War in Ukraine and the LPM-Top 4 lessons from the current war
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
The war in Ukraine is not over, far from it, but as we reflect again in France on our model of armies and on the future military programming law, it is not useless to come back on what seems already obvious in view of the eight months of conflict. This is obviously a personal assessment and therefore just as obviously open to criticism with arguments.
1-20% of resources for those who do 80% of the work is not much
Russia's difficulties in militarily defeating Ukraine, a country with a defence budget officially 13 times smaller (and unofficially much more, despite American aid before 2022) is explained first of all by an army model that is unsuited to the context.
Russia wanted a "United States" class army with a GDP barely higher than that of Italy and it was necessary to make trade-offs. Each of its components argued that its absolute priority was to ensure nuclear deterrence, the presence and prestige of the red-white flag in the world, support for industry and sometimes to win the wars to be fought.
In the end, Russia opted for the maintenance of a plethoric nuclear arsenal, massive modernisation of its air force and navy, a powerful air defence, the creation and development of special forces and an independent air assault force. Only 20 per cent of the resources were left for the army. Confrontation and eventual war with Western countries attracted attention, minds and budgets (always use the greatest threat to attract finances) while the probability of such a war was and still is very low, due to nuclear deterrence. In the name of "more allowing less", it was believed that this model could cope with everything and this proved to be a delusion when it was necessary to wage a real war and without the excuse of surprise, since it was Russia itself that triggered this war.
From fighting armed organisations to invading a country, wars are not won by killing all enemy combatants from a distance - a rich Sisyphean strategy that does not want to take risks - but by occupying the terrain. The Russian army in charge of planting the flags was far inferior to what it could have been given the country's potential.
On the other hand, due to a lack of means and an ambition limited to territorial defence, the Ukrainian army devoted 90% of its resources to its ground forces and anti-access means. While a large part of the Russian army model could not be engaged against Ukraine, the actual balance of power on the ground was therefore much less unbalanced than it could have been. It is not important to be able to win hypothetical wars, and all the more hypothetical as they would oppose nuclear powers, if one is not able to win the major wars of the moment, especially those that one has decided.
To go further into the details of the model, it should be added that not only has the Russian army been neglected, but that the very model of this army, based on the firepower of the artillery and the shock power of the battle tanks, has been found wanting. There is no way to win a major war without a large, quality infantry force, either your own or that of the allies you support, especially in a complex, urbanised environment like Ukraine. The Russian Army had even less of this necessary infantry as the best elements were taken by the airborne forces and the naval infantry brigades, good units, but poorly equipped and organised to fight other than in airmobile/airborne/amphibious operations, which proved to be rare.
2. Stock is survival
The balance of power was all the more unfavourable to the Russians because the Ukrainians had real human reserves at their disposal. To be able to cope with a radical change of context, you have to be able to build up power very quickly or at least to be able to sustain power over time. The Russians and Ukrainians had the intelligence to rely on their stocks of old major equipment inherited from the Soviet army. Retrofitted, they made it possible to have the material mass. The difference is that the Ukrainians have better organised the human resource to use this material mass.
You can't get back up to speed quickly without drawing on the resources of the rest of the nation. Ukraine organised this appeal, not Russia. The Ukrainians had real reserves of experienced men to supplement the active brigades, train new ones for mobilisation and form the framework of the territorial brigades. With the influx of volunteers and then mobilised men, the Ukrainians had a mass of men who became soldiers after several months of training and experience. It can be added that this contribution of the nation was also a contribution of particular skills and even of civilian equipment of military use. Thanks to this mobilisation effort and with Western material assistance, the Ukrainian army became the most powerful in Europe in the summer of 2022.
On the other side, nothing of the sort was planned. Rather like France in the war against Iraq in 1990, Russia committed an expeditionary force of only professional soldiers, but without a professional operational reserve of the same magnitude to complement or support it. Since the beginning of the war, Russia has been improvising in this area, from a mop-up of volunteers to a chaotic partial mobilisation, and this has obviously not been successful. High-intensity warfare, to use the term, cannot be seriously conducted without first simplifying administrative procedures, organising stocks of equipment and logistical resources, complete reserve units, a census of all individuals with military experience, the possibility of requisitioning civilian equipment and planning the transformation of production lines.
Let us add that even if, like the Western countries at present, we remain within the framework of a confrontation and not of a war, having at least stocks of equipment and training structures makes it much easier to help materially the allied country which is engaged in war.
3. Has the sky become too dangerous for humans?
One of the characteristics of the war in Ukraine is that there are few aircraft, the (70% American) stars of the coalition wars fought during the "New World Order". This is not completely new. The 2014-2015 war in the Donbass was fought almost without manned aircraft, as was the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. The main reason for this is the difficulty of engaging tens of millions of euros worth of manned aircraft in a dense, multi-layered air defence environment. Despite the caution in their use, the Russian Air Force has lost 63 aircraft and 53 helicopters to date, losses that are documented and therefore less than the reality. There are also alternative means of carrying out the missions of these aircraft: drones of all kinds, long-range artillery and missiles. The Russian campaign of strikes in the depths of Ukrainian territory is the first to be carried out almost entirely with missiles or near-missiles since the German V-1 and V-2 campaign in 1944-45. It has more or less the same ineffectiveness.
It should be noted that after having placed all its confidence in the certainty of having air superiority (with American help as soon as something important and/or long-lasting had to be done) and in its concern to save money at all costs, France sacrificed both its anti-aircraft artillery and its ground-to-ground artillery, as well as the drones, which seemed to have no use in such a context, even though it was well known that there would be an end. If the American air force is still capable of operating in such a hostile environment at great expense, what is the real situation with the French forces?
The problem also arises for amphibious operations or simply near the coast, within missile range or even for air assault operations. Should they be abandoned in favour of other modes of action? Should the means be adapted to make them capable of penetrating powerful anti-access defences? Is it worth it?
4. The atom is peace or almost
There has never been so much talk about nuclear weapons since the 1980s. This is at least an opportunity to recall how useful it is for preventing wars between the powers that possess it. If nuclear weapons had not existed, we would not be on the threshold of a third world war, but of a fourth, since the third would certainly have already taken place between NATO, the Warsaw Pact and China between 1950 and 1990.
France must therefore continue to improve this tool and retain this second-strike capability (being able to respond to a massive nuclear attack) which is the only way to be a real deterrent against another nuclear power. The major problem is that this has a cost, and even an increasing cost. The additional cost of renewing the means of our nuclear strike force is devouring the increase in the budget of the armed forces and therefore, unless this budget is further increased, will produce crowding out effects.
This is an opportunity to remind ourselves of the need to have the means to match our ambitions - if we made the same defence effort as in 1989, the army budget would be 70 billion euros - or if it is not possible to do the opposite, otherwise France will find itself in the current position of Russia when it comes to waging war.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
The war in Ukraine is not over, far from it, but as we reflect again in France on our model of armies and on the future military programming law, it is not useless to come back on what seems already obvious in view of the eight months of conflict. This is obviously a personal assessment and therefore just as obviously open to criticism with arguments.
1-20% of resources for those who do 80% of the work is not much
Russia's difficulties in militarily defeating Ukraine, a country with a defence budget officially 13 times smaller (and unofficially much more, despite American aid before 2022) is explained first of all by an army model that is unsuited to the context.
Russia wanted a "United States" class army with a GDP barely higher than that of Italy and it was necessary to make trade-offs. Each of its components argued that its absolute priority was to ensure nuclear deterrence, the presence and prestige of the red-white flag in the world, support for industry and sometimes to win the wars to be fought.
In the end, Russia opted for the maintenance of a plethoric nuclear arsenal, massive modernisation of its air force and navy, a powerful air defence, the creation and development of special forces and an independent air assault force. Only 20 per cent of the resources were left for the army. Confrontation and eventual war with Western countries attracted attention, minds and budgets (always use the greatest threat to attract finances) while the probability of such a war was and still is very low, due to nuclear deterrence. In the name of "more allowing less", it was believed that this model could cope with everything and this proved to be a delusion when it was necessary to wage a real war and without the excuse of surprise, since it was Russia itself that triggered this war.
From fighting armed organisations to invading a country, wars are not won by killing all enemy combatants from a distance - a rich Sisyphean strategy that does not want to take risks - but by occupying the terrain. The Russian army in charge of planting the flags was far inferior to what it could have been given the country's potential.
On the other hand, due to a lack of means and an ambition limited to territorial defence, the Ukrainian army devoted 90% of its resources to its ground forces and anti-access means. While a large part of the Russian army model could not be engaged against Ukraine, the actual balance of power on the ground was therefore much less unbalanced than it could have been. It is not important to be able to win hypothetical wars, and all the more hypothetical as they would oppose nuclear powers, if one is not able to win the major wars of the moment, especially those that one has decided.
To go further into the details of the model, it should be added that not only has the Russian army been neglected, but that the very model of this army, based on the firepower of the artillery and the shock power of the battle tanks, has been found wanting. There is no way to win a major war without a large, quality infantry force, either your own or that of the allies you support, especially in a complex, urbanised environment like Ukraine. The Russian Army had even less of this necessary infantry as the best elements were taken by the airborne forces and the naval infantry brigades, good units, but poorly equipped and organised to fight other than in airmobile/airborne/amphibious operations, which proved to be rare.
2. Stock is survival
The balance of power was all the more unfavourable to the Russians because the Ukrainians had real human reserves at their disposal. To be able to cope with a radical change of context, you have to be able to build up power very quickly or at least to be able to sustain power over time. The Russians and Ukrainians had the intelligence to rely on their stocks of old major equipment inherited from the Soviet army. Retrofitted, they made it possible to have the material mass. The difference is that the Ukrainians have better organised the human resource to use this material mass.
You can't get back up to speed quickly without drawing on the resources of the rest of the nation. Ukraine organised this appeal, not Russia. The Ukrainians had real reserves of experienced men to supplement the active brigades, train new ones for mobilisation and form the framework of the territorial brigades. With the influx of volunteers and then mobilised men, the Ukrainians had a mass of men who became soldiers after several months of training and experience. It can be added that this contribution of the nation was also a contribution of particular skills and even of civilian equipment of military use. Thanks to this mobilisation effort and with Western material assistance, the Ukrainian army became the most powerful in Europe in the summer of 2022.
On the other side, nothing of the sort was planned. Rather like France in the war against Iraq in 1990, Russia committed an expeditionary force of only professional soldiers, but without a professional operational reserve of the same magnitude to complement or support it. Since the beginning of the war, Russia has been improvising in this area, from a mop-up of volunteers to a chaotic partial mobilisation, and this has obviously not been successful. High-intensity warfare, to use the term, cannot be seriously conducted without first simplifying administrative procedures, organising stocks of equipment and logistical resources, complete reserve units, a census of all individuals with military experience, the possibility of requisitioning civilian equipment and planning the transformation of production lines.
Let us add that even if, like the Western countries at present, we remain within the framework of a confrontation and not of a war, having at least stocks of equipment and training structures makes it much easier to help materially the allied country which is engaged in war.
3. Has the sky become too dangerous for humans?
One of the characteristics of the war in Ukraine is that there are few aircraft, the (70% American) stars of the coalition wars fought during the "New World Order". This is not completely new. The 2014-2015 war in the Donbass was fought almost without manned aircraft, as was the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. The main reason for this is the difficulty of engaging tens of millions of euros worth of manned aircraft in a dense, multi-layered air defence environment. Despite the caution in their use, the Russian Air Force has lost 63 aircraft and 53 helicopters to date, losses that are documented and therefore less than the reality. There are also alternative means of carrying out the missions of these aircraft: drones of all kinds, long-range artillery and missiles. The Russian campaign of strikes in the depths of Ukrainian territory is the first to be carried out almost entirely with missiles or near-missiles since the German V-1 and V-2 campaign in 1944-45. It has more or less the same ineffectiveness.
It should be noted that after having placed all its confidence in the certainty of having air superiority (with American help as soon as something important and/or long-lasting had to be done) and in its concern to save money at all costs, France sacrificed both its anti-aircraft artillery and its ground-to-ground artillery, as well as the drones, which seemed to have no use in such a context, even though it was well known that there would be an end. If the American air force is still capable of operating in such a hostile environment at great expense, what is the real situation with the French forces?
The problem also arises for amphibious operations or simply near the coast, within missile range or even for air assault operations. Should they be abandoned in favour of other modes of action? Should the means be adapted to make them capable of penetrating powerful anti-access defences? Is it worth it?
4. The atom is peace or almost
There has never been so much talk about nuclear weapons since the 1980s. This is at least an opportunity to recall how useful it is for preventing wars between the powers that possess it. If nuclear weapons had not existed, we would not be on the threshold of a third world war, but of a fourth, since the third would certainly have already taken place between NATO, the Warsaw Pact and China between 1950 and 1990.
France must therefore continue to improve this tool and retain this second-strike capability (being able to respond to a massive nuclear attack) which is the only way to be a real deterrent against another nuclear power. The major problem is that this has a cost, and even an increasing cost. The additional cost of renewing the means of our nuclear strike force is devouring the increase in the budget of the armed forces and therefore, unless this budget is further increased, will produce crowding out effects.
This is an opportunity to remind ourselves of the need to have the means to match our ambitions - if we made the same defence effort as in 1989, the army budget would be 70 billion euros - or if it is not possible to do the opposite, otherwise France will find itself in the current position of Russia when it comes to waging war.
. In real, in its speeches, Putin never says « Ukraine » but “the west”. As if in his mind Ukraine would not exist.
