Update on operations in Ukraine 5 March D+9 12:45
1- General situation: general stalemate of Russian forces with the exception of the Eastern zone where the 20th A is advancing towards Kiev and the 1st ABG is suspending the investment of Kharkiv in favour of reconnaissance operations in force towards the centre (Poltava) and the South-East.
2- Air and sea: little change. Persistent fear of anti-aircraft defences (S300, MANPADS) which hindered air manoeuvres. Flying at very low altitude and/or at night with less efficiency.
3- New area, West: the western Ukrainian area (large marshes at the Belarusian border, few important axes during the Rasputa period) is not very favourable for a ground manoeuvre, but possibility of penetrating Jitomyr, west of Kiev.
4- It is possible that the large column on standby is in fact the 35th A (and not the 36th) until then in reserve in Belarus and that it is intended to manoeuvre, either towards Kiev, or towards the South in the direction of Vinnitsya, in order to cut the Ukraine in two.
5- Kiev: the 41st A still stopped at Chernihiv and the 36th A west of Kiev, but rapid advance of the 20th A to the east. The 20th A may reach the east of the capital in the coming days.
6- East: limited Russian advance into Kharkiv but peripheral operations of the 1st ABG towards Sloviansk in the south-east and Poltava in the south-west of Kharkiv. Poltava, a high point in Russian military history, victory of Peter the Great against the Swedish army of Charles XII, 1709
7- Southeast: major Russian effort and separatist militias against Mariupol. Violent fighting. The siege of Mariupol absorbs the forces of the 58th A and part of the 49th A from Donetsk.
8- Few forces available to advance north, but presence with limited forces near Zaporozhjia, with seizure of the nuclear power plant and thus control over 15% of Ukrainian electricity production.
9- South-West: new attack on Mykolayev (Ukr. naval forces HQ) from Kherson. The fight in the sector seems to be taken over by the 22nd Corps (CA) + naval brigade and 7th AAD and no longer the 58th A. The capture of Mykolayev essential for the attack on Odessa.
10- Notes Return to the phase of suppression of air defences in the early days of the war. Its incompleteness had serious consequences on the failure of the high-speed offensive of the ground forces.
11- The air raid on the airport of Gostomel (North Kiev), suffered heavy losses (two attack helicopters destroyed and especially one or two IL76 transport planes destroyed with undoubtedly heavy human losses).
12- Back to the problems of Russian organisation. Their origin may be the anarchic accumulation of different command structures after the succession of reforms: army and corps, autonomous brigades and divisions with regiments.
13- Often too many units to be commanded (far beyond the norm of 5) simultaneously by the army staffs, especially with reinforcements + liaison problems.
14- Death of several Russian generals reported, sign of the need (by order?) for commanders of large units to go directly to the closest unit to bypass a saturated chain of command and compensate for the lack of initiative of the units.
Point 11 seems fake, the IL-76 debris would have been on the internet by now.
Point 14 is surprising. Several?