the regional governors in order to respect the requested numbers, as when Stalin gave quotas of deportees. When they arrived at the sorting center, those who could really serve or who could not afford to pay an exemption were seen. Those who cannot get through will then discover that the equipment depots are largely empty, due to lack of organization or lack of anticipation except for the increase in the bank account of some. Thus, we are still looking for, among others, hundreds of thousands of winter outfits that have probably been paid for, but never manufactured.
Another Stalinist touch can be found in the law on tougher sanctions for draft dodgers and now even for prisoners, who have just been told that they will go to Russian prisons as soon as they are released by the Ukrainians, which is added to a more modern element such as the "stop-loss" which transforms the fixed-term contracts of soldiers who volunteered to serve for a while in Ukraine into permanent contracts that cannot be denounced.
There is not much in it, except the duty to defend the "extended Fatherland" which gives good reasons to fight, and even less confidence in one's abilities, which are weak, one's means, which are non-existent, and one's friends, who are unknown. As for victories, they are not likely to come with bulk soldiers facing a Ukrainian army that has become the best in Europe with Western help (several recent examples show that this is not enough in itself) and its internal energy. If the 200,000 mobilized troops announced by Minister Shugu are sent immediately and in small packages directly to the combat units on the front line, and the units are not numerous enough to be much elsewhere, they will not strengthen them but on the contrary will plummet them. Fragile and unskilled rookies are dead weight there, figuratively at first before they really are, and much more often than others.
However, no revolt or mutiny is to be expected in the immediate future. In Russia, at best, one revolts first on one's knees by going to see the Tsar so that he corrects the errors of the boyars, or one takes refuge in an extreme passivity. It takes a lot of accumulated suffering to see a Potemkin battleship, the hungry women workers in Petrograd in February 1917, or the mothers who ask where their sons are sent to the furnace of the horrible wars in Afghanistan or Chechnya. Often, however, suffering alone is not enough; it must also be accompanied by disaster. Moreover, these angers only lead to shocks and not to direct seizures of power. These upheavals end up replacing the failing regime with another, more liberal one, as in February 1917 or 1991, or a harder one, like the Bolsheviks taking power in November 1917 or Putin succeeding Yeltsin at the turn of the year 2000.
So we risk seeing more disaster and horror in Ukraine before we get our hands on the second Pandora's box, the one that is only opened as a last resort. Every month, a Russian leader reminds us that it exists, and another one reminds us the next day that we will only put our hand on it in case of an existential threat to Russia. This is a dangerous game that was played almost every four or five years during the Cold War and that has been forgotten since 1989, except in the Indian subcontinent. No one has ever dared to play it to the end. No one wanted to attach his name to the first use of nuclear weapons after they had become taboo after their sole use in Japan. So far, Russia has played by the rules of the game: nuclear weapons are used to frighten and care is taken to avoid military aggression that would escalate and increase the likelihood of reciprocal use. In the context of a confrontation, everything else is possible, including sabotage of gas pipelines, but we do not fight each other with weapons in hand, at least on a large scale.
Two things have changed, however, since September 30. The first is the most worrying part of Vladimir Putin's surreal speech on 30 September, in which he recalled the example of the American atomic strikes on Japan, but not to emphasize that this marked the end of a taboo, but on the contrary to explain that this constituted a precedent that could justify all the others. This is a subtle change of tone from an ultimately very orthodox discourse. The second, more obvious and probably too much so, is the displacement of the Russian border, which allows one to declare that anything is possible as long as it concerns the Fatherland. It is as if France had invaded Belgium, annexed Wallonia under the pretext that French is spoken there, and declared that the use of nuclear weapons to defend this new France would not be excluded.
These two elements and the effect of many of the various statements, from Medvedev to Kadyrov, make the matter more serious if not more likely. There is still a long way to go before the nuclear card is the only one to be played. The partial mobilization, which will undoubtedly be followed by others, must be seen as a drawing of new cards, and there are still many hopes on the Russian side of getting the decadent West to weaken aid to Ukraine. There are also strong doubts about the credibility of a terrible punishment for crossing a border that is not even known.
The red line has been made clearer. It is also hard to see at what stage of what is ultimately a nibbling of the new motherland one will start using a nuclear weapon, no matter how powerful it is, since what counts is the label "nuclear". Will the Russians accept to become a pariah state for the whole international community, including China, because Melitopol has been reconquered by the Ukrainians? Will they accept devastating conventional strikes on Russian forces, the Sevastopol base, the Kerch bridge or others, because it is inconceivable to accept the banalization of nuclear use? One cannot eternally multiply strategic errors.
In 1983, the British general John Kackett described the third world war in a book of the same name. To break the deadlock in their attack on the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviets destroyed the city of Birmingham with a nuclear strike. Minsk was destroyed immediately in response. The fear of the apocalypse shook the Soviet Union enough to cause its breakup and collapse. On top of that the revolt began in Ukraine.
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If you happened to know about the atrocities made up Japanese soldiers to pow during ww2 & the area they captured, a normal person will wish to nuke them as many as possible.
And what your dear Anglo/Euro masters did to poor Red-Indians was extremely nice and gentle, lol. I know it's off-topic, but still couldn't resist
Its better than u forced to have intercorse with your mother infront of japanese soldiers or you *censored*ing your own daughter.And what your dear Anglo/Euro masters did to poor Red-Indians was extremely nice and gentle, lol. I know it's off-topic, but still couldn't resist
Indian T-90s are manufactured in India. None of them are available to Russian military.
T90 engines are manufactured in India.
‘Made in India’ tank engines handed over to the Army
We can produce our own products: Defence Minister
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Russia is getting beaten up in Kherson now. Russian retreat from the northern part of the bridgehead was a disaster, suffering huge losses.
If Russia can't hold on to Kherson, it's safe to say that Russian military is now a spent force.
If Russia can't hold on to Kherson, it's safe to say that Russian military is now a spent force.
The Islamic attackers on India did even worse. So should we nuke the Islamic world?
Also you've no idea about the mass murder of Polyneasians/Red-Indians by the European invaders.
What exactly is your point? No one denied that Europeans (including Russians) did genocides left right and center. Imperial Japanese army was as worse as the European invaders of North America. Idea of Japanese supremacy is not any different from white supremacist ideology.
Are You serious?
So only Japanese military members died in bombing of nagasaki & hiroshima?
Is that what you claim?
Point is simple, no crime whether war or ethnic warrants the use of atom/nuclear bomb like uncle Sam did in the name of liberty, fraternity and humanity.
Man, what are you trying to say?
That west is hypocritical. Yes, Everybody Knows that.
But What russia is doing is simply wrong according to International law.
From the comments you have made in this thread, I get the sense that You also want russia to violate international law without facing any consequences just like west.