We have capability, never said we didn't, they too know that but we have the will? MA, HS in tight security is precaution, few months from now he will be attending rallies in open, I won't read anything in those NOTAM, they are over very limited areas and are our only source of joy these days.
If we had to conduct a symbolic strike in Balakot to drive a message why not firing over the mast of GHQ if we really meant business? They didn't hesitate in targeting our brigade HQ, that too after declaring upfront and in daylight. Though things didn't pan out as they planned but still they clearly showed intent and our intent is always missing with half hearted attempts and half hearted efforts.
Did we not know that a major attack will happen, it's not the matter of if but when. We knew this in 2014 when Modi and Doval took charge, what capability we developed during these 5years to avenge the upcoming threat or neutralize Hafiz Saed and Azhar?
It's not easy to take them out, I doubt if we can even take them out without significant loss on our side too and then fearing retaliation. If we had that capacity MA would be the target not Balakot. We wait, wait and wait till enemy is fully prepared and then say it's not possible now, be content with whatever we achieved. Why there is no set pre planned, pre gamed strategy to deal with this inevitable outcome? Why not strike within hours of attack and surprise them? Its Parliament attack deja vu all over again with minor changes here and there, we are moving, we are mobilizing, be afraid of us, be very afraid of us but then we vanish.
Your threat has no value if you don't have intent to follow up. Modi's red lines are thoroughly probed by Pakistan and his 2nd term will see more and bigger attacks. He chickened out on night of 27th when everything was set. Now he himself admitted he is happy with mere return of Abhinandan as it earned him some good PR. International pressure and other things means nothing to a suicidal nation only brute force and pain can keep them in control.
They may well be attending rallies, call for jihad and raise funds. How good will that look when their case comes up for review in September in the FATF? Those NOTAMs are like alcohol. A slow poison. They're taking its toll. It's just not fast enough or powerful enough for our liking.
Which brings us back to the age old question. How do tackle Pakistani sponsored terrorism? Do we keep it overt or do we go covert? Irrespective of our wish lists, certain milestones and actions on our end have clearly fallen into a pattern. Enough for us here to chart out a path the GoI, irrespective of which party's at the helm of affairs, taken.
We aren't in the covert business. If we are, it's pretty evident that it's low key. Meaning it's insignificant for it to make a difference to Pakistan. That rules us out of supporting the Baloch insurrection or even the upcoming Pashtun struggle not to mention the TTP or the civil Rights movement on in PoK or even the MQM.
Our reaction is overt as Balakote demonstrated along with diplomacy. If you agree to this, then you'd also have to agree that an escalation matrix cannot be plotted as this is the first time we've reacted the way we have.
Let's understand that there's been no precedence for us to follow either in our relationship with Pakistan or any such lesson to be learnt in world affairs too where in one N power actively aids, abets and indulges in terrorism against another N power.
Hence, you'd have to give our security managers and planners a bit of the benefit of doubt in that this is learning curve for them too and this learning has been steep.
I've partially answered your post earlier. To elaborate - what exactly happened vis a vis our response on the 27 th Feb is a mystery. My conjecture is the GoI didn't anticipate it and probably asked the IAF to observe purely defensive duties based in part, in all probability, on the IAF's own assessment apart from other sources.
What also comes out starkly, is Operation Gaganshakti and all the hoopla surrounding it, notwithstanding, the IAF in its present form is out of its depths. You may factor in depleted squadron strength , lack of desired AC, poor AD, antiquated AC in operation, etc.
The PAF action on 27th Feb jolted both the IAF & GoI out of their hubris. The GoI, in all probability, concluded that any further escalation using the IAF may be effective but also counter productive.
Let me bring in the Chinese analogy here. I read some where a long time ago that when Xi Jinping took power in 2013 , Apparently, the government there asked for a report on how favourable would the outcome be if the PLA were to indulge in a limited war across the Himalayas against India. While the details escape me, apparently, the report confirmed the Government's suspicion that the PLA lacked overwhelming superiority to prosecute China's claims and humble the Indians a la 1962. Something similar can be observed here. To conclude, no government can get into a skirmish or a war of they aren't confident of winning. And in order to win, the GoI being comprised of civilians will go by rule of thumb i. e - they won't initiate hostilities if they know we don't enjoy overwhelming superiority.
I think you ought to divorce their statements during campaigning to what they undertook after assuminy power. Let's face it. The state of affairs with respect to the conditions of our armed forces in 2014 was deplorable. Things haven't improved dramatically but they're definitely better than what we had then. That's as far as the capabilities go. Let me also reiterate all those talks that you read about our overwhelming superiority over Pakistan in every sphere of operation is just that. Talk. If we did enjoy such overwhelming superiority over them, we wouldn't be having this conversation.
The escalation matrix to take out a HS or a MA has just been established post Pulwama, post Balakote, post 27 th Feb, post the UN proscription of MA and everything that happened in between these events covertly or overtly.
This will be set into motion the next time you see a Pulwama type outrage.
