No evidence of anything except that you surrendered our pilot back to us in less than 60 hours.
Air Battle over Kashmir : MiG-21 Bison shoots down F-16
- Thread starter Ashwin
- Start date
No evidence of anything except that you surrendered our pilot back to us in less than 60 hours.
@BlackOpsIndia
The Best part of the video is the ACM Dhanoa Remark where he clearly
Says that
"NO country will ever reveal it's Actual capabilities , Just to score few Brownie points "
SO this criticism of Pravin Sawhney is irrelevant
Now the question that Why Su 30 could not fire back is because of ALTITUDE
SU 30 was at 15 K feet
They were firing from 40 K
BVR s cannot climb such steep altitude
The Best part of the video is the ACM Dhanoa Remark where he clearly
Says that
"NO country will ever reveal it's Actual capabilities , Just to score few Brownie points "
SO this criticism of Pravin Sawhney is irrelevant
Now the question that Why Su 30 could not fire back is because of ALTITUDE
SU 30 was at 15 K feet
They were firing from 40 K
BVR s cannot climb such steep altitude
Limited Area -- Limited Period conflicts will always favour the Aggressor
They can again bring a 24 plane Package
The Best option is Escalation along the IB
They can again bring a 24 plane Package
The Best option is Escalation along the IB
(((Christine Fair))) (@CChristineFair) Tweeted:
Ps. Ain't nothing about you that is actually "Bahadur." Change your handle to Manmohan Chutiya...as that's more accurate.
You really tried to rally men to bully me in hopes that these gents will show me "my place."
*censored* you and the horse that kicked you in the head. Manmohan Bahadur on Twitter ( )
Ps. Ain't nothing about you that is actually "Bahadur." Change your handle to Manmohan Chutiya...as that's more accurate.
You really tried to rally men to bully me in hopes that these gents will show me "my place."
*censored* you and the horse that kicked you in the head. Manmohan Bahadur on Twitter ( )
These people Fair and Sawhney have a Standard Operating Procedure
They will Annoy India by Thrashing all our
Efforts and Institutions ,till we are forced to Give Access to Confidential Details and Information ,Which then they will use for
Publicity -- and claim to know EXCLUSIVE Details which only they know
It is Best to Ignore them
If IAF is so weak , why is PAF keeping a safe
Distance from the LOC
I dont think she will be invited again lol ..
She is Not even invited on their Own TV discussions on CNN or FOX news
Just keeps ranting on Twitter
And even though she is supposed to be a South Asia expert , Trump administration does not give her any importance on any policy matter
It is us Indians who want her " Certificates "
I think F16s were doing BARCAP. Can't one of Su 30 after evading ARMRAAM go vertical up, reach 40 or 50k altitude away from their ranges of missiles and come back into the theatre and fire R-77s?
Sir the Sukhois were Guarding Udhampur and Jammu area Military Targets
I read somewhere that Udhampur air station was the first target for PAF but they could not do so because of Su 30s , Hence they went for Brigade HQs and dropped their H 2
H 4 bombs
In the whole of J and K only 4 fighters were on CAP , 2 Su 30s in South ie Jammu - Udhampur , And 2 Mirage 2000s up North
The 4 Mig 21s were scrambled from Srinagar
Later More Su 30s and MiG 29 were sent from Pathankot but then the PAF package simply retreated
They retreated because they were shocked by WC Abhinandan
F 16s were used all three purposes
Bombing , BARCAP and
Offensive Fighter Sweep by Firing Amraams on Su 30
And they failed in all three tasks
Amraams did not hit , Bombs went Haywire
BARCAP was breached by MiG 21
Last edited:
We had already established that the roofs were replaced and the CGI sheets brand new. Nothing new here.
Pakistani FM has gone running to the UN claiming India has cut the wires at five locations on LOC, deployed Brahmos missile systems, SPIKE Atgm, Main battle tanks.
Monday, December 16, 2019
Key Takeaways From The IAF-PAF February 27 Aerial Engagements
South Asia’s first aerial engagement in 48 years, which took place on the morning of February 27 this year, was noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the engagements between the two opposing air forces saw the successful usage of both beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM), with the former being a first for the skies of South Asia. Secondly, both opposing air forces engaged one another not only with their respective multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) fleets, but also with combat-support platforms like airborne early warning & control (AEW & CS) aircraft—the world’s first -ever such engagement in the history of aerial warfare. And it is in these two areas that witnessed outcomes that were not entirely surprising when analysed in detail, and which will have a profound impact on both future force modernization projects of both air forces, but also on the employment of offensive airpower in the next round of limited hostilities in South Asia.
In the arena of air combat with BVRAAMs, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had an appreciable head-start over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) when in the 1980s it had procured Vympel R-23R and Matra Super 530D missiles along with its MiG-23MF and Mirage-2000H/TH combat aircraft, whereas the PAF could procure its first BVRAAMs—the Raytheon-built AIM-120C-5 AMRAAMs—only in the previous decade. Consequently, the IAF was expected to have acquired a very degree of proficiency in putting its present holdings of BVRAAMs to good use by applying innovative tactics. But surprisingly, this did not turn out to be the case, with the PAF ending up scoring the first air combat kill with a BVRAAM. On the other hand, the IAF’s successful employment of the Vympel R-73E SRAAM with the help of the Sura-1 helmet-mounted display system (HMDS) once again proved that even third-generation legacy-MRCAs—when suitably upgraded—can be lethal tools in the hands of experienced air warriors. But if the ‘deep upgrade’ efforts are half-hearted, then a heavy price will have to be paid, which is exactly what the IAF seems to have now discovered.
Take, for instance, the MiG-21 Bison upgrade project, which in the late 1990s was meant to give a new lease of life to 125 of the IAF’s 225 those MiG-21 Bis light-MRCAs that were scheduled to be phased out on the expiry of their total technical service-life (TTSL) of 20 years/2,400 flight-hours. Known as the MiG-21-93 project, it involved the following: extending the TTSL of the airframe and its Tumansky R-25-300 turbofan (producing 97.1kN thrust with afterburning) for up to 40 years and 4,000 flying hours; installing the Phazotron NIIR-developed Kopyo (Spear) multi-mode airborne pulse-Doppler X-band radar (MMR), and a new navigation-and-attack system developed by THALES of France that included a TOTEM ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system (RLG-INS) coupled to a NSS-100P GPS receiver, ELBIT/El-Op Type 967 heads-up display, a MFD-55 active-matrix liquid-crystal display (AMLCD), locally-developed Tarang Mk.1 radar warning receiver (RWR), radar altimeter, hands-on-throttle and stick (HOTAS) controls, digital flight data recorder, autopilot, and a stores management system. The entire project was co-developed by RAC MiG, Phazotron-NIIR, GosNIIAS and Sokol Joint-Stock Company. Thus, the MiG-21 Bison was made capable of airborne target detection and lock-on range both in look-up and look-down while using R-27R and R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs; ground and sea-surface target detection and improved communications and navigation aids; airborne target detection and engagement range in action in the front hemisphere; improved PGM guidance and engagement capabilities in action against ground targets of any type; track-while-scan mode with the capability of tracking up to 10 targets and engaging two of them concurrently; and self-protection through the usage of the ELTA Systems-built EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, plus newly-installed chaff/flare countermeasures dispensers. And yet, on the morning of February 27, one such MiG-21 Bison (armed with two Vympel R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs and two R-73E SRAAMs) of the IAF’s 1 Wing’s No.51 ‘Sword Arms’ Sqn operating out of Avantipora air base in Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) was lost to enemy fire. So what went wrong?
Lessons From The ‘Furball’
At around 9:30am on February 27, IAF flight controllers noticed a large package of 24 PAF combat aircraft taking off in a matter of 15 minutes from three different air bases. These included at least 12 F-16C/Ds. As they approached the Line of Control (LoC), they split up into two different formations, with airborne battle management cues being provided by a Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform. The formations included four Mirage-VPAs, four Mirage-IIIEAs and four JF-17s headed for the Sundarbani-Rajouri-Naushera sub-sectors; and eight F-16s headed for the Rajouri-Mendhar sub-sector and Nangi Tekri in Karmara. Pitted against them were two of the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000INs and four MiG-21 Bisons flying north of the Pir Panjal Range, and four Su-30MKIs to the south of the Range. The main PAF strike force comprised four F-16C/Ds armed with DENEL Dynamics-supplied Raptor-IID TV-guided gliding munition, while the remaining four F-16C/Ds and four JF-17s were tasked with the protection of the strike package while remaining in a rear area over the Mangla Dam near the PoK-Pakistan Punjab border. Targets selected by the PAF for the air-strikes were the Indian Army posts at Bhimber Gali (elevation of 5,479 feet), Krishna Ghati Top (Nangi Tekri) at a height of 4,665 feet, Potha at an elevation of 4,073 feet, and an ammunition storage area in Narian (belonging to the 25 Infantry Division of the Indian Army) at an elevation of 2,000 feet. These targets, falling in India’s Rajouri sector, were deliberately selected for the sake of establishing Pakistan’s ‘moral; ascendancy’ along this portion of the LoC—given the fact that it is from these areas that the Indian Army dominates its opposing adversary’s Battal sector, which is located at lower altitudes.
However, the moment the intruding PAF F-16s gained altitude for crossing into the areas southeast of the Pir Panjal Range and approached their designated targets in Jammu at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet in order to launch the Raptor-IIDs, they were detected by the A-50I PHALCON by 10.25am, which in turn vectored the airborne MiG-21 Bisons towards their respective intercept courses. Since these MiG-21 Bisons climbed in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range, the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform failed to detect them. This proved to be a blessing for the IAF, since the PAF’s attacking F-16C/Ds were taken aback and were forced to launch their Raptor-IIDs in great hurry. The Su-30MKIs carrying EL/L-8222 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) pods were kept on standby further down south to engage the four PAF F-16s that were still orbiting 162km further to the west. It subsequently became evident that the PAF had no intention of creating a ‘furball’ either over PoK or over southern Jammu and all it wanted to achieve was to drive home a ‘point’ about the PAF demonstrating its will, means and capability to stage a ‘retaliatory sneak attack’ inside Indian territory.
By most accounts, while cruising at 15,000 feet altitude, the MiG-21 Bison flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman engaged a PAF F-16D of 19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn that had approached the Indian Army’s ammunition depot at Narian in southern Jammu and was exiting that location at an altitude of 9,000 feet. While the MiG-21 Bison made a shallow dive to get within R-73E firing range of the F-16, the latter’s pilot was alerted by his wingman about the impending attack and so he took an evasive measure by going into a steep climb to about 26,000 feet. By this time Wg Cdr Abhinandan had skillfully manoeuvred his MiG-21 Bison behind the fleeing F-16 and had positioned himself at a 60-degree angle of elevation below the F-16 for maximum head-on impact. He then fired an R-73E, which effortlessly struck the nose-section of the F-16D. However, even as the R-73E was closing on to its target, the wingman of the F-16 (Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan) moved in from behind and fired an AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM from a distance of less than 12km, hitting the centre-fuselage of the MiG-21 Bison. A second AIM-120C-5 that was probably fired against Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman (who had gotten separated from him) failed to hit its target and consequently it slammed into Mamankote Mallas village, Reasi, and caused an explosion that spread splinters and missile parts within a radius of 100 metres.
The entire aerial engagement lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K, but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK), opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.
Contd...
The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.
There are two probable reasons why Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s MiG-21 Bison was hit by the AIM-120C-5, while that of his wingman survived the aerial engagement: the former’s aircraft was not equipped with either a missile approach warning system, or MAWS (which provides advance warning on inbound guided-missiles of all types), or the EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, while the latter had the EL/L-8222 and hence was able to jam the AMRAAM’s Ku-band active radar seeker. It needs to be noted here that universal air combat rules call for using one high-band self-protection pod for every two combat aircraft (comprising the flight leader and his/her wingman). However, since it is impossible to maintain formation during air combat, it is now preferable to have internally-mounted high-band self-protection jammers that can provide assured self-defence.
There are only three plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of SRAAMs for this aerial engagement: 1) The PAF was unsure whether or not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with OLS-30 infra-red search-and-track (IRST) sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect); 2) The PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the Boeing-built Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison. Thus, even though equipped with either ITT Corp-built ALQ-211V4 or Northrop Grumman-built ALQ-131V jamming pods, the pilots of the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17 ‘Thunders’ on February 27 morning knew only too well that once the ‘furball’ started within a hemispheric air combat ‘bowl’ measuring 10 nautical miles in diameter, MRCAs like the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI (that were airborne at that time) were the perfect ones to fly. In fact, it is universally acknowledged that thanks to their superb aerodynamics and all-aspect SRAAM/HMDS combination, both the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI are exceptional platforms for close-in combat. 3) In the BVR arena, the IAF had a unique edge over the PAF through the incorporation of a radar finger-printing avionics suite (which is interfaced with the on-boasrd radar warning receiver sensors) on its fleet of Su-30MKIs that allows the H-MRCAs to operate in an all-passive non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) mode (which none the PAF’s frontline MRCAs possess till today).
NCTR Mode: A Vital Force-Multiplier
In essence, the NCTR mode enables a combat aircraft to approach its opponent/s in all-passive mode while at the same time maintaining total situational awareness about the range and bearing of the opposing aircraft whose on-board MMR is operating in the track-while-scan mode and the subsequent target lock-on mode when firing a BVRAAM. However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated, the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference (EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its own integral ASPJ pod.
On the other hand, the sleek MiG-21 Bison in combination with the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS in sensor-lock mode proved to be a sure-killer. The R-73E hosts a very capable infra-red heat-seeker with a greater range and wider off-boresight sensor cueing capability than the PAF’s Raytheon-supplied AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder. A simple monocular lens in front of Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s right eye enabled him to slew the R-73E’s seeker onto his adversary at a high angle off target and achieve lock-on even though his MiG-21 Bison’s nose was pointed far away from its target. The Sura-1 comes mounted via a spring-loaded clip to a modified HGU-55P helmet. The pilot then connects the HMDS to a tester and adjusts the symbology so that it is centered in the monocle. Once in the aircraft, the simple act of plugging in the power cord means it is ready for use. There is no alignment process required with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cuing System. It just worked. Being on the shooting end of the equation, one sees shot opportunities that he/she would never have dreamed of with SRAAMs like the AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder used by the PAF. Those on the receiving end are equally less enthused about being shot from angles they could not otherwise train to.
IAF’s MSWS Shortcomings
Where the IAF’s MRCAs came short of their PAF counterparts was in the arena of self-protection suites—a situation similar to the one in mid-1999 when only after Operation Safed Sagar did the IAF decide to equip the bulk of its USSR-origin aircraft and helicopters with the hitherto-absent chaff/flare countermeasures dispensers. In the MiG-21 Bison’s case, the lack of conformally-mounted high-band self-protection hammers and MAWS is hard to explain, since such fitments have been available to the IAF from Sweden’s SaabTech, South Africa’s Avitronics and Grintek, and from Denmark’s TERMA since the mid-1990s. In case of the MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKis too, such mission-critical fitments have not yet been specified by the IAF, even though the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17s have had these since the previous decade! It was in March 1999 that Celsius of Sweden, which also owns SaabTech, bought a 49% share in Grintek Avitronics, South Africa's biggest passive electronic warfare development house, for US$4.8 million. And in March 2011 Cassidian Optronics, part of the defence and security division of EADS, acquired the majority shareholding in South Africa-based Grintek Ewation (GEW) Technologies. In October 2014 Cassidian Optronics became part of Airbus Defence & Space Optronics Airbus Group, which in March 2017 became HENSOLDT Optronics GmbH. Interestingly, on July 17, 2006, the then EADS and India’s state-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Bengaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) had inked a Memorandum of Understanding on the joint development of a MAWS suite (using MILDS-F AN/AAR-60V2 dual-color IR/UV sensors) for three of the locally-developed EMB-135I AEW & CS platforms as well as other IAF combat and combat-support aircraft. Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and laser warning receivers.
Contd...
Key Takeaways From The IAF-PAF February 27 Aerial Engagements
South Asia’s first aerial engagement in 48 years, which took place on the morning of February 27 this year, was noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the engagements between the two opposing air forces saw the successful usage of both beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM), with the former being a first for the skies of South Asia. Secondly, both opposing air forces engaged one another not only with their respective multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) fleets, but also with combat-support platforms like airborne early warning & control (AEW & CS) aircraft—the world’s first -ever such engagement in the history of aerial warfare. And it is in these two areas that witnessed outcomes that were not entirely surprising when analysed in detail, and which will have a profound impact on both future force modernization projects of both air forces, but also on the employment of offensive airpower in the next round of limited hostilities in South Asia.
In the arena of air combat with BVRAAMs, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had an appreciable head-start over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) when in the 1980s it had procured Vympel R-23R and Matra Super 530D missiles along with its MiG-23MF and Mirage-2000H/TH combat aircraft, whereas the PAF could procure its first BVRAAMs—the Raytheon-built AIM-120C-5 AMRAAMs—only in the previous decade. Consequently, the IAF was expected to have acquired a very degree of proficiency in putting its present holdings of BVRAAMs to good use by applying innovative tactics. But surprisingly, this did not turn out to be the case, with the PAF ending up scoring the first air combat kill with a BVRAAM. On the other hand, the IAF’s successful employment of the Vympel R-73E SRAAM with the help of the Sura-1 helmet-mounted display system (HMDS) once again proved that even third-generation legacy-MRCAs—when suitably upgraded—can be lethal tools in the hands of experienced air warriors. But if the ‘deep upgrade’ efforts are half-hearted, then a heavy price will have to be paid, which is exactly what the IAF seems to have now discovered.
Take, for instance, the MiG-21 Bison upgrade project, which in the late 1990s was meant to give a new lease of life to 125 of the IAF’s 225 those MiG-21 Bis light-MRCAs that were scheduled to be phased out on the expiry of their total technical service-life (TTSL) of 20 years/2,400 flight-hours. Known as the MiG-21-93 project, it involved the following: extending the TTSL of the airframe and its Tumansky R-25-300 turbofan (producing 97.1kN thrust with afterburning) for up to 40 years and 4,000 flying hours; installing the Phazotron NIIR-developed Kopyo (Spear) multi-mode airborne pulse-Doppler X-band radar (MMR), and a new navigation-and-attack system developed by THALES of France that included a TOTEM ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system (RLG-INS) coupled to a NSS-100P GPS receiver, ELBIT/El-Op Type 967 heads-up display, a MFD-55 active-matrix liquid-crystal display (AMLCD), locally-developed Tarang Mk.1 radar warning receiver (RWR), radar altimeter, hands-on-throttle and stick (HOTAS) controls, digital flight data recorder, autopilot, and a stores management system. The entire project was co-developed by RAC MiG, Phazotron-NIIR, GosNIIAS and Sokol Joint-Stock Company. Thus, the MiG-21 Bison was made capable of airborne target detection and lock-on range both in look-up and look-down while using R-27R and R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs; ground and sea-surface target detection and improved communications and navigation aids; airborne target detection and engagement range in action in the front hemisphere; improved PGM guidance and engagement capabilities in action against ground targets of any type; track-while-scan mode with the capability of tracking up to 10 targets and engaging two of them concurrently; and self-protection through the usage of the ELTA Systems-built EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, plus newly-installed chaff/flare countermeasures dispensers. And yet, on the morning of February 27, one such MiG-21 Bison (armed with two Vympel R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs and two R-73E SRAAMs) of the IAF’s 1 Wing’s No.51 ‘Sword Arms’ Sqn operating out of Avantipora air base in Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) was lost to enemy fire. So what went wrong?
Lessons From The ‘Furball’
At around 9:30am on February 27, IAF flight controllers noticed a large package of 24 PAF combat aircraft taking off in a matter of 15 minutes from three different air bases. These included at least 12 F-16C/Ds. As they approached the Line of Control (LoC), they split up into two different formations, with airborne battle management cues being provided by a Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform. The formations included four Mirage-VPAs, four Mirage-IIIEAs and four JF-17s headed for the Sundarbani-Rajouri-Naushera sub-sectors; and eight F-16s headed for the Rajouri-Mendhar sub-sector and Nangi Tekri in Karmara. Pitted against them were two of the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000INs and four MiG-21 Bisons flying north of the Pir Panjal Range, and four Su-30MKIs to the south of the Range. The main PAF strike force comprised four F-16C/Ds armed with DENEL Dynamics-supplied Raptor-IID TV-guided gliding munition, while the remaining four F-16C/Ds and four JF-17s were tasked with the protection of the strike package while remaining in a rear area over the Mangla Dam near the PoK-Pakistan Punjab border. Targets selected by the PAF for the air-strikes were the Indian Army posts at Bhimber Gali (elevation of 5,479 feet), Krishna Ghati Top (Nangi Tekri) at a height of 4,665 feet, Potha at an elevation of 4,073 feet, and an ammunition storage area in Narian (belonging to the 25 Infantry Division of the Indian Army) at an elevation of 2,000 feet. These targets, falling in India’s Rajouri sector, were deliberately selected for the sake of establishing Pakistan’s ‘moral; ascendancy’ along this portion of the LoC—given the fact that it is from these areas that the Indian Army dominates its opposing adversary’s Battal sector, which is located at lower altitudes.
However, the moment the intruding PAF F-16s gained altitude for crossing into the areas southeast of the Pir Panjal Range and approached their designated targets in Jammu at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet in order to launch the Raptor-IIDs, they were detected by the A-50I PHALCON by 10.25am, which in turn vectored the airborne MiG-21 Bisons towards their respective intercept courses. Since these MiG-21 Bisons climbed in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range, the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform failed to detect them. This proved to be a blessing for the IAF, since the PAF’s attacking F-16C/Ds were taken aback and were forced to launch their Raptor-IIDs in great hurry. The Su-30MKIs carrying EL/L-8222 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) pods were kept on standby further down south to engage the four PAF F-16s that were still orbiting 162km further to the west. It subsequently became evident that the PAF had no intention of creating a ‘furball’ either over PoK or over southern Jammu and all it wanted to achieve was to drive home a ‘point’ about the PAF demonstrating its will, means and capability to stage a ‘retaliatory sneak attack’ inside Indian territory.
By most accounts, while cruising at 15,000 feet altitude, the MiG-21 Bison flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman engaged a PAF F-16D of 19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn that had approached the Indian Army’s ammunition depot at Narian in southern Jammu and was exiting that location at an altitude of 9,000 feet. While the MiG-21 Bison made a shallow dive to get within R-73E firing range of the F-16, the latter’s pilot was alerted by his wingman about the impending attack and so he took an evasive measure by going into a steep climb to about 26,000 feet. By this time Wg Cdr Abhinandan had skillfully manoeuvred his MiG-21 Bison behind the fleeing F-16 and had positioned himself at a 60-degree angle of elevation below the F-16 for maximum head-on impact. He then fired an R-73E, which effortlessly struck the nose-section of the F-16D. However, even as the R-73E was closing on to its target, the wingman of the F-16 (Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan) moved in from behind and fired an AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM from a distance of less than 12km, hitting the centre-fuselage of the MiG-21 Bison. A second AIM-120C-5 that was probably fired against Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman (who had gotten separated from him) failed to hit its target and consequently it slammed into Mamankote Mallas village, Reasi, and caused an explosion that spread splinters and missile parts within a radius of 100 metres.
The entire aerial engagement lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K, but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK), opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.
Contd...
The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.
There are two probable reasons why Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s MiG-21 Bison was hit by the AIM-120C-5, while that of his wingman survived the aerial engagement: the former’s aircraft was not equipped with either a missile approach warning system, or MAWS (which provides advance warning on inbound guided-missiles of all types), or the EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, while the latter had the EL/L-8222 and hence was able to jam the AMRAAM’s Ku-band active radar seeker. It needs to be noted here that universal air combat rules call for using one high-band self-protection pod for every two combat aircraft (comprising the flight leader and his/her wingman). However, since it is impossible to maintain formation during air combat, it is now preferable to have internally-mounted high-band self-protection jammers that can provide assured self-defence.
There are only three plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of SRAAMs for this aerial engagement: 1) The PAF was unsure whether or not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with OLS-30 infra-red search-and-track (IRST) sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect); 2) The PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the Boeing-built Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison. Thus, even though equipped with either ITT Corp-built ALQ-211V4 or Northrop Grumman-built ALQ-131V jamming pods, the pilots of the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17 ‘Thunders’ on February 27 morning knew only too well that once the ‘furball’ started within a hemispheric air combat ‘bowl’ measuring 10 nautical miles in diameter, MRCAs like the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI (that were airborne at that time) were the perfect ones to fly. In fact, it is universally acknowledged that thanks to their superb aerodynamics and all-aspect SRAAM/HMDS combination, both the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI are exceptional platforms for close-in combat. 3) In the BVR arena, the IAF had a unique edge over the PAF through the incorporation of a radar finger-printing avionics suite (which is interfaced with the on-boasrd radar warning receiver sensors) on its fleet of Su-30MKIs that allows the H-MRCAs to operate in an all-passive non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) mode (which none the PAF’s frontline MRCAs possess till today).
NCTR Mode: A Vital Force-Multiplier
In essence, the NCTR mode enables a combat aircraft to approach its opponent/s in all-passive mode while at the same time maintaining total situational awareness about the range and bearing of the opposing aircraft whose on-board MMR is operating in the track-while-scan mode and the subsequent target lock-on mode when firing a BVRAAM. However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated, the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference (EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its own integral ASPJ pod.
On the other hand, the sleek MiG-21 Bison in combination with the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS in sensor-lock mode proved to be a sure-killer. The R-73E hosts a very capable infra-red heat-seeker with a greater range and wider off-boresight sensor cueing capability than the PAF’s Raytheon-supplied AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder. A simple monocular lens in front of Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s right eye enabled him to slew the R-73E’s seeker onto his adversary at a high angle off target and achieve lock-on even though his MiG-21 Bison’s nose was pointed far away from its target. The Sura-1 comes mounted via a spring-loaded clip to a modified HGU-55P helmet. The pilot then connects the HMDS to a tester and adjusts the symbology so that it is centered in the monocle. Once in the aircraft, the simple act of plugging in the power cord means it is ready for use. There is no alignment process required with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cuing System. It just worked. Being on the shooting end of the equation, one sees shot opportunities that he/she would never have dreamed of with SRAAMs like the AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder used by the PAF. Those on the receiving end are equally less enthused about being shot from angles they could not otherwise train to.
IAF’s MSWS Shortcomings
Where the IAF’s MRCAs came short of their PAF counterparts was in the arena of self-protection suites—a situation similar to the one in mid-1999 when only after Operation Safed Sagar did the IAF decide to equip the bulk of its USSR-origin aircraft and helicopters with the hitherto-absent chaff/flare countermeasures dispensers. In the MiG-21 Bison’s case, the lack of conformally-mounted high-band self-protection hammers and MAWS is hard to explain, since such fitments have been available to the IAF from Sweden’s SaabTech, South Africa’s Avitronics and Grintek, and from Denmark’s TERMA since the mid-1990s. In case of the MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKis too, such mission-critical fitments have not yet been specified by the IAF, even though the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17s have had these since the previous decade! It was in March 1999 that Celsius of Sweden, which also owns SaabTech, bought a 49% share in Grintek Avitronics, South Africa's biggest passive electronic warfare development house, for US$4.8 million. And in March 2011 Cassidian Optronics, part of the defence and security division of EADS, acquired the majority shareholding in South Africa-based Grintek Ewation (GEW) Technologies. In October 2014 Cassidian Optronics became part of Airbus Defence & Space Optronics Airbus Group, which in March 2017 became HENSOLDT Optronics GmbH. Interestingly, on July 17, 2006, the then EADS and India’s state-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Bengaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) had inked a Memorandum of Understanding on the joint development of a MAWS suite (using MILDS-F AN/AAR-60V2 dual-color IR/UV sensors) for three of the locally-developed EMB-135I AEW & CS platforms as well as other IAF combat and combat-support aircraft. Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and laser warning receivers.
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Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and laser warning receivers.
However, as of today, only the three EMB-145Is have the MSWS, while none of the existing IAF combat aircraft fleets have them. While they have been specified for the projected Super Su-30MKI mid-life deep upgrade programme, what remains unanswered is why was the MSWS not incorporated into the Su-30MKI procurement project early in the previous decade itself, and on the 63-unit MiG-29UPG upgrade project (whose DARE-developed D-29 suite includes only the DARE-developed and BEL-built R-118 ‘Dhruti’ RWRs and high-band active transmit/receive units with Vivaldi-type antenna arrays) that commenced in 2010. In comparison, when Malaysia in 2005 ordered 18 Su-30MKMs, it specified the fitment of Saab-Grintek Avitronics-supplied MAW-300 MAWS and LWS-310 laser warners along with the Russia-supplied Pastel L-140-30 RWRs. Incidentally, the MAW-300, LWS-310 and the RWS-300 RWR from Saab-Grintek Avitronics were specified early this decade for installation on the ‘Rudra’ helicopter gunships that were ordered for the IAF and Indian Army’s Aviation Corps from state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).
Lack of SDR & TDLs Affected Airborne Battle Management
The introduction of AEW & CS platforms into the subcontinent by the PAF (four Saab 2000s of the Kamra-based No.3 Sqn and four CETC of China-supplied ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle KE-3s of the Masroor-based No.4 Sqn) in the previous decade, and followed by the IAF’s procurement of three A-50I PHALCONs from Israel and three locally-developed EMB-145Is earlier this decade) has seen aircrew of both air forces act like air-traffic controllers for military aircraft on operations. Due to this, the AEW & CS platforms have become as proficient in an offensive role as in a defensive role. In the former, the aircrew on board the AEW & CS platforms can now guide both combat and combat-support aircraft on to targets during offensive engagements, be they on land, in the air or at sea. While doing this, the platforms still maintain their defensive roles by informing friendly pilots what other aircraft are within their area of operations, be they friend or foe. The A-50I, for instance, can detect low-flying targets within a diameter of 400km or 215nm. At medium-altitude, it can detect targets within 520km or 280nm. Thus, one A-50I cruising at 9,150 metres (30,000 feet) has a radar coverage of 312,000 square kilometres.
On February 27 morning, in the world’s first-ever aerial engagement in the history of aerial warfare that involved AEW & CS platforms by both sides, the IAF maintained a defensive posture, while the PAF went on an offensive limited in time and depth. While the PAF had two of its Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms airborne at that time (with each capable of controlling three combat air patrol [CAP] interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time) over an area south of Islamabad and east of Sargodha, the IAF had one A-50I from the Agra-based No.50 Sqn (capable of controlling six CAP interceptions and managing three tactical strike missions at the same time) over Himachal Pradesh and one EMB-145I from the Bhisiana-based No.200 ‘Netra’ Sqn (capable of controlling three CAP interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time) airborne near Pathankot at the same time.
But why did the IAF not mount barrier-CAPs aimed in-strength against the F-16s and JF-17s? One plausible reason appears to be the IAF’s laid-down rules of engagement (emerging from the political directives issued), which discouraged the initiation of air combat inside PoK’s airspace. And this in turn is most probably due to the lack of UHF-/L-band two-way tactical data-links (TDL) on-board the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft, which prevents the AEW & CS platforms from providing real-time airborne battle management cues to airborne IAF combat aircraft while operating inside contested/hostile airspace. Instead, the AEW & CS platforms are presently transmitting the air situation picture via VHF bands to ground exploitation centres from where ground-controlled intercept cues are transmitted within line-of-sight (and consequently over a very limited distance) to the defending IAF combat aircraft deployed on CAPs. TDLs required for offensive air operations inside hostile airspace include: the L-band data-link for two-way line-of-sight communications with AEW & CS platforms; and a UHF-band SATCOM-based data-link for communicating with ground-based tactical air-controllers. The TDL thus forms part of the airborne software-defined radio (SDR) suite, which the IAF had specified for procurement in the previous decade. While the HAL-developed SDR-2010 has been available since 2011, it was only last year that the IAF commenced efforts on procuring 473 + 3,125 SDRs worth Rs.630 crore (including the integral TDL component) TDLs for achieving real-time connectivity between all IAF aircraft/helicopters and the Integrated Aerospace Command, Control & Communications System’s (IACCCS) terrestrial and airborne elements, especially via the GSAT-7A satellite’s on-board SATCOM transponders. For its 83 projected Tejas Mk.1A L-MRCAs, the IAF has specified RAFAEL of Israel’s BNET-AR SDR for installation.
During future hostilities, there are two possible ways of severely degrading the effectiveness of the PAF’s AEW & CS platforms: 1) investing in LR-SAMs like the Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf ADMS; and 2) acquiring at least four aircraft equipped with high-power wideband jamming hardware. Following the signature of a contract on October 5, 2018 that is valued at US$5.43 billion, the IAF is all set to receive its initial five squadrons of S-400 Triumf ADMS, with deliveries commencing in late 2020. Plans call for eventually expanding this LR-SAM network into five Brigades in the following decade, and deploying them for the air-defence (against hostile AEW & CS platforms and ballistic missiles) of major cities and industrial corridors located in western and central India. The sector-wise command-and-control posts of each of these Brigades will be integrated with the IAF’s already-operational five nodes of the Integrated Air Command, Control & Communications System (IACCCS) at Barnala (Punjab), Wadsar (Gujarat), Aya Nagar (Delhi), Jodhpur (Rajasthan) and Ambala (Haryana). Initially, the S-400 ADMS will come equipped with only the 380km-range 40N6E LR-SAMs, which were declared by Russia as being ready for series-production following a series of user-assisted successful test-firings last August. In the following decade, the 40N6E LR-SAMs will be joined by the 77N6-N and the 77N6-NI LR-SAMs, having top speeds of 7km/second and using Ka band millimeter-wave active phased-array radar seekers required for fire-control and guidance of hit-to-kill interceptors.
Airborne wideband high-power jammers (with the low-bandwidth jamming taking care of hostile medium-power/high-power airspace surveillance radars; the mid-band jamming countering the engagement/target illumination radars used by ground-based surface-to-air defence systems; and the high-band jamming neutralizing the active seekers of BVRAAMs and SAMs) using active phased-array transmit-receive modules with microprocessors made of gallium nitride can generate around ten times the isotropic radiated power of existing airborne jammers. In addition, the signal itself is cleaner, which means less accidental interference. Such new-generation jammers can also handle quadruple the number of assignments and can switch from target to target almost instantaneously. Also built-in is the ability to collect, analyse and jam new hostile signals as they emanate, enabling the system to adjust in-flight to evolving threat profiles, and apply appropriate countermeasures as the situation develops. Furthermore, its agile jamming flexibility is further extended by the deliberate choice of open-architecture, solid-state electronics, which enables quick and easy updates to be made to its on-board threat library as and when required, to meet new hostile capabilities as they appear. Such jammers also have the potential ability to launch a cyber-attack, involving inserting rogue data packets into hostile ground-based air-defence networks in a so-called “network invasion.” As effective, broad spectrum jamming increasingly becomes key to survival in the modern contested airspace, it is therefore imperative that the IAF acquire such new-generation wideband high-power jammers to help meet the growing capability demand.
CSAR Deficiencies
The results of the Board of Inquiry (BoI) looking into the IAF Mi-17V-5 helicopter crash that took place in an open field near Garend Kalaan village in Budgam on February 27 at 10.10am (merely 10 minutes after it took off from Awantipora, resulting in seven fatalities, including six IAF personnel), are likely to result in an overhaul of the IAF’s current standard operating protocols regarding combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) missions. The BoI, which is looking into all possible angles (inclusive of friendly surface-to-air fire due to mistaken friend-or-foe identification actions) due to local eyewitness accounts of hearing a loud explosion in the air just before the ill-fated Mi-17V-5 went down, indicating the possibility of some external event causing the crash. Traditionally, personnel recovery (PR) and CSAR missions have never been considered as one of the core mission functions of the IAF and it was due to this that the IAF began procuring SARBE hand-held personal locator beacons from the UK only from the mid-1990s, followed a decade later by the raising of ‘Garud’ special forces units tasked with conducting PR/CSAR missions within highly contested operating environments. As per a RAND Corp study, if the downed aircrew cannot be recovered in the first 2 hours or so, the recovery probability drops to about 25%, but the probability declines only slowly thereafter with increasing time on the ground. However, the IASF till this day does not possess the kind of specially-equipped helicopters required for CSAR missions. Despite the requirement being specified a decade ago, the IAF only last year began developing a prototype Mi-17V-5 for the CSAR role (which made its debut as a static exhibit at the Aero India 2019 expo in Bengaluru last February) by equipping it with an ELBIT Systems-supplied COMPASS optronic sensor turret and BEL-developed miniature SATCOM antenna and secure modems. Other elements, like the MSWS suite, GPS receiver, VOL/ILS receiver, Doppler-based terrain navigation system, IFF transponder, radar altimeter, attitude heading reference system, and a traffic collision avoidance system, have yet to be selected.
Overcoming The Damning Shortfalls
When it comes to airpower projection, the gaping holes are not just limited to the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) depleting combat aircraft squadron strength, but they also extend to vital support infrastructure, as well as block obsolescence of guided air-combat missiles and ground-based air-defence systems of both the IAF and Indian Army. Three proposals are now awaiting financial clearance in the current fiscal year: an order for 18 additional licence-assembled Su-30MKI from state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL); the procurement of up to 50 upgraded MiG-29UPGs from Russia off-the-shelf; and commencement of the Super Su-30MKI deep-upgrade project. The first was confirmed at the Aero India 2019 expo in Bengaluru last February by Anatoly G Punchuk, Deputy Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, when he said: “We have received an official request from the IAF for 18 more (semi-knocked-down) kits just in January this year. We are preparing a commercial offer,” Although. Punchuk did not confirm the cost of this projected order, it is estimated that the figure would be a third of the last order for Su-30MKIs from Russia, which was placed in 2012 and was valued at. Rs.17,246 crore order for an additional 42 Su-30MKIs in semi-knocked-down condition that HAL subsequently had licence-assembled.
Earlier, in November 2018, Russia had made an unsolicited offer for the off-the-shelf supply of up to 34 upgraded MiG-29UBGs, each powered by Klimov RD-33MK turbofans and using the Phazotron NIIR-supplied Zhuk-M2E multi-mode fire-control radars. While the IAF has been invited to buy them at a unit-cost of US$25 million or Rs.175 crore (since they are already substantially upgraded to the MiG-29SMT standard and have not been flown ever since they were built in 2008), each of them will cost Rs.285 crore after being upgraded to the IAF’s specifications. An IAF technical inspection team visited Russia last January and has since submitted a favourable report to India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). The IAF’s existing 69 MiG-29B-12s are presently being upgraded to the MiG-29UPG-standard under a 2008 contract worth $900 million (Rs.3,850 crore). These are in service with the Adampur-based 8 Wing’s 47 Black Archers and 223 Tridents squadrons and the Jamnagar-based 33 Wing’s 28 First Supersonics squadron.
In 2010, the IAF had issued a Rs.10,200 crore Request for Proposals (RFP) for the deep-upgrade of 84 of its Su-30MKIs into the Super Su-30MKI configuration. Negotiations subsequently went into a limbo since Russia’s asking price had then exceeded the IAF’s estimated budget. The upgrade offer was resurrected last year during the summit-level talks between Indian PM Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin and a contract is due to be inked later this year. Meanwhile, Alpha-Tocol has bagged a contracted under the IAF’s ‘Eagle Eye’ project for installing six fifth-generation R-118 digital radar warning receivers on each of the IAF’s 148 Su-30MKIs currently based in Lohegaon (Maharashtra), Bareilly (Uttar Pradesh), Tejpur and Chabua (Assam), Jodhpur (Rajasthan), Bhisiana and Halwara (Punjab), Bhuj (Gujarat), Sirsa (Haryana), Kalaikunda and Hashimara (West Bengal) and Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu).
NG-HAS Unavailability
The IAF had initiated efforts for constructing 108 new generation hardened aircraft shelters (NG-HAS) for housing its Su-30MKI heavy-/medium-multi-role combat aircraft (H-/M-MRCA) back in 2012, the cost of which was then pegged at Rs.5,400 crore. Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) was accorded by the MoD to its Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) in December 2012 for evolving the NG-HAS’s detailed engineering design. SAubsequently, a proposal to rework the project in three phases by categorising air bases within a distance of 100km, 200km and beyond 200km from the border, respectively, with a gap of two years in each phase, came under consideration. The first phase was to involve the construction of 36 NG-HAS requiring a cash outflow of Rs.270 crore. Under this, the air bases at Pathankot, Srinagar, Udhampur, Bagdogra, Naliya, Hasimara, Jaisalmer and Uttarlai were to receive top-priority. However, the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) approved financial sanctions only at the end of 2017, while the Union Finance Ministry released the funds only on January 7, 2019. Consequently, the project will now be completed only by 2023. The IAF’s existing HAS, built to house smaller combat aircraft like the MiG-21 Bison, Jaguar IS, Mirage-2000IN and MiG-29UPG, are tunnel-shaped concrete structures covered with a layer of earth and protective walls near their openings, which are supposed to protect aircraft from the effects of blasts in case of hostile aerial attacks.
E-SHORADS, MR-SAM, QR-SAM & VSHORADS Backlogs
The DRDO-developed Akash-1 extended short-range air-defence system (E-SHORADS), whose development began back in 1983, cleared its user-trials only in 2007, following which the IAF ordered 1,000 missiles and the Indian Army 2,000 missiles. The IAF service-inducted its first Akash-1 Flight in March 2012 upon completion of nine successful rounds of user-trials, with service commissioning following in July 2015. Eight Akash-1 squadrons are now in service, with 125 missiles in each squadron. Another six squadrons, worth around Rs.3,500 crore, are now in delivery and these will use Akash-1S missiles fitted with the same indigenously-developed Ku-band active terminal seeker as that on the indigenous Astra-1 BVRAAM. The Indian Army expressed its desire to order the Akash-1 in June 2010, but it was only in 2017 that the order for two regiments (each comprising 288 launchers and 750 missiles) worth Rs.6,000 crore ($2.8 billion) was placed. In terms of hardware content, the Akash-1 is 96% indigenous and sources its components from 330 Indian public-sector and private-sector industries.
The IAF’s medium-range surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) contract that was signed in 2009 had a project cost of Rs.10,076 crore. Of this, the DRDO’s share, which constituted the developmental costs, added up to Rs.1,680 crore, while the remaining amount of Rs.8,396 crore was committed by the IAF towards the guaranteed purchase of the Barak-8 missiles and other related ground-based fire-control systems. It is only this year that the IAF will begin inducting an initial nine squadrons of this land-mobile MR-SAM. On April 6, 2017 Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the MoD signed a contract worth $1.6 billion for the supply of two Regiments of Barak-8 MR-SAMs for the Indian Army. Delivery of the first system will begin within 72 months and will be deployed for operations by 2023. The order for each MR-SAM regiment or Group, has been pegged at Rs.14,000 crore, or Rs.6 crore per missile round.
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The order for each MR-SAM regiment or Group, has been pegged at Rs.14,000 crore, or Rs.6 crore per missile round.
Both the IAF and Indian Army also have a pressing need for up to 72 land-mobile quick-reaction SAM (QR-SAM) systems, for which the DRDO has since the earlier part of this decade been working on developing a QR-SAM variant of the Astra-1 BVRAAM. Production deliveries by the MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) are expected to commence only by 2022. The requirement for manportable very short-range air-defence systems (VSHORADS) for the Indian Army and Navy, is worth $5.2 billion and involves the procurement of 5,175 missiles and 1,276 single and multi-launchers with stipulated industrial technology transfers. There have been three contenders over the past nine year—SAABTech of Sweden (offering the RBS-70), MBDA of France (offering the Mistral) and Rosoboronexport State Corp of Russia (offering the Igla-S). User-trials began in May 2012 and were completed only last year, with the Igla-S emerging as the winner.
As for S-125 Pechoras, 30 Sqns were acquired in all, of which 16 are being upgraded and fully digitised. The $272 million RFP to upgrade 16 IAF S-125 Sqns was issued in May 2016 to Tata Power SED, Larsen & Toubro, Reliance Defence, Offset India Solutions and a partnership of BDL and BEL. The contract was awarded in 2017 to BDL/BEL, with first deliveries to commence within 42 months of contract signature. As for SpyDer-SR, the Indian Army has acquired four Regiments worth $250 million to replace all its OSA-AK and Strella-10Ms. The IAF has acquired 18 Firing Units of Spyder-SR LL-QRMs worth $260 million that were contracted for in September 2009. RFPs for both requirements were issued in mid-2005 to OEMs based in France, Israel, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
BVRAAM/SRAAM Shortfalls
In the aftermath of the February 26 Balakot air-strikes, the IAF has asked the MoD to urgently purchase new stockpiles of beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM) due to the prevailing extended levels of combat preparedness being experienced against Pakistan. The hectic flying activity by both day and night for ensuring high-levels of operational alert have led to an increasing number of BVRAAMs and SRAAMs being used in fully-armed mode, which has reduced their shelf-life from eight years (in case they are stored in cannisters) to only four sorties of service-life, following which they have to be zero-lifed by their original equipment manufacturers (OEM). The IAF is authorised to stockpile up to 4,000 BVRAAMs and 6,000 SRAAMs and its present inventory holdings include the Vympel R-27ER1/ET1 and R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs from both Russia and Ukraine, and Mica-EM BVRAAMs from MBDA; plus Vympel R-73E SRAAMs from Russia and MBDA-supplied Mica-IR and AIM-132 ASRAAMs.
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Backlogs
Though the IAF requires 430 new-generation anti-aircraft cannons and related fire-control systems worth $400 million for close-in base air-defence, it plans to initially procure 244 cannons, 228 target acquisition/fire-control radars and 204,000 programmable bullets for 61 Flights—only 18 of which can be delivered directly from a foreign OEM. Five Indian companies, including Bharat Forge/Kalyani Defence teamed with BAE Systems, Reliance Defence teamed with Hanwha Defense Systems of South Korea , Tata Aerospace & Defence, Larsen & Toubro and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) teamed up with BEL and THALES of France have put in their bids. On the other hand, the Indian Army requires 938 cannons to replace in-service Bofors L-70 and Russian ZU-23MM-2B systems, plus 5,05,920 rounds of ammunition, including 1,63,200 smart 3P rounds—all valued at $1.7 billion (Rs.17,000 crore).
The Indian Army also has a requirement for five Regiments (or 104 units) of self-propelled cannon-missile systems, 97 ammunition carriers, 39 command vehicles, 4,928 missiles and 172,260 rounds of ammunition, costing a total of $1.6 billion. The bidding process took off in 2013, and the candidate weapons were evaluated throughout 2015 and field-tested in 2017. Contenders included the Hanwha Defense Systems’ Hybrid K-30 Biho (paired with the Chiron SAM developed by aerospace manufacturer LIG Nex1), and Russian companies Almaz-Antey, which offered its upgraded Tunguska system, and KBP Tula, which offered its Pantsyr system. In October 2018, the Army officially declared Hanwha Defense Systems as the only qualified company for i8mplementing the project.
Another requirement that has acquired greater urgency (due to the Pakistan Army’s intentions for attacking the Indian Army’s dominating outposts south of the Pir Panjal Range along the LoC in southern Jammu with remotely-operated quadcopters armed with improvised explosive devices) is the need for drone countermeasures systems capable of jamming the two-way data-links of such ‘kamikaze’ quadcopters. Expected to be ordered are a BEL-developed, manportable, remotely-operated anti-drone jammer that can be coupled with an OFB-developed, vehicle-mounted 12.7mm remote-control weapon station.
In the deep-upgrade category, on June 30, 2015 Punj Lloyd and BEL were shortlisted for upgrading the Army’s 468 ZU-23MM-2B cannons under a $100 million (Rs.670 crore) project. While Punj Lloyd has partnered with Slovakian defence company EVPU Defence Punj, BEL has teamed up with OFB. However, no final winner has been announced as yet. Meanwhile, following a March 2011 contract award, BEL on November 28, 2014 delivered the first of 48 modernised ZSU-23-4 Schilka self-propelled air-defence weapon systems to the Army.
Prasun K. Sengupta at 2:09 AM
TRISHUL: Key Takeaways From The IAF-PAF February 27 Aerial Engagements
However, as of today, only the three EMB-145Is have the MSWS, while none of the existing IAF combat aircraft fleets have them. While they have been specified for the projected Super Su-30MKI mid-life deep upgrade programme, what remains unanswered is why was the MSWS not incorporated into the Su-30MKI procurement project early in the previous decade itself, and on the 63-unit MiG-29UPG upgrade project (whose DARE-developed D-29 suite includes only the DARE-developed and BEL-built R-118 ‘Dhruti’ RWRs and high-band active transmit/receive units with Vivaldi-type antenna arrays) that commenced in 2010. In comparison, when Malaysia in 2005 ordered 18 Su-30MKMs, it specified the fitment of Saab-Grintek Avitronics-supplied MAW-300 MAWS and LWS-310 laser warners along with the Russia-supplied Pastel L-140-30 RWRs. Incidentally, the MAW-300, LWS-310 and the RWS-300 RWR from Saab-Grintek Avitronics were specified early this decade for installation on the ‘Rudra’ helicopter gunships that were ordered for the IAF and Indian Army’s Aviation Corps from state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).
Lack of SDR & TDLs Affected Airborne Battle Management
The introduction of AEW & CS platforms into the subcontinent by the PAF (four Saab 2000s of the Kamra-based No.3 Sqn and four CETC of China-supplied ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle KE-3s of the Masroor-based No.4 Sqn) in the previous decade, and followed by the IAF’s procurement of three A-50I PHALCONs from Israel and three locally-developed EMB-145Is earlier this decade) has seen aircrew of both air forces act like air-traffic controllers for military aircraft on operations. Due to this, the AEW & CS platforms have become as proficient in an offensive role as in a defensive role. In the former, the aircrew on board the AEW & CS platforms can now guide both combat and combat-support aircraft on to targets during offensive engagements, be they on land, in the air or at sea. While doing this, the platforms still maintain their defensive roles by informing friendly pilots what other aircraft are within their area of operations, be they friend or foe. The A-50I, for instance, can detect low-flying targets within a diameter of 400km or 215nm. At medium-altitude, it can detect targets within 520km or 280nm. Thus, one A-50I cruising at 9,150 metres (30,000 feet) has a radar coverage of 312,000 square kilometres.
On February 27 morning, in the world’s first-ever aerial engagement in the history of aerial warfare that involved AEW & CS platforms by both sides, the IAF maintained a defensive posture, while the PAF went on an offensive limited in time and depth. While the PAF had two of its Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms airborne at that time (with each capable of controlling three combat air patrol [CAP] interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time) over an area south of Islamabad and east of Sargodha, the IAF had one A-50I from the Agra-based No.50 Sqn (capable of controlling six CAP interceptions and managing three tactical strike missions at the same time) over Himachal Pradesh and one EMB-145I from the Bhisiana-based No.200 ‘Netra’ Sqn (capable of controlling three CAP interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time) airborne near Pathankot at the same time.
But why did the IAF not mount barrier-CAPs aimed in-strength against the F-16s and JF-17s? One plausible reason appears to be the IAF’s laid-down rules of engagement (emerging from the political directives issued), which discouraged the initiation of air combat inside PoK’s airspace. And this in turn is most probably due to the lack of UHF-/L-band two-way tactical data-links (TDL) on-board the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft, which prevents the AEW & CS platforms from providing real-time airborne battle management cues to airborne IAF combat aircraft while operating inside contested/hostile airspace. Instead, the AEW & CS platforms are presently transmitting the air situation picture via VHF bands to ground exploitation centres from where ground-controlled intercept cues are transmitted within line-of-sight (and consequently over a very limited distance) to the defending IAF combat aircraft deployed on CAPs. TDLs required for offensive air operations inside hostile airspace include: the L-band data-link for two-way line-of-sight communications with AEW & CS platforms; and a UHF-band SATCOM-based data-link for communicating with ground-based tactical air-controllers. The TDL thus forms part of the airborne software-defined radio (SDR) suite, which the IAF had specified for procurement in the previous decade. While the HAL-developed SDR-2010 has been available since 2011, it was only last year that the IAF commenced efforts on procuring 473 + 3,125 SDRs worth Rs.630 crore (including the integral TDL component) TDLs for achieving real-time connectivity between all IAF aircraft/helicopters and the Integrated Aerospace Command, Control & Communications System’s (IACCCS) terrestrial and airborne elements, especially via the GSAT-7A satellite’s on-board SATCOM transponders. For its 83 projected Tejas Mk.1A L-MRCAs, the IAF has specified RAFAEL of Israel’s BNET-AR SDR for installation.
During future hostilities, there are two possible ways of severely degrading the effectiveness of the PAF’s AEW & CS platforms: 1) investing in LR-SAMs like the Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf ADMS; and 2) acquiring at least four aircraft equipped with high-power wideband jamming hardware. Following the signature of a contract on October 5, 2018 that is valued at US$5.43 billion, the IAF is all set to receive its initial five squadrons of S-400 Triumf ADMS, with deliveries commencing in late 2020. Plans call for eventually expanding this LR-SAM network into five Brigades in the following decade, and deploying them for the air-defence (against hostile AEW & CS platforms and ballistic missiles) of major cities and industrial corridors located in western and central India. The sector-wise command-and-control posts of each of these Brigades will be integrated with the IAF’s already-operational five nodes of the Integrated Air Command, Control & Communications System (IACCCS) at Barnala (Punjab), Wadsar (Gujarat), Aya Nagar (Delhi), Jodhpur (Rajasthan) and Ambala (Haryana). Initially, the S-400 ADMS will come equipped with only the 380km-range 40N6E LR-SAMs, which were declared by Russia as being ready for series-production following a series of user-assisted successful test-firings last August. In the following decade, the 40N6E LR-SAMs will be joined by the 77N6-N and the 77N6-NI LR-SAMs, having top speeds of 7km/second and using Ka band millimeter-wave active phased-array radar seekers required for fire-control and guidance of hit-to-kill interceptors.
Airborne wideband high-power jammers (with the low-bandwidth jamming taking care of hostile medium-power/high-power airspace surveillance radars; the mid-band jamming countering the engagement/target illumination radars used by ground-based surface-to-air defence systems; and the high-band jamming neutralizing the active seekers of BVRAAMs and SAMs) using active phased-array transmit-receive modules with microprocessors made of gallium nitride can generate around ten times the isotropic radiated power of existing airborne jammers. In addition, the signal itself is cleaner, which means less accidental interference. Such new-generation jammers can also handle quadruple the number of assignments and can switch from target to target almost instantaneously. Also built-in is the ability to collect, analyse and jam new hostile signals as they emanate, enabling the system to adjust in-flight to evolving threat profiles, and apply appropriate countermeasures as the situation develops. Furthermore, its agile jamming flexibility is further extended by the deliberate choice of open-architecture, solid-state electronics, which enables quick and easy updates to be made to its on-board threat library as and when required, to meet new hostile capabilities as they appear. Such jammers also have the potential ability to launch a cyber-attack, involving inserting rogue data packets into hostile ground-based air-defence networks in a so-called “network invasion.” As effective, broad spectrum jamming increasingly becomes key to survival in the modern contested airspace, it is therefore imperative that the IAF acquire such new-generation wideband high-power jammers to help meet the growing capability demand.
CSAR Deficiencies
The results of the Board of Inquiry (BoI) looking into the IAF Mi-17V-5 helicopter crash that took place in an open field near Garend Kalaan village in Budgam on February 27 at 10.10am (merely 10 minutes after it took off from Awantipora, resulting in seven fatalities, including six IAF personnel), are likely to result in an overhaul of the IAF’s current standard operating protocols regarding combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) missions. The BoI, which is looking into all possible angles (inclusive of friendly surface-to-air fire due to mistaken friend-or-foe identification actions) due to local eyewitness accounts of hearing a loud explosion in the air just before the ill-fated Mi-17V-5 went down, indicating the possibility of some external event causing the crash. Traditionally, personnel recovery (PR) and CSAR missions have never been considered as one of the core mission functions of the IAF and it was due to this that the IAF began procuring SARBE hand-held personal locator beacons from the UK only from the mid-1990s, followed a decade later by the raising of ‘Garud’ special forces units tasked with conducting PR/CSAR missions within highly contested operating environments. As per a RAND Corp study, if the downed aircrew cannot be recovered in the first 2 hours or so, the recovery probability drops to about 25%, but the probability declines only slowly thereafter with increasing time on the ground. However, the IASF till this day does not possess the kind of specially-equipped helicopters required for CSAR missions. Despite the requirement being specified a decade ago, the IAF only last year began developing a prototype Mi-17V-5 for the CSAR role (which made its debut as a static exhibit at the Aero India 2019 expo in Bengaluru last February) by equipping it with an ELBIT Systems-supplied COMPASS optronic sensor turret and BEL-developed miniature SATCOM antenna and secure modems. Other elements, like the MSWS suite, GPS receiver, VOL/ILS receiver, Doppler-based terrain navigation system, IFF transponder, radar altimeter, attitude heading reference system, and a traffic collision avoidance system, have yet to be selected.
Overcoming The Damning Shortfalls
When it comes to airpower projection, the gaping holes are not just limited to the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) depleting combat aircraft squadron strength, but they also extend to vital support infrastructure, as well as block obsolescence of guided air-combat missiles and ground-based air-defence systems of both the IAF and Indian Army. Three proposals are now awaiting financial clearance in the current fiscal year: an order for 18 additional licence-assembled Su-30MKI from state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL); the procurement of up to 50 upgraded MiG-29UPGs from Russia off-the-shelf; and commencement of the Super Su-30MKI deep-upgrade project. The first was confirmed at the Aero India 2019 expo in Bengaluru last February by Anatoly G Punchuk, Deputy Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, when he said: “We have received an official request from the IAF for 18 more (semi-knocked-down) kits just in January this year. We are preparing a commercial offer,” Although. Punchuk did not confirm the cost of this projected order, it is estimated that the figure would be a third of the last order for Su-30MKIs from Russia, which was placed in 2012 and was valued at. Rs.17,246 crore order for an additional 42 Su-30MKIs in semi-knocked-down condition that HAL subsequently had licence-assembled.
Earlier, in November 2018, Russia had made an unsolicited offer for the off-the-shelf supply of up to 34 upgraded MiG-29UBGs, each powered by Klimov RD-33MK turbofans and using the Phazotron NIIR-supplied Zhuk-M2E multi-mode fire-control radars. While the IAF has been invited to buy them at a unit-cost of US$25 million or Rs.175 crore (since they are already substantially upgraded to the MiG-29SMT standard and have not been flown ever since they were built in 2008), each of them will cost Rs.285 crore after being upgraded to the IAF’s specifications. An IAF technical inspection team visited Russia last January and has since submitted a favourable report to India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). The IAF’s existing 69 MiG-29B-12s are presently being upgraded to the MiG-29UPG-standard under a 2008 contract worth $900 million (Rs.3,850 crore). These are in service with the Adampur-based 8 Wing’s 47 Black Archers and 223 Tridents squadrons and the Jamnagar-based 33 Wing’s 28 First Supersonics squadron.
In 2010, the IAF had issued a Rs.10,200 crore Request for Proposals (RFP) for the deep-upgrade of 84 of its Su-30MKIs into the Super Su-30MKI configuration. Negotiations subsequently went into a limbo since Russia’s asking price had then exceeded the IAF’s estimated budget. The upgrade offer was resurrected last year during the summit-level talks between Indian PM Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin and a contract is due to be inked later this year. Meanwhile, Alpha-Tocol has bagged a contracted under the IAF’s ‘Eagle Eye’ project for installing six fifth-generation R-118 digital radar warning receivers on each of the IAF’s 148 Su-30MKIs currently based in Lohegaon (Maharashtra), Bareilly (Uttar Pradesh), Tejpur and Chabua (Assam), Jodhpur (Rajasthan), Bhisiana and Halwara (Punjab), Bhuj (Gujarat), Sirsa (Haryana), Kalaikunda and Hashimara (West Bengal) and Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu).
NG-HAS Unavailability
The IAF had initiated efforts for constructing 108 new generation hardened aircraft shelters (NG-HAS) for housing its Su-30MKI heavy-/medium-multi-role combat aircraft (H-/M-MRCA) back in 2012, the cost of which was then pegged at Rs.5,400 crore. Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) was accorded by the MoD to its Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) in December 2012 for evolving the NG-HAS’s detailed engineering design. SAubsequently, a proposal to rework the project in three phases by categorising air bases within a distance of 100km, 200km and beyond 200km from the border, respectively, with a gap of two years in each phase, came under consideration. The first phase was to involve the construction of 36 NG-HAS requiring a cash outflow of Rs.270 crore. Under this, the air bases at Pathankot, Srinagar, Udhampur, Bagdogra, Naliya, Hasimara, Jaisalmer and Uttarlai were to receive top-priority. However, the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) approved financial sanctions only at the end of 2017, while the Union Finance Ministry released the funds only on January 7, 2019. Consequently, the project will now be completed only by 2023. The IAF’s existing HAS, built to house smaller combat aircraft like the MiG-21 Bison, Jaguar IS, Mirage-2000IN and MiG-29UPG, are tunnel-shaped concrete structures covered with a layer of earth and protective walls near their openings, which are supposed to protect aircraft from the effects of blasts in case of hostile aerial attacks.
E-SHORADS, MR-SAM, QR-SAM & VSHORADS Backlogs
The DRDO-developed Akash-1 extended short-range air-defence system (E-SHORADS), whose development began back in 1983, cleared its user-trials only in 2007, following which the IAF ordered 1,000 missiles and the Indian Army 2,000 missiles. The IAF service-inducted its first Akash-1 Flight in March 2012 upon completion of nine successful rounds of user-trials, with service commissioning following in July 2015. Eight Akash-1 squadrons are now in service, with 125 missiles in each squadron. Another six squadrons, worth around Rs.3,500 crore, are now in delivery and these will use Akash-1S missiles fitted with the same indigenously-developed Ku-band active terminal seeker as that on the indigenous Astra-1 BVRAAM. The Indian Army expressed its desire to order the Akash-1 in June 2010, but it was only in 2017 that the order for two regiments (each comprising 288 launchers and 750 missiles) worth Rs.6,000 crore ($2.8 billion) was placed. In terms of hardware content, the Akash-1 is 96% indigenous and sources its components from 330 Indian public-sector and private-sector industries.
The IAF’s medium-range surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) contract that was signed in 2009 had a project cost of Rs.10,076 crore. Of this, the DRDO’s share, which constituted the developmental costs, added up to Rs.1,680 crore, while the remaining amount of Rs.8,396 crore was committed by the IAF towards the guaranteed purchase of the Barak-8 missiles and other related ground-based fire-control systems. It is only this year that the IAF will begin inducting an initial nine squadrons of this land-mobile MR-SAM. On April 6, 2017 Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the MoD signed a contract worth $1.6 billion for the supply of two Regiments of Barak-8 MR-SAMs for the Indian Army. Delivery of the first system will begin within 72 months and will be deployed for operations by 2023. The order for each MR-SAM regiment or Group, has been pegged at Rs.14,000 crore, or Rs.6 crore per missile round.
Contd...
The order for each MR-SAM regiment or Group, has been pegged at Rs.14,000 crore, or Rs.6 crore per missile round.
Both the IAF and Indian Army also have a pressing need for up to 72 land-mobile quick-reaction SAM (QR-SAM) systems, for which the DRDO has since the earlier part of this decade been working on developing a QR-SAM variant of the Astra-1 BVRAAM. Production deliveries by the MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) are expected to commence only by 2022. The requirement for manportable very short-range air-defence systems (VSHORADS) for the Indian Army and Navy, is worth $5.2 billion and involves the procurement of 5,175 missiles and 1,276 single and multi-launchers with stipulated industrial technology transfers. There have been three contenders over the past nine year—SAABTech of Sweden (offering the RBS-70), MBDA of France (offering the Mistral) and Rosoboronexport State Corp of Russia (offering the Igla-S). User-trials began in May 2012 and were completed only last year, with the Igla-S emerging as the winner.
As for S-125 Pechoras, 30 Sqns were acquired in all, of which 16 are being upgraded and fully digitised. The $272 million RFP to upgrade 16 IAF S-125 Sqns was issued in May 2016 to Tata Power SED, Larsen & Toubro, Reliance Defence, Offset India Solutions and a partnership of BDL and BEL. The contract was awarded in 2017 to BDL/BEL, with first deliveries to commence within 42 months of contract signature. As for SpyDer-SR, the Indian Army has acquired four Regiments worth $250 million to replace all its OSA-AK and Strella-10Ms. The IAF has acquired 18 Firing Units of Spyder-SR LL-QRMs worth $260 million that were contracted for in September 2009. RFPs for both requirements were issued in mid-2005 to OEMs based in France, Israel, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
BVRAAM/SRAAM Shortfalls
In the aftermath of the February 26 Balakot air-strikes, the IAF has asked the MoD to urgently purchase new stockpiles of beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM) due to the prevailing extended levels of combat preparedness being experienced against Pakistan. The hectic flying activity by both day and night for ensuring high-levels of operational alert have led to an increasing number of BVRAAMs and SRAAMs being used in fully-armed mode, which has reduced their shelf-life from eight years (in case they are stored in cannisters) to only four sorties of service-life, following which they have to be zero-lifed by their original equipment manufacturers (OEM). The IAF is authorised to stockpile up to 4,000 BVRAAMs and 6,000 SRAAMs and its present inventory holdings include the Vympel R-27ER1/ET1 and R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs from both Russia and Ukraine, and Mica-EM BVRAAMs from MBDA; plus Vympel R-73E SRAAMs from Russia and MBDA-supplied Mica-IR and AIM-132 ASRAAMs.
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Backlogs
Though the IAF requires 430 new-generation anti-aircraft cannons and related fire-control systems worth $400 million for close-in base air-defence, it plans to initially procure 244 cannons, 228 target acquisition/fire-control radars and 204,000 programmable bullets for 61 Flights—only 18 of which can be delivered directly from a foreign OEM. Five Indian companies, including Bharat Forge/Kalyani Defence teamed with BAE Systems, Reliance Defence teamed with Hanwha Defense Systems of South Korea , Tata Aerospace & Defence, Larsen & Toubro and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) teamed up with BEL and THALES of France have put in their bids. On the other hand, the Indian Army requires 938 cannons to replace in-service Bofors L-70 and Russian ZU-23MM-2B systems, plus 5,05,920 rounds of ammunition, including 1,63,200 smart 3P rounds—all valued at $1.7 billion (Rs.17,000 crore).
The Indian Army also has a requirement for five Regiments (or 104 units) of self-propelled cannon-missile systems, 97 ammunition carriers, 39 command vehicles, 4,928 missiles and 172,260 rounds of ammunition, costing a total of $1.6 billion. The bidding process took off in 2013, and the candidate weapons were evaluated throughout 2015 and field-tested in 2017. Contenders included the Hanwha Defense Systems’ Hybrid K-30 Biho (paired with the Chiron SAM developed by aerospace manufacturer LIG Nex1), and Russian companies Almaz-Antey, which offered its upgraded Tunguska system, and KBP Tula, which offered its Pantsyr system. In October 2018, the Army officially declared Hanwha Defense Systems as the only qualified company for i8mplementing the project.
Another requirement that has acquired greater urgency (due to the Pakistan Army’s intentions for attacking the Indian Army’s dominating outposts south of the Pir Panjal Range along the LoC in southern Jammu with remotely-operated quadcopters armed with improvised explosive devices) is the need for drone countermeasures systems capable of jamming the two-way data-links of such ‘kamikaze’ quadcopters. Expected to be ordered are a BEL-developed, manportable, remotely-operated anti-drone jammer that can be coupled with an OFB-developed, vehicle-mounted 12.7mm remote-control weapon station.
In the deep-upgrade category, on June 30, 2015 Punj Lloyd and BEL were shortlisted for upgrading the Army’s 468 ZU-23MM-2B cannons under a $100 million (Rs.670 crore) project. While Punj Lloyd has partnered with Slovakian defence company EVPU Defence Punj, BEL has teamed up with OFB. However, no final winner has been announced as yet. Meanwhile, following a March 2011 contract award, BEL on November 28, 2014 delivered the first of 48 modernised ZSU-23-4 Schilka self-propelled air-defence weapon systems to the Army.
Prasun K. Sengupta at 2:09 AM
TRISHUL: Key Takeaways From The IAF-PAF February 27 Aerial Engagements
The BVRAAM was fired within WVR. So it can't be called a BVRAAM engagement. The truth is that actual BVRAAMs fired by PAF did not hit anything in air other than some air.
But overall, how do you find his diagnosis, investigation & recommendations of the events of 26 & 27 Feb 2019?
He is way off. Please read my earlier posts on this subject. IAF took time to realise that an actual strike was headed towards them. In any air battle, seconds can change everything. By the time IAF realised what was the game, they had lost the chance to get an advantage. Mig-21s were scrambled to bring down the ratio of forces opposing eachother. Su-30MKI and other fighters were based too far deep to make any impact on the battle. IAF was not prepared for such a scenario. They did not have even adequately weaponised fighters on the frontline bases other than Mig-21s which maintain ORP-5 all across our frontline bases. This was the most shocking lapse on part of IAF after having done Balakot just a day before.
I have no doubts about what you wrote. Being a BVR truck, why didnt they fire back from attaining higher altitude, that's my question.
