Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Вёрстка
🛑 В Беларуси начали строить лагеря для размещения бойцов ЧВК «Вагнер». «Вёрстка» подтвердила строительство лагеря в Осиповичах Могилёвской области на 8 тысяч бойцов, в 200 км от границы с Украиной. Лагерей будет несколько. В Могилёвской области Беларуси уже вовсю ведётся строительство военного...t.me
Construction of new military field camps started near Asipovichy of Mahyliw region of Belarus, reportedly to host 8000 Wagner troops.
Ha! That's a straight road to Lithuania.
Germany ready to put 4,000 soldiers permanently in Lithuania
Infrastructure and training facilities need to be constructed.
www.politico.eu
Germany ready to put 4,000 soldiers permanently in Lithuania
Infrastructure and training facilities need to be constructed.
Need 20 times more with current Wagner numbers. Even more if you count the combat experience.
There's only 8,000 Wagner in Belarus and there are significant numbers in the Baltics already. Wagner won't have anything to fire if they kick off in the Baltics. We'll hit their ammo stockpiles and bases in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. It's a full war with NATO once they step into the Baltics. It's highly likely that Kaliningrad will be invaded by NATO too if they move on Lithuania, and once Russia loses that, they will never get it back.
The Wagner combat experience is sending small bunches of expendable convicts ahead to get shot so that they can find out where the defenders are, and attack them with mortar and artillery.
But what happens if they have no artillery to pummel the defenders, and no convicts to sacrifice?
Again, as always, any attack against NATO is a death warrant to Russia. We are really, really tired of Russia's bullshit. The fear of the Russian bear is gone, as we've all seen how weak it really is:
Keep in mind that the one thing we have kept in reserve so far is our air forces -- besides a few old MiG and Su from Eastern European countries that had replaced them with Western jets, and a few missiles that were close to their end of service life so it's better to give them to Ukrainians so that they can shoot them at Russians than to have to pay to dismantle them. And if a Tu-141 drone can travel up to the Engels-2 air base without being intercepted on the way, that means that the Russian AD/A2 system is far from being all that it was hyped up to be...
A CI isn't what you think it is, or both Iraq and Afghanistan would have become peaceful very quickly.
You have to physically fight an individual in a firefight. That's when casualties mount.
All your solutions basically see NATO going to war with Russia over an insurgency. Never gonna happen.
That was disinformation from the Western side. There were only two instances of convicts being massacred like that and both times were captured on film and broadcasted by the Ukrainians, both included 2 platoons. And it happened because the convicts were indisciplined and revealed themselves to the UAF.
Also, most convicts finished their 6 months and returned home. Some have stayed back as mercenaries. They are all a pretty screwed up bunch, but are not being used as cannon fodder. Otherwise these units wouldn't have pledged their allegiance to Prigozhin, although some feel betrayed by his withdrawal from Moscow.
Okay, I really hope that's not what EU leaders are actually thinking.
Anyway, any attack Russia would conduct in a NATO country will not be traced back to them. And in some cases it geniunely won't be their fault. For example, arming gangs and terrorists in Europe with M-4s and C-4s delivered by the West to Ukraine, which can be done by the Ukrainian mafia.
Iraq and Afghanistan were getting weapons from Russia and Iran and probably China too the whole time, but they are not NATO, and NATO was not prepared to extend the conflict as a result. Equally the Taliban are not Russian.
Wagner are Russians, and the only place they can get weapons and fuel is from Russia. The Baltics is also NATO. Therefore it's a direct attack on NATO by Russia and we will attack them in response to such a move.
Casualties will also mount when we blow up their camps, training barracks, ships weapons factories, air bases, ammo dumps, chemical/explosive production plants and decision making centres inside Russia if they attack the Baltics.
You even suggested it's a Russian plot yourself, but then you try to claim deniability on their part, are you like mentally ill or something? Of course it's an attack by Russia. The only source that could possibly supply them in that location is Russia. Like I said earlier, it's not the Middle East or Asia where the lunatics are diverse and many. There is only one lunatic in Europe - Russia.
Dude, you're talking about Wagner creating an insurgency in the Baltic states. Of course it'd be traced back to Russia. How do you believe it wouldn't?
Monday 26 June 2023 The Ukrainian offensive
Wars are not fought by armies, but by nations, and the strength of nations in combat is measured according to a very simple equation: F = army x rear, where if only one of the two terms is equal to 0, the total strength is zero. It is therefore possible to use operations on the front and/or rear to change the balance of forces and achieve a strategic objective.
For the time being, as has already happened and may still change, Ukraine's strategic objective is still to drive the Russian occupiers out of all the occupied territories, Donbass and Crimea. To achieve this, Ukraine has a few weak cards to play on the Russian rear: raids and strikes on Russian soil to undermine Russian morale or, on the contrary, bolster that of the Ukrainians. These are in addition to the Western cards of "economic sanctions" and "diplomatic isolation", but all in all they are not enough to, in the words of the French Foreign Ministry, "make Russia give up in the face of the prohibitive cost of war".
On the other hand, Ukraine does have some strong cards to play when it comes to conducting offensive or defensive military operations in Ukraine: a good air defence network, a solid territorial defence corps, a good strike force in depth in the theatre and, above all, a corps of 80 manoeuvre brigades, around 60 of which are of good tactical quality.
The most important of these Ukrainian operations, let's call it Zapo-Donetsk or Z-D, began at least 22 days ago in its attack phase. That's a long time, but we're still finding it very difficult to define the contours. In fact, it's still not very clear what objective has been written into the order of operations (ORDOPE). An operational objective is an effect to be achieved on the terrain and/or the enemy. The objective may be to defend or conquer a point or an area, but it can also be to "bleed the enemy dry" or to gain time. What is absolutely essential in this Z-D operation is that the objective is commensurate with the stakes, the resources committed and the expectations - in short, that it is important.
One could therefore imagine that Zapo-Donetsk was a "ripper" or "killer" operation, named after the American operations in Korea from February to April 1951, an objective with a limited field goal but seeking to kill as many Chinese and North Korean fighters as possible under deluge of fire around the advancing armoured phalanxes. This was not to be the case, as the Ukrainians did not have the same firepower as the Americans. Nor will it be the case because the Ukrainian army has always been very "terrain" oriented on the defensive, not giving up a metre - which is costly in human terms - and on the offensive, preferring to occupy space rather than pursue the enemy, which saves part of the enemy forces. Conversely, and this may seem paradoxical for an army that has such contempt for its men at the lower echelons, the Russians did not hold on to ground - the Kiev region, Snake Island, the Kherson pocket - where they could lose a lot of strength by persisting. On balance, since 1 April and the Russian disaster around Kiev, an interwoven battle in which the Ukrainian defence in great depth was excellent, the Ukrainians have regained a lot of ground, but the losses have tended to be balanced between the two sides.
The objective assigned to Operation Z-D was therefore a point to be reached, between the Zaporijia nuclear power station, Melitopol and Berdiansk. The capture of just one of these points, especially the last two, would be considered a major success. Getting close to one of them, which might be enough to make the front untenable, would already be a major success. It would undoubtedly be preferable to focus on a single objective in order to concentrate forces on a single area and achieve fire superiority. After all, it is the attacker's main advantage to be able to choose his points of attack where the defender is forced to disperse. At this point, it's hard to say whether there are one, two or - horror - three Ukrainian objectives in the order of operations.
Once the target or targets have been chosen, you need to enter the matrix. To put it simply, we see how we can get there (modes of action, MA) and how the enemy can prevent us (enemy modes of action, ME) and we cross-reference.
On the MA side, we could have something like:
All these AMs are accompanied by a campaign of deep strikes to weaken, if not suffocate, the Russian forces in the sector in the manner of the Kherson pocket, as well as secondary attacks in other sectors.
On the Russian side, things are simpler, as is often the case in defence.
Normally, MA and ME are then compared in a matrix. This is generally a thinking exercise, but when you're serious, you play. You play a war game, a wargame, and see what happens in all the configurations. Based on the results, you choose the final MA, and give all the subordinate units their missions. On D-Day at time H, you launch the first phase of the operation, which can be a preparation phase if you don't have the benefit of surprise, or a direct attack phase.
An important point: there is a tendency to think that an operation always takes place in two distinct stages: planning before D-Day, followed by the conduct of the operation, during which the plan is unfolded and adapted to the vagaries of combat while maintaining the same course. Only when the objective has been achieved, or when it becomes clear that it will not be, does the operation come to an end. But there can also be cross-fade operations where you start the action without really having chosen your mode of action and you choose it according to events. It's rare and requires a certain sophistication of command, but it's not impossible and that's perhaps what we're witnessing at the moment. In fact, as we have said, it is a little difficult to read the pattern of the Ukrainian operation.
Wars are not fought by armies, but by nations, and the strength of nations in combat is measured according to a very simple equation: F = army x rear, where if only one of the two terms is equal to 0, the total strength is zero. It is therefore possible to use operations on the front and/or rear to change the balance of forces and achieve a strategic objective.
For the time being, as has already happened and may still change, Ukraine's strategic objective is still to drive the Russian occupiers out of all the occupied territories, Donbass and Crimea. To achieve this, Ukraine has a few weak cards to play on the Russian rear: raids and strikes on Russian soil to undermine Russian morale or, on the contrary, bolster that of the Ukrainians. These are in addition to the Western cards of "economic sanctions" and "diplomatic isolation", but all in all they are not enough to, in the words of the French Foreign Ministry, "make Russia give up in the face of the prohibitive cost of war".
On the other hand, Ukraine does have some strong cards to play when it comes to conducting offensive or defensive military operations in Ukraine: a good air defence network, a solid territorial defence corps, a good strike force in depth in the theatre and, above all, a corps of 80 manoeuvre brigades, around 60 of which are of good tactical quality.
The most important of these Ukrainian operations, let's call it Zapo-Donetsk or Z-D, began at least 22 days ago in its attack phase. That's a long time, but we're still finding it very difficult to define the contours. In fact, it's still not very clear what objective has been written into the order of operations (ORDOPE). An operational objective is an effect to be achieved on the terrain and/or the enemy. The objective may be to defend or conquer a point or an area, but it can also be to "bleed the enemy dry" or to gain time. What is absolutely essential in this Z-D operation is that the objective is commensurate with the stakes, the resources committed and the expectations - in short, that it is important.
One could therefore imagine that Zapo-Donetsk was a "ripper" or "killer" operation, named after the American operations in Korea from February to April 1951, an objective with a limited field goal but seeking to kill as many Chinese and North Korean fighters as possible under deluge of fire around the advancing armoured phalanxes. This was not to be the case, as the Ukrainians did not have the same firepower as the Americans. Nor will it be the case because the Ukrainian army has always been very "terrain" oriented on the defensive, not giving up a metre - which is costly in human terms - and on the offensive, preferring to occupy space rather than pursue the enemy, which saves part of the enemy forces. Conversely, and this may seem paradoxical for an army that has such contempt for its men at the lower echelons, the Russians did not hold on to ground - the Kiev region, Snake Island, the Kherson pocket - where they could lose a lot of strength by persisting. On balance, since 1 April and the Russian disaster around Kiev, an interwoven battle in which the Ukrainian defence in great depth was excellent, the Ukrainians have regained a lot of ground, but the losses have tended to be balanced between the two sides.
The objective assigned to Operation Z-D was therefore a point to be reached, between the Zaporijia nuclear power station, Melitopol and Berdiansk. The capture of just one of these points, especially the last two, would be considered a major success. Getting close to one of them, which might be enough to make the front untenable, would already be a major success. It would undoubtedly be preferable to focus on a single objective in order to concentrate forces on a single area and achieve fire superiority. After all, it is the attacker's main advantage to be able to choose his points of attack where the defender is forced to disperse. At this point, it's hard to say whether there are one, two or - horror - three Ukrainian objectives in the order of operations.
Once the target or targets have been chosen, you need to enter the matrix. To put it simply, we see how we can get there (modes of action, MA) and how the enemy can prevent us (enemy modes of action, ME) and we cross-reference.
On the MA side, we could have something like:
- MA 1: The slow stream. We advance everywhere and then we see, position after position. Any gaps are exploited as deeply as possible, with no a priori direction.
- MA 2: Attack at Tokmak. Uninterrupted concentration of fire and shock from Orikhiv towards Tokmak. Then spread out towards the Dnieper and Melitopol.
- MA 3: Towards the sea. Concentration of uninterrupted fire and shock efforts around the Russian pocket south of Velika Novosilka as far as the T0803 road. Then advance towards Berdiansk or Marioupol.
All these AMs are accompanied by a campaign of deep strikes to weaken, if not suffocate, the Russian forces in the sector in the manner of the Kherson pocket, as well as secondary attacks in other sectors.
On the Russian side, things are simpler, as is often the case in defence.
- ME 1: Brake and kill. Trade ground for Ukrainian losses and time. Hold the second position firmly. Prepare a third position north of Melitopol and Berdiansk.
- ME 2: Not an inch. Resist the first position and recapture any ground lost. No matter what the Russian losses. All reserves are committed to the Z-D front.
- ME 3: Hold and counter-attack. Resist in the second position and counter-attack in Luhansk province, at best to retake the ground there or at least to fix the Ukrainian forces.
Normally, MA and ME are then compared in a matrix. This is generally a thinking exercise, but when you're serious, you play. You play a war game, a wargame, and see what happens in all the configurations. Based on the results, you choose the final MA, and give all the subordinate units their missions. On D-Day at time H, you launch the first phase of the operation, which can be a preparation phase if you don't have the benefit of surprise, or a direct attack phase.
An important point: there is a tendency to think that an operation always takes place in two distinct stages: planning before D-Day, followed by the conduct of the operation, during which the plan is unfolded and adapted to the vagaries of combat while maintaining the same course. Only when the objective has been achieved, or when it becomes clear that it will not be, does the operation come to an end. But there can also be cross-fade operations where you start the action without really having chosen your mode of action and you choose it according to events. It's rare and requires a certain sophistication of command, but it's not impossible and that's perhaps what we're witnessing at the moment. In fact, as we have said, it is a little difficult to read the pattern of the Ukrainian operation.
The Taliban did not get anything from others. Maybe money at best.
Casualties will also mount when we blow up their camps, training barracks, ships weapons factories, air bases, ammo dumps, chemical/explosive production plants and decision making centres inside Russia if they attack the Baltics.
You even suggested it's a Russian plot yourself, but then you try to claim deniability on their part, are you like mentally ill or something? Of course it's an attack by Russia. The only source that could possibly supply them in that location is Russia. Like I said earlier, it's not the Middle East or Asia where the lunatics are diverse and many. There is only one lunatic in Europe - Russia.
I am claiming it's a plot, but NATO's gonna have to prove it.
It's not about NATO, it's about the rest of the world. You have to make any war on Russia legal in the eyes of the world.